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Rev’d Andrew John Bigg 
Theology, science and the topos of the Logos: a stable, dynamic topology of Creation 
Abstract 
This thesis argues that an integrated, dynamically stable theo-science may be explored by 
considering scientific and theological perspectives regarding stability itself, combining 
them in one overarching framework by embedding a scientific conception of stability 
within a broader theological conception thereof. Our very capacity to perceive „reality‟ in 
a functionally consistent manner is dependent upon the physical cosmos presenting a 
particular, dynamic stability, allowing for the sustainable emergence of life in the first 
place.  
Stability is hierarchically qualified, with higher-order functional systems such as those 
pertaining to life being an emergent result of particular modes of interaction between 
lower-level degrees of stability, ultimately right down to fundamental particles or fields. 
Theologically, any stability inherent to „reality‟ must furthermore be considered to derive 
from the fact that such reality is, at its profoundest, a manifestation of God‟s revealing, 
Creative Activity through the Logos.  
The thesis considers, qualitatively, the scientific and theological „place‟ and relevance of 
stability from a holistic perspective regarding our anthropological development. 
Scientifically this is viewed in layered, evolutionary terms. Theologically, the Incarnation 
is considered of central relevance to our anthropological journey, transfiguring the process 
of its development so as to draw human nature into its intended eschatological stability „at 
the right hand of the Father‟.  
Since stability can be considered scientifically in topological terms, the framework is 
developed by means of a „theological topology‟ centred, as the etymology suggests, on the 
idea of a sacramentally stable, pervasive topos indicative of God‟s „motioning‟, Creative 
Activity through the Logos. Such Activity becomes sense-objectified in the Incarnation, 
considered figuratively-speaking as a „phase transition‟, the net effect of which is argued 
as a „drawing in‟ (cf. John 12:32), reordering and enhancing all meaningful, creaturely 
contribution to the „content‟ of Creation – content actively generated according to our 
iconic, creative capacity for conceiving (of) the Logos. 
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Introduction 
If theology and science are truly to complement each other in terms of their perspectives 
regarding any unified, underlying „reality‟ then some consonance, or some degree of 
congruence, ought logically to exist between their respective understandings concerning 
the nature of any critical stability undergirding such reality and supporting our very 
capacity for perceiving and evaluating within it. Only then can truly sustainable doctrines 
or consistent hypotheses be treated in a justifiably objective and interrelated manner. As 
theology and science necessarily speak about the same cosmos they ought furthermore to 
have complementary things to say regarding the harmony lying behind any critical 
stability. Given that theological doctrine connects the creation, in its harmonious order, 
with the central conception of the Logos, an organization of focus upon such centrality 
ought to be of mutual relevance to theology and science, around which an increasingly 
informed conversation might coalesce. 
In both theological and scientific domains stability may be qualified in layered, 
hierarchical terms. Scientifically-speaking, if one considers a fundamental physical basis 
for stability, then one of the most basic, calculable mathematical descriptions of such 
involves the minimizing of potential energy. The easiest examples to understand in this 
case tend to be trivial, static and uninteresting, such as a marble resting in the bottom of a 
bowl having minimized its gravitational potential energy. More involved examples in 
dynamic systems may involve many-body problems like the orbits of planets and moons 
in the Solar System. It might also involve an analysis of the possible trajectories 
describing the dynamics in question, analysing which trajectories reliably remain within a 
defined, finite region of phase space. Landau and Lifshitz offer a helpful insight into the 
complexity of stability analysis from the perspective of fluid mechanics,
1
 appealing to a 
geometrical means of representation involving a „space of states...each point in which 
corresponds to a particular velocity distribution‟ [or more generally to some vector field] 
and such that „adjacent instants then correspond to adjacent points‟.2 Steady flow is then 
represented by a single point and periodic flow by a closed curve or loop in the space of 
states. A stable flow then requires that „adjacent curves representing the establishment of 
the flow‟ tend towards either such a point or such a loop over time, each such „limit cycle‟ 
                                                             
1
 Landau and Lifshitz, Fluid Mechanics: Course of Theoretical Physics, Vol. 6 (Oxford: Elsevier, 2010), pp.95ff. 
2 Ibid, p.108. 
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or „limit point‟ having its own „domain of attraction‟.3 Stability therefore becomes a 
dynamic concept, evaluated with reference to an extended time period. More complex 
regimes of stability (or instability) analysis then require appeal to more complex 
topologies accommodating any geometrical representation.
4
 This connection between 
stability and a topological conception is important to what follows.   
In chemistry not only is there the quantum level of consideration but also the question of 
the overall stability of reaction networks and the extent to which they are autocatalytic. In 
the biological domain things become yet more involved, since any energy-based aspect to 
our analysis becomes entangled in a complex interrelation with an information-based 
aspect. Biological stability emerges through a complex relationship between energetic and 
informational requirements, providing an interesting and dynamic stability having the 
potential for self-organizing, emergent properties. To give but one example there are, on 
the level of protein folding, many possible conformations that could occur purely 
according to energy requirements but only some of these present functionally useful 
properties concerning informational provision at active sites.
5
 The overall result is a 
hierarchically-layered, functionally-modulated, domain-bounded, living arrangement or 
architecture, involving an intricately interconnected network topology and incorporating a 
critical, communicating balance between local and global modes of stability. 
Theologically-speaking, one might consider a sacramental framework as qualifying the 
stability of the participate existence of the whole of created space, and especially of 
intelligent life within it. Creation is treated here as an opening of created space, 
accommodating creaturely participation over an entire hierarchy of levels with human 
nature at the apex by virtue of the divine image bestowed upon us. While the progression 
of consideration through physical, chemical and biological domains suggests a bottom-up 
development, such sacramental stability may be taken more as a top-down communication 
or bestowal, ultimately necessary for the sustained foundation of created space and order. 
For any appreciable reception of such communication, especially as revelation, to distil 
                                                             
3
 Ibid, p.109. 
4 Ibid, p.110. 
5 Alberts et al. Molecular Biology of the Cell (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2015), pp.354ff. 
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within the iconic human intellect it is then necessary that these top-down and bottom-up 
aspects meet according to an appropriately patterned or interwoven harmony.
6
 
A dynamically stable, harmonious conversation between theological and scientific 
outlooks and insights ought to involve theology considering that science‟s epistemological 
enterprise, if worked out with the greatest possible degree of responsibility and accuracy, 
may carry advantageous and even (potentially) eschatologically significant consequences 
for our theological perspective. Science may highlight what it considers the most central 
anthropological prospects and challenges to consist in, and the future accentuation of 
theological activity may therefore become increasingly scientifically informed. Theology 
in turn may remind science that not every aspect of created space, or of what it means to 
be created, is susceptible of scientific analysis, pointing instead to a different form of 
holistic framework for considering Creation, especially where a deeper appreciation of 
stability is concerned. 
The theology-science dialogue is of on-going importance, at one level of applicability or 
another, to many people throughout the world, affecting the psychological balance of 
human understanding and endeavour, weighing up different possibilities and avenues of 
inquiry. Indeed, there is a double urgency for dialogue among those communities that live 
in areas of intense religious pluralism and a heavy influence of the natural sciences.
7
 This 
thesis suggests a hopefully robust, stable theo-scientific integration based mainly upon the 
relation of both disciplines to a dynamic conception of stability itself and its relation to the 
Logos concept, to the intelligibly meaningful harmonization therewith associated, even in 
„becoming flesh and tabernacling among us‟. It hopes further to suggest some interesting 
possibilities for how various core theological concepts – especially Incarnation and 
Transfiguration – might best be appreciated from the perspective developed here. 
Background to the thesis 
I am writing first and foremost as an ordained scientist and have tried to apportion material 
evenly between theological and scientific domains of consideration, aiming to focus on 
sources summarizing the salient contributory points in the most cogent manner. The 
variety reflects the fact that this thesis is not primarily a focus on the work of any one 
                                                             
6 This use of language is, in part, inspired by Boersma’s description of the weaving of a sacramental 
‘tapestry’ (see below).  
7 S. C. Kim, Religion and Science in Dialogue: An Asian Christian View (Zygon, Vol.51, No.1, March 2016), 
pp.63-70. 
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theologian, philosopher or scientific theory but consists instead in the promotion of a 
conceptual framework for theology-science integration, a key aim being to demonstrate an 
internal consistency and interconnectedness concerning the language used in building up 
the framework. The kernel for this thesis originated through a combination of three 
distinct components: my motivational interest, a consideration of what I hoped to offer the 
theology-science conversation, and what I considered to constitute the critical underlying 
idea. I shall review these three aspects in turn.  
The central motivation originally stemmed from a superposition of two related interests, 
both involving trying to see something as a whole, as far as possible without an 
overemphasis on one detail, or thematic set of details, obscuring the bigger picture. On the 
side of scientific interest, Big Bang cosmology illustrates that, for the first time ever, 
physics in the twentieth century was coming genuinely close competently to considering 
the cosmos, and various stable, emergent domains therein, as a whole. More recently 
biology has also developed a greater dexterity in viewing the interconnected, multi-
dimensional landscape of its evolutionary domain more robustly as a whole (chapter 1). 
Increasingly science is starting to say things about the infinite,
8
 especially in the wake of 
Cantor, and regarding eschatology (chapter 4). On the side of theological interest, theology 
might classically have seemed better suited to seeing the whole, aiming to say „something 
about everything‟ rather than vice versa.9 Science, however, is presenting a broader 
context of discovery in the 21
st
 Century than ever before, excelling in piecing together 
connections between necessarily interrelated contingencies. Theology meanwhile looks to 
the source of all contingency.  
This important distinction was promoted by Torrance, who emphasizes how scientific 
attachment to the contingent and the comparative contrasts with some acknowledged 
dependency on the non-contingent, but that both theological and scientific domains 
nonetheless appeal to the theme of connectedness in their own way.
10
 He emphasizes that 
a form of approach cannot be divorced from its associated content in terms of knowledge 
acquisition and, furthermore, that the nature of our appreciation of any balance between 
contingency and universality inevitably shifts over time for any genuine advance in 
                                                             
8 Sondheimer and Rogerson, Numbers and Infinity: A Historical Account of Mathematical Concepts 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1981), pp.147ff.  
9
 S. Oliver, What Can Theology Offer to Religious Studies? In Warrier and Oliver, Theology and Religious 
Studies: An Exploration of Disciplinary Boundaries (London: T and T Clark, 2008), p.20. 
10 T. F. Torrance, Theological Science (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1996), especially pp.281-285. 
10 
 
understanding. Human modes of knowledge must remain open to change or metanoia. 
There is also the consideration that the contingency upon which scientific method depends 
includes that of its means of inquiry upon natural parameters defining and constraining our 
operational epistemology, or in other words how our particular embodiment means that we 
are on principle able to observe „reality‟. Our capacity to contemplate scientifically or 
theologically is contingent upon a particular, cosmic history. Defending the integrity and 
distinction of the created, while distinguishing the modes of scientia operative in 
theological and scientific searching for critical objectivity, Torrance looks to the inherence 
of an actively self-disclosing „motion‟ rather than an unhelpfully static, inert interpretation 
of „beginning‟ or „principle‟. Humanity should not seek inappropriate dominion over 
divine image, humanizing theology so as to make „man himself the measure or central 
point of reference‟,11 although on the other hand human nature still plays a pivotal 
theological role as assumed in the Incarnation. 
To Torrance, knowledge of God only occurs through a means by which His self-disclosure 
can be treated objectively, such that „theological knowledge takes place only through a 
critical reconstruction of subjectivity in accordance with the nature of the object‟.12 This 
proves especially important when it comes to considering the Mind of Christ, a critical 
theme in this thesis. It is also necessary to distinguish that domain in which God „sees‟ 
Himself purely as or according to Himself, taken here to consist in the Trinitarian 
Immanence.
13
 Such distinction may constitute an objective logic in itself, and one that is 
complementary to Torrance‟s insistence on distinguishing that domain according to which 
nature is known purely from a natural perspective.  
Our physically-embodied, theological engagement within the created domain is treated 
here in terms of propositional and prepositional aspects. The former pertains to those 
proposed aspects of revelation that seem, within reason, detached from the context of our 
particular physicality – things we could not properly be claimed to have influenced in 
ontological terms. The latter is representative of a more direct consequence of our physical 
involvement in space and time, and a term chosen because one of the many consequences 
of such involvement is the need to decide upon the most appropriate use of prepositions 
when developing theological argument, discriminating between whether something is 
                                                             
11
 Ibid, pp.76-77. 
12 Ibid, p.98. 
13 As distinct from the outward ‘regard’ in which Creation is held together. 
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before or after, top-down or bottom-up, within or without, in or through, with or between, 
and so forth. This aspect emphasizes the God-humanity relationship as some product of 
that between God and created space overall and that between a topologically non-trivial, 
cosmic context and our contingent humanity. There is a certain symmetry between the 
manner in which the cosmic context forms us and that by which we come to form 
appreciable representations of it, and the possible significance of such symmetry is 
developed in what follows. 
Stǎniloae, in his profoundly creation-focussed theology, approaches the „God-humanity‟ 
relationship through such a combination of „God-world‟ and „humanity-world‟.14 His 
focus upon creation theology allows for some sense of theosis to precede soteriological 
consideration. Humanity is immersed in such precedence in a way disposing us to search 
openly for higher levels of meaning. His understanding of theosis works itself out in space 
and time, involving completion in some revealed meaning and he suggests that „human 
nature is not filled from the beginning with the whole substance of its pre-existent reason 
(Logos) in God, but is called to actualize this substance by voluntary effort‟.15 
Carr notes similarities between the theological concerns of Stǎniloae and Torrance, both 
importantly searching for a united Weltbild allowing for revelation in space and time, 
holding fast to critical principles of rationality, contingency and a central reference to the 
Logos as securing the goodness of creation, pointed towards completion in a manner 
involving an inseparably active role for humanity while not allowing our theological 
significance to be considered in a manner divorcing us from creation as a whole.
16
 
In the holistic context of this thesis I am advocating a scientific ressourcement within 
theology, informing our 21
st
 Century context for exploring and interpreting the 
significance of a Christian doctrinal framework. The word ressourcement is chosen in 
comparison to the Nouvelle Théologie movement seeking to reinvigorate Christian 
thinking by returning to the Scriptures and the wisdom of the early Church fathers.
17
 Here, 
however, the scientific ressourcement plays precisely to what classical theological sources 
                                                             
14 E. Bartos, Deification in Eastern Orthodox Theology: An Evaluation and Critique of the Theology of 
Dumitru Stǎniloae (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1999), pp.95-144. 
15 Ibid, p.105. 
16 T. Carr, The Rationality of the Cosmos: A Study of T. F. Torrance and Dumitru Stǎniloae, in Baker and 
Speidell, T. F. Torrance and Eastern Orthodoxy: Theology in Reconciliation (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2015), 
pp.247-266.  
17 H. Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 
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or methodology are not so well-placed to do – namely to go right back to our earliest, 
physical roots as human beings, couching our understanding of such within a deeper 
appreciation of the interconnected nature of those contingencies saturating cosmic history. 
The extension of our history to genuinely cosmic proportions has been dubbed Big 
History. One very recent presentation of this looks at cosmic history in the context of a 
series of transitional, threshold developments, or movements, from one era to another: 
transitions classified according to (a) having certain „ingredients‟, (b) some identifiable 
structure, and (c) some particular „Goldilocks conditions‟ that may in turn give rise to (d) 
critical emergent properties,
18
 and ones that are necessarily stable within their own 
functional domains, defined according to a chain of relative, interrelated contingencies as 
systems self-organize. One motivation here is to provide some theological accentuation on 
this important viewpoint. Such motivation ought also to be fuelled by an emphasis on the 
urgency of the context facing 21
st
 Century humanity, arguably coming towards the verge 
of another mass extinction if certain signs have been correctly interpreted.
19
 The renowned 
evolutionary biologist E. O. Wilson, for example, expresses contemporary concern over 
the dawn of another extinction phase and argues, against more extreme approaches to the 
„Anthropocene Era‟, for what he considers the best conservation plan, involving the 
reservation of one half of the Earth‟s surface for such purposes.20 We need a scientifically 
and theologically fuelled urgency if the dynamic of human nature is to move properly 
towards the next phase, or threshold, in its active, contributory participation in Big 
History. One question then becomes the degree of conversation between scientific and 
theological outlooks on futurity: the former being more evidently and necessarily data-
focussed than the latter. 
Taken alone, each discipline‟s attempt to speak about „the whole‟ in its own language 
remains incomplete, in some sense reliant upon the input of the other. The question then 
becomes whether a means of conceptual interaction might be suggested which ultimately 
simplifies, rather than complicates, the quest for a more holistic integration – perhaps a 
simplicity „on the far side of complexity‟ as Wendell-Holmes put it.21 Such simplification 
                                                             
18 Christian, Brown and Benjamin, Big History: Between Nothing and Everything (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
2014)  
19 A. Newitz, Scatter, Adapt, and Remember: How Humans will Survive a Mass Extinction (New York: 
Doubleday, 2013)  
20 E. O. Wilson, Half-Earth: Our Planet’s Fight for Life (New York: Liveright, 2016) 
21 http://www.alisonmorgan.co.uk/Croft%202008.htm (accessed 2014) 
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may relate to those points of informed contemplation at which divine Activity becomes 
more transparent,
22
 reorienting the nature of our encounter and engagement within the 
multi-dimensional, cosmic fabric whose causal interdependencies promote many possible 
avenues of enquiry.  
Both theology and science are agreed on the concept of some united cosmic origin, albeit 
via different applications of language. Seemingly, something must just be. Whether one 
looks solely at this cosmos, or considers various multiverse theories, one is faced with an 
inescapable conclusion that, especially in theories of origin, there must be something that 
just is. A scientific perspective might suggest a quantum fluctuation consisting in some 
vacuum energy, or posit an essential mathematical construct,
23
 while theology states first 
and foremost that God simply is, divine simplicity here emphasizing unity of „substance‟ 
or essence.
24
 An enlightening combination of origin principles between scientific and 
theological disciplines would clearly be valuable, and I believe that this is best to be found 
through a proper consideration and conception regarding the Logos and the harmonizing 
stability that it affords.  
Novelty and the central, underlying theme 
As to what I am purporting to offer as new, the central consideration is the particular 
combination of vocabulary involved in the advocated framework. The vocabulary and the 
topological flavour of the overall framework are aimed, as far as possible, at considering a 
holistic, cosmic viewpoint within which our anthropological journey develops. In the 
abstract to an article on a possible holographic origin for the Big Bang,
25
 Pourhasan et al 
ask 
While most of the singularities of General Relativity are expected to be safely 
hidden behind event horizons…we happen to live in the causal future of the 
classical Big Bang singularity, whose resolution constitutes the active field of early 
                                                             
22 P. N. Jordan, Minimalist Engagement: Rowan Williams on Christianity and Science (Zygon, Vol.51, No.2, 
June 2016), pp.387-404. 
23 Such as the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis, a theory technically having no free parameters. See M. 
Tegmark, Our Mathematical Universe: My Quest for the Ultimate Nature of Reality (London: Penguin, 
2014). 
24
 Also ‘seeing’ as a whole, through an impartial, undifferentiated ‘regard’.  
25 Pourhasan et al, Out of the White Hole: a holographic origin for the Big Bang (Journal of Cosmology and 
Astroparticle Physics, No.4, April 2014), pp.1-16. 
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universe cosmology. Could the Big Bang be also hidden behind a causal horizon, 
making us immune to the decadent impacts of a naked singularity?  
Somewhat analogously, one could ask, from a 21
st
 Century perspective, what might 
constitute the theological focal point around which the questions or concerns of most 
causal relevance to humanity may be considered to accumulate or coalesce, and the degree 
to which any theological „horizon‟ might shield us from the full, naked impact of such. 
Inasmuch as the concept of Logos could be considered a viable candidate for such a focal 
point, a theological term also retaining a critical relevance to the „logic‟ of science, the 
Incarnation induces a change in perspective regarding such a conception. The concept of 
the „singularity‟ will be extended metaphorically in what follows to the incarnational 
context. The theologically unique Mind of Christ will be taken to represent a critical, 
unifying cooperation between divine and human „idioms‟ (see below) of operative 
engagement with respect to Creation, and such irreducible uniqueness is argued, by 
analogy with the concept of the singularity, to manifest an hourglass topology opening 
into the New Creation. 
I aim to avoid any unhelpfully separatist dualism and therefore focus throughout on the 
principle of distinction without separation, indispensable to Trinitarian and Christological 
vocabulary. To this end, the vocabulary of this thesis tends towards a focus on certain key 
dual-aspect unities. Each such unity has its own context of application, but such contexts 
are dynamically interrelated. Overall, an integrated, dynamic and internally self-consistent 
framework is thereby constructed. Sometimes I refer to such dual-aspect unities as „bonds‟ 
– a description carrying obvious chemical associations. If one wishes to speak about water, 
for example, one must do so within the context of a framework in which hydrogen and 
oxygen, although their respective locations within a water molecule can be distinguished, 
cannot be spoken of in isolation from each other without it becoming the case that water is 
no longer what is genuinely being spoken about.  
While a bonded molecule has a certain stability, the interdependence or interrelatedness 
between the various aspects of consideration made here is in tune with the idea of an 
enveloping, dynamic stability. This inherent dynamic proves useful for keeping conceptual 
track of developments in an evolving context. The very idea of  „dynamic stability‟ is 
understood here in terms of some mutual, binding influence effected by and between those 
aspects, terms or components that coalesce in the functional context of a particular domain 
15 
 
of operation – the human mind being a pivotal example here. Where the holistic viewpoint 
is concerned, applying both to the Creation as an interconnected, cosmic whole and to the 
particular „place‟ of the human mind therein, I look in each case to the idea of simplifying 
the context of focus by homing in on two key interrelating aspects (form-content in the 
case of the created whole and refuge-prospect in the case of the human „mindscape‟ – see 
below for more details) aiming to maintain a suitably flexible but practically relevant 
vocabulary. 
Interconnectedness is a critical concept here. In physical science, inasmuch as it considers 
finite systems requiring a formal context of definition, any representation or evaluation of 
interconnectedness is necessarily accompanied by some functional appreciation of 
compactness, or a degree of enfoldedness defining the relative strength of 
interconnectedness between various points in a system or space. Compactness may also 
relate to whether the system or space is open or closed with respect to another. The 
interconnected framework of this thesis is described here in similarly compact terms, 
through an „enfolded‟ use of vocabulary and analogy.  
The words „interconnected‟ and „compact‟ are chosen advisedly here owing to the 
deliberate couching of the overall framework within a topological treatment of „created 
space‟ and its largely asymmetrical relationship with the „Uncreated‟. Topology looks to 
the holistic properties of shape and the nature of its connectedness within particular 
dimensionalities of space, something broader than more strictly geometric considerations 
involving metric distance and curvature. The decision to centre the use of vocabulary on 
an underlying topological conception was made for a variety of reasons.  
Firstly, being mathematically grounded, its terminology is robustly defined while its 
application is wide-ranging and relatively flexible. Topological conception can be applied 
in many different evaluative and analytical contexts: point-set topology, rubber-sheet 
topology, algebraic topology and differential topology. 
Secondly, its scientific application is an area of great contemporary interest, such 
application having been made at the cosmic scale
26
 right down to the scale of Quantum 
Field Theory (involving stable „kinks‟, „vortices‟ and „monopoles‟)27 and String Theory.28 
                                                             
26
 J. Levin, How the Universe Got its Spots: Diary of a Finite Time in a Finite Space (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 2002) 
27 L. H. Ryder, Quantum Field Theory (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), pp.390ff.  
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On intermediate scales it has been applied to the growing area of network topology,
29
 
applied to such diverse contexts as the Internet, neural networks, collaboration networks 
and social contact networks, as well as autocatalytic networks in chemistry (chapter 1) that 
may readily be extended into the biological domain. There is developing interest in the 
influence of topological properties on the development of biological systems.
30
 Recent 
Nobel Prizes were awarded for work on topological phase transitions and materials 
science has benefitted from insights concerning non-trivial topologies associated with 
particular electronic wave-functions, such as in Weyl semi-metals.
31
 
Thirdly, taking its mathematical grounding seriously, the concept of a topology 
circumscribes any specific geometric consideration – many geometries being able on 
principle to be accommodated within a given topology. Accommodation, especially in the 
sense of theological incorporation and embedded participation, is important here.  
Fourthly, the concept incorporates a variety of ways in which aspects of continuity and 
discontinuity may be considered and by which categorical distinctions may be made 
between two spaces or structures. Among other things, it involves considering the nature 
of connectedness and the form of compactness, as well as invariants and homeomorphisms 
(transformations by stretching and bending rather than tearing or puncturing).
32
 Through 
certain analogous or metaphorical extensions, these concepts have important application in 
what follows. 
Finally, the very manner in which the notion of a topological space is defined involves a 
broader context consisting in an entire hierarchy of concepts concerning a general 
treatment of „space‟. This extends from the most general and flexible idea of a set through 
to the more tightly classified idea of Euclidean vector space, with an additional classifying 
condition being imposed at each level in the hierarchy, such as requirements of 
convergence, neighbourhood, boundary, symmetry, distance and orthogonality.
33
 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
28 Yau and Nadis, The Shape of Inner Space: String Theory and the Geometry of the Universe’s Hidden 
Dimensions (New York: Basic Books, 2010) 
29 Latora et al. Complex Systems: Analysis and Models of Real-World Networks, in Musumeci et al. Energy 
and Information Transfer in Biological Systems: How Physics Could Enrich Biological Understanding 
(London: World Scientific, 2003), pp.188-204. 
30 Doostmohammadi and Yeomans, Topology in Biology: Mechanical Control of the Density of Cell Layers 
(Department of Physics Newsletter, University of Oxford, No.11, Autumn 2017), pp.2-3.   
31 A. Boothroyd, Magnetism Orders Exotic Fermions (Department of Physics Newsletter, University of 
Oxford, No.9, Autumn 2016), p.5. 
32 M. Nakahara, Geometry, Topology and Physics (London: Taylor & Francis, 2003), pp.67-91. 
33 Reid and Szendrői, Geometry and Topology (Cambridge: CUP, 2005) 
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basis of definition regarding a topological space involves a particular collection of subsets 
of a set X, and, in the particular case in which the collection in question is the so-called 
„power set‟ (the set of all possible subsets of X) the associated topology is referred to as a 
„discrete topology‟.34 The choosing of subsets could be considered as some discrete 
selection, differentiating between one means of choosing a subset, or collection of subsets, 
and another. The set of all possible subsets therefore represents a summation over all these 
distinct possibilities, effectively summarizing an overall flexibility within the set or, in an 
applied context, the formal structure of a space.  
One could extend this conception, by analogy, to a theological domain of application 
concerning created order or „space‟. There are several ways in which our created and 
creative intelligence may conceptually differentiate between one discrete category, 
component or dimension of created space and another, and there are several subsets or 
selections of interrelating „domains‟ that we could focus upon. However, an overall 
interconnectedness according to the ultimate unity of cosmic origin demands some 
complementary integration. The cosmic whole, in its stably perceivable stability, then 
represents an emergently critical balance between integration and differentiation.  
This way of thinking provides, I think, a basis for an analogous, topological treatment of 
cosmic, created space from a theological perspective, something more naturally 
communicating with physical, scientific approaches. Our very conceptual capacity for 
differentiation and definition within „created space‟ exists in necessarily natural 
accordance with its underlying structure, topology, parameters and principles, in turn 
theologically rooted through (the concept of) the Logos. This inevitable constraint defines 
our accessible, finite modes of intellectual engagement, collectively summarized here by 
reference to our particular „idiom‟, emergently operational within this particular 
interconnected, multidimensional, created space. The distinct, divine idiom of operative 
engagement with regard to Creation is then that which initiates, manifests and sustains the 
critical stability that is ultimately necessary for the emergence of our idiom of engagement 
and our capacity to perceive reality in an intelligibly consistent, dynamically stable 
manner.  
                                                             
34 McCluskey and McMaster, Undergraduate Topology: A Working Handbook (Oxford: OUP, 2014), pp.17ff 
provides a reasonably accessible introduction to the relevant concepts.  
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Any putative „topology‟, or basis for topological definition, associated with any 
hypothetical Uncreated “Space” – that „domain‟ from or according to which the divine 
idiom engages with created space – is then categorically different in its nature, and 
interacts with the created through the Activity of the Logos in accordance with a holistic, 
undifferentiated regard or „seeing‟. I will argue that, through the Incarnation, the Logos 
reintegrates, re-harmonizes and recapitulates created order/space as the net effect of these 
two differently postulated topoi, distinctively associated with Uncreated and created, being 
united in such a way as to effect a unique mode or „pointedness‟ of encounter. Such 
pointedness is represented by the „node‟ or „neck‟ in a hypothetical, compound hourglass 
topology
35
 and is considered analogous in this case to an essentially induced and 
topologically irreducible „singularity‟ corresponding to a mutual and necessary novelty of 
encounter in the Incarnation. This irremovable singularity represents, theologically, both 
the definitive coincidence of Alpha and Omega and the radical coincidence of divinity and 
humanity, or Uncreated and created more generally. The contingent, interconnected terms 
of created order (chapter 3) are „drawn into‟ the divine Economy afresh according the 
unique and actively creative mode of encounter of the Incarnate Logos in created space so 
as to create a pathway into the eschatological openness of a new creation or reconfigured 
order.  
The non-trivial „topology‟ corresponding to our particular capacity for encounter and 
reception within created space is refashioned or transformed through the Incarnation and 
Resurrection, according to the enabling of a new mode of communicative engagement 
between the created and the Uncreated, within which the created is embedded and 
participate. The process of the „breaking in‟ of a New Creation is then inseparable from 
the „motioning‟ of the Incarnate Logos and Cosmic Christ, reordering or „re-membering‟ 
(see chapter 5) created space.  
The capacity for metaphorical application within this topological conception will be 
invoked at various points, including the idea of a „semantic hierarchy‟ regarding our 
capacity for encounter and engagement (chapter 3), making use of the classification of 
„genus‟ concerning topological forms. The topological concepts of „neighbourhood‟ and 
„connectedness‟ will be applied theologically to the central concepts of divine-human 
communion and united, sacramental participation. The aforementioned „node‟ (a term 
                                                             
35 ‘Compound’ in the sense of the created context being embedded in the Uncreated. 
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borrowed from network topology) is taken as grounding the essential stability for both of 
these.
36
 In both the scientific and theological contexts of application, topological 
consideration therefore remains intimately associated with some qualification of stability. 
In the theological case such qualification involves a hierarchical differentiation concerning 
the term „motion‟ (see below); in the scientific case it involves a layered, bottom-up 
emergence building on previously established forms of stability and/or transitioning into 
new and topologically distinct domains of organization.   
The very word „topology‟ carries a convenient etymology for an application to theological 
context and the thesis presents what one might think of as a scientifically informed vision 
of a theological topology – a sacramentally pervasive topos being associated with the 
Logos, in some sense „objectified‟ in the Incarnation, embedded in the Uncreated and fully 
participating in the divine Economy.  
To our finite conceptual perspective, any revealable or physically discernible effect 
concerning such a pervasive topos relies on, and emerges from, a critical „enfoldedness‟ or 
„compactness‟ within created space. Our epistemological capacity, or mode of encounter, 
within such a compacted „reality‟ then effectively engages with some form of „diffraction 
pattern‟ (chapter 4) with respect to the creative „motioning‟ of the divine Economy in 
Creation, through the Logos.  
The idea of Creation, and its critical stability, deriving from the integrating, harmonizing 
role of the Logos suggests a musical metaphor. Levinson, defending the ontological 
objectivity of the non-physical in the context of a discussion on the artistic nature of a 
musical work, considers the underlying creative activity to be indicated or initiated 
through being contextually embedded within the uniqueness of a person, time and means 
of performance.
37
 Such terminology could well be applied to the uniqueness of the 
incarnational context, something demonstratively defining a theological context for human 
completion through a Creative Activity being worked out through the Logos, indicating 
and initiating a New Creation in „becoming flesh‟. 
                                                             
36 This grounding is eternal, its foundational relevance not being contingent on chronological progression, 
just as the relevance of the Incarnation should properly be considered to stretch back in time as well as 
forward. Such foundational relevance also pertains to a divine ‘regard’ or ‘perspective’ beyond distinction 
between the actual and the potential, and is in contrast to that emergent relevance occurring with respect 
to the human regard or ‘mindscape’.   
37 J. Levinson, What a Musical Work Is (The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.77, No.1, Jan 1980), pp.5-28. 
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Dynamically interconnected, harmonious balance is critical. In terms of our interpretative 
perspective such should extend to some proper balance of association between the ideal 
and the material, between the mediate and the immediate, between the immanent and the 
transcendent, between integration and differentiation, and between theological and 
scientific insights. Furthermore, the creative, interpreting human mind represents a crucial 
domain of emergence and operative unification within that dynamic, hierarchically 
qualified stability that progressively enabled our embodied perspective and its quasi-stable 
(in the sense of being relative rather than absolute) topos of encounter. The emergence of 
such an operative topos from a scientifically engaged, bottom-up perspective is considered 
in chapter 1. An active interrelatedness between this and the aforementioned „theological 
topology‟ is then considered possible as a result of our iconic bearing of divine image, 
fulfilled and completed through the Incarnation.  
This unification highlights another critical theme in this thesis. Within an Incarnation-
centred, topological representation of created space, two distinct „idioms‟ of operative 
engagement cooperate with one another through a dynamically pervasive „tension‟ (see 
below) pertaining to the Uncreated-created interrelation in general and to divine-human 
communion in particular. Such idioms are taken here as relating to distinct moods of 
creative freedom: that associated with the finite and the created being participant in the 
openness or „affordance‟ initiated by that associated with the Uncreated.  
On the one hand there is the distinctive, operational epistemology pertaining to creaturely 
humanity, patterning and re-patterning various aspects of intelligibility in a manner 
inseparable from our environmental conditioning to search for such intelligibility in the 
first place
38
 (chapter 1), generating meaning in so doing and handing it on to our progeny 
in various ways (chapter 5). If one is to take seriously the theological claim that all created 
space and its emergent properties are ultimately derived through the Logos, including our 
engagement with generating meaning, then such engagement becomes inseparable from 
our capacity for conceiving (of) the Logos (chapter 3).  
On the other hand there is the top-down, divine idiom of operation, manifesting meaning 
in the sense that it is latently established within the order and stability pertaining to created 
                                                             
38 Williams notes the importance of the inevitable association between our particular, natural drive to seek 
intelligible structure(s) and our means of generating and patterning meaning, considered in the context of 
maintaining a distinction between the underlying ‘nature’ of the sacramental and any focus on the 
practices surrounding the reception of one particular Sacrament. R. Williams, On Christian Theology 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp.197-208. 
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space. Inasmuch as it is also channelled through the context of the Incarnation, divine 
engagement with Creation „draws all things‟ (cf. John 12:32) to itself, bringing them 
“back” through Christ as Incarnate Logos, according to the „hourglass topology‟ here 
being associated with the „place‟ of the Mind of Christ (chapter 3). Such channelling 
occurs within and according to those material contours assumed and newly encountered in 
the Incarnation, contours defining our generative idiom of engagement and which may be 
related to the aforementioned „compactness‟ within created space – a compactness 
transformed and opened into a New Creation through the node of the hourglass. Our 
generative, meaningful contribution to the „content‟ of Creation (chapter 3) is thereby re-
manifested through the unity of the distinct natures in Christ and the consequent 
cooperation of their respectively associated idioms of engagement with(in) Creation. Such 
cooperation is, I shall argue, no less relevant to the more strictly representational means of 
generating or patterning meaningful knowledge through scientific pursuit – which might 
be considered at least covertly sacramental – than it is to the more overtly sacramental 
engagement pertaining to a theological perspective on our participate activity and 
formation. 
I therefore associate the divine idiom of engagement with a means of „manifesting‟ 
meaning and the human idiom with a means of „generating‟ meaning in a given, finite 
physical context, in this particular cosmos. As to the distinct moods of creative freedom, I 
adopt the view that divine freedom „identifies‟ with necessity while human freedom 
„correlates‟ therewith.39 Bulgakov enlarges on this by suggesting that „in creation, freedom 
is prior to the person, so to speak, and ascends through various stages of development to 
the person…Such an extrapersonal freedom is, in general, nothing else but life [italics 
Bulgakov], it corresponds to the living principle in creation‟.40 This fits with the layered, 
hierarchical framework of stability and its up-building to new operative levels within 
created order, involving a delicate interaction between chance and necessity upon which 
chapter 1 expands. The above use of vocabulary is also relevant to Schmemann‟s 
insistence, in the context of Eucharistic theology, that  
The empirical (or “visible”) and the spiritual (or “invisible”) are united not 
logically (this “stands for” that), nor analogically (this “illustrates” that), nor yet 
by cause and effect (this is the “means” or “generator” of that), but epiphanically. 
                                                             
39 S. Bulgakov, Bride of the Lamb (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 2002), pp.126-127. 
40 Ibid, p.130. 
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One reality manifests…and communicates the other [italics Schmemann], but – and 
this is immensely important – only to the degree to which the symbol itself is a 
participant in the spiritual reality and is able or called upon to embody it.
41
 
Since the above makes reference to „motioning‟, to the „Uncreated‟ and to „sacramentality‟ 
it is worth enlarging on how these terms are being understood. 
An understanding of „motion‟ 
Given the necessary distinction between that humanly-inaccessible Trinitarian Immanence 
in which God „sees‟ Himself purely as Himself, and the economic but nonetheless 
uncreated energeia allowing for some aspectual revelation in created space,
42
 
encounterable by us, one may properly distinguish between within-ness and without-ness 
with respect to the Uncreated and divine nature. Where our capacity for encounter and for 
coming to „know‟ is concerned we are, as it were, embedded and participant „within‟ the 
aforementioned „without-ness‟. The term „within‟ therefore requires qualification (chapter 
4). Such participation importantly does not involve any manipulative, negotiating aspect of 
our „seeing‟ or knowledge.43 The process of theologizing (something properly 
accommodating scientific development in the broadest sense) is taken here to consist in an 
initiating participation in the self-knowledge of God, not presuming in any sense to „see‟ 
God as God would do, but nonetheless suggesting a necessarily creative complementarity 
between divine and human modes of knowing.  
One must likewise distinguish properly between an immanent, internal „theo-motion‟ – 
that intrinsic perichoresis of the Trinitarian dynamic – and an economic „motion‟ both 
enabling human understanding and being at least partially conceivable by it. The internal 
„theo-motion‟ cannot be „seen‟ by us as such, any mutual motioning of the Persons being 
united in an unmovable Event. Any „motioning‟ into and throughout created space,44 
pertaining to the Trinitarian Economy, then amounts to a distinct qualification of the term 
„motion‟. 
Oliver emphasizes the historical and theological understanding of this term within a 
broader, interactive, multidimensional framework beyond strictly discursive limits, 
                                                             
41 A. Schmemann, The Eucharist (New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1987), p.39.  
42 T. Ware, The Orthodox Church (London: Penguin Books, 1997), pp.208-238, and K. Ware, The Orthodox 
Way (New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1995), pp.11-25. 
43 R. Williams, The Wound of Knowledge (London: DLT, 2014), pp.24ff. 
44 A motioning also opening such space in the first place.  
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holding together an ontological hierarchy that could be (re)configured to demonstrate 
relevance to contemporary scientific concepts. He relates the motional quality both to a 
means of approaching human knowing and to an understanding of the Eucharist as 
something motionally accommodating and reincorporating.
45
 A complementary but 
distinct perspective on this is given in chapter 5, Eucharistic accommodation being pointed 
towards finding „rest‟ in Christ. Oliver notes that the concept of „rest‟ can also be 
hierarchically qualified. Such fits with the topological framework here and its hierarchical 
qualification of „stability‟, and the inter-communing between Uncreated and created is 
then interpretable as a dynamic, harmonious but asymmetrical equilibrium pertaining to 
cooperative, divine-human interaction.  
Oliver considers a bottom-up hierarchy from „first potentiality‟ (the potential, for example, 
to learn an as yet un-encountered language) through „second potentiality‟ (the engagement 
with learning such language) into „first actuality‟ (becoming fully able to speak the 
language) and finally to „second actuality‟ (actually speaking the language in practice). It 
is perhaps tempting to suggest, from our perspective, a top-down hierarchy along similar 
lines: the Immanent Trinity being in some first potentiality for self-disclosure; the 
Economic Trinity being in second potentiality thereto; the act of Incarnation being the first 
actuality; and the fulfilment of the entire mission of the Logos as returning to the Father 
constituting some completed, second actuality. Owing to the (co-)eternal and cyclical 
nature of such „returning‟, however, one must postulate of any hypothetical, divine 
perspective that the Immanence of the Trinitarian Life consists in an ever-actualized 
potential – beyond distinction between act and potency.  
The Immanent Trinity identifies with its ever-actualized potential for Creative Activity, 
revealed according to the Trinitarian Economy and manifest through the Incarnation in the 
integrated totality of its physical relevance, dynamically representative of an engagement 
throughout all created space and ultimately resulting in a newly established, re-stabilised 
Creation. The fulfilment of the „second actuality‟, again from our perspective, would then 
be the full and final (re)incorporation and eschatological establishment of human nature in 
Christ „at the right hand of the Father‟.  
Oliver‟s analysis makes reference to Aristotelian principles. McLaughlin revisits the 
Aristotelian concept of potency and conceptions of form and matter, essence and 
                                                             
45 S. Oliver, Philosophy, God and Motion (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005). 
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existence, considering possible analogies within modern science, after the relatively late 
introduction of fundamental energy principles in the advent of thermodynamics. He 
suggests analogies through careful consideration of the distinctions between such concepts 
as kinetic energy, force, and the inherent configurational ambiguity of potential energy, 
including its subtle distinction of reference from that found in Einsteinian, relativistic 
physics. Seeing a link between the potential energies of the fundamental forces and 
Aristotelian potency, McLaughlin argues that the broader language of philosophical 
history does thereby have a cogent relevance to the particularities of modern scientific 
discipline.
46
 Though this thesis is not a direct extension of this idea, such relevance is 
nonetheless considered important. 
Scientifically, once the aforementioned, layered stability becomes operationally 
established, collective cooperation among interacting components may lead to further 
emergent properties. The requirement of finding and maintaining a dynamic pertaining to 
an appropriate energy-information relationship qualifies any degrees of freedom that may 
be interpreted in accordance with a biological consideration of „motion‟, and the biological 
domain further represents a critical connection between the purely physical and the 
intellectual or psychological. Furthermore, the aforementioned integration between top-
down and bottom-up aspects must at some level be related to the communicative and 
creative „motioning‟ of divine Activity through the Logos.  
The motioning or motion-inducing Creative Activity or Energy (see below) inseparably 
associated with the role of the Logos enables and dynamically qualifies our iconic, 
creative freedom from a theological perspective, affording us an integral, distinct and 
theologically significant idiom of engagement. Just as top-down and bottom-up 
components must harmoniously interrelate, so too ought the divine and human idioms of 
creative freedom properly and fully to cooperate, ultimately perfecting sacramental 
participation and completing sacramental process. The integrated totality of all 
„motioning‟ can then be considered as incorporated within a participative, sacramental 
framework pointed consistently and coherently towards eschatological relevance and 
„rest‟. This thesis, given the considered importance of scientific input regarding any 
layered qualification of motion and stability, therefore insists on maintaining a rootedly 
physical aspect to any eschatological outlook (chapter 4). 
                                                             
46 T. McLaughlin, Act, Potency and Energy (The Thomist, Vol.75, 2011), pp.207-243. 
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The late theoretical physicist John Wheeler once stated that time was defined so that 
motion looked simple. This may apply both to the trajectories of classical mechanics and 
to the particle interactions associated with Feynman diagrams in the quantum regime. It is 
therefore not unreasonable to suppose that, in order to make the notion of divine, 
economic „motioning‟ in created space more accessible to human conception and 
appreciation, there needs to be some intelligible working understanding of „God‟s Time‟ – 
or in other words that operative association with the temporal domain that is particular to 
the divine idiom. This is also considered in chapter 4. 
The Uncreated-created „tension‟ and sacramentality 
On the basis of the topological framework I will retain, albeit cautiously, some 
hypothetical notion of “Space” as pertaining to the Uncreated, distinct from created space. 
The defining factor taken here to indicate a „created space‟ is that any intelligent, emergent 
property, such as the human mind, within and with respect to that space may broadly be 
able to perceive it in a manner articulable through a language rooted in conceptual 
categories that are dependent, to whatever extent, on separation, distinction and 
differentiation. This may involve some geometric conception of distribution and 
dimensionality – including an array of intervals, points, lines, areas, volumes and so forth. 
The mind in question thereby participates in and according to such created-ness. Any 
particular, created representation, as a product of the human mind, may also be 
mathematically mapped or transformed into other representative spaces or geometries. As 
geometric conception is couched within some broader topological framework, a bounding, 
topological representation regarding such created space is fitting here. Rather like in a 
medieval Mappa Mundi, a space can be topologically moulded so as to be centred on those 
points or aspects considered to be of greatest theological significance. 
This differentiating, geometrical conception can then be contrasted with purely semantic 
distinctions, avoiding strict separation, by which one might attempt to articulate the nature 
of what is here intended by the absolutely indivisible Uncreated (“Space”). A complicating 
factor, however, is that the purity of any such semantic distinction is blurred by the fact 
that our linguistic capacity derives from a particular means of encounter that is informed, 
at one level or another, by ultimately „geometric‟ properties of relation through some 
degree of separation in created space. This is inevitable considering the spatial and 
temporal organization of our neurology and the irreducible requirement for particular 
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perceptions of space and time for our conceptual processing. The Trinity-in-Unity and 
Unity-in-Trinity pertains intrinsically to the Uncreated in the sense that enumeration of the 
Three Persons is not taken to imply any spatio-temporal separation or disjunction, and any 
distinction between the Persons is not differential in any graduated sense.  
I therefore retain the language of “Space” with reference to the Uncreated simply as a 
hypothetical label to accommodate the principle of that according to which any notion of a 
divine, Creative Mind might be considered to operate or engage. Clearly one cannot think 
of divine intelligence as natural in any emergent sense, nor as artificial in any sense of 
being contingent upon something beyond itself. Simply referring to such as „supernatural‟, 
beyond our conception of any material embodiment and dismissing pantheistic 
approaches, one would do well at least to retain a hypothetical vocabulary for referring to 
that according to which such intelligence could be considered to operate and, furthermore, 
to accommodate creaturely co-operation. In all cases of terminological distinction between 
the two idioms, the operative aspect of engagement pertaining to the divine idiom will 
retain a capital letter to avoid confusion. 
There is an inevitable „tension‟ of otherness between Uncreated and created but it is surely 
theologically axiomatic to suppose that any such tension must be pervasive and creatively 
efficacious – a positive interrelation or communicability between the two upon which any 
revelation (including that in the Incarnation) is dependent. Furthermore, given that the 
created is in some sense conceived through the Logos while the Logos may in another 
sense become conceived of by human intelligence (and ultimately conceived more directly 
and physically in the act of Incarnation), one could consider the opening of created space 
within the Uncreated – a creational approach – in a certain (creatively constructive) 
contrast with the manifestation or impregnation of the Uncreated within created space – an 
incarnational approach. This thesis takes an asymmetrical view of the dynamics of this 
mutual pervasion, divine initiative being always ontologically prior, and interprets such 
pervasion as an efficacious „tension‟ that is constructively creative rather than 
obstructively oppositional. Appreciating this inevitable, Uncreated-created „tension‟ of 
mutual otherness, and acknowledging the necessarily complementary dimensions of 
consideration pertaining to Creation and Incarnation, further involves bearing in mind that 
the context for the act of Incarnation required creaturely cooperation, involving a 
physically conditioned capacity for „conception‟ in both senses of the term. This „tension‟ 
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is taken here as constituting the basis of sacramentality, affording us our participative 
potential.  
This basis is distinct from any one, particular sacramental encounter, or the reception of a 
specific Sacrament as instituted in the Church. It stands instead as a background 
theological constant
47
 or pervading, background consonance, while specific encounter or 
reception would then compare to some particular, foreground vocalization, a description 
having convenient etymological association with some vocational component, or even an 
invocation performed as part of a particularly pronounced „unfolding of the liturgical 
action‟.48 
It is important to be clear that while created entities can be represented (statically or 
dynamically) within a creatively abstracted space, the Uncreated cannot be represented 
according to any directly analogous terms, given the above considerations. Given that 
divine Creative Activity through the Logos facilitates the critical, communicative 
connectedness between Uncreated and created – providing a basis for intelligible, 
physically relevant revelation – it is logical to seek some dynamic representation of the 
overall relevance of the theological claim that all created space/order was derived through 
the Logos. As our appreciation of the „relevance‟ in question must necessarily develop 
over a process of theological formation it must therefore be integrated over all relevant 
and revealing time. Any „representation‟ of such relevance is therefore in and of itself a 
dynamic, a critical aspect of that dynamic stability pertaining holistically to the Creation in 
theological terms by virtue of its being derived through the Logos. It is within this 
dynamic mediation, communicating between Uncreated and created, that a sacramental 
ontology is considered to manifest itself with developing, theologically formational 
effectiveness. Given the above mention of „compactness‟ as associated with created space, 
being finite at least in theological terms, the idea of an implicate enfolding and its 
contextually unfolded relevance will be developed below, with particular reference to a 
means of conceiving „reality‟ developed and advocated by Bohm. 
                                                             
47 In Bevans and Schröder, Constants in Context: A Theology of Mission for Today (New York: Orbis Books, 
2004), there is, somewhat surprisingly, no explicit mention of sacramentality among the otherwise listed 
“constants” of Christology, Ecclesiology, Eschatology, Salvation, Anthropology and Culture. 
48 H. B. Green, The Eucharistic Presence: Change and/or Signification (Downside Review, Vol. 83, No. 270, 
Jan 1965), p.34. Green further relates his discussion on Eucharistic Presence to the concept of ‘a necessary 
tension between Christ glorified and his members in via, still awaiting the full consummation of their union 
with him…’ (p.41). 
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This abstract classification also reflects the participatory view of sacramental ontology 
advocated by Boersma, beginning from a concern over the need for a heavenly 
ressourcement with respect to appreciating the proper nature of our topos. He comments 
that „St Paul‟s otherworldliness does not stand in absolute opposition to every this-worldly 
orientation. Rather, heavenly participation means that life on earth takes on a heavenly 
dimension...paradoxically, only otherworldliness guarantees proper engagement with the 
world‟.49 He seeks a return of the best aspects of the Platonist-Christian synthesis in order 
to engage with a sacramental treatment of the cosmos, especially given the parallel 
between Christ coming from and returning to the Father and the cosmic whole “going out” 
from and “returning” to God, according to the exitus-reditus schema.  
Boersma is influenced by Schmemann‟s entirely proper connection between those material 
elements normally associated with our reception of a particular, instituted Sacrament and 
the cosmic totality.
50
 Scientifically the derivation of such elements traces back, through a 
chain of interconnected contingencies, to the question of cosmic origin. In this respect the 
cosmic connectivity concerned may also be considered representational in a dynamic 
rather than a static sense – a dynamic pointed towards an eschatological relevance through 
the Incarnation. This dynamic is referred to by Boersma as the sacramental „tapestry‟, 
woven according to the principle of participating interconnectedness and allowing for the 
aforementioned „neighbourhood‟ of divine-human communion inasmuch as the various 
interrelated terms collectively comprising such a dynamic are assumed in the Incarnation. 
An open question is then the extent to which this can be understood according to some 
communicatio idiomatum. This thesis considers the concept of idiom specifically in terms 
of a mode of creative engagement, with eschatological establishment occurring through a 
bi-idiomatic cooperation in Christ.  
Any search for sacramental ontology must, for Boersma, be consonant with the core 
epistemology underlying the Christian creeds.
51
 He notes the fathers‟ view of „mystery‟ as 
referring to „realities behind the appearances that one could observe by means of the 
senses‟,52 pertaining to a not fully accessible but nonetheless irreducible dimensionality 
regarding the supra-cosmic whole. He uses an illustration from C. S. Lewis whereby an 
                                                             
49 H. Boersma, Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2011), p.5.  
50
 Ibid, p.9. 
51 Ibid, p.20. 
52 Ibid, p.21. 
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entity being represented is active in enhancing the effectiveness of the means of its own 
representation, thereby being „present‟ in the representation in a sacramental manner.53 
Lewis describes the activity of the Sun falling on a representative painting of itself, such 
that the paint in question shines and thereby significantly enhances the effectiveness of the 
representation. He considers this a good analogy for sacramental activity and engagement. 
Fittingly enough given the discussion concerning topos, this understanding of the 
sacramental (which I will adopt here) stems from Lewis‟ essay entitled “Transposition”.54 
The „background‟ basis or grounding for sacramentality, that pervasive topos dynamically 
representative of God‟s economic motioning in created space, enables our participation 
and may further enhance a theological appreciation regarding our topos within Creation.  
As to stability, Christ offers „narrative‟ stability, principally through being both the Alpha 
and the Omega of such narrative, integrating and „recapitulating‟ created order.55 Such 
order consists in a temporally dynamic but integrated whole, indicating some overall 
theme or Creative Idea (see below). Over a sacramental process pervading the entire 
dynamic, everything relevantly conceivable with respect to the ordering role of the Logos 
is ultimately drawn back into, and re-established through, the Incarnate Logos. Creator and 
creature are kept distinct throughout by insisting that the latter is „derived‟ and 
„penultimate‟ in its significance.56 Boersma‟s chief concern, in line with Radical 
Orthodoxy, is that an insuperable dilemma awaits any loss of consideration concerning a 
top-down, heavenly stability,
57
 and furthermore (in agreement with de Lubac) that any 
separation between nature and the supernatural rends asunder the proper relationship 
between theology and philosophy
58
 and, by extension, the natural sciences.    
The working definition given here regarding a basis for sacramentality qualifies the 
associated ontology by virtue of its curiously immediate mediation “between” Uncreated 
and created. Baillie referred to the relationship between God and knower as „mediated 
immediacy‟.59 Stearns picks up on this phrase, taking an epistemological emphasis in 
responding to a concern that „the inescapable gap between the finite and the infinite is 
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eliminated and the distinction between mediacy and immediacy in knowledge is 
obscured‟.60 He suggests that a hard-and-fast model is required in order to avoid 
accusations of some artificial theological „convenience‟. It is important, given the above, 
that the infinite Uncreated engages with the dynamic that in itself becomes representative 
of the communicative interaction “between” Uncreated and created. Ontologically 
speaking, in the context outlined above, this mysterious engagement from the „side‟ of the 
Uncreated – the immediate mediation – enables the sacramental participation of the 
created within the Uncreated in the first place, and such participation then effectively 
mediates such immediacy over space and time. The expression „in the first place‟ attains 
added significance here, since such participation is principally centred on the dynamic, 
sacramentally pervasive „place‟ of the Logos.  
 
Overall, from our perspective, mention of the „mediate‟ might indicate some 
epistemological accentuation – knowledge being progressively acquired through some 
developing, finite appreciation of directedness, meaning and purpose – while the 
„immediate‟ pertains to an ontological accentuation, constituting some necessary given(s) 
concerning our capacity for appreciating „reality‟. Since for divinity there is, one must 
assume, perfect conjugation between Being and Knowing, divine nature is then essentially 
immediate in and of itself. We, however, cannot know anything that is not influenced, or 
re-represented, by the fact that our epistemological engagement is inseparable from our 
particular, materially-embodied nature. This inevitably means that our viewpoint 
concerning „reality‟ is subject to change. 
Related to the Uncreated-created „tension‟, Wood examines three defining and deliberately 
ordered relations found in the Nicene Creed: God‟s relation to Himself as Creator; the 
relation between Uncreated and created; and the relation between created „heavens‟ and 
„earth‟, also reinforcing the inseparability but non-interchangeability of these two created 
aspects.
61
 He is careful to stress the fundamental difference in any relation between 
created aspects and that between Uncreated and created. A metaphor of particular interest 
here, especially given the above remarks concerning „motion‟, lies in his use of the phrase 
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„the settled trajectory of the divine Economy‟62 – a metaphor which I shall invoke at 
various points in what follows. 
The vocabulary of the thesis 
I refer to distinct „idioms‟ of engagement and creative freedom, as associated with divine 
and human natures, pointing towards an essential cooperation between them. Ultimately 
the deepest stability behind created order is the immutable stability of divine nature, 
Unity-in-Trinity and Trinity-in-Unity, and if human nature is to be stable in any enduring 
and theologically meaningful sense then it must be so by virtue of bearing divine image. 
Insofar as „the Fall‟ indicates a blurring of such image, creation exists in a relative quasi-
stability – something dynamically engaging but nonetheless finite, temporally dispersed 
and requiring a particular context of engagement for its completion, namely the 
Incarnation.  
Two theological writers relevant to the choice of vocabulary in this thesis have both 
written on the subject of theology as „drama‟ and an established dynamic. Balthasar 
applies the metaphor of the stage drama as part of an extensive and holistic presentation,
63
 
according to which the threefold form of Christian dogma is represented through an 
inseparable relationship between Author, Actor and Director – with the „world‟ or cosmos 
constituting the „stage‟. Accordingly he is able to represent and incorporate many critical 
themes including, of particular relevance here, the following:- 
(i) The fact of an objective „tension‟ residing in the mere possibility of any enacted 
performance.
64
 
(ii) The active involvement and breaking in of an essential „background‟, especially in 
manifesting a relevant point of focus. 
(iii) The importance of an integrated, cooperative and collective „content‟ being worked 
out over the complete performance, emphasizing the important theme of 
interconnectedness. 
(iv) The actively contributing participation of an „audience‟, emphasizing the theo-drama 
as being necessarily dynamic and goal-oriented. 
(v) The proper balance between the openness of an ultimate „horizon‟ and the relative 
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closedness of any humanly accessible revelation or humanly generated representation of 
meaning (or meaningfulness) in/over time. To use Balthasar‟s own words 
 The objective tension lies in the inner transcendence of a strict immanence, in the 
 justified expectation that the necessarily closed framework will – equally 
 necessarily – be exploded by the intrusion of an absolute meaning.65 
On the other hand, and in a manner complementary to Balthasar, Sayers focuses on the 
individual creative mind, and the sacramental significance of the artistic life or vocation. 
In her work on the Trinity,
66
 she builds on Augustine
67
 to develop her own contemplative 
analogy regarding the Economic Trinity, based on the idea that the creative image of the 
inherently creative Creator must, first and foremost, be manifest in the creative potentiality 
of any creature considered to bear divine image – that aspect of the creature being most 
truly iconic in a theologically meaningful sense. The analogy consists in relating the 
language of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, respectively, to the Creative Idea, Creative 
Energy/Activity and Creative Power pertaining to the artistic Mind in question, mutually 
defining an inextricable unity in the case of any actual, or even potential, creative work. 
She plays to her expertise as a creative writer and dramatist, examining the deeper 
working of literary styles, methods and abilities, and even accommodating a theory of the 
nature of Good and Evil, asserting that the Fall has blurred the image with the 
consequence that we always create slightly out of skew, betraying what she refers to as 
„scalene trinities‟ in each individual.68 In this respect too she agrees with Augustine‟s 
insistence on the disparity of the human mind. Her focus on the individual is relevant here 
inasmuch as the human being might be considered, in more abstract terms, to stand as a 
microcosm, representing a concentrated, cosmic significance regarding any higher truth or 
meaning.  
Augustine‟s idea that the image of the Trinity in humanity is related to the unity of 
memory, understanding and will in the practical context of any thought-process
69
 requires 
making a distinction between contemplating temporal succession and contemplating 
eternity, and such that the two communicate with each other, in addition to his distinction 
                                                             
65 Ibid, p.346. 
66 D. L. Sayers, The Mind of the Maker (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1979). Original work published in 
1941. 
67
 Ibid, pp.35-36. 
68 Ibid, pp.149-178. 
69 Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity (United States: fig-books, 2013), pp.250-251, 269-274 and 289ff. 
33 
 
between inner and outer man. In the modern discipline of cognitive psychology, accepting 
the active engagement of human perception in any act of mental conception, involving 
distinct classes of memory (and on-going debate as to the nature and place of human „will‟ 
and its freedom), direct use of Augustine‟s language could prove problematic in a thesis 
aiming to accommodate contemporary scientific language and outlook. This is where 
Sayers‟ particular vocabulary proves useful and Balthasar too uses the language of 
„creative activity‟ and „creative power‟, albeit in a slightly different context, referring 
largely to the place and contribution of the actor(s) in the drama.
70
 
The language of Creative Idea, Creative Activity/Energy and Creative Power proves 
helpful, I believe, for a scientific context of consideration, and I will make use of this in 
what follows. The term „Creative Activity‟ is especially important given that it is 
analogized (by Sayers) with the „image of the Word‟, something carrying an importantly 
verbal quality, especially noting the possible French translation of Logos as le Verbe. This 
allows for an analogy of finite participation in the infinite, considering the verbal moods of 
indicative, subjunctive and the various participles as participating in the grammatically 
non-contingent infinitive, the very „name‟ of the activity-bearing component.  
The translation of Logos as le Verbe is also etymologically appropriate inasmuch as I am 
arguing that, through the Incarnation (and taking the Passion, Resurrection and Ascension 
of Christ as constituting an inseparable theological whole) the Verbe incorporates and 
trans-figuratively re-embodies the reverberation of its own Creative Activity throughout 
that space deriving through it in the first place. The particular collection of interacting 
boundaries representative of the topology of created space defines the form of such 
reverberation, and the „architecture‟ of Creation (chapter 2) is therefore intimately related 
to the manner in which it is „drawn‟ both by and towards the Incarnate Logos.      
Furthermore, where an idiomatic engagement with time is concerned, a critical association 
between the „Creative Activity/Energy‟ and „God‟s Time‟, referring back to the above 
section on motion, will be suggested (chapter 4). In terms of Van Huyssteen‟s threefold 
classification of approaches to imago Dei as substantive, functional and relational
71
 a 
substantive approach is here considered critical to the scientific context of engagement – 
the creative mind being inextricable from an embodied brain and space-time also being 
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best considered in substantive terms (chapter 4). I am somewhat suspicious of purely 
relational arguments which risk becoming too detached from what physical, human nature 
actually consists in, and consequently from scientific relevance. 
Loades assesses Sayers‟ overall motivation as a theologically educated, professional writer 
and dramatist, commending her not only for a tenacity in aiming to show forth the truths 
contained in the creeds of Christendom through an analogy with what, to her, constituted 
good creative art, but also for „wanting a “sacramental” view of creative freedom…the 
human somehow giving us clues to the divine, clear that the artist is subject to the 
judgement of God and must not misuse his materials or regard himself as their creator‟.72 
The sacramental significance of such „creative freedom‟ in an interactive, cosmic context 
is emphasized in what follows. It is also important that the analogy is cast specifically in 
terms of that critical domain of unification noted above, namely the creative mind. 
Within the essence of a play or drama a latently or covertly residing „answer‟73 (or 
resolution) presents its particular horizon. Balthasar remarks that „scientific explanations 
render the existential question more baffling than it was even in myth‟,74 and this thesis 
relates the dynamic, cosmic arena and its possible „horizon‟, seen in topological terms, to 
ideas and concepts relevant to scientific engagement, suggesting that our active 
participation in such terms may be considered as being steeped in theological relevance. 
Balthasar goes on to say that „Christian drama…can only act in the presence of [italics 
Balthasar] God, knowing that it is embraced by him; it can never allow the drama that 
flows from the horizon to be absorbed into the drama that presses toward the horizon‟.75 
This, in essence, reveals the importance of the idiomatic distinction made here between the 
engagement of the divine Economy and our participate responsiveness. On the one hand 
there is the divine idiom of infinite operativity, ultimately integrating and holding all 
things together as some „content‟ (chapter 3). On the other hand there is the idiom of 
compact, finite operation and activity, „moving‟ (or being moved) in a particular manner 
and direction, able on principle to contribute to the generation of content, and involving an 
understanding of a particular, physical interconnectedness – a particular „topology of 
reality‟ at least partially discernible, from a scientific perspective, through a layered means 
of considering stability.  
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On another point of vocabulary, divine „simplicity‟, conveying the notion of „being of one 
substance‟, is taken as the antithesis of confusion or deconstructive complication, but not 
in itself opposed to some appropriately structured, creative complexity. White emphasizes 
the importance of the notion of divine simplicity
76
 in as far as God may well be complex, 
as related to some creative omni-potential, but in Himself is neither complicated nor 
compositional, as a composition of the human mind or otherwise. The human mind is, 
however, compositionally created and creatively compositional, consonant with some 
process of evolutionary formation (chapter 1). Yet it is nonetheless through the remarkable 
property of a practical, creative unity of self-consciousness (chapter 3) that we (like 
Sayers) may come to articulate our appreciation of that iconic property pertaining to divine 
image in humanity.  
As to human attachment to the compositional, Wittman, as part of a commentary upon 
Aquinas, suggests that 
Broadly speaking, if a theological „grammar‟ designates the rules and assumptions 
that attend knowledge of and therefore reference to God‟s being and activity, then 
a „syntax‟ of the same will have something to say about the order in which this 
knowledge and reference is most elegantly and intelligibly (or sapientially) 
composed…77 
The „sapiential‟ aspect will be considered in chapter 3 and the „ordering‟ here is important 
since the most natural ordering must necessarily be consonant with our physical and 
temporal participation in this cosmos, especially in relation to any developing „conception‟ 
concerning the Logos. It will be suggested (chapter 4) that the medium of „created space‟ 
itself partially determines some figurative „diffraction‟ pattern with respect to such 
developing reception of that truth which is inseparable from God‟s revealed Word. 
Expanding on the analogy of Authorship, the coined term „idiom‟ is preferred to the at 
first seemingly comparable term „genre‟, since the development of an overall idiom occurs 
through an immersion throughout the entire process of achieving articulate expressiveness 
as a whole. Such immersion is necessary for the subsequent emergence of stable domains 
of operation and expression within such a process. A genre, meanwhile, pertains more to a 
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secondary mode of expression more particularly tuned to a specific context of concern or 
encounter. Many genres may therefore emerge within an incorporating idiom. Chapter 5 
suggests one such possible emergence of distinct genres of creative activity within our 
developing idiom of creative freedom.  
 
Given that our idiomatic capacity for coming to know or appreciate the Creator‟s „Art‟ is 
itself part of the Artwork, such could on principle influence the purpose or eschatological 
aspect of the Artist‟s engagement with the Creation. Understanding the Incarnation as 
assuming and consummating this influential potential is important. Fiddes even presents 
the idea that „the divine Logos… achieves considerable imaginative identity; he does not 
know that he is impassible and so enters imaginatively into dying‟.78 This is bold 
phraseology, but it highlights the importance of considering distinct modes of knowing, 
particularly as associated with distinct idioms of engagement.  
From a human, psychosomatic perspective, relevant to an incarnate mode of encounter, a 
robust, scientific understanding of human psyche involves a consideration of our 
inseparably embodied context (chapter 3). In line with this, Wirzba relates, or correlates, 
our means of „seeing‟ (or knowing) to our manner of being, according to a certain theoria 
being necessarily accompanied by a presiding ethos.
79
 Acknowledging this necessary, 
dynamic connectivity is important for considering any form of topos that one might 
associate with an embodied human brain and an inseparable, creative mind – one which is 
both physically and theologically relevant. 
Considering the divine Infinity as „simple‟ and non-composite is of course theologically 
parsimonious, beyond addition or comparison and arguably skirting the question of why 
one thing in particular should exist as if over or against another. This, alongside mention 
of theoria and its connection with „sight‟ and theos, brings to mind Cusa‟s one, initial and 
ultimate, non-composite infinity, preceding differentiation and an archetype of unity 
which grounds „thorough-going coincidence‟. Not satisfied with the scholastic regime 
where contemplating the ineffable was concerned Cusa formed his own approach from 
various concepts already established by thinkers such as Oresme, Lull and Anselm, 
coming to the position that because the divine infinity „transcends analogy...and exceeds 
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composition and synthesis‟, it is antecedent to that which is „contracted within the world‟s 
unity, the universum‟. Here such contraction may relate to the compactness associated 
with created space. What is „subsequently “contracted”‟ of the divine „maximality‟ is 
„antecedently “enfolded”...as infinite and one in the mind of God‟, and while God is 
„absolute maximum‟ the universe then becomes a „limited maximum‟. Not only does this 
provide a logical basis for considering some evolving continuum but it establishes the 
„Christ maximum‟ as the ultimate „agent of coincidence‟, the „maximum contracted 
individual‟ communicating a critical aspect of the divine infinity in our midst.80 By 
hypostasizing a finite, contracted human nature a maximum of creaturely potential is 
drawn into a reconciled, radical coincidence. Chapter 5 explores the idea of a creative 
maximum from a more scientific perspective. The overall impression gleaned from Cusa‟s 
use of vocabulary here is definitely that of a created topology embedded in a broader, 
infinite Uncreated “Space”, in tune with the framework promoted here.   
As to our ability to come to know the Christ maximum, „seeing‟ as through God‟s seeing, 
according to that Light in which our capacity for seeing is participate (cf. Psalm 36:9), we 
may come to acknowledge such a maximum, established through the Incarnation, as 
constituting the „epistemological foundation and the logical model for theological 
method‟. Yet, to Cusa, there is still ultimately a „holy ignorance‟ beyond our knowing and 
not-knowing, something pertaining to our very being and „illuminated...by union with the 
Light‟ so that such ignorance is „not the opposite of knowing but its fulfilment‟.81  Our 
being derives theologically from a participation in that which enables both knowing and an 
acknowledgement of not knowing. Likewise, that „topology‟ of created space shaping our 
very capacity to perceive and conceive in physical terms derives from some theologically 
principal but not in itself directly conceivable topos, within the profounder stability of 
which it may be considered to be embedded.  
There is a particular aspect of „coincidence‟ in this case between God and nature, although 
for Cusa there are also coincidences within nature and a coincidence „beyond seeing‟. 
Furthermore, if abstract concepts, even if comparative, nonetheless „more closely 
approximate the nature of God as absolute‟ then it must be acknowledged that all 
attempted comparisons occur at some level on a hierarchy, which Bond, again in reference 
to Cusa, interprets in terms of „linguistic similitude‟, „logical similitude‟ and finally the 
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„iconic similitude‟ of the image – that which is most proximate to divine nature in terms of 
its „utility‟ in being able to „stir up an inquiry after the truth of the exemplar‟.82 Human 
„sight‟ can thus be elevated according to such a structured, hierarchical arrangement, 
harmonized according to the Logos and ultimately attaining its apex theoriae as seeing „in 
all things nothing except Posse‟,83 being as far as active contemplation can go.  
Considering Cusa‟s work, Alfsvåg notes the central challenge to Scholasticism „to 
maintain the idea of divine difference within the framework of a uniform rationality‟.84 
Noting Cusa‟s affirmation that all learning is necessarily reliant on comparison, but that, in 
contrast to the thinking of Scotus and Occam, such comparison was not available in the 
infinite-finite case, effectively because they do not produce any readily discernible 
interface as such, he considers that  
As an alternative to the via moderna concept of causality, Cusanus suggests the 
Neoplatonic idea of participation as the appropriate approach to a closer 
investigation of the relation between the inﬁnite and the ﬁnite…all entities are 
made what they are through participation in entity itself; as indeﬁnable, pure entity 
or oneness is, however, a concept that is closely related to inﬁnity.85 
This is consonant with the aforementioned idea of various verbal conjugations, moods and 
voices participating within the affordance of the infinitive, the very simplicity and name of 
the verb itself. Having supposed a theoretical equivalence between actualization and non-
actualization in divinity, Cusa is noted as developing this thinking towards the view that 
„as humans realize their true humanity by participation in divinity, divine providence and 
human freedom coincide. One realizes one‟s freedom by being seen by God…The idea of 
divine indifference over against the difference between possibility and actuality is then not 
lost‟.86 Hollingsworth expresses the same idea in different words in stating that „infinite 
being could not be if the possibility of its being were not itself actual [italics 
Hollingsworth]. Infinite possibility of being and infinite actual being are, then, coeternal‟. 
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She too highlights the defining influence of the divine „sight‟,87 which might be compared 
to God‟s „seeing‟ Activity in Genesis 1.  
The Uncreated “Space” in which actuality and potentiality are beyond distinction is 
fundamentally distinct from the created space of heavens-earth unity in Genesis 1 in which 
these (and other) aspects are distinguishable but inseparable within the created whole 
(chapter 2). The Uncreated enables the participation of the created within it, but while this 
provides an eternal grounding for our participation in theological terms it says nothing in 
itself about how any specific development of such participation might occur over Big 
History in more scientific terms.  
The created „ethos‟ inseparable from our particular, idiomatic capacity for theoria could 
be considered representative of our „mood‟ of participation, tuned according to those 
interconnected contingencies defining our physicality. If God‟s Self-knowing is then to 
„operate‟ or „engage‟ incarnationally, then the finite, composite and compactly “enfolded” 
physical basis for the human mind – hierarchically organized and evolved – must be 
assumed and re-hypostasized. This emphasizes the Mind of Christ as a critical theological 
concept. The participative, sacramental significance of its physicality ought then properly 
to have relevance not just to an overtly theological domain of consideration but also, at 
least covertly, to a scientific perspective regarding that which grounds our ability to 
contemplate and to come to various degrees of knowledge. Having now laid down the 
relevant pointers with respect to the use of vocabulary the specific layout of material in the 
main chapters will now be described.  
Chapter layout 
The ressourcement offered by recent scientific progress in unpacking Big History has 
increased our awareness of the many interrelated contingencies involved in reaching our 
modern anthropological context. This thesis takes as holistic a view of our anthropological 
journey as is practical in the given framework. 
Considering our anthropological roots, chapter 1 begins with an overview of the context of 
evolutionary thinking and its significant development in more recent years, incorporating a 
more robust appreciation of the contingent interrelations involved. It appeals in particular 
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to the recent, integrative work of Smith and Morowitz, considering a contemporary view 
of the critically stable emergence and sustainability of the living dynamic of the biosphere. 
The emergence of a dynamic „mindscape‟ out of this functional stability is then 
considered, suggesting a connection between the topography of our „landscape‟ context of 
formation and the topology of our mental dynamic, appealing to Appleton‟s Prospect-
Refuge Theory as a holistically accessible, scientifically respectable, dual-aspect means of 
considering the development of such a mindscape over time. Finally, the nature of human 
thought-process (critically inseparable from particular qualifications of memory) is briefly 
considered, suggesting a working set of developmental stages regarding our evolutionary 
history and finishing by considering possible theological corollaries of such development.  
The theological relevance of our anthropology is expanded in chapter 2, looking towards a 
biblical justification for considering a stable, eschatological openness to our potential for 
active, creative contribution through our idiom of engagement, rather than some merely 
passive or preservative role. The argument invokes a strong Creation-Temple relationship, 
considering the embodiment of the significance of the Temple and its representative 
architecture through the assumption of human nature in Christ, establishing the dynamic 
architecture of a new, perfected creation. A biblical perspective on human nature, imbued 
with an eschatological relevance, is considered alongside the critical importance of a 
theologically stable topos. 
Chapter 3 considers our mental domain from a more neuro-scientific and philosophical 
perspective, focusing on the critical centrality of self-consciousness and considering the 
capacity for creative enhancement that self-consciousness, or self-relation more generally, 
involves. Consciousness is taken as having a cosmic background and scale of relevance. A 
particular consideration of the nature of „Art‟, involving a dynamic form-content bond 
(another dual-aspect, interactive unity), is then related to the cosmic, creative Artwork 
deriving from the „Author‟ or through the Mind of the Maker, including the significance 
thereby implied regarding our conscious means of coming to recognize and appreciate 
such as „Art‟. Particular attention is paid to how central theological concepts such as 
Incarnation and Transfiguration may relevantly be understood within such a framework. 
Finally, there is a more in-depth consideration of the significance of the Mind of Christ, 
the Incarnation of the Mind of the Maker, involving a unique conceptual „compactness‟ 
being associated with incarnational encounter, according to the aforementioned „hourglass 
topology‟. 
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Given the importance noted above concerning integration over time, Chapter 4 moves 
towards outlining a model according to which the more familiar analogies of phase 
transition and paradigm shift may be used to describe the outworking of the divine and 
human idioms of operation respectively (i.e. manifestational reordering and generational 
progression). Divine and human idioms of creative freedom are considered specifically in 
relation to their operative association with time, a consideration which is expanded to 
contemplate suitable options for both a panentheistic framework and a physical 
eschatology. It is argued that the Incarnation,
88
 with respect to the topological framework 
in question, could in itself be considered theologically in terms of the phase transition 
metaphor. 
Finally, chapter 5 looks at three particular genres of creative activity emerging within the 
developing, dynamic stability undergirding the human idiom of engagement. First there is 
the pro-creative, predominantly forced upon us by the nature of our physical and 
intellectual environments, and according to which we have a highly constrained freedom 
regarding the manner in which we may hand things on to subsequent generations. It is the 
genre most closely relating to various inextricable „tacit coefficients‟ (chapter 1) left upon 
our mental operation by our evolutionary roots, and this aspect of our creative activity is 
something whose basis is clearly shared with other species. Out of this basis there emerges 
a re-creative genre of engagement, more specifically highlighting the freer, emancipated 
act of creative invention for its own sake. This is the genre of the hypothetical scenario 
and the thought experiment, highlighting significant prospect both for more lucid thought-
process and for better informed, more focussed and coherent development. This then 
moves into the emergence of a co-creative genre, stemming chiefly from the specific 
engagement of human understanding with the creative strategies seemingly written into 
the humanly discernible, emergent order of the cosmos and the biosphere. This genre is 
taken as developing through an “autocatalytic” enhancement of our re-creative 
involvement. The latter two genres are intended to be representative of our distinctiveness 
among all other creatures, the re-creative laying the necessary developmental grounding 
for a fuller appreciation of our co-creative potential. 
An important clarification is necessary here, since it might seem that this understanding 
implies that any co-creative engagement is something that only comes into genuine 
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existence at some vaguely defined point in the history of our species‟ development. It is 
not being suggested that our participation before such a point is therefore eschatologically 
irrelevant. Rather, the concern is to focus specifically on that aspect of progression more 
relevant to a tangibly scientific dimension to our potential and its theological significance. 
There are, of course, broader ways in which human beings might be considered co-
creators. Ninan, for instance, within the context of a quantum framework, suggests that 
Every human decision is a creation ex nihilo. This is probably what the statement 
“in the image of God created He them” essentially means. So a person is not 
making a decision but creating something totally new. We are involved along with 
God himself in creating the Universe we live in. We are co-creators with God.
89
 
This is appealing in terms of its ubiquitous relevance to the entirety of our anthropological 
history. With regard to a more scientifically specific relevance to the context of our 
progressive development, however, such consideration needs to be more tightly focused, 
respecting that the basis upon which „decisions‟ may be made is specific to a developing 
context of encounter which may become increasingly informed over the course of our 
anthropological development. The aim is to lay down some guiding conceptual contours 
for considering our creative development and progression, according to which that aspect 
of our co-creative potential carrying more specific, scientific relevance might become 
better emphasized.  
In engaging with created order on a deeper and more integrally understood basis it is 
argued that our critical potential for „conception‟ regarding the place and relevance of the 
Logos participates more deeply and thereby attains a profounder significance in relation 
thereto. The superimposed relevance of these genres of creative activity throughout our 
idiomatic development as a whole is then briefly considered, including a possible relation 
to the concept of an Omega Point, incorporating the idea of eschatological stability or 
„rest‟ in as far as any aspect of continuity may exist between this and those interrelated 
components involved in our temporal development. 
Final clarifications 
Finally, the following points may provide helpful additional clarification: 
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1. Reference is made to John 12:32 and the idea of Christ „drawing all things‟ to 
Himself. The Greek word translated as „I will draw‟ – ἑλκςζεν – can in other 
contexts mean „drag‟ or „haul‟, suggesting a context involving laborious physical 
exertion, defined according to whatever motion is allowed by physical laws and 
constraints. It is used again in John 21:6 when Jesus has just instructed the catch-
less disciples to cast their net once again into the water, whereupon they obtain 
such a large catch that they can no longer „haul‟ the net into the boat. This is fitting 
in relation to Christ‟s promise to make the disciples „fishers of men‟, actively 
involving humanity and the Church in the process of „drawing‟ or „hauling‟ in but 
still ultimately on Christ‟s initiative. In the assumption of human nature a 
committed involvement is made to the long „haul‟ while also defining a context for 
the demonstrable completion of human nature, being „drawn in‟ to the Incarnate 
Logos. 
2. As to the originally hypostasizing human mind or nous being re-placed by the 
hypostasis of the Logos in the Incarnation (chapter 3), it is worth noting Nesteruk‟s 
consideration, made in the context of searching for a neo-patristic synthesis 
between theology and science,
90
 that the natural, discursive, finite and anonymous 
dianoia is distinct but inseparable from the infinite, named and supra-natural nous. 
The first is presented as being to science as the second is to theology. Nesteruk 
considers total awareness of nous or dianoia to be mutually exclusive with respect 
to that of the other, nous awareness being absent to any epistemology that is 
reducible to a series of logical steps, though present ontologically according to an 
enhypostasis. This might offer a complementary angle of approach with respect to 
the novelty associated with the Mind of Christ, although it is peripheral to the 
topological consideration here. 
3. A core doctrinal concept is that of transcendence-in-immanence and immanence-
in-transcendence. Intuitively one could consider such a concept by reference to a 
compact series of concentric circles emanating from their mutual origin without 
limit. The more circles there are the more the transcendence is emphasized but 
equally the more the commonality of their mutually defining origin – 
dimensionless in and of itself and thereby technically occupying no space – is 
likewise emphasized. The concentric circles may also represent a nested hierarchy, 
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irreducibly so by virtue of the fact that the larger circles fully contain smaller ones 
but not vice versa. Immanent and transcendent aspects are mutually emphasized 
and balanced within the same diagrammatic representation. Such representation is, 
however, still specific to the focal perspective of our creative intelligence, forming 
representations within and according to the „terms‟ of created space as described 
above. Mathematically our conception of „infinity‟ may be qualified hierarchically, 
while theologically our capacity for appreciating such remains finite in accordance 
with our finite understanding being dependent upon some revelation, 
representation or definition within created space.  
4. According to Tracy‟s threefold classification of systematic, fundamental and 
practical theology,
91
 the approach here could count as fundamental theology in 
view of its consistent relation to a chosen underlying framework. It is not being 
suggested, however, that such a framework is definitive, but simply that it 
constitutes a useful and potentially enlightening approach where seeking any 
integrated theo-scientific relevance is concerned. 
5. Not wishing to divorce philosophy from theology, the tenets described here are, I 
believe, broadly in tune with the ethos of „Radical Orthodoxy‟, involving a 
sacramentally qualified, ontological grounding within a participative framework, 
shirking unhelpful dualisms while accommodating constructive distinction or 
paradox.
92
 Furthermore, I do not intend simply to reproduce past viewpoints but to 
suggest a fresh means for moving forward, seeking an involved engagement with 
21
st
 Century science and promoting the relevance of our developing 
epistemological engagement. 
6. This thesis takes up the suggestion of Bawulski and Watkins that an act of genuine 
divine „discovery‟ (I prefer the word „encounter‟) of novelty in the Incarnation may 
have primary eschatological consequences for the „new heavens‟ and the „new 
earth‟.93 Bawulski and Watkins defend the tenets of classical theism, and my 
approach too remains predominantly classical in its outline, while taking a nuanced 
approach in considering how the suggested framework could work itself out in 
physical practice. 
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Chapter 1: From Landscape to Mindscape – Considering Biophysical Stability 
I begin by considering the broader significance of our biological history and 
anthropological roots to the context of the „stability‟ of our journey as a species and its 
possible theological relevance. Such roots leave a lasting mark on the dynamic of our 
mental life and the formation of our idiomatic „mindscape‟. This mindscape will be taken 
to form a critical foreground for the working out of our anthropological journey and 
encounter in theologically relevant terms, affording us, among other things, a theologically 
significant appreciation of our topos. Such a „foreground‟ can then be embedded within 
the enveloping „background‟ basis given in the Introduction with respect to a sacramental 
stability, couched within the theological topology advocated here. This will have particular 
significance when it comes to considering the theologically critical „place‟ of the Mind of 
Christ. This chapter will build towards this point by first considering the layered nature of 
the development from non-living manifestations of physics or chemistry, through the 
biological domain, to the noetic domain and the emergence of intelligence and subjective, 
psychological perspective. 
 
As far as possible a holistic viewpoint is maintained, aiming to avoid excessive 
terminological confusion or dispute. Where the precise nature of detailed, evolutionary 
influences on our creative propensity and freedom is concerned, this thesis keeps an open 
view, simply holding creativity and anthropological history hand-in-hand while being 
aware of the as yet not fully resolved debate concerning Darwinian and non-Darwinian 
developments that may contribute to our propensity, as well as non-biological influences 
of environmental happenstance.
94
 Furthermore, strictly Darwinian explanations of 
evolution with regard to creativity are often unable to explain those traits that are acquired 
rather than strictly inherited.  
 
Comparison is also made between a pre-Mendelian, pre-DNA era of development – one 
that is catalytic rather than strictly encoded – and the pre-linguistic era of anthropological 
history. The non-biological aspect of our environment may also be taken as catalytic, as 
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our formation mirrors our response to environmental structure and intelligibility. As to 
whether our creative propensity is domain-general or domain-specific no definitive view 
will be (or needs to be) assumed here in either direction, since, in accordance with that 
pointed out by Baer,
95
 the forms of evidence one looks towards will themselves be 
influenced by the way in which one has already, surreptitiously, come to think of 
creativity. 
                                                                                                                                                   
First, it is necessary to consider the bottom-up basis from which our mindscape may 
emerge with a practical and functional level of stability. This critical factor of stability is 
essential to the hierarchical ordering of living systems, as highlighted by the complex 
communicability that constitutes the dynamics of cellular life, largely by virtue of the 
phenomenal capacity of protein arrangements for functionally communicative cooperation. 
On the one hand there is the need for modulated regions of high and low complexity to be 
mutually stabilizing and, on the other hand, the necessary channels of information transfer 
must be maintained in conjunction with a favourable energetics. The living cell seems to 
be able to select or discriminate between various conformations of relative stability and 
instability and to perform required modifications in a computationally precise manner.
96
 
Scientific insight, centred on physical principles, shows a fairly consistent process of 
attraction towards, and emergence from, underlying principles such as action-reaction 
effects, a minimization of potential and/or free energy, and the maintenance of a dynamic 
equilibrium. This lies at the core of many means of assessing physical stability. In cases 
when certain systems may be pushed so far as to undergo phase transition into a new 
regime – in which the above principles may then manifest themselves in a different 
configuration, according to a different form of structural stability – such transition 
potentially enhances variegation, as becomes evident among biological life-forms and in 
the potential for emergence of novel structures and operational systems.
97
 
                                                             
95 J. Baer, Is Creativity Domain Specific? in Kaufman and Sternberg, The Cambridge Handbook of Creativity, 
pp.321-328. 
96 Alberts et al. Molecular Biology of the Cell, pp.109ff. 
97
 A clear and thorough account of such theory can be found in H. E. Stanley, Introduction to Phase 
Transitions and Critical Phenomena (New York: OUP, 1987), beginning with a qualitative overview for non-
specialists.  
47 
 
The complexity of any stability analysis is plain enough even when considered on the 
level of humanly engineerable systems.
98
 There is an important distinction between 
absolute and conditional stability and yet another distinction between properties of a 
system that are only deducible through the explicit solving of a differential equation and 
those discernible through looking purely the form of equation without solution. There is 
also the question of timeframe regarding any perturbing influence, as well as the fact that a 
system may be composed of many interacting subsystems, each of which have different 
transient speeds of response. An involved matrix analysis is required even for systems 
whose engineering is far simpler than in the biological domain, accepting that complexity 
can be the result of any or all of high-dimensionality, manifold structure, connectivity, 
nature of operation and the form of any perturbing factors. While most of these principles 
are ultimately maths-based the aspects of consideration they point towards inevitably have 
resonance at the bio-physical level of inquiry.  
Likewise, the concept of convergence is critical to mathematical stability analysis, and 
different strengths of convergence form a hierarchy from the strongest condition of 
asymptotic stability, where all dynamic trajectories „near‟ to an equilibrium point strictly 
converge to that point, through Lyapunov stability, where the system dynamics are 
bounded in a region around the equilibrium point, to weaker conditions such as bounded 
systems exhibiting Lipschitz continuity, which imposes a maximum numerical value on 
how fast the function of a particular variable can change with respect to that variable. The 
concept of convergence could intuitively be extended to the broader context of the journey 
considered here with respect to our emerging mindscape. The stability of our mental 
dynamic may be considered in terms of some functionally reliable convergence upon 
particular critical mindmarks, concepts or categories (see below) that allow for a dynamic 
mental equilibrium with respect to our environmental encounter.     
The expanded framework of evolutionary biology 
The interconnected context of our anthropological roots is ultimately cosmic, a fact to 
which chapter 3 will return. Within the biological domain contemporary academia has 
unearthed a multi-dimensional plethora of interconnected contingencies concerning our 
formational history: those indelible influences intrinsic to our embodiment and 
                                                             
98 Grujid et al, Large Scale Systems Stability under Structural and Singular Perturbations (Heidelberg: 
Springer-Verlag, 1987) 
48 
 
consequently to any emerging self-consciousness. The context of evolutionary thinking 
has expanded significantly in more recent times.
99
 Awareness of particular details of 
evolution has stimulated a two-way dialogue with philosophy
100
 and has more broadly 
informed our methodology for anthropological and socio-cultural analysis.
101
 
The dominant evolutionary model in the 1940s was the so-called „modern synthesis‟ based 
on a mathematical treatment of population genetics models. The critical processes were 
genetic drift (largely neutral in as far as it did not necessarily influence reproductive 
advantage) and some vertical, selective pruning over many generations, resulting in a 
fitness landscape. Speciation was considered predominantly allopatric, the result of natural 
boundaries dividing respective environments, leading to diverse evolutionary trajectories. 
More recently, however, there has been movement towards an „extended synthesis‟ of 
evolution, incorporating a far greater body of evaluative evidence on evolutionary 
influences than that originally accommodated by the mathematical treatment of population 
genetics.
102
 This new synthesis refashions the older emphasis by opening up to such ideas 
as active niche-construction,
103
 the evolution of evolvability as a whole, epigenetic 
mechanisms of so-called „soft inheritance‟, and a generally more thorough consideration 
of the boundary conditions placed upon biological systems by the basic bio-physical 
constraints implicit in developmental mechanisms, not directly pertaining to nucleotide 
sequences. One such importantly acknowledged constraint is canalization, a bounding 
mechanism for phylogenetic development based on how later-emerging developmental 
processes are constrained by what has already been put in place by earlier ones. 
The „epigenetics revolution‟ has led to a variety of possibilities illustrating the potential of 
an inherently mechanistic system to function in a manner that appears to be not entirely 
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deterministic. Even genetically identical twins do not have exactly the same brain 
structure, and certainly not the same mind. Furthermore, during the pre-natal period 
changes in diet and living conditions experienced at different points during that period 
have surprisingly different consequences for the resulting offspring. A broader „epigenetic 
landscape‟ was needed in order better to relate to the observed distribution of 
phenotypes.
104
 
Various other layers of explanation have been offered for various levels of evolutionary 
mechanism. In addition to other horizontal transfer mechanisms there was McClintock‟s 
discovery of transposons, transferrable sections of DNA sequence, as a mechanism for 
genome shuffling. At the level of environmental encounter, the concept of exaptation (a 
term coined by Gould and Vrba) makes the important distinction between a „historical 
process‟ that may have formed a trait, or developmentally connected traits, to serve a 
particular function and a „current product‟ in which a possibly non-adapted trait is co-
opted to serve an entirely new purpose
105
 – feathers being a classic example.  
Another important recognition was that gaining reproductive advantage is only part of the 
story of evolutionary struggle, another aspect being the nature of competition for scarce 
resources in an ecosystem. Both competing organisms and the environment evolve in 
tandem with this requirement, and cooperative adaptation by symbiosis is one critical 
means of incorporating a response to such challenge. One means of understanding this 
connectedness became dubbed the Red Queen Hypothesis after the character in Alice 
Through the Looking Glass who says to Alice, “here, you see, it takes all the running you 
can do, to keep in the same place.” Organisms must be in constant biological motion with 
respect to each other just to remain in the same niche, and sexual reproduction became an 
indispensable means of speeding up the capacity for such adaptive motion – male and 
female being, genetically-speaking, in biological „motion‟ with respect to each other over 
the generations.
106
 On the cellular level, symbiotic associations have further fuelled 
increasingly detailed theories of symbiogenesis.
107
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There also remains the question concerning how best to integrate the species-influencing 
action of natural selection on the individual organism with the individual-capacitating 
mechanism of reproduction for the future of a collective species. Rothman concludes that 
there are two interactive and complementary types of selection: natural and reproductive. 
The former acts on being (predominantly related to individual traits); the latter acts on 
becoming (predominantly related to holistic mechanism, having prospective and 
retrospective components).
108
 
Rothman couches this within an appreciation of final cause in biological terms: an 
embodiment of purpose, constituting biophysical laws rather than merely conforming with 
them. In the case of somatic features the final cause is taken to be the circumvention of 
danger in an environment. In the case of reproductive systems, emerging over a population 
and in species characteristics, the final cause is, he argues, ultimately death, in terms of the 
part that the resulting statistics play in influencing the developing population dynamics. 
Though it suggests no detailed, mechanistic unfolding of the developmental aspect of 
reproductive systems Rothman‟s contribution is attractively lucid and consistent.  
He states at one point that „even in the simplest species, the need for sustenance does not 
give rise to random physical or chemical events, but to action that not only serves the 
purpose [italics Rothman‟s] of obtaining nourishment; it embodies that purpose‟.109 This is 
an interesting statement given that, considered theologically, one encounters the 
embodiment of divine purpose in the Incarnation of the Logos who Himself affords 
created order its profoundest sustenance.  
Trying to comprehend the intricate process of morphogenesis alone, in addition to that of 
the growth and differentiation of cells, has demanded an analysis of biochemical 
hormones, toxic chemicals and the physics of mechanical stress.
110
 Recently the evo-devo 
movement has shown great interest in integrating evolutionary and developmental 
considerations, and particular interest has focussed on the manner in which information is 
transferred and processed in biological systems.  
Küppers emphasizes the role of various biological boundary conditions as not merely 
offering protection but providing information, or at the very least a context for 
                                                             
108 S. Rothman, The Paradox of Evolution (New York: Prometheus Books, 2015) 
109
 Ibid, p.133. 
110 For a comprehensive contemporary account see J. A. Davies, Mechanisms of Morphogenesis (London: 
Elsevier, 2013) 
51 
 
informational integration. He further distinguishes between structural and functional 
aspects of complexity. From an informatics perspective, he relates these to syntactic and 
semantic aspects respectively, the influence of the latter extending beyond the former. 
Overall „actual information content is the result of the historical pathway evolution has 
taken‟.111 
Davies notes the current absence of any coherent info-dynamics, especially given that the 
manner in which we may view or define information transfer in functional terms is 
dependent on the context of our investigation. He emphasizes the need for a combination 
of „randomness‟ and „extreme specificity‟ in biological macromolecules – the randomness 
relating to a sufficiently high information content (in algorithmic terms) and the specificity 
relating to an expulsion of entropy from the domain of biological organization, released 
into the surroundings.
112
 In their major work on the rudiments of information theory, 
Cover and Thomas affirm that the future of such theory rests upon the hope that new 
contexts of exploration will naturally fall in some respect into the contours of an analysis 
that functions on the basis of standardly defined quantities such as informational entropy, 
relative entropy and mutual information, as well as Kolmogorov complexity (a means of 
evaluating algorithmic complexity).
113
 
Marijuán looks to „informational architectures‟ accommodating „upward and downward 
directions of causation‟ and notes the importance of considering the „natural properties of 
biological information (rather than merely computation)‟. He distinguishes between 
primary and secondary „addresses‟ with respect to enzymatically active sites, the former 
being concerned with „implementation‟ and the latter with some higher „orchestration‟. 
The overall challenge, for him, lies in „making sense of the informational events produced 
by the dynamic coupling between amorphous and sequential architectures‟.114 Any formal 
organization involves cooperation between distinct levels in some hierarchical array of 
architectures pertaining to different functional relationships.  
                                                             
111 B. O. Küppers, The World of Biological Complexity: Origin and Evolution of Life, in S. Dick, Many Worlds: 
The New Universe, Extra-terrestrial Life and the Theological Implications (London: Templeton Foundation 
Press, 2000), pp.31-43. 
112 P. C. W. Davies, Biological Determinism, Information Theory and the Origin of Life, in Dick, Many Worlds, 
pp.15-28. 
113
 Cover and Thomas, Elements of Information Theory (New Jersey: Wiley, 2006), pp.1-12. 
114 P. C. Marijuán, From Inanimate Molecules to Living Cells: the Informational Scaffolding of Life, in 
Musumeci et al. Energy and Information Transfer in Biological Systems, pp.217-244.  
52 
 
Recently, Marshall has presented an encouraging „third way‟ between an atheistic, 
accident-centred theory of evolution and the position taken by Intelligent Design 
advocates.
115
 He puts the information theoretic (bioinformatics) aspect of things first, 
placing natural selection as secondary. Clearly, natural selection requires first a substrate 
on which to operate, and there is far more to biological organization than some 
macroscopic filtering mechanism. Marshall promulgates adaptive engineering in the story 
of life. His advocacy of the idea of some actively creative operation as far back as the first 
ever living cells is attractive in its congruence to the importance given here to active 
contribution from the created domain, though it forces a careful consideration of what 
exactly is implied by words like „intent‟ or of the ascription of any cognitive, sentient 
qualities to a system.  
I think Marshall is right to connect any question concerning the origin of life to the origin 
of bio-chemical information, though one still needs to find a robust means of integrating 
informatics principles with those principles deriving from energetics. The energetics 
aspect of any living formation importantly defines the stability of metabolic pathways, 
while the informatics aspect considers how contextually salient information is provided to 
build the structures accommodating those pathways, in itself an energy-demanding 
process.  
As to the secondary role of selective filtering, Stadler et al
116
 add neutral drift, punctuated 
change, plasticity and modularity (describing functional arrangements of structures not 
predefined according to embryogenesis, ones facilitating new patterns of evolution just as 
much as they result from them) to the list of phenotypical phenomena not readily 
emerging from a mathematical, population genetics treatment of neo-Darwinism. They 
suggest a dynamic genotype-phenotype map taking account of topological considerations, 
ones that could explain phenotypical properties in a manner that „grounds patterns of 
phenotypic evolution in biophysical principles and mechanisms rather than arbitrary and 
convenient assumptions about fitness‟.117 The topological formulation further allows for 
the incorporation of structural independence between two phenotypic characteristics and 
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emphasizes the role of selection as occurring mainly through the introduction of 
covariance factors between different phenotypic traits.
118
 
Furthermore, there is now significant argument concerning whether mutations can 
properly be considered genuinely random,
119
 and yet another aspect of evolutionary 
debate, highlighted by Bissen, concerns the manner in which „chance‟ is understood.120 
The need is highlighted for a tighter awareness of the context in which particular terms 
such as „chance‟, „contingent‟ and „design‟, as well as „information‟ are defined and 
subsequently used or misused. Bissen argues that there exists a misconception on the part 
of creationist and intelligent design proponents that the nature of any debate is a matter of 
„chance vs. design‟ rather than „evolution vs. design‟, since, although different emphases 
are given to the place of necessity and law-based, probabilistic selection by different 
interpretations of the macroscopic journey of evolution, evolution is rarely presented as 
entirely blind chance.  
Defining „chance‟ is no easy task, implying the need for some existing framework of 
comprehension with respect to whatever might qualify the nature of any chance. 
Discriminating between coincident and non-coincident forms of chance is also only 
partially helpful. Any interpretation of chance is inseparable from some law-based 
framework within which patterns pertaining to probabilistic analysis may be quantified. 
Chaos theory adds another layer to this. It is not just the sensitivity of any one, particular 
logistic map to initial conditions that is the defining feature of predictability or 
unpredictability. There is also the question of structural stability – the degree of sensitivity 
found in overall patterns of stability, such as the so-called „strange attractors‟, with respect 
to small perturbations in the overall mathematical form of any underlying map/model.
121
 
In other words, one can examine how much the structural form of a mathematical mapping 
needs to be perturbed before subsequent iterations give rise to emerging, patterned regions 
of stability/convergence that bear little or no congruence to those arising from other, more 
distantly-related mathematical models. Differently hypothesized mathematical models 
would, furthermore, provide different enveloping frameworks within which any 
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probabilistic analysis could be carried out. It is important to distinguish this basically 
topological property, in which stability is being evaluated with respect to perturbations in 
the form of the equations (representing the manner of connectedness), from the more 
common idea of the stability of a physical state with respect to small perturbations in 
environmental conditions (the latter pertaining more strictly to Lyapunov stability). It is to 
an integrated view of such critical stability that I now turn. 
An integrated viewpoint: the dynamically stable, non-equilibrium emergence of the 
biosphere 
In a macroscopic biological context any notion of „chance‟ must be taken in relation to the 
layered, evolutionary build-up to that context, always necessarily building upon or within 
some previously established, functionally stable, dynamic system, arrangement or 
architecture. Frequently recurring patterns may manifest themselves according to a certain 
cooperation between energy and information requirements. The form that our 
anthropological roots and developing journey came to take is inseparable from those 
dynamic biophysical architectures that first capacitated the emergence of life on Earth. For 
several decades now we have been asking how long living systems took to form, and by 
what means.
122
 The first amino acids and proteins were originally thought to have been 
formed in a heated environment of UV rays, electrical storms, volcanic lava and meteorite 
impacts,
123
 though now this idea is roundly challenged by the idea of emergence from hot 
deep-sea vents.  
In a recent, comprehensive magnum opus Smith and Morowitz present a persuasive 
viewpoint in which the gap between geochemistry and cellular life is bridged by a 
biochemistry operating principally at the ecosystem level.
124
 The substrate for this 
bridging takes the form of a basic, universal group of small-molecule metabolites, 
indispensable to the formation of a stable metabolic dynamic, and which is continuous 
right back to the proto-metabolic origins of life by virtue of the continuity of the laws of 
physical chemistry. From an energetics perspective the principal mechanism involves the 
opening of a reaction pathway allowing for a lightning-like channelling of electrons from a 
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high-energy, high-entropy state of lower chemical potential to a low-energy, low-entropy 
state of higher chemical potential. Life consists in a non-equilibrium thermodynamics such 
that a given, representative trajectory of metabolic history need not cross through, or even 
near, a state of equilibrium. Closed, equilibrium systems are just not suited to life.  
Life is not seen primarily as some property possessed by an individual organism but rather 
as a principle of connectivity over the entire aggregate of the biosphere, emerging from 
and actively tapping into the energetics of interactions between three abiotic geospheres: 
the lithosphere, the hydrosphere and the atmosphere.
125
 The small molecule, universal 
metabolic substrate is argued to be a good candidate for „anchoring‟ the necessary stability 
of the biosphere, while allowing the potential for error correction. Informatics principles 
are taken as being just as critical as energetics principles for the acquisition and 
maintenance of such stability. 
Of vital importance is the self-amplifying compactness of reaction and network properties, 
incorporating an essential feedback for autocatalysis. This acts as the gateway for the 
aforementioned channelling cascade, channelling being furthermore a form of 
convergence. This consideration of „network topology‟ lies at the heart of the 
discussion,
126
 and Smith and Morowitz refer explicitly to a „bowtie topology‟ (a phrase 
they reference as being used by other academics in the field) formed through a particular 
combination of catabolic and anabolic pathways, the former moving towards the central 
„knot‟ and the latter moving away from it.127 This is a good example of a topologically 
stabilized niche of coordinated chemical motion, such network topology being critical for 
the opening of what they call the „biosynthetic gateway‟. 
Expanding on the place of information theory in their approach, they remark 
In some approaches to the origin of life, metabolism is viewed merely as the source 
of material for the biosphere. We wish to emphasize its role as a key source of 
information [italics Smith/Morowitz] for the structure of the living 
state…information is a property of systems that are subject to limits on their 
variation…Information in evolution is usually associated with processes of 
adaptive change, because that is how we recognize that variation is possible ex 
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ante but restricted ex post. The information in a unique and universal metabolism 
would be of a different kind, because it would preclude variation in the processes 
that permit structure to form at all…this is the information carried in paths of least 
resistance. It is essential to the organization of the biosphere because only along 
these paths are the residual problems of robustness in a hierarchical system simple 
enough to have evolutionary solutions.
128
 
There is therefore an aspect of informational heritage that is implicit and an aspect that is 
more functionally explicit. As to energy requirements Smith and Morowitz see the 
composite distribution of available energetics channels, shaped by the nature of the 
various interfaces between the abiotic geospheres according to the natural structure of the 
Earth, as providing the necessary (and semi-flexible) boundary conditions for such 
information provision. They consider information to be „inherently a distributional 
concept‟ according to which „the range of processes that must be referred to in order to 
state a pattern indicates the scope of variations that should be considered to define an 
information measure for that pattern‟.129 They consider that if, overall, biochemical 
variation were included within that „scope‟ indicated by an emergent pattern across the 
biosphere, such would enlarge the combinatorial space so far that any analysis of such 
would become equivalent to deciding „whether self-organizing metabolism is possible or 
unique‟.130 
Overall, Smith and Morowitz see the ecosystem level of bio-dynamics as exhibiting a 
greater degree of invariance than individual organisms. Such organisms are expected to be 
more information rich and algorithmically complex by virtue of needing to find a 
compartmentalized speciality within the globally-connected network of energy exchange. 
Based on an entire cascade of bounded, stability-inducing phase transitions, building up an 
interactive hierarchy of nested domains of organization step-by-step (so that lower orders 
remain stable in and of themselves and living systems become heterogeneously „nested‟ 
according to organizational modules), they consider progressive biological development as 
emerging from the small-molecular substrate for self-maintaining, autocatalytic 
metabolism. This gives rise to an „oligomer‟ world, involving the cooperation of various 
enzymatic cofactors, effecting a transition from self-reinforcement around a possibly 
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unique metabolic solution to some more selective system-level maintenance over non-
unique states. This then grounds the emergence (at the cellular level) of „individuality‟, 
robustly compartmentalized through genomic encoding. This individuality is argued to be 
indispensable for the emergence of specifically Darwinian dynamics in its characteristics 
of coarse-grained flow and shared fate. 
The strength of the phase transition schema lies in the fact that phase transitions imply 
some cooperative mechanism allowing longer-range order or organization to emerge from 
interaction at the micro-level, reducing the dimensionality of variance in the new domain 
such that error margins are brought within controllable confines. Some aspect of 
continuity must be preserved across any domain boundary, especially given that the new 
domain still relies on some preserved framework of laws/principles. An „order parameter‟ 
represents, statistically and causally, the primary feature of novelty in the new domain, 
around which other features are re-organized in accordance with the relevant principles. 
That aspect of the order parameter that is fully determined by boundary conditions is thus 
a necessity, and can be related to the continuity of the basic laws of physical chemistry, 
anchoring the stability of the biosphere.  
Smith and Morowitz take the primary bounding condition to be energy stress rather than 
temperature. Rather than an externally variable parameter defining some equilibrium order 
useless to life, particular networks of „transport currents‟ lead instead to non-equilibrium 
biological order. Life is seen as comprising of both states and processes in an integrated, 
jointly-ordered system, and any information measure must therefore relate both to the 
number of „states of being‟ necessary to satisfy bounding constraints and also to the 
number of „ways of doing something‟ necessary to satisfy the non-equilibrium demands. 
An information measure not only indicates the reduction in the number of states required 
to satisfy environmental constraints but also a „reduction in the range of histories that 
perform a function, where each history is an integrated series of states and 
transformations‟.131 
Within the organizationally-heterogeneous, quasi-stable, domain-distributed and 
hierarchically-nested dynamic connected across the aggregate of the biosphere, the various 
„order parameter‟-distinguished patterns or architectures of functional organization are 
able to communicate with each other across various semi-permeable boundaries. The 
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system as a whole remains necessarily flexible and „plastic‟ in the sense that there is the 
possibility of substituting various domain-bounded components without destroying overall 
functional coherence and relative stability. Living systems therefore have the capacity to 
„recapitulate‟ patterns of organization in new operational contexts,132 such that ecosystems 
are neither super-organisms in themselves nor are they merely communities of individual 
species. Certain holistic properties remain invariant with respect to the species fluctuation. 
This ecosystem-level language might find relevance to a theological domain of inquiry. 
The Incarnate Logos recapitulates created order (cf. Ephesians 1:10) in such a manner that 
the connectedness of our sacramental participation, in the topological „neighbourhood‟ 
referring here to our communion, is neither merely a natural community of individuals nor 
in itself supernatural in the sense of some pantheistic convergence. 
One of the most appealing features of Smith and Morowitz‟s presentation is its obvious 
integrative power. Functionally sufficient, dynamic stability is critical, reliant upon 
constantly self-amplifying and reinforcing feedback in order to avoid the tendency towards 
system degradation. This amounts to „using long-range correlations in an optimal way to 
ensure that – asymptotically – all errors are identified by comparison against a majority of 
uncorrupted, redundant degrees of freedom somewhere in the system‟.133 One could think 
of this as topological regulation. Organized, hierarchical complexity depends on a modular 
architecture which is in turn dependant on a layered metabolism, building from the level of 
atomic location/bonding up through the „control‟ level of the cofactors, into the 
information-sorting and replicating level, and leading finally to higher-order processes 
now additionally regulated by specifically Darwinian selection as acting on individual 
organisms.  
On its own, Darwinian selection would be too coarse-grained and wasteful, not itself able 
to explain any statistically reliable, necessity-based generating mechanism for life‟s origin. 
Heredity and ontogeny have to be in place before its action can produce positive, 
functionally effective feedback. Taking a bottom-up viewpoint, we start from a non-
equilibrium geochemistry and accompanying, phase-transitional electron cascades 
ultimately responsible for generating a non-flat biochemical architecture. Induced order 
parameters can be interpreted as flux attractors, according to which the statistically most 
likely trajectory or „fibre bundle‟ of flux pathways – offering a stable, but sufficiently 
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flexible, core biotic metabolism – is the one in which fluctuations around the flux 
pathways are conditionally independent and therefore not augmented by cross-
correlation.
134
 
It is important to distinguish properly between the interior, non-Darwinian, bottom-up, 
pattern-generating selectivity of self-organization within or around some established order 
parameter(s) – technically called „buffering‟ in control theory – and the exterior, 
Darwinian, top-down, individual-filtering selectivity (conditioning speciation) according 
to coarse-grained and possibly conflicting fitness requirements. The small-molecular level 
develops upwards through the catalytic control level of medium-sized molecules such as 
cofactors in order to influence, via what one might dub molecular canalization, what forms 
of individuality are eventually able to present themselves for Darwinian selection. Such 
additional selection can then feed its influence back in such a way as to “second” various 
important aspects of the already established, functional stability, such that subsystems 
come to cooperate more reliably as robustly integrated, context-dependent control 
systems. This Darwinian influence may then induce, over time, the formation of an 
interiorized model of an organism‟s surroundings, functionally insulated in order that a 
more reliable control system can develop.
135
 This cooperation between top-down and 
bottom-up effects, especially with respect to the formation of some appropriately insulated 
capacity for accurate representation, might well be comparable, in its critical effectiveness, 
to the context of the mind-brain relationship and the emergence of self-consciousness 
(chapter 3).  
Feedback, whether strictly homeostatic or otherwise, can be constructive for a particular 
purpose whether it is positive or negative in character. Environmentally circumstantial, 
quasi-stable feedback mechanisms are endemic to biological sustenance, such cycles either 
bursting or integrating with larger cycles within an environment or ecosystem, like a foam 
of bubbles bursting or recombining according to energetic stability. Such temporarily and 
circumstantially stable – or quasi-stable – conglomerations of feedback cycles,136 which 
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may change their structure and domain boundaries somewhat unpredictably over time, 
provide the nested and modulated hierarchy required for ecosystem-level organization of 
the biosphere. Hierarchical organization over a neurological system similarly undergirds 
the emergent properties associated with our brains and the functional stability of our 
consequent „mindscape‟. 
The emergence of intelligence 
The subject of human intelligence and creativity is clearly intimately connected to our 
self-consciously developing practice of behaviour, including the development of our 
linguistic capacity. The above discussion highlights that genetically selective influences do 
not represent the initial or exclusive driving seat over the history of life, having developed 
instead as efficient ways of establishing more robust assimilation of information in more 
strictly encoded form. Biophysical principles largely dictate what can, or cannot, on 
principle be formed or supported in a given environment. Recent advance has illumined 
the necessary complementarity between selective mechanisms and the way in which 
certain morphologies either could or could not be generated on principle.
137
 
Despite the well-acclaimed success of what neo-Darwinism and its more recent extensions 
allow us to explain concerning our dispositional or compositional attributes, especially 
with respect to somatic features, newly-developed schools of thought have been required 
to tackle the phenomenon of language instinct and the development of evolutionary 
psychology.
138
 
If one is to take seriously any analogy between biological and cultural evolution then the 
new synthesis contributes a certain basic intuition, in as far as words (a way of coding for 
concepts, analogous to the nucleotide sequence of „letters‟) and culturally visible, 
established manifestations of ideas (comparable with genes coding for the production of 
particular proteins) are not the original driving force, but represent a more robust 
accommodation of particular ways of perceiving and subsequently conceiving that were, 
on principle, largely accessible to early, pre-linguistic humanity, for whom environmental 
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encounter was catalytic for the development of pre-articulate thought. Just as there was a 
pre-Mendelian era, so likewise there was a pre-linguistic or proto-linguistic period. 
The need for a philosophical response to more recent developments in scientific 
knowledge and criticality has prompted a „post-critical‟ philosophy showing particular 
interest in our intuition, a word whose very etymology suggests engagement via some 
(possibly surreptitious) tuition, rather than being entirely innate or instinctive. Polanyi 
takes a thoroughly holistic, integrated view of the human person,
139
 noting its focal and 
subsidiary modes of awareness, in which development broadens the latter away from 
reliance on the former. He is critical of the empiricist‟s downplaying of the role played by 
human reason and personal judgement concerning empirical method. He emphasizes 
distinct stages of knowing through inarticulacy and pre-articulacy, as well as considering 
how explicit and tacit modes may interact, both at the „ineffable‟ extreme where explicit 
articulation is impossible and at the „sophistication‟ extreme where the explicit focus 
opens up a mode of thought not accessible to the tacit component, leading to a „logic of 
achievement‟.140 
He emphasizes especially that „when man participates in this life [that of noogenesis] his 
body ceases to be merely an instrument of self-indulgence and becomes a condition of his 
calling. The inarticulate mental capacities developed in our body by the process of 
evolution become then the tacit coefficients of articulate thought‟.141 This is not dissimilar 
to Rothman‟s idea (as above) concerning embodiment of purpose. The degree of emphasis 
with which one thing becomes focally articulated over another may then reflect a 
weighting of such coefficients according to the environmental challenges of the moment. 
The metaphor „tacit coefficients‟ is I think an elegant one, calling to mind the 
mathematical analogy of coefficients as weighting successive terms in a power series, a 
series needing to converge at some limit if it is to remain finite and be interpreted as 
physically meaningful. Where an analysis of stability is concerned, such weighting is also 
relevant to time-dependent Perturbation Theory, in which correction terms to some initial, 
unperturbed base-model term (derived according to a simplified context in which an exact 
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solution is analytically obtainable) can have time-variable coefficients.
142
 The idea of the 
stable aspects of our mindedness resulting from the brain having to perform ongoing 
correction procedures is considered in chapter 3.  
The „tacit coefficients‟ of our pre-linguistic formation are then developed in later 
generations as some accumulated, intuitive potential. Linguistic structure is therefore 
inextricably expressive of past encounter, such structure in turn forming the basis for our 
developing articulacy. In their investigation of the roots of creative space for a knowledge-
civilization age, Wierzbicki and Nakamori make use of this pre-linguistic formation to 
suggest that articulate language might actually have reduced human awareness of our tacit 
and subsidiary capabilities as our reliance upon such articulacy makes these functions 
lazy, though still latent in our biology. This they call the Rational Theory of Intuition, in 
which they distinguish from Polanyi‟s talk of the tacit component and define intuition as 
„the ability of preverbal, holistic, subconscious imagining and processing of sensory 
signals and memory content, left historically from the preverbal stage of human 
evolution‟.143 
They rightly see intuition as connected to a process of learning rather than some inflexibly 
inherited instinct.
144
 The question of intuition is still, however, inevitably connected with 
that which is considered „innate‟. From a neuro-scientific perspective, Ward considers the 
definition of innate as being somewhat elastic but generally implying the presence of a 
potential capacity not reliant on explicit, a priori knowledge of environmental content. He 
suggests that the term stands for a „readiness for certain knowledge to be acquired, but the 
knowledge itself is not strictly innate‟.145 While there is some instinctual readiness for 
knowledge acquisition such readiness requires the complementary development of an 
intuitive component, cumulatively learned through stably-structured, conceptually-
convergent responses to environmental input, in order for acquired knowledge to become 
more robustly and consciously articulable as some mental „content‟ or experience. 
Intuition might therefore be considered as developing such as to bring the latent potential 
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of our instinct and the heritage of the aforementioned „tacit coefficients‟ into a greater 
degree of conscious awareness, necessarily working in tandem with environmental factors. 
As to the communal heritage undergirding the development of speech, Aitchison traces a 
history of evidence from anthropology, archaeology and mitochondrial DNA in search of 
the developing seeds of articulacy, as the first hominids dispersed across the earth. In 
particular she notes the hypothesis that the Great Rift Valley separated the water-abundant 
west from the arid east, splitting the until then cohabiting groups of hominids in two, the 
ones isolated to the east being ultimately, if somewhat ironically favoured through the 
more demanding pressures of survival, with an increased adaptability for which speech 
development proved central.
146
 She considers various theories of anatomical development 
and estimates of timeframes over humanity‟s punctuated journey out of Africa, something 
making any putative universality in grammatical form of language
147
 all the more 
intriguing. 
The basic utterances of our pidgin and subsequent creole languages formed in direct 
parallel with a fascinating but intense struggle to survive. The nature of the urgency facing 
archaic humanity, as it first came to develop basic linguistic skills, was different to that of 
most people today. Adaptability through reactivity, emotional response and basic 
understanding needed to be relatively quick. Our capacity for effective cooperation would 
frequently constitute the difference between life and death. If one accepts the „out of 
Africa‟ hypothesis, then ever since early hominids were forced out of the forested areas 
and across the desert, urgency has never left their side.
148
 With the seemingly few 
advantages of grasping hands, good focal vision and conveniently placed vocal chords, 
accompanied with a more efficiently connected brain, these special hominids were 
somehow able to reproduce, feed and move with sufficient creative awareness to come to 
survive, and even to dominate over, the large majority of creatures who are any or all of 
faster, stronger, more agile, better protected and perhaps less complicated to sustain than 
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they were.
149
 All these factors contributed somehow to the pre-articulate development of 
our humanity. 
Developing our heritage: the compositional mindscape 
Human mindedness, in its focal and tacit components, naturally strives in some sense to 
ponder its nature and „place‟. However, the functional operation of the mind relies on 
establishing an at least quasi-stable perspective, rooted according to some systematic 
means of relating the domain of thought to that of physical extension: in other words, 
relating the mental domain referred to here as our „mindscape‟ to a particular means of 
encounter with the physical landscape within the context of which our species has 
evolved.  
The relevance of a certain critical symmetry between the way in which we come to form 
representations of the world and the way in which the world in turn forms our capacity to 
form representations was marked briefly in the Introduction. Concerning especially the 
importance of our pre-linguistic formation, Appleton considers the shaping of our mental 
processes along precisely these lines and for empirical guidance he appeals to the hard, 
experimental observation of our tendency to prefer certain landscapes over others.  
He notes that „there are within everybody‟s experience innumerable kinds of interaction 
between the two worlds, that of „reality‟ and that of the imagination. The latter is created 
by reprocessing raw material drawn from our observations of the former, material which 
has already been reprocessed in the act of observation itself‟.150 Light and sound are the 
two sensory media most overtly affecting orientation with respect to our environment, and 
are of considerable evolutionary significance. Appleton therefore asks, „If I build, not one 
world of my own, but two, one in sounds and one in pictures, what is the relationship 
between them?‟151 This question attaches to the work of John Barrow,152 especially in 
developing his theory concerning how the world of light shapes our intelligibility of space 
while the world of sound shapes our intelligibility of temporal ordering (itself partially 
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affected by the ordering of light in its degrees, tones or absence). In particular, Barrow 
remarks that 
The spatial order exhibited in painting or sculpture is heightened when endowed 
with a temporal aspect. Films are often more appealing than still 
photographs…music imposes its own perceptual order. It has a beginning and an 
end. A painting does not. Musical appreciation may be associated with a 
propensity of the mind to structure time in order to sort and store information. 
Music making is more complex, since it requires the coordinated action of different 
limbs or muscles. Thus it could be that our liking for music is...a by-product of an 
advantageous adaptation for coordinated actions.
153
 
This highlights the importance of a coordination and synchronization of those „worlds‟ 
pertaining to different sensory sources. The mind must have the capacity to unify its 
perception of such inputs by integrating associated conceptual categories, converging on 
critical points or aspects of focus and allowing our intelligible appreciation to become 
sufficiently articulable through just one communally spoken language, pertaining to one 
commonly perceived world. The non-trivial nature of any „topology‟ of 
interconnectedness upon which our environmental encounter and perception is reliant can 
indeed be seen by considering this necessary integration over different sensory sources. 
Appleton‟s worlds of sounds and pictures must combine into one landscape vision in 
which shades of light somehow connect with a temporal ordering of information, to which 
we have become tuned in our historical quest to establish our livelihood and which also 
affects our sense of aesthetic. He believes that this is broadly explicable in terms of 
morphology, function and evolution,
154
 and compares the Stoic world, in which perception 
of rightness is to be unaffected by lessons that may teach one otherwise, to the Epicurean 
world of an obtainable and graspable objectivity realistic to individual attainment. He 
argues the latter to be more consonant with the lessons of neo-Darwinism, but advocates a 
conditioned romanticism that abstracts itself from classicalism far enough for novelty of 
achievement (cf. Polanyi) but not so far as to forsake the advantages of classical formalism 
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and harmony.
155
 In the biological domain such formalism is built according to largely non-
Darwinian forms of selection and self-organization, as noted previously.  
To Appleton the key influence upon his own means of coming to perceive the world must 
have derived from „critical boundaries between that part of the world which I could see 
and that part which I could not, the field of perception and the field of speculation‟.156 He 
considers it crucially relevant that historical survival required (as for Rothman above) 
active encounter with often partially obscured danger. Perhaps for this reason controlled 
experience of danger provides an aesthetic pleasure for many people today.
157
 Attraction 
to artistic expression, always operating in part through the „field of speculation‟, must then 
similarly derive from some pleasure contained in the act of creation, deriving in turn from 
some inherited, innate capacity being developed through learning and creative intuition. 
With regard to this thesis‟ use of vocabulary, centred on such themes as dynamic stability 
and interconnectedness, Appleton importantly develops a symbolic framework formed 
principally from two dynamically interrelated aspects referred to as „prospect‟ and 
„refuge‟. Each of these is connected to a perception of environmental challenge: the 
prospect domain being seen in terms of a motivation and a capacity to search out and 
interpret environmental potential, incorporating whatever degree of risk we are prepared to 
take in pursuit of it; the refuge domain highlighting the requirement of some necessary 
degree of safety, being in a sense representative of that convergent stability which has 
allowed our very capacity for evaluating or interpreting our environment progressively and 
consistently to develop in the first place.  
Appleton acknowledges a partial but constructive feedback in his theory, since „just as our 
habits and our tastes in landscape are influenced by our life experiences, so also are our 
attempts to explain these things‟.158 His viewpoint importantly appreciates the relation 
between how we have been formed, physically and emotionally, and what methodology we 
therefore most naturally employ in order to appreciate this, expressing at root the 
necessary relationship between our physical ontology and our epistemological capability.  
Appleton is certainly aware of the different timescales of evolution and evolvability, 
carefully distinguishing between an evolution in the way we respond to stimuli of 
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opportunity and safety and that by which we acquired the means to respond in the first 
place.
159
 Biophysical evolution progresses more slowly but consequently leaves a deeper 
impression on our communal heritage. The relatively rapid changes connected with 
urbanization subsequently saw the replacement of many of the signs of nature with new 
and distorted objects of focus, such that we found ourselves „endowed innately with a 
mechanism for building a behavioural relationship with one kind of environment while 
living in another‟.160 Noting the historical struggle to emancipate ourselves from the baser 
challenges of our immediate environment, Appleton presumes some tension between an 
unwillingness to relinquish such dominance and a surreptitious yearning to engage afresh 
in that for which we are, in certain respects, naturally better tuned.
161
 
His symbols of prospect and refuge co-exist as a tense, dynamic unity, informing the 
noetic interpretation and appreciation of our „landscape‟ context. This provides a valuable, 
dynamic dual-aspect bond for the purposes of this thesis. Being both a dynamic and 
symbolic representation it can be extended to apply to the dynamic of our „mindscape‟ in 
general, relating to the manner in which internal representations of the world preferentially 
become processed and interpreted by the brain.  
While Appleton acknowledges that in a manmade work of art, such as a landscape 
painting, it is usually the stylistic aspects that are noted and not explicitly what is 
occurring with respect to a sense of „prospect‟ and „refuge‟ there is still a significant link. 
He argues that the chiaroscuro technique of juxtaposing light and dark emphasizes both 
prospect and refuge, while impressionism suppresses refuge and the coulisse represents a 
possible variety of forms of prospect-refuge interface.
162
 In a broader anthropological 
context – living within the Artwork of Creation as a whole (chapter 3) – we live, „move‟ 
and become intellectually acclimatized to our means of existence in the inseparably 
dynamic tension between these aspects of prospect and refuge, not selecting one to the 
exclusion of the other since they are not properly separable in the context of our mental 
dynamic. Our sense of stable „form‟ concerning environmental perception, inducing our 
appreciation of „refuge‟, itself contours that aspect of our environment that we then 
interpret in accordance with a sense of prospect, guiding in turn the manner in which we 
focus and develop our attention. 
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Given the symbolic nature of such description, Appleton further suggests that 
Once one has established that, even in traditional landscape painting, the 
interpretation of aesthetic response in terms of the observer‟s „habitat‟ involves a 
large measure of symbolism, one can never eliminate the possibility that even the 
most abstract forms of art may lie at the end of an avenue which leads to the 
primitive game of hide-and-seek.
163
 
This possibility is important if one is to extend or abstract the principle involved to the 
level of searching out a broader and theologically significant appreciation of our „habitat‟ 
or topos, without divorcing ourselves from the formational importance and rootedness of 
our „landscape‟ context. Something of this topos will inevitably be partially hidden or 
„implicate‟, enfolded and participating within that deeper environing pertaining to the Life 
of the Trinitarian Economy.   
The discipline of landscape architecture encompasses such areas as „problem 
identification, user needs analysis and site analysis‟,164 all of which could logically be 
developed according to Appleton‟s insight. There are empirically estimable factors 
regarding preference ratings, such as „mystery‟, forming part of Kaplan‟s „preference 
matrix‟,165 and our sense of prospect could further be considered in terms of „the promise 
of learning more about an environment as one moves further into it‟.166 
The prospect-refuge theory is attractive owing to its broad, applicative potential and 
critical, evolutionary awareness. It is scientifically relevant while remaining intuitively 
accessible to our more common, conscious experience and understanding. It presents a 
simple, suitably compact, conceptual framework that remains relatively flexible and 
extendable. Furthermore, it is properly focused on the important consideration of how 
what it has meant to become human affects the subsequent means by which we engage 
intellectually and creatively with our environment.  
This symbolically represented dynamic also offers an intuitive means of connecting the 
spatial and temporal „extensions‟ constituting our landscape encounter with those thought-
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processes resulting from the interiorized, representational capacity endemic to our mental 
dynamic or mindscape. This critical landscape-mindscape interface provides a convenient 
context of consideration in which to re-present the critical relation between extension and 
thought. Only around the convergent stability of such can our mental development occur 
in a sustainable manner. In any species cerebral development relies heavily on physical 
conditions, and the evolving process involved has already influenced our means of sub-
consciously processing any raw data of which we can subsequently become consciously 
perceptive and, from that basis, imaginatively conceptive.  
We may therefore consider how such a representatively dynamic, prospect-refuge 
„tension‟ or „bond‟ provides the potential for understanding more about our operational 
epistemology. It is here being claimed that our appreciable reliance on a dependable and at 
least partly predictable form of mental refuge is inseparable from our gradually deepening 
awareness of mental prospect – that sense of prospective potential associated with 
pursuing particular avenues of inquiry. Our natural attraction to „mental refuge‟ may be 
appreciated according to our naturally-conditioned tendency to focus attention according 
to some „category‟ analysis, intuitively developed over time. Such analysis is inseparable 
from our capacity for acknowledging particular core concepts/categories – considered 
more fully below – whose interrelation in turn informs our „prospective‟ sense. This 
natural inseparability conditions the intellectual coulisse, to borrow Appleton‟s term, of 
our mental dynamic, and inevitably has some bearing on our subsequent and “higher” 
intellectual capabilities, including our capacity to think more abstractly or philosophically. 
This dynamic further manifests itself through the basic human requirement or desire to be 
forward-moving in our intellectual, creative activity and provides a suitable means by 
which to consider the further evolution of our operative, mental domain and associated 
idiom of creative freedom (chapter 5).  
Barrow offers a comprehensive survey of the critical sizes and scales that influence the 
structural and functional properties of the physical cosmos, the macroscopic biosphere and 
the relatively microscopic details of those individual organisms embedded in some 
particular landscape setting.
167
 As part of this, and on the scale of human interaction with 
such landscape, he purposefully makes reference to Appleton‟s terminology in providing 
his own illustration of how the human mind picks out the most pleasing prospect-refuge 
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tension in its aesthetic evaluation of landscape, remarking that „so many of the classically 
seductive landscape scenes combine symbols of refuge and safety with the prospect of 
uninterrupted panoramic views‟.168 He notes that „the topography must allow us to 
navigate easily; landmarks, bends, and variations are welcome to the eye, so long as they 
do not create confusing complexities or mask dangers‟.169 Such „confusing complexities‟ 
are more bearable in the abstracted context of manmade art because they constitute 
controllable exposures to risk.  
Inherent to our ability to abstract is some degree of emancipation away from the 
topography of landscape towards what one might consider the freer topology of an overall, 
integrated mindscape, in which a tighter, conceptually more compacted prospect-refuge 
relationship can more readily be borne or imagined. Our mental dynamic is not something 
to be analysed as if from the evidence of a series of static landscapes, captured 
photographically in turn. Given the abstraction from the topographical to the topological 
domain, one might coin the term “photological” (something more like a film than a series 
of snapshots) to illustrate the means by which the processing of any mental imagery might 
be integrated and interpreted in the human mind. Any such hypothetical representation of 
our mental dynamic over time would then highlight the continual necessity for subtle, 
„reweighting‟ adjustments, made right down at the neuronal level (chapter 3) and 
occurring in accordance with those „tacit coefficients‟ previously impressed throughout 
our anthropological heritage as we „moved‟ both physically and mentally, requiring the 
ability to shift the focus of our attention from one context to another. 
The prospective aspect of our consequent thought-process might be considered in terms of 
a semantic elasticity, a potential for reinterpretation or re-evaluation, related to some 
inherent flexibility in our capacity for ordering and reordering various symbolic 
abstractions gleaned from our environmental encounter. Our mental refuge would then 
relate to the „structural stability‟ or reliability of particular, integrated forms of 
representation, adaptable to differing contexts of encounter without fundamentally or 
necessarily altering the architecture of our cerebral organization to any macroscopically 
appreciable extent. Such reference to structural stability refers once again to a topological 
property. Just as a given topology could on principle support a range of geometries, so our 
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mindscape can adapt to accommodate different environmental challenges, according to a 
hierarchical manner of organization. 
Dutton, also noting Appleton‟s influence, adds an emphasis on humanization, or evidence 
thereof in a landscape, being attractive for its added security feel,
170
 and explores the 
evolutionary basis for a noted preference for Savannah landscapes among young children 
and a cross-cultural preference for water, animals and human activity in a landscape 
painting. Some preferences may of course reflect the manner of one‟s nurture or 
education: evolutionary background relates to a lowest common denominator while a 
particular form of education may produce instead a highest common factor reflecting a 
more culturally specific response concerning one‟s educated beliefs and interpretations. 
Dutton considers, quite logically, that the greatest bulk of evidence concerning the 
evolution of any nature (having predominantly genetic and epigenetic roots) underlying 
our more instinctive preferences must derive from the Pleistocene era, given the 
overwhelming majority of human generations thus far having existed in some pre-city 
culture. He suggests, similarly to Barrow, an attempted inventory of human nature and its 
relation to spatial and temporal qualities of awareness,
171
 and emphasizes the importance 
of social co-operation. It is through such cooperative interaction that our baser 
instinctiveness provides a collective basis for the flourishing of a creative, learned and 
actively applied intuitiveness.  
Creativity is clearly inseparable from our capacity to be imaginative and to appreciate the 
subjunctive. The „worlds‟ of the real and imaginary (or the actual and the potential) are not 
separate in any absolute sense. What we contribute to the making of „reality‟ is stimulated 
by an on-going formation in our imagination, while what we are most fluent at imagining 
is in turn heavily conditioned by the way in which we are already accustomed to perceive, 
and conceptually to focus upon, that which we believe we understand in/by „reality‟. 
Dutton notes the remarkable way in which „children can invoke consistent rules and 
limitations within freely invented yet coherent fantasy worlds‟ but that „children are also 
able…to keep fantasy worlds separate [for these really can be separated] from one another, 
and to quarantine multiple imaginary worlds from the actual life of the real world‟.172 This 
ability is rooted in our crucial capacity for distinguishing between that which is 
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subservient to us and that to which we are subservient, according to the form of our 
embodiment.  
Dutton suggests a possible evolutionary role of fiction as arranging a repertoire of 
memorable, narrative suggestions made in accordance with a particular author‟s reality-
influenced thought experiments concerning human interaction, which he argues is an aid 
in unknown social circumstances. He makes comparison with a chessplayer getting to the 
point of having to search through the interconnected, variation-rich thicket of opening 
possibilities, beyond the point at which beginner-style rules of thumb are helpful, aided by 
the records and lessons of games played by others („fictional‟ with respect to that player‟s 
own particular set of games actually played) finding their way into the player‟s long-term 
memory.
173
 This principle is related to what I will call the re-creative genre of our creative 
activity, developed in chapter 5. The formation and development of any individual mind is 
thereby inextricably linked to the communally-connected development of a collective 
human mindscape, and to an evolution in the creative freedom of its operative idiom 
overall. 
The dynamic of thought-process 
For all the advantages that language brings, thought (or thought-process) ought not to be 
conflated with language, whether spoken or mentally imaged. Even Fodor‟s Language of 
Thought (LOT) theory
174
 says simply that there is a structural analogy between the two in 
terms of a relation between syntactic and semantic aspects. Any expressible thought must 
have been preceded by the operation of some pre-articulate faculty, a subliminal aspect to 
thought-process necessarily coming first, not least in evolutionary terms. I will think of 
language as a „window on thought‟, as Jackendoff presents it175 as part of a broader 
argument concerning how one might think about the active construction of human 
experience from the universal, foundational and evolutionarily-tuned „grammar‟ of those 
concepts and constructions that are, again on principle, appreciable according to human 
nature. He takes language to be a tool for achieving articulate resonance in our conscious 
experience, making the persuasive suggestion that „just as phonological grammar governs 
how the pronunciations of words can be put together, conceptual grammar must govern 
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how the meanings of words are assembled from smaller conceptual primitives‟.176 Once 
again, language robustifies the development of our capacity for mental conception. There 
is a certain „topology‟ lying behind that which is, on principle, accessibly conceivable for 
us, contoured by our embodiment and evolutionary history, and the developing context of 
grammar and specific uses of articulate language then „geometrize‟ the accessible contours 
of such a topology in accordance with the particulars of our environmental encounter. 
Bayne introduces the ways in which modern thought has approached the nature and 
subject of thought itself.
177
 On the assumption that thought should have a purely physical 
basis he notes just one mainstream suggestion, the Computational Theory of Thought 
(CTT). A responsible degree of caution is clearly necessary regarding how far we ought to 
be prepared to push any computer-based metaphor to describe the workings of the human 
brain and its associated mindedness.  
Penrose defends a position on the nature of consciousness which, through an argument 
connected with Gödel‟s Incompleteness Theorem, both denies that it can be reduced to a 
model based upon strictly computational simulation and yet also denies that it will remain 
necessarily outside of the explanatory capabilities of science.
178
 The argument highlights 
the difficulty, for the computational world, in finding congruence with the operations of 
particular, specifically evolved embodiments. There remains a gulf between the 
programmatically designed and the naturally evolved, especially with regard to the extent 
to which natural memory may properly be viewed as „compartmentalized‟. The jury may 
be out concerning any balance between algorithmic and non-algorithmic processes and 
influences over evolutionarily history but human intelligence cannot realistically be 
considered purely algorithmic. 
Human mental phenomena are all ultimately stimulated, while a computer program is 
predominantly simulated. Searle made a very similar point when he remarked that no 
matter how well a computer can simulate the workings of a digestive system it still doesn‟t 
actually digest anything and that „any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially 
(strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the 
                                                             
176 Ibid, p.189. 
177
 T. Bayne, Thought: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: OUP, 2013). 
178 R. Penrose, Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness (London: Vintage 
Books, 2005), pp.7-77. 
74 
 
causal powers of the human brain‟.179 Penrose further remarks on „the general quality of 
being able to understand [italics Penrose] that Man has somehow acquired, or developed 
to a high degree, through the pressures of natural selection‟, and he does not consider that 
computers can yet be said to „understand‟ in this sense.180 
Instead of applying the common metaphors of hardware and software to the brain and 
mind respectively, Bray suggests looking directly to the interestingly computational 
properties of proteins, constituting what he dubs „wetware‟. He proceeds to use this 
metaphor as part of his argument that cellular organizational mechanisms can be 
considered computational inasmuch as any „wiring‟ is replaced by an efficient 
combination of molecular binding affinity and diffusion.
181
 There is an inherently 
topological aspect to such organization, calling for a flexible potential for connectedness 
over varying scales and therefore a deeper insight regarding the concept of nearness or 
neighbourhood in cellular communication systems. Furthermore, it needs to be asked how 
organisms might “search” for the most biologically functional and efficient collection of 
subsets, interpreted in this case in terms of interrelating domains concerning possible 
molecular interactions. As noted in the Introduction, the very definition of a topological 
space is based upon the notion of a collection of subsets. 
Just as topological consideration is inseparable from the theme of connectedness, there is 
also a certain challenge to CTT from connectionist models, less heavily modularized than 
Fodor‟s theory, and certainly it seems reasonable that different regions of the brain, 
incorporating different types of cells and involving differently layered architectures, might 
suggest some functional aspects better described by computational theories and others 
better described by connectionist approaches.
182
 
Fodor‟s computationally-focused LOT hypothesis suggests inseparability between some 
intentional aspect of mindedness and an associated semantic appreciation concerning our 
environment, something generated through the processing of sensory input and 
                                                             
179 J. Searle, Minds, Brains and Programs (Behavioural and Brain Sciences, Vol.3, No.3, 1980), pp.417-424. 
180 Penrose, Shadows of the Mind, p.148. 
181 D. Bray, Wetware: A Computer in Every Living Cell (London: Yale University Press, 2009). The subject of 
structural and computational properties of proteins and of the possibilities they might offer us for the 
engineering of efficient biosynthetic materials has been a growing area of recent interest, related to the 
area of biomimetics (chapter 5). See Böker and van Rijn, Bio-Synthetic Hybrid Materials and 
Bionanoparticles: A Biological Chemical Approach Towards Material Science (Cambridge: Royal Society of 
Chemistry, 2015) 
182 M. J. Cain, Fodor: Language, Mind and Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), especially pp.81-111. 
75 
 
represented according to a particular, syntactical means of „tokening‟ various symbolic 
cerebral states. One might consider here the interesting distinction between the 
„intentional‟ (a property associated with the mind) and the „intensional‟ (a logical property 
of some sentences).
183
 Syntactically tokened mental states may not necessarily have to 
correspond to what we might articulate as some particular intention, but one could still 
assume a logical in-tension between any formal, syntactical aspect of mental 
processing/tokening and any semantically associated mental content or interpretation. The 
idea of such a dynamic form-content bond will be revisited in chapter 3. 
CTT is relatively flexible, however, interpretable through representationalist approaches, 
an algorithmic view of processing, or simply through consideration of the mathematical 
potential of systematised arrays of symbols. The question nonetheless remains as to how 
any formal property or aspect „generates‟ content, especially if different modes of thought-
process become associated with different degrees of reliance upon developing linguistic 
capacity. As a prerequisite for robust articulation proto-linguistic cues must be effectively 
arranged and integrated. 
From the perspective of operational epistemology, and assessing the form of any 
procedural rationality in those non-linguistic creatures comprising our living ancestry, 
Bermúdez suggests three levels of rationality: level-0, relating to reflexive, innate, 
tropistic behaviours simply requiring the stabilization of particular forms of information 
exchange; level-1, relating to the ability to compare „affordances‟, seeing the environment 
as an agglomeration of afforded possibilities (a vocabulary clearly congruent with 
Appleton‟s prospect-refuge dynamic), but with such comparison relying only upon a 
means of representing different possible (re)actions internally; and level-2, relating to an 
evaluation of choice that grounds activity in instrumental beliefs concerning respective 
outcomes.
184
 This highlights the importantly and necessarily layered development of 
rational operation over time, a stratified up-building that will be developed further in 
chapter 5. 
As to „affordances‟,185 Siegel considers the degree of primacy that representationalist 
approaches should be granted in the field of perception.
186
 She invokes what she calls 
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„experienced mandates‟ by which a subject is considered to be primarily drawn along by 
the manner in which they are already acting in a situation, in addition to other innate 
predispositions. The manner in which a particular encounter is perceived is shaped by the 
form of action involved in coming to such perception. The key question is then whether 
there is an internal representation of this action that provides specific illumination 
regarding perceptual content, as some „proposition‟ characterising the possible 
„affordance‟ of the encounter in question. Siegel argues that there must be some such 
representation.  
In agreement with this, the term „affordance‟ will here be extended metaphorically to a 
theological context of encounter in subsequent chapters. Any „representation‟ associated 
with our developing appreciation of some theological affordance is then seen as something 
carried along with the dynamic of our iconic nature and its creative activity – our 
developing „form of action‟ as collective and connected participators – especially 
inasmuch as we are „moved‟ to conceive something of that critically pervasive topos 
associated with the „motioning‟ of the Logos in and throughout created space/order.  
From an evolutionary perspective, one must begin with some proto-semantic appreciation, 
an archaic sense of significance and environmental affordance which has become encoded 
in terms of some innate capacity. This physical, formational quality provides a necessary 
substrate upon which subsequent human response to contextual challenge can develop. 
Eventually one reaches the point of formally reproducible representations of semantic 
significance, allowing various forms of communication to become socially embedded. 
Such capacity is then developed and passed on over many generations, progressively 
transforming an original, proto-semantic appreciation into a more robustly articulable 
means of semantic expression. The key evolutionary stages concerning the development of 
thought-process are therefore being taken as follows.
187
 
(1) Perceptual – based on the formation of constructive, internal feed-forward and 
feedback effects, responsive to particular types of stimuli impacting upon particular 
sensitivities pertaining to particular molecular constructs, leading to the formation, 
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development and active use of sensory organs. This constitutes the first level of 
„representation‟. 
(2) Conceptual– based on the emergence of a primitive mental ability to respond 
syntactically, and with operationally sufficient consistency, to some proto-semantic quality 
of recognition, evaluating (and re-representing) more complex combinations of stimuli. 
Anatomical features may alter slightly over time in conjunction with such a process. A 
basic gesticulatory code thereby emerges, eventually becoming rhythmically embedded 
and/or ritualistically developed (chapter 3). 
(3) Articulatory – emerging after the required networks, architecture and nature of 
connectedness in the human brain has developed, bridging onto the complementary 
processes of other anatomical developments. This allows for the major transition from 
relatively constrained gesticulation to more significantly varied and robust articulation. 
Social behaviour thereby develops more formally into something identifiable and 
maintainable as society. 
(4) Abstractive – consisting in the development of an ability consciously to intend some 
detachment of thought-process from any closer connection with immediate stimulus or 
perceptual context, affording the possibility of intellectual inquiry becoming partly an end 
in itself and increasingly able to consider its own nature in more formal terms. 
(5) Beyond formal logic – finally developing the capacity to think around those 
established contours which represent or reveal natural boundaries highlighting our various 
degrees of ignorance or unknowing, assessing the significance of any inevitable 
blackspots. 
Considering evolutionary complexity as a relatively unpredictable passing on of a multi-
faceted, embodied responsiveness to environmental challenge, the notion of „freedom‟ 
becomes tricky to define (chapter 5). Such freedom is intrinsically conditioned by our 
temporality and circumstance of encounter, right down to the neurological level and any 
associated „plasticity‟.188 Couched within such plasticity is the potential for the vital 
development of memory. Any particular, articulable memory, retrieved from the elusively 
distributed and hypothetical „engram‟, is further dependent on the form of retrieval cue, in 
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turn stimulated by the encounter in question. Natural memory is not therefore to be 
considered merely as some fixed databank.
189
 
As to the impact of evolution on the relative freedom afforded by memory, Clayton notes 
the important distinction between whether particular traits are shared on the homological 
basis of common ancestry or on the analogical basis of common environmental challenges. 
He highlights the distinction between quantitative and qualitative adaptations such as, 
respectively, an increase in the accuracy/duration of a type of memory and the 
development of a distinct class such as episodic memory.
190
 Memory is, furthermore, 
inseparable from creative ability. As Klein notes 
Different memory systems have evolved to solve different problems…memory 
processes are not just in the animal‟s head: memory systems have procedures that 
are designed to use specific cues that are reliably present in the animal‟s 
environment…Each encoding, storage and retrieval feature has co-evolved not just 
with the environment, but with attention and learning mechanisms that are just as 
problem-specialized as the more traditional „memory‟ features and without which 
these features would be inert.
191
 
Not only does this make the important point that consciousness is not a topic of discussion 
which can properly be confined to our cerebral interior without reference to the broader 
environment of encounter (chapter 3), but it also makes clear that the development of 
memory accompanies our evolutionary journey in all of its unpredictability and heavily 
conditioned responsiveness to changing contexts of encounter. Along this process its 
effects become functionally differentiated into qualitatively distinct classes.  
It would be helpful to have some robust, working means of translating this development 
into psychological terms. Vigo suggests a mathematically salient means of defining a 
psychologically practical measure of information, such that  
the notion of “the degree of surprise of an event” [as in Shannon‟s original 
electronics-based formulation] as the basis for measuring information is replaced 
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by the notion of “the rate of change of the structural complexity of a concept” or, 
equivalently, the rate of change of the structural complexity of the category (in 
intension) from which the concept is learned.
192
 
His underlying assumption is that „the manner by which organisms, and particularly 
humans, extract useful patterns for generalizing or ascertaining essential information about 
their environment…is necessary for organisms to be able to form concept representations 
(i.e., prototypes, rules exemplars, etc.) in the first place‟.193 He introduces his Generalized 
Invariance Structure Theory, which provides a means of tracking critical deviations from 
some invariant, conceptual norm or archetype and is subsequently used for the evaluation 
of conceptual or categorical complexity. The theory involves no entirely free parameters, 
which makes empirical verification easier, but a scaling parameter can be used to account 
for individual performance differences in various conceptual exercises.  
Vigo even develops his own calculus in order mathematically to describe how we might 
keep track of changing structural complexity while still recognizing the constancy (or 
stability) of the concept to which the category in question critically gives rise. He 
introduces the idea of an ideotype as „a higher order representation in psychological space 
that carries the structural information detected in categorical stimuli‟ and he interprets this 
practically as a „compound memory trace‟.194 He also takes a hierarchical view of the 
contributory aspects to our mental experience, such that  
…perception subsumes sensation…likewise one may argue that conception 
(concept learning or concept formation) subsumes perception…In turn, reasoning 
and language subsume conception…which are subsumed by problem solving. 
Finally, problem solving is subsumed by what may be regarded as the highest level 
capacity of all: decision making.
195
 
Not only is this consistent with that noted above (cf. Bermúdez), but Vigo also maintains 
that at each point in the hierarchy there is a corresponding qualification of memory. 
Importantly, our conceptualizing is taken to constitute „a fulcrum…on which all the lower 
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level and higher level capacities converge‟.196 As his theory develops it becomes clearer 
that this fulcrum looks rather like the “neck” in an hourglass topology. There are many 
different possible combinations of information-rich, sensory inputs and many possible 
abstract applications that may affect decisions on how to apply the results of conceptual 
processing, but any relative distribution or variety at the conceptualizing level must remain 
sufficiently compact and precise as for mental response to be reliably efficient – an 
evolutionary requirement revisited in chapter 3.   
In the context of the earlier discussion regarding biological information, one could 
consider such error-variation problems in parallel to the critically sustainable degree of 
variance accommodated within Vigo‟s concept-category relationship (a type of structural 
stability within the conceptual domain). This may perhaps allow for an intuitive link 
between the idea of different qualifications of memory, or memory systems, 
accompanying the development of our cognitive capacity according to a modular, 
hierarchical view of cerebral organization, and the developing complexity according to 
which the hierarchical connectedness of the biosphere is able to self-organize. In other 
words, there is an intuitive organizational link between the biosphere and the noosphere in 
this sense. In both cases, modulatory or individuation mechanisms are useful as a means 
by which errors may be prevented from spreading, at least to a functionally sufficient 
degree, and in which error buffering mechanisms can become better established, 
enhancing bio-physical and mental stability.  
Towards a theological connection 
As argued above, a particular, layered arrangement, accommodating a dynamic, 
orchestrating stability, is critical for the reliable sustainability of our composite mental 
life, of that which not only grounds our thought-process in a more „mechanical‟ sense but 
also influences the actively ordering and selectively filtering operation of intelligence to 
which such thought-process is necessarily conjugate. A primary function of intelligence is 
to evaluate degrees of relevance. In the context of a discussion on whether „flux‟ or some 
more explicit, particular arrangement (i.e. as represented according to particles) constitutes 
a more fundamentally suitable physical basis of ontology, Bohm considers how mental 
process and knowledge acquisition might be related to the framework of such a discussion. 
He considers thought-process in its „mechanical‟ aspect as the „active response‟ of some 
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composite memory, something continuously reintegrated over the various „phases‟ of life 
like a reorganizing kaleidoscope of contributory, collectively interrelating components. He 
argues, however, that this mechanistic aspect does not inherently or totally guarantee that 
„the thoughts that arise should be relevant or fitting to the actual situation that evokes 
them‟. Such conceptually positive discrimination requires „the operation of an energy that 
is not mechanical...that we shall call intelligence...able to perceive a new order...that is not 
just a modification of what is already known or present in memory‟.197 
The result of this operative intelligence constitutes an emergent novelty, beyond what 
Bohm refers to as the „fortuitous interplay of elements of memory‟. A theological 
extension of this might suggest that the novelty pertaining to a revelatory (from the divine 
„side‟) and receptive (from the human „side‟) communication between divinity and 
humanity, something attaining its apex theoriae in the incarnate Mind of Christ, ought to 
pertain to a still deeper emergent novelty or relevance. Very fittingly for the context of this 
thesis, Bohm‟s argument develops from his wish to avoid fragmentary tendencies in 
language by allowing the activity-centred role of the verb to form the kernel of linguistic 
development, constructing other aspects of linguistic expression around verbal roots in 
what he calls the „rheomode‟, a scheme in which our means of constructing language 
acknowledges some movement as being the primary factor.
198
 He appeals to our 
remarkably innate capacity effortlessly to fit the appropriate verbal mood to a given 
context, considering that this ought ultimately to derive from the fact that, when one 
considers the matter at the level of united flow or flux, „the content of thought and its 
actual function are seen and felt as one‟.199 
Part of our ability to appreciate such flow is our capacity speedily to discern degrees of 
relevance, and Bohm bases his argument upon considering the root of the word „relevant‟ 
as connected to the re-levation or re-lifting of some „content‟ into a mode of attention 
whose fittingness to the context of encounter can be discerned according to the associated, 
functional degree of relevance (as evaluated by our intelligence). The active involvement 
of a memory system then constitutes a means by which the likelihood of establishing and 
maintaining higher degrees of relevance, and therefore of paying more proper attention, 
increases.  
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Bohm notes that any re-levated content would stand out „in relief‟. This is fittingly a 
landscape term, here reflected in the mindscape. In this context one could say that human 
memory correlates with a re-levatory activity, and the iconic context of divine-human 
communication or encounter would then involve a subtle association between such 
receptive, re-levatory activity and some revelatory Activity. This association could then be 
understood according to an embedding of that „topology‟ contouring the dynamic, bio-
physical stability of our conceptual capacity within a broader and more theologically 
pointed, topological framework emphasizing a deeper, sacramental stability, based on a 
participatory model and established in accordance with the critically pervasive topos of the 
Logos. Our iconic capacity for conceiving something of this actively involving topos is 
again taken to be enabled by the „motioning‟ of the Economic Trinity whose image is 
bestowed upon the activity of the human mind.   
The framework of this thesis effectively points towards some working „model‟ of 
interaction between that interconnectedness undergirding the communal heritage behind 
our developing, operative idiom of engagement and that communal inherence pertaining 
to divine nature and its associated, operative idiom as Trinity-in-Unity. The iconic image 
of Trinity-in-Unity, as may be discerned through our creative capacity (as per Augustine 
and Sayers), affords us a sacramentally significant stability: a reliable and theologically 
relevant topos of encounter. 
Heidegger‟s ontological approach to our „place‟ in the scheme of things advocated Dasein 
as a temporal entity, always possessing some mood, inseparable from the world with 
which its engagement produces mutual feedback, finding its priority in potential and its 
greatest redemption from its fallen state when distanced from the trivialities of idle Gerede 
and absorbed instead in attending to specific usefulness or relevance.
200
 Of particular 
interest here, Malpas relates Heidegger‟s treatment of „dwelling‟ in Being and Time to the 
consideration of some associated topology. He remarks that „building must be understood 
as arising on the basis of dwelling rather than being that on which dwelling is based‟.201 In 
what follows here, the idea of humanity‟s contributory up-building is likewise taken as 
being on the basis of some integrally afforded topos, representing the ultimate grounding 
of our „dwelling‟ in both bio-physical and theological terms. In the theological case this is 
extendable to the pivotal Johannine theme of mutual in-dwelling.  
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When it comes to any topos associated with the integrated bond of experiences, memories 
and representative perspectives forming our „mindscape‟ it seems necessary to interpret 
our „place‟ at least partly in terms of an egocentric sense of location, but one which can 
further act as a catalyst for learning, development and recollection. Such a „place‟ is 
created, operative in created space, and one should properly distinguish here between the 
idea of space and that of place. Mackenzie considers the usefulness of this distinction and 
relates it to Luther‟s „topology‟,202 interpreting Luther as wanting to reconcile any 
opposition between the place of „living before God‟ and that of „living before the 
world‟(although perhaps „in‟ would be a more suitable choice of preposition in this 
context) and arguing that Luther should be read as seeking an equal balance between 
subjective and objective aspects of space. Formation within created space/order seems to 
aim towards the revealing of the topos of individual human perspective, holding a unique 
distinction and „distance‟ between Creator and creature. Ultimately, however, we must 
come to appreciate some communally-integrated topos pertaining to a sacramental, 
participative sharing in the Mind of Christ, in which we commune in accordance with an 
integrated topology. Christ notably directs the Samaritan woman towards the idea that 
„you will worship the Father neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem‟ (John 4:21), 
pointing away from topographical constraint towards some greater, topological pervasion 
and freedom, worshipping „in spirit and in truth‟. 
From a theological perspective it is also interesting to note Christ‟s statement that „foxes 
have holes, birds of the air have nests, but the Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head‟ 
(Matthew 8:20 and Luke 9:58). The mental dynamic associated with the human „head‟ and 
its associated topos cannot ultimately dwell in any convenient isolation of refuge or 
prospect alone, neither the refuge of the hole nor the prospective vantage point of the nest, 
having instead to live through an inseparable relationship between the two. Appleton‟s 
symbolic framework may therefore incorporate theological relevance. Owing to our 
unique capacity for higher modes of abstraction, allowing us a theologically significant 
intellect, no purely physical abode associated with our „landscape‟ context ultimately 
suffices, especially not for the intended fullness of our humanity demonstrated through the 
Incarnation. The manner in which we carve our basic drive for survival into our physical 
surroundings does not, and cannot, equate to finding any eternal „place‟ or abode. That 
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ultimately theological challenge requires a higher form of living relationship than that 
encountered in the localized context of an ecosystem. In responding to this challenge, the 
symbolic aspects of prospect and refuge should acquire theological relevance. What is 
revealed constitutes the basis of an „affordance‟ pertaining to a higher environing, 
something ultimately defining a sense of eschatological „prospect‟ in dynamic and 
developing relation with our ongoing yearning for a higher refuge (cf. Psalms 16:1, 17:8, 
90:1 and 91:1-2) and eschatological „rest‟.   
Summary 
The hierarchical, modulated and dynamic order constituting the biosphere consists in 
particular, layered domains of stability, emerging according to a combination of energy 
and information requirements. The integration undergirding such stability affords 
individual organisms a natural platform of operation. The subsequent development of 
various requisite, functional faculties enables greater responsiveness to those aspects of an 
organism‟s environment that may, with sufficiently predictable consistency, actively be 
perceived according to some reliably intelligible pattern. This development is necessarily 
conjugate to, and therefore sufficiently correlated with, that organism‟s means of receiving 
sensory stimuli. Once the receipt of perceptual input has been processed, has become more 
robustly, efficiently and compactly interiorized and (in higher life-forms) integrally 
conceptualized, a new domain of mental stability emerges, largely on the basis of a 
capacity for integral, stored representations.  
These representations may then be invoked in different ways according to different forms 
of retrieval cue associated with differently categorized classes of memory. In humanity, 
the development of a particular form of linguistic capacity lends an additional layer to this 
hierarchy, by which a relatively abstract use of language arising through various, 
conceptually convergent arrangements of symbols, becomes reliably stable in itself, 
feeding back so as to contribute to the enforcement of its own stability (perhaps even 
through some demonstration of proof) in a more self-conscious, deliberated manner. 
Among other things, this moves one step closer to highlighting the ultimately cosmic 
context of interactive formation lying behind the phenomenon of consciousness (chapter 
3). The context for our overall mental „affordance‟, and the necessarily correlative 
character of its relative and finite stability with respect to our environment, develops from 
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the interactive entirety of such cosmic context and the parameters, whether constant or 
evolving, associated therewith. 
Various natural limits and a critical requirement for particular degrees of precision are 
necessarily placed on those conceptual categories to which our cognitive capacity relates, 
limits reinforced by the evolutionary requirement for speedy and reliable recognition of 
such categories. Too much variation may well render the category in question 
unrecognizable. Such limiting factors give the „topology‟ of our mental engagement an 
hourglass form by virtue of our developing intelligence and capacity for clearer 
articulation first requiring some appropriate convergence upon various critically guiding 
„mindmarks‟ or points of conceptual reference. Such necessary convergence means that 
any emergent, creative, practical application of our intelligence results from a prior 
channelling through the node or neck in this hourglass. This idea will later be re-expressed 
in considering the theological context pertaining to the Mind of Christ, where topological 
constraint will be reinterpreted according to various contingency-induced „terms‟ 
inevitably influencing or contouring the mode of divine encounter in assuming a finite 
human nature (chapter 3).  
Stability is an inherently graduated concept, inseparable from any consideration of 
functional establishment and from some qualification (or even quantification) of freedom, 
according to the necessarily correlative mode of interaction throughout previously 
established structures or architectures. Our mental stability is similarly inseparable from a 
consideration of those qualified degrees of freedom pertaining to our physically 
conditioned „idiom‟ of operation. The next chapter looks towards our higher search for 
stability in a theological context and considers the nature of our topos from a biblical 
perspective. 
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Chapter 2: From Creation to Temple – Considering Theological Stability 
The chapter title deliberately parallels the previous discussion on landscape-mindscape, 
highlighting a significant Creation-Temple connection. The Temple focus is chosen as a 
background leitmotif owing to it being a symbolically detailed and relatively continuous 
aspect of theological development over the biblical period, including its reinterpretation 
and reincorporation in the New Testament context, made newly relevant or re-elevated (cf. 
Bohm and noting further the French translation of John 2:19 involving the verb relever). 
Such a conceptual transition offers an insight regarding how our topos and its theological 
„affordance‟ might be reconceived and even become liturgically manifest.203 Creation and 
Temple are also suitable areas of focus for considering how the „motioning‟ of the divine 
Economy, involving the critically pervasive „place‟ of the Logos throughout the dynamic, 
created order, is sacramentally relevant to the establishing of our deepest and most proper 
topos through „heavenly participation‟. It is fitting that the Hebrew word ןוכ indicating 
stability or the act/process of establishing is related to the word ןוכמ for „place‟. 
Furthermore, the ותבש־ןוכמ or „place‟ of God‟s dwelling/rest is represented, in the temple 
context, by the ריבד or holy of holies, from the root indicating speech or „word‟. The place 
of the word is therefore a concept related to the stability or establishment of the temple 
context.
204
 Overall, this chapter considers the biblical significance placed upon our nature, 
topos and potential, emphasizing the importance of our theological and sacramental 
stability. 
Choosing a framework of interpretation 
First, the approach should be clarified, especially in view of the contemporary scientific 
context with which this thesis is concerned. Clearly some „irreducibly extra-scientific 
knowledge‟ is necessary in addition to what is more normally considered scientific 
knowledge, including some aspect of direct, personal acquaintance.
205
 This should, 
however, be expressible in a manner relevant to the „scientific‟ in the broadest 
understanding of the term. 
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White argues, I think correctly, that there is no absolute standard of biblical interpretation 
that can be agreed upon on theoretically,
206
 replacing the idea of objective intent with that 
of a „central theological presupposition‟ about what God is doing. Here it will be 
considered how God-as-Author might accommodate potentially contributory or co-
operational human activity, especially through an involving inspiration permitting 
contribution from our interpretative freedom of engagement with the text and the entire 
canonical process. Furthermore, Christian Tradition does not just concern interpretative 
activity, but also the question of how such activity is to be embodied.
207
 From an 
educational perspective, canonical process consists in the maintenance of a normative and 
educationally relevant judgement as to how a collection of texts may be interpreted within 
a sufficiently consistent framework to be semantically enduring while still permitted a 
sufficient novelty of encounter to remain alive and fresh.
208
 The phrase „canonical process‟ 
comes from Sanders, who emphasizes that „a primary character of canon is its adaptability 
as well as its stability [italics Sanders]‟.209 Once again therefore, stability remains a central 
concept.  
An allegorical approach is taken here, relating the structure of a text to critical (but stable) 
underlying concepts or metaphors, or to the comparable structure of another text in a 
different context. It seeks, for its own validation, semantic consistency of such means of 
interpretation across the Canon. It is through consistency of relevance to an overall 
framework of symbols/allegories, involving some hind-sighted lens of interpretation, that 
such texts can realistically be claimed to be „inspired‟. 
In considering the allegorical method as being rooted, philosophically-speaking, in the 
human mind‟s limitations in relating to the „objects‟ of its thought, Brown remarks that 
„the worst enemies of such inquiry…were superficiality, the dead-weight of common-
sense, habitual stereotypes that made a man cease to be surprised and excited, and thus 
veiled the most vertiginous complexities with a patina of the obvious‟. He notes that 
Augustine had considered the category of „time‟ an apt example, as well as considering the 
„veiling‟ of Scripture as being purposed to engage the reader more powerfully but 
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indirectly.
210
 The distancing caused by the resulting indirectness of knowing was, for 
Augustine, „bridged‟ by the particularly intriguing manner in which Scripture presented its 
own melee of symbols. The symbol-oriented approach here is inductive, inasmuch as it 
accepts that „emphasis upon structure and genre is supported by the consideration that 
communication never comes as pure content but that form and content are always 
inextricably bound together in the communicative process‟.211 Indeed, the interest on form 
and content in this thesis goes beyond that specifically applicable to biblical hermeneutics. 
I seek theological aspects of relevance to an engaging scientific context, though not 
committing myself to any official philosophical position regarding an intellectual co-
fraternity between theology and science in biblical terms. With regard to the relationship 
between possible biblical intent and scientific doctrine, the approach here is broadly 
discordist, but not to the point of suggesting any direct analogy between the „radical 
coincidence‟ of divinity and humanity and the relationship between theology and 
science.
212
 There may be occasional points at which biblical theology and scientific 
knowledge might speak about roughly the same context in different but complementary 
ways, but overall each discipline is afforded a greater freedom and integrity if any such 
concordance is circumstantial rather than assumed. This is in line with Polkinghorne‟s 
view, which considers that „the wisdom writers are the nearest ancient Israel got to 
anything remotely like a dispassionate scientific attitude‟.213 Considering especially those 
passages of Scripture, including the Wisdom literature of Job (see below), relating various 
chaotic but still integrated occurrences within the Creation to the revealing of some 
pathway by divine preparation, McLeish and Hutchings remark that „if our world was 
entirely random or entirely predictable, life as we know it would not be possible, and we 
could have no hope of any meaningful interaction with either nature of its Creator‟.214 In 
the context of this thesis, however, the „pathway‟ in question is a topological opening 
within a broader context of participation.  
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The concept of such a pathway inevitably invites an active searching on the part of 
humanity. Brueggemann claims that to live out canonical relevance in contemporary faith 
is inevitably to take „risks‟ of imagination not in order to make definitive answers to on-
going questions of interpretation but primarily to give some extra-commentary motivation 
to the community of faith to join in a journey of exploration.
215
 Such explorative 
engagement is equally important where scientific relevance is concerned.  
Finally, I consider the approach here to be within the hermeneutical guidelines presented 
by the Catholic Church,
216
 and further commend Oeming‟s placing of „philosophical 
premises‟ at the start of any theological exploration,217 as I have aimed to do here.  
The „place‟ of the Word  
Given the centrality of some critical, pervasive conception of the Creative Activity of the 
Logos to this thesis a holistic viewpoint is necessary, interpreting theological content over 
the Scriptural Canon as a whole while keeping hold of the concept of the Word of God as 
the Incarnate Logos, assuming human nature and tabernacling among us. It is therefore 
necessary to consider the study of the Canon as a Christological exercise. Failure to do so 
risks provoking an unhelpful disjunction between the „Word of God‟ as interpreted over 
the Canon and that appearing directly in Christ. The ontology of Christ transcends the 
capacity of the Canon (cf. Hebrews 1:1 and John 21:25) and the potential and motivation 
to search for a progressively deeper, more holistic interpretation
218
 over a canonical 
process of engagement remains open to our epistemological involvement. Such 
interpretation must also be relevant to things nominally outside the Canon, informing the 
„process‟. 
In commenting on de Lubac‟s approach to Scripture, Milbank notes similarly that 
Christ‟s human nature could not exhibit through divine personification the divine 
idiom unless literal events of his life were doubled by an allegorical summation of 
all of the Old Testament and indeed all foregoing reality. Only the metanarrative 
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level of allegory…sustains the narrative coherence relevant to and constitutive of 
Christianity as such.
219
 
Taking seriously the relationship between the relevance of the canonical library of 
Scripture and the „Word‟ made flesh, and given the unity of divine and human natures in 
Christ, there must also be unity of truthful encounter between divine and human idioms of 
engagement in any activity through which communicable inspiration may reveal itself, 
relevance and revelation again being conjugate to each other. The human engagement (in 
this case through the words) can and should become the subject of all manner of 
recognized methods of biblical criticism,
220
 while still remembering the task of searching 
for an inspired consonance with a greater, sacramentally pervasive mode of divine 
engagement and self-communication in the Word. 
Balthasar, in considering the temporal movement of the Word through the various stages 
of human development in the Incarnation, highlights the subtle multi-dimensionality 
according to which the actions, words and even „blood‟ of the Logos might be considered 
to flow and to open themselves to human response and interpretation in engaging with 
Scripture.
221
 The Incarnate Logos is prolific in His capacity to draw all things to Himself 
through His Passion and into an ascended Resurrection by which He loses nothing of all 
which the Father has given Him. Such drawing together is critical for any holistic “macro-
theology” and Balthasar‟s parallel between the significance of Mary and the Bride that is 
the Church, the Second Eve,
222
 also allows for a microcosmic representation of our critical 
capacity to conceive (of) the „place‟ and significance of the Logos. This particular 
significance of Mary will be revisited at the end of this chapter, invoking the prospect-
refuge symbolism in the context of a theological stability and its associated „affordance‟. 
Balthasar notes the primacy and, even despite becoming flesh, the immutability of the 
Logos, the non-passing of whose hypostasis is considered theologically equivalent to the 
Resurrection and whose passage through time was/is such that „he has passing time also in 
his grip, not through a poetic, legislative transcendence of time, but by dominating the 
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inner time structure‟.223 To reflect a genuine sense of the eternal in the fullness of one‟s 
life is truly to have come from God, which, to Balthasar, makes the mission of the Logos 
unique and allows that „the individual figure as well as the sense of direction are enfolded 
in the eternal‟.224 This language of „enfolding‟ is complementary to that used, in their own 
ways, by both Cusa and Bohm. The concept of the „figure‟ alongside the phrase „enfolded 
in the eternal‟ also accommodates the transfiguring quality of the Creative Activity, a key 
aspect of which works itself out through the divine idiom of engagement with our 
creaturely temporality (chapter 4).  
Maintaining sacramentality: taking the „physical‟ seriously 
Given the „background‟ sacramentality assumed throughout, one should consider the 
nature of any sacramental conception in the Old Testament. Moberly, in connection with a 
commentary on the healing of Naaman and the request for the earth/soil of Israel in 2 
Kings 5:17, eloquently remarks that 
He recognizes the particular connection between the LORD and Israel, and so the 
presence of Israelite soil would have a material specificity that would symbolically 
represent Israel in such a way as to focus his understanding and identify his 
sacrifice as directed to the LORD, the God of Israel…The role of Israelite earth 
within such a logic could arguably be recognized as sacramental.
225
 
He hints at an Old Testament sacramentality developing through an awareness of the 
insufficiency of life and human existence outside of a proper relationship with something 
beyond the sustenance found purely within created space. 
Boersma notes Maximus‟ participatory viewpoint, seeing creation as sacramental offering, 
and also the fathers‟ more general view that „Old Testament events were sacraments of the 
Christological reality of the New Testament...It was this sacramental participation that 
gave the temporal order eternal significance‟.226 Considering such participation to reflect 
the critical, mutual indwelling towards which the progressive build-up of John‟s Gospel 
develops, moving towards its conceptual climax in something not ultimately containable 
by this cosmos, an important insight is highlighted regarding sacramental time, seeing the 
                                                             
223 Ibid, p.242. 
224 Ibid, p.246. 
225
 R. W. L. Moberly, Sacramentality and the Old Testament in Boersma and Levering, The Oxford Handbook 
of Sacramental Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2015), pp.13-14. 
226 Boersma, Heavenly Participation, p.32 and p.39. 
92 
 
Holy Spirit as communicating between “distanced” but still somehow interconnected 
events or manifestations, especially through human memory and tradition. The 
significance of one moment of encounter highlights that of another and since „temporal 
events have meaning because of their sacramental connection‟ a purely rational, 
propositional view of revelation that might fragment or obscure any integrated 
significance across otherwise separated events is less appropriate.
227
 One must also 
appreciate revealed truth as being inevitably relative to the created space within which 
such truth is, or is able to become, appreciably received as an analogia veritatis.
228
 The 
significance of this inextricably spatio-temporal aspect of sacramental analogy or 
participation is considered further in chapter 4. Boersma notes Bouillard‟s distinction 
between eternal „affirmations‟ and temporal „representations‟, which highlights the 
importance of viewing any holistic representation of the „place‟ and revealed relevance of 
the Logos as being in itself a dynamic, as stated in the Introduction. The res (the mystery) 
transcends the sacramentum that is in this case inseparable from „the particularity of 
human discourse‟ throughout our participative engagement.229 
Williams presents an angle on natural theology that gets to grips with the fact that 
revelatory reception takes place within natural, created existence, focusing attention on the 
very way in which the material world is steeped in subtle and implicit communicability.
230
 
Such tacit communication, sometimes seeming superficially like „silence‟, provokes the 
emergence of various types and scales of embodiment (arguably even down to inter-
cellular communication) which in turn provide the basis for the emergence of linguistic 
ability and consequent influence upon theological development. The concept of „God‟ has 
an inseparable part to play in this process and the activity of coming to speak about God is 
inseparable from the process of enhancing our horizons and discerning various 
epistemological limits. The very concept of „God‟ enables or catalyses the uncovering of 
additional and deeper truths, but without the concept itself becoming a finite predicate or 
direct object, since Williams remarks that the very definition of contingency could be said 
to consist in some contextual limitation to a finite predicate, subject to other influences. 
The „infinite‟ is therefore analogised here with the enveloping mood of the infinitive, the 
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very name of the verbal activity in question, not in itself being contingent upon or defined 
by any one particular grammatical context or structural „geometry‟. 
God is incarnationally creative through, among other things, the fact that the development 
of any language concerning divine nature, and the search for its relevance and meaning in 
humanity, occasions some genuine semantic novelty, pushing our previously established 
capacity for understanding ever slightly beyond its more immediately natural, contextual 
limits. Williams‟ theology importantly does not fall foul of any reductionist or materialist 
isolationism that might simply serve to make the spoken capacity (and, just as importantly, 
also the incapacity) of language less than relevant to the entire historical 
interconnectedness of our physical contingency. Theological consideration must properly 
remain relevant to everything affecting our physical acquisition of the capacity for 
language and the consequent conditioning of the manner in which we may come to 
conceptualise any relevant „terms‟ or critical categories. There is therefore an evolutionary 
aspect to the way in which our appreciation of revelation emerges, and to how we come to 
consider what we mean by revelation. 
Crystal, as part of a comprehensive survey concerning how language ought best to be 
viewed and how close-knit its nature is to the conveniences and potentials of our 
embodiment and our activity respectively, takes linguistic development as resulting from 
interplay between human ability and cultural requirement.
231
 For him too, the theologian is 
prominent as one whose discipline naturally demands the pushing of language right up to 
the verge of the non-articulable, pushing human conception beyond previously bearable 
boundaries. 
Meyer notes the debate between Eunomius and Gregory of Nyssa on human language,
232
 
the former arguing it to be of divine origin and the latter claiming human origin, especially 
due to its dependence on space and time. He considers that „while language is a function 
of intelligence enfleshed, language exerts a counterforce that influences the very shape of 
flesh itself‟.233 Unlike Eunomius, who sees language as made totally reliable by God, 
Gregory denies such reliability, asserting that something is always lost in translation and 
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hence the need, especially in Scripture, to multiply images of presentation.
234
 This is 
important, for Gregory, in making God a point of longing rather than an object of 
knowledge.
235
 
Language is in one sense prior to Scripture, in that one could not have any formally 
written record without it, while Scripture proves significant as a theological source by its 
role in highlighting certain critical, theological „domain boundaries‟, aspects of encounter 
where language is pushed beyond its more natural capacity or literal implication in order 
to accommodate the context in question while still pointing towards something critically 
and conceptually stable.  
Our theological capacity is shaped by everything that has contributed to the way in which 
theological language has come to function, and must accommodate our progressive 
interpretation of new intellectual contexts. Combining this with the philosophical question 
of how, in principle, best to „conceive‟ (of) the Word, one is drawn to consider how to 
read the term Logos (chapter 3) and to interpret its assumption of human nature, revealing 
a fuller theological relevance than previously encountered. 
The greatest unity of communion between divine and human natures and their associated, 
operative idioms occurs in the Logos made flesh, retaining the distinction and individual 
integrity of each nature. In a similar vein, in the more partial and varied (Hebrews 1:1) 
nature of any purported relation between the words of a text and some revealing 
inspiration through the Word, there must be two distinct but cooperating modes of 
engagement – divine and human. The operative engagement of divine initiative must itself 
enable interpretative reception on the part of human responsiveness, taken here as 
consisting in an idiomatically distinct mode of reception formed by all relevant, physical 
contributions to the relative but critical stability of our finite, conceptual capacity over 
time. Our responsive perspective develops its distinct patterns of epistemic engagement, 
informing our appreciation of both our „place‟ in and the extent of our spatio-temporal 
context and „reality‟. This further induces theological consideration concerning the 
relationship between „our time‟ and „God's Time‟ (chapter 4). 
As to the participatory framework, Psalm 39:6 – „For with you is the fountain of life, and 
in your Light we see light‟ – incorporates the idea of God‟s idiomatic engagement being 
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represented by the Light specifically in terms of His economic, revealing Activity, 
grounding the ability of life to come to „see‟ or know anything. Genesis 1 indicates some 
additional, but distinct orientation according to the various lights in the firmament. Such 
„lights‟ then stand for our means of coming to orient ourselves towards accumulating 
information, fostering our means of comprehension. The Light is, effectively, that of Day 
One, while mediation through the sun-moon-stars complex is ascribed to „the fourth day‟, 
providing orientation in accordance with marking out various critical rhythms, patterns 
and cycles. Once again, such cycles may be associated with stability.  
„Unfolding‟ created order  
I am here ascribing allegorical significance to the terms „heavens‟ and „earth‟ as, 
respectively, aspects of subjunctive potential (including in this case the possibility, or 
opening, of some top-down, emergent property) and indicative actuality (emerging 
through dynamically stabilized, bottom-up, layered hierarchies, whether directly 
experienced or indirectly discernible by scientific means). These grammatical moods are 
distinct but united by being aspects of the same underlying grammar. Furthermore, the 
distinct aspects of „has been created‟ and „might yet be created‟ may both properly be 
considered as participating in the broader infinitive category „to create‟, along with the 
participle „in the process of creating‟. Such distinction without separation fits the ethos of 
this thesis and, in terms of the created heavens-earth unity, defines another dual-aspect 
bond. „Heavens‟ and „earth‟ are epistemologically distinct, inasmuch as we understand the 
distinction between potentiality and actuality, yet ontologically united through the opening 
statement that „in a/the beginning God created the heavens and the earth‟.  
This dual-aspect bond is physically relevant in grounding the capacity for the participation 
of the created domain in that which becomes represented by the Name associated with 
God‟s Creative Activity, having the perfect, non-contingent, and (in that sense) infinite 
freedom simply to create. This further fits the biblical conception of participation 
according to which things or people may be granted holy status but only the „most holy‟ 
ultimately takes initiative in the active impartation of holiness. This is further 
complemented by the former understanding of the anointing oil as imparting knowledge so 
as to achieve holiness by the illumination of the mind, bringing the previously „hidden‟ 
into terms accessible to human intelligibility and thereby enabling some knowledgeable 
(and acknowledgeable) participation in the „eternal‟.  
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The heavens-earth bond as taken here, including the totality of space-time, is 
indispensable in defining the context in which humanity is able to come to knowledge or 
to make intelligible sense of things. This unity is the subject of the first of the tol
e
dot of 
Genesis
236
 and provides us with a physically relevant framework through which we may 
participate, as physical beings, in the divine Economy. As Kline remarks, „the heavens and 
the earth are viewed in their earliest, not perfected state, yet as a totality, this being the 
idiomatic force in Hebrew of such contrasted pairs‟.237 
The above inclusion of the indefinite article – „in a beginning‟ – simply serves to highlight 
the possibility that other intrinsic unities, pertaining to bonds other than this particular 
„heavens-earth‟, could on principle be defining of other „beginnings‟, or indeed some new 
beginning. This accommodates the idea of many possible „universes‟, intended here purely 
as respecting divine omni-potential and creative freedom as opposed to some particular 
interpretation of quantum theory. This reading also suggests a holistic parallel between a 
beginning and a hypothetical created space, together with any associated, interactive 
topology according to which any creaturely participation may develop.  
It is therefore important to distinguish between something consisting „in a beginning‟ and 
an event occurring „at/as the beginning‟, each provoking potentially different 
understandings concerning creatio ex nihilo. The former suggests some all-encompassing 
sustainability of continuous, creative efficacy and engagement, while the latter suggests 
some merely initiating interest or involvement which Christian doctrine has generally 
preferred to avoid.
238
 If this bond of „heavens-earth‟ unity is created „in a beginning‟ then 
any renewal of Creation ought to consist in some new beginning, initiated in this case in 
the Logos „becoming flesh‟ and clearly of eschatological significance (chapter 4). Keeping 
the standard translation „in the beginning‟, however, arguably emphasizes precisely that 
which is definitive in terms of its physical accessibility and meaningful relevance to us, as 
products of the particular heavens-earth bond defining this cosmos and as participators 
both in Big History and the divine Economy. 
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From a Kabbalistic perspective, Smith prefers the translation „with beginningness‟, seeing 
the Reshit as referring „to a continual state of becoming‟,239 while Sacks distances the 
association of Reshit from some sharp, chronological beginning, since „for that biblical 
Hebrew has other words. Reshit implies the most significant element, the part that stands 
for the whole…the principle‟. He declares of Genesis that „the theology is almost always 
implicit rather than explicit. What Genesis is, in fact, is philosophy written in a 
deliberately non-philosophical way [italics Sacks]‟ and he relates its purview to questions 
of ontology, epistemology and philosophical psychology.
240
 This distinction between the 
implicate and the explicate, seeing created order as something unfolded from within a 
dynamically representative heavens-earth bond, resonates with Bohm‟s description of an 
„implicate order‟, elaborated in subsequent chapters.   
Even an implicate order must have an origin, even if such is infinitely compacted. Taking 
the idea of a singularity in its scientific sense suggests such infinite compactness, and any 
hypothetical enfoldedness within which is only discernible according to some expansion. 
Applying the concept of singularity metaphorically to the theological topology under 
consideration here, any „beginningness‟ is indicative of some dynamically pervasive 
„Principle‟ critically enabling the creation of a (theologically-speaking) finite and compact 
„created space‟. Just as the Infinite, again theologically-speaking, facilitates the 
createdness and participation of the finite within it, so, in this respect, any „something‟ is 
facilitated in conjunction with a „nothing‟ that, ontologically, may be considered on the 
same footing as the Infinite. The pervasive topos of the Logos is irreducible with respect to 
finite, created space precisely because such finitude is a mark of the contingency of that 
space upon divine Activity through the Logos. 
On the subject of creatio ex nihilo,
241
 Bockmühl distinguishes clearly between this and the 
act/process of giving form to formlessness, emphasizing that it is the removal of any 
divine reliance upon anything outside of the divine nature that is most critical and also 
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noting a possible translation of bereshit as „by a principle‟.242 Formlessness is formed or 
shaped (by divinity and humanity) through those activities implied by Hebrew verbs such 
as asah and yatsar used in addition to, and as distinct from, the exclusively divine act 
implied by bara.
243
 Through the Logos created space/order is sustained by divine Creative 
Activity, retaining the potential to have more made (out) of it. 
Carroll eloquently remarks that 
The distance between minute fractions of a second after the Big Bang is, in a sense, 
infinite. We do not get closer to creation by getting closer to the Big 
Bang…creation is not really an event at all…The „nothing‟ in cosmological 
reflections may very well be nothing like our present universe, but it is not the 
absolute nothing central to what it means to create; it is only that about which the 
theories say nothing.
244
 
He considers the concept of creation in terms of enduring action, distancing any theology 
of creation from inert readings of the term „beginning‟. To this principle McGrath adds 
that „the laws of quantum mechanics do not actually help us to answer what we might call 
“ultimate questions”. They do not tell us why the universe should be made up of particular 
kinds of fields…They do not tell us where those fields came from‟.245 
From a biblical perspective Worthington distinguishes between divine creation ex nihilo 
and ex materia. One possible common currency is suggested as being that the „thing‟ in 
question does not yet exist in the manner into which divine creative initiative will 
ultimately bring it, but the most crucial point seems to be a caution over whether the 
„nothing‟ is taken in an absolute sense or relative to the specific, animate quality of living 
things.
246
 Perhaps for God there is „nothing‟ – not anything – that is technically 
nothingness (cf. Psalm 139:12), circumventing any implication of divine inability to make 
something of it, since „not one thing will be impossible for God‟ (Luke 1:37, translated 
literally). Worthington plausibly concludes that „the first aspect of God‟s relationship to 
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nihil is his ultimate prerogative to speak, call, label and claim regarding it just as he 
wishes‟.247 
One biblical image with obvious topological relevance is the moulding of the clay by the 
potter in Jeremiah. Frese highlights the primary importance of divine initiative in this 
case,
248
 the ultimate sovereignty of the LORD operating from an idiomatically unique 
purview, transcending the heavens-earth unity. However, while divine engagement retains 
the freedom to refashion the clay, the result of any finished product or contextual 
completion „in earth‟ remains reliant upon the nature of the clay in terms of its strength 
and durability. This consideration lends some indirect influence to the created, something 
integral to its distinctiveness. 
Burrell emphasizes God as self-sufficient Being, everything else consisting in some 
participant mood of existence.
249
 Rejecting any pantheist/emanation framework, he then 
emphasizes the need for a unique form of distinction („unique‟ presumably in the sense of 
being beyond any suitably illustrative, physical analogy) concerning an unchanging, 
divine, creative essence and a dependent, changing created whole that does not itself effect 
any ontological change in that essence. This distinction reinforces the principle of 
transcendence-in-immanence:
250
 transcendent in the sense of being beyond any reliance on 
the created; immanent in the sense of it being declared that „in him we live and move and 
have our being [or existence]‟ (Acts 17:27). Overall, Burrell wishes to establish a non-
dualistic approach to this uniqueness conundrum, one which must also leave room 
somehow to accommodate the Johannine declaration that „we shall be like him‟. Perhaps 
the creatio ex nihilo distinctiveness might most simply be viewed in terms of a supra-
cosmic, physically uncaused, uncreated, all-pervasive initiative, revealing or unfolding 
some enfolded, implicate, creative “pointedness” in Creation through the motioning of the 
divine Economy. 
In any „unfolding‟ some degree or interpretation of „chance‟ must still have its place. As 
Hayes notes 
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…to say that the world is intelligible is not the same as saying that there cannot be 
some contingence and random activity within the history of the world. To take 
intelligibility to mean absolute necessity is to make the created cosmos equivalent 
to God. Hence Aquinas could argue that it would be contrary to the nature of the 
created world if nothing ever happened by chance.
251
 
In terms of a biblical account of creation, the defining of some distinct „space‟ for an 
actively engaged, participate, creaturely contribution may relate to the concept of divine 
„rest‟, inseparable from an appreciation of Sabbath as actively empowering, and 
considering rest in terms of re-creation. Furthermore, with respect to Creation as a whole, 
atonement is connected with the concept of a Sabbath of sabbaths.
252
 In the context of the 
Incarnation this idea indicates a final completion of Creation in a renewed sense while also 
constituting an open demonstration of a divine „resting‟ among us. It reveals the divine 
openness towards accommodating and incorporating a distinctively human, creative 
activity. A renewed space is created for the active involvement of a human nature 
sanctified through the Incarnation and imbued with eschatological relevance. God‟s 
„resting‟ could therefore be thought of as establishing a dynamic but stable equilibrium of 
communicability between Uncreated and created, holding together a coherent harmony. 
Considering such „rest‟ as demonstrably held together in Christ, this concept becomes 
centred upon a fully cooperative relationship between two distinct natures according to the 
unifying hypostasis, facilitating our more deeply participative, sacramental becoming 
within divine image. 
This is consonant with Augustine‟s consideration that „toil‟ should not be implied by way 
of contrast to God‟s „resting‟ as if to suggest any previous intellectual toil, a pondering of 
some „ought to be‟ concerning creation of which He is suddenly relieved. Rather, „rest‟ 
signified for Augustine an accommodation of the created into God, an enabling of 
participation especially and most critically with respect to intellectual beings through the 
gift of divine image. The openness of the 7
th
 Day, not having an evening, indicates God‟s 
rest as not in itself being limited, but such can nonetheless be made relevant to our finite 
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context precisely inasmuch as it is revealed through the Incarnation.
253
 Relevance and 
revelation act once again in critical conjunction, in accordance with the pervasive topos 
associated with God‟s motioning, Creative Activity in the Logos. Such Activity is 
inseparable from any conceivability regarding the Logos and is pointed towards „rest‟ in 
Christ so as to bring the created (rather than God) into eschatological „relief‟ (returning to 
Bohm‟s connection between relevance and relief). In Christ‟s death on the Cross there is 
then an important sense of finishing a great Sabbath preparation, highlighting the true 
Sabbath of sabbaths and opening the way for re-accommodation in/as Christ‟s Body, and 
an empowering Resurrection Life involving some critical, shared participation in the Mind 
of Christ. Unification in the Mind of Christ ultimately affords the distinctiveness of our 
human knowing an eternal, eschatological relevance.    
Our incomplete knowing and finite, compromised topos 
Being and knowing are two categories fundamental to considering our nature. In Genesis 2 
these categories could be considered by reference to the focus on the centre of the garden. 
Von Rad notes that the Tree of Life is only referred to twice in the Old Testament and that 
the Tree of Knowledge is exclusive to Genesis, suggesting a suspicion that „the duality of 
trees in the midst of the garden is only the result of a subsequent combination of two 
traditions‟, noting that only the Tree of Knowledge plays a role until a return to a guarded 
Tree of Life at the end of the narrative.
254
 
This duality could still be allegorically significant, however, since the particular focus on 
the Tree of Knowledge rather ironically detracts from that on the Tree of Life. The eternal 
significance of the ontology that the Tree of Life affords becomes inaccessible to us (at 
least on our initiative) upon expulsion from the garden. Having eaten the forbidden fruit 
on the basis of believing some promise of omniscience, such consumption highlights 
instead the naked recognition of human ignorance and our need for completion – an 
imperfect, finite self-consciousness devoid of genuine, complete self-sufficiency. 
Adam is cast into some compromised „reality‟ in which he cannot in and of himself find 
true rest for his nature or being. It is the sense of „fear‟ in the face of the divine Presence in 
the garden, involving an attempted covering of his „nakedness‟, that becomes for Adam 
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„the beginning of knowledge‟ (cf. Proverbs 9:10 and Psalm 111:10). The Incarnation, the 
Second Adam, is then necessary for providing a context for human completion and 
eschatological rest. In the New Testament this occurs through a particular means of 
rebuilding the Temple according to a more deeply, stably embedded topos, involving the 
breaking in of a New Creation. 
Our means of coming to knowledge cannot in itself eliminate our naked, finite and relative 
sense of incompleteness, characterizing our compromised sense of topos. Our yearning for 
completion is arguably represented in the narrative of Genesis 11, the aim of building the 
tower implicitly involving some arbitrary human authority to say at what point this tower 
has reached its putative goal. Davidson notes the connection with the building of the 
Mesopotamian ziggurats to express the power of humanity‟s piety, noting that „man unites 
in the anthem “Glory to Man in the highest” and the outcome is division and confusion. In 
the fear which prompts this action…there is symbolized man‟s feverish search for security 
apart from God‟.255 
Blenkinsopp notes the „ring composition‟ of the narrative,256 the first four verses 
describing human attitude towards language, choice of settlement, use of building material 
and intention to build a city, and verses 6-8 then describing the divine reaction to this, 
pivoting around verse 5 as the LORD „comes down‟ to see what humanity‟s activity of 
building is like. He further notes that the plural inherent in the collective human discourse 
leading up to this turning point is paralleled by the deliberative plural of divine discourse. 
A condition is clearly placed on the manner in which human nature can build effectively, 
connected, as suggested above, to the nature of our dwelling, our topos. The error lies not 
in the desire to build something up but rather in the assumption of some arbitrary authority 
to define an ultimate point of completion from our finite perspective. The turning point of 
the Babel narrative, God‟s „coming down‟, may ironically pre-empt the incarnate basis 
upon which subsequent up-building may legitimately occur, re-gathering that otherwise 
scattered and drawing all things to the Logos. The Incarnation thereby „affords‟ our active, 
participate involvement an enduring, sacramentally-stable topos. 
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On the central theme of stability, Sylva suggests (with reference to Psalm 93) that 
„stability is neither achieved by controlling the unabolished chaos, as in Genesis 1, nor 
wrestled from a primal chaos, as in the Chaoskämpfe. Stability is a larger reality that 
includes the chaos‟.257 Whether or not a consideration of chaos is deemed the most 
suitable approach to a biblical theology of creation, this suggestion contrasts somewhat 
with a modern, mathematical viewpoint concerning „chaos‟, as something within or 
according to which various modes of stability can exist or emerge.
258
 If there is a „larger 
reality‟ here, a greater stability including any chaos, then it is something like a structural 
stability incorporating the entire array of interconnected contingencies and possibilities 
pertaining to the „topology‟ of our cosmic reality as a whole. For any absolute point of 
reference one therefore needs to consider some deeper, theological topology, pertaining to 
a domain of stability encompassing that „chaos‟ within or according to which other modes 
of relative stability can in turn emerge. One significant representation of such stabilization 
is, I will argue, hinted at in the implicit biblical relationship between Creation and Temple.  
The Creation-Temple parallel 
It has been suggested in different ways that the language in the creation accounts in 
Genesis could be related to certain aspects of temple imagery. From a holistic perspective, 
Brown compares the hem of God‟s robe filling the temple in Isaiah 6 with the cosmic 
parallel of the world being immersed in God‟s glory.259 Van Dyk highlights the similarity 
of genre between Genesis and that of Near Eastern writings regarding the idea that 
palaces, temples and gardens were seen as earthly copies of some heavenly archetype.
260
 
Childs considers it „likely that the idea of a pattern of a heavenly sanctuary belonged to the 
older tabernacle tradition before it received its stamp from the late Priestly theology‟,261 
also relating to Near Eastern parallels. As to the idea of some specific relationship between 
a representation of God‟s Creation and the tabernacle revelation he acknowledges the 
importance of the theme while noting the challenge of discriminating between those 
elements which could properly be taken as symbolic and those that should not. The 
problem, for him, is that the Old Testament does not contain any verbatim description of a 
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means of understanding tabernacle symbolism, though he does not deny that such a 
symbolic dimension is theologically reflected overall.  
Considering the two tabernacle accounts in Exodus, the first closing with the sabbath 
command and the second opening with it, Childs remarks that „the tabernacle represents 
the fulfilment of the covenant promise [to dwell among the people]…But the actual sign 
of the covenant is the sabbath. Therefore, the observance of the sabbath and the building 
of the tabernacle are two sides of the same reality‟.262 The sabbath being a theme 
inseparable from the doctrinal content of Genesis 1 it seems therefore that both creation 
accounts have some distinct relevance, direct or indirect, to the place, purpose and 
possibly also the structure of the tabernacle, eventually established through the fuller 
context of temple life and reincorporated in the New Testament.    
Beale explores a link between the garden and the temple,
263
 including the broader 
geography of Eden as a whole, and its geographical orientation. He emphasizes the 
immanence of the eschatological significance in which much of the biblical imagery is 
steeped and notes certain aspects of possible association between the creation narrative of 
Genesis 1 and the temple layout, such as the fact that there is a distinct Hebrew word used 
specifically for the lights of the lampstand and those lights of the 4
th
 Day of creation.  
Wenham notes other symbolic aspects suggesting some creation-temple parallel: between 
the menorah and the trees of the garden, between the jewels and gold of Eden and the 
temple decoration and priestly vestments, between mention of God walking to and fro – 
hithallek – in garden (Genesis 3:8) and tent (Leviticus 26:12, Deuteronomy 23:15) alike, 
between the river out of Eden and that of Ezekiel 47, between the Tree of Knowledge and 
the keeping of the Decalogue inside the Ark of the Covenant alongside the book of the 
Law, and in the fact of both being approached from the East and being guarded by 
cherubim.
264
 
Barker even suggests a direct parallel between the „Days‟ of Genesis 1 and the stages of 
instruction given to Moses for tabernacle construction
265
 while Genesis 2 may relate to 
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temple imagery in another way – Adam/High Priest, Eve/Divine Consort, Tree of 
Knowledge/Ark of the Covenant. Though apparently rather idiosyncratic in her 
suggestion, such still seems an interesting and potentially extra dimension to the 
relationship between the theology of creation and the place and purpose of the temple. 
Levenson provides, from a Jewish perspective, a quite beautiful insight into the overall 
significance of Temple completion, especially in terms of sacred space and its relation to 
time. Combining the image of „cosmic mountain‟ – with its associated properties of divine 
meeting place, battleground for a meeting of heaven and earth, and a universal „moral 
capital‟ in Near Eastern literature266 – with that of the Temple as a microcosm, he 
concludes that „the Temple is not a place in the world, but the world in essence. It is the 
theology of creation rendered in architecture…the centre is not a point in space at all, but 
the point in relation to which all space attains individuation and meaning‟.267 This is a 
theologically significant „architecture‟ representative of a deep, undergirding stability 
throughout the dynamic order of Creation. 
The structure of created space is opened up within the Uncreated, the Uncreated 
establishing (and therefore stabilizing) the created heavens-earth unity and conditioning 
creaturely, sacramental participation. Levenson distinguishes the „upper tier‟ of the 
heavenly Jerusalem that holds „ultimate reality‟ from the „lower tier‟ of the earthly 
Jerusalem open to the accidents and fulfilments of history (this idea is briefly revisited in 
the eschatological discussion in chapter 4). Sinai then becomes a representation of 
meaning given to that history.
268
 Importantly, he sees the Mount Zion-Temple-City 
combination as participating in that which it is supposed to represent,
269
 which relates to 
what is here understood as affording sacramental encounter.  
Levenson‟s reading of Isaiah 66:1 is noteworthy, seeing it as a prophet invoking „the 
cosmic dimension of the Temple theology in critique of the mundane Temple building 
program which produced the Second Temple‟.270 God may find (and thereby define) „rest‟ 
in the world for which the Temple stands, a fact that he summarizes most eloquently. 
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The Sabbatical experience and the Temple experience are one. The first represents 
sanctity in time, the second, sanctity in space, and yet they are somehow the same. 
The Sabbath is to time and to the work of creation what the Temple is to space and 
to the painful history of Israel which its completion brings to an end.
271
 
Exploring this theological link between the architecture of Creation and that of the 
Temple, while considering the Body of Christ as the ultimate fulfilment of the Temple, 
in/as the Incarnate Logos through whom the architecture of Creation came into being in 
the first place, other parts of the opening chapters of Genesis seem allegorically 
significant. All creatures were brought to the First Adam to be named, culminating in his 
recognition of the „partner‟ the LORD had made and provided for him. As the Second 
Adam, Christ enters into created order in the Incarnation, „motioning‟ throughout all 
created order afresh as the true High Priest, redefining and completing it through the 
inseparably associated breaking in of a New Creation, culminating in the completed 
formation of an ecclesial Bride fully known by the Bridegroom. 
One might also consider the commission to humanity to finish labouring for the 
completion of both the building and the boarding of the Ark (cf. Matthew 24:36-39), 
bringing creation through the flood waters. Here all the animals, even the „unclean‟ ones 
(Genesis 7:2-3), are taken into the inventory commissioned to Noah by God, a narrative 
also notably containing a staged set of instructions for constructing the Ark. Wenham 
notes the significance of literary structure involved,
272
 with Genesis 6:9 to 7:24 containing 
the sequence: Noah; Shem, Ham and Japheth; Ark to be built; announcing of flood; 
covenant with Noah; food in the Ark; command to enter Ark; 7 days waiting for flood; 
entry to the Ark; the Lord shutting Noah in; 40 days of flooding; increase of waters; 
covering of mountains; prevailing for 150 days. Then the pivotal moment seems to be 
God‟s remembering of Noah, after which events unfold in a reverse order: 150 days for 
waters to abate; mountain tops becoming visible; waters abating some more; the end of 40 
days; Noah opening the window of the Ark; raven and dove released from Ark; 7 day wait 
for waters to subside; command to leave the Ark; food outside the Ark; covenant made 
with all flesh; promise of no more such flooding in future; final mention of Ark; then back 
to Shem, Ham and Japheth; and finally to Noah (end of Genesis 9). A change in direction 
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pivots around the „remembering‟ of Noah; a change in direction likewise pivots around 
incarnational involvement with the Creation in Christ, fleshing out a divine „remembering‟ 
thereof (chapter 5 presents a Eucharistic viewpoint on this). 
Furthermore, the temple-building commission involves active, contributory formation and 
up-building rather than passive preservation. Humanity is afforded a genuine (albeit 
physically-conditioned) contributory potential, and a degree of freedom for influencing the 
manner in which meaning is generated, augmented, and responded to in Creative Power, 
as per Sayers‟ terminology relating to the „meaning of the work‟.273 As building up the 
New Temple becomes interpreted in relation to the Body of Christ, there is then a 
critically inseparable and irreducible potential for „novelty‟ in the Mind of Christ. The 
finite, relative topos associated with the human mindscape is thereby „afforded‟ an active 
potential or prospect represented here in terms of contributing towards building up the 
New Temple and involving a share in the Mind of Christ (1 Corinthians 2:16). The First 
Adam was tempted to aspire to an inappropriate dominion, over the image rather than as a 
result of it; the Second Adam institutes a reincorporated context through which the image 
becomes perfected, opening deeper participative potential. 
The pervasiveness of the implied topos is clearly present in the Revelation vision of the 
New Jerusalem: the temple no longer being localizable or superficially visible and light no 
longer sourced by some localizable „sun‟ but with the divine Light instead pervading the 
entire space or reality that it thereby defines. This new context of „affordance‟, opened to 
us through the pervasive topos pertaining to the Creative Activity of the Incarnate Logos, 
offers the greater stability of a reincorporated indwelling. Human nature is established at 
the „right hand of the Father‟ and its active, contributory influence is eternally secured 
within the Second Person, without ontologically affecting divine nature per se. There is 
notably no actual seat in the open invitational space shown in the Rublev icon,
274
 no 
explicit fourth „place‟ in hypostatic terms, the invitation is through and in the Second 
Person. Our creative activity is perhaps therefore best seen as an actively cooperative 
enhancement of what is revealed both to and within us, not enhancing the divine nature in 
essence but enhancing the degree or depth of creative, human participation actively known 
within the divine Economy. 
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This transition (chapter 4) is ultimately a result of divine initiative. As part of an analysis 
of the presentation of the Glory of the LORD in Ezekiel,
275
 Keck concludes that   
In Ezekiel, the unenclosed presence of the Glory serves as a conceptual link 
recalling Israel‟s beginnings as a nation. Ezekiel…participates in a re-creation of 
Sinai, in which the prophet eventually receives a new order for a re-created 
community, along with instructions for a new sanctuary in the idealized land 
(Ezek. 43–48). In this re-creation, it is important to remember that „the initiative is 
with Yahweh. Ezekiel does not expect Israel to be able to make a new start on her 
own, to which Yahweh would then positively respond. Yahweh is not waiting for 
Israel‟s response, he is creating it‟.276 
This initiative of re-enacting a whole beginning over again in a new form fits with the 
holistic concept of Reshit noted above. This is a key idea: a divinely-initiated, ordained 
and established topos through which human responsiveness can actively be assumed and 
„drawn in‟ without in itself being ontologically initial or ultimate, drawing humanity „from 
one degree of glory to another‟ (2 Corinthians 3:18).  
How to interpret our nature? 
A critical question remains: how theologically to understand the term „human nature‟. 
Clearly this is intimately related to an appreciation of divine „image‟. McFadyen277 looks 
to Psalm 8, rather than the texts of Genesis 1-3, noting that 
Where thinking about creation is conducted without reference to the horizons of 
both soteriology and eschatology, there are consequences for both the grammatical 
mood and tense of anthropological discourse: the present and the indicative 
predominate. This includes the interpretation of its key theological, anthropological 
trope and largely explains the tendency to think of the image in static rather than 
dynamic categories.
278
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According to McFadyen, Psalm 8 properly starts out from God‟s Mindfulness, such that 
„humanity itself is constantly sought by God, not as a fixed and static entity, but in a way 
that stretches, challenges, and – most importantly – reenergizes the possibility of our being 
fully human…Here the dominant grammatical moods are the vocative and interrogative, 
the subjunctive and the optative‟.279 
We are to conscribe, according to an active engagement in growing according to divine 
„likeness‟, our fullest and truest humanity rather than merely describing it.280 Nonetheless, 
we still inevitably require some resourcing, scientific insight regarding the most consistent 
facets and tendencies of our nature. Consideration of the development of our creative 
capacity within our operative idiom of creative freedom (chapter 5) is one means of 
responding to this requirement. 
Walton focuses on the assumption of a sacred cosmic space as an accompaniment to 
divine image,
281
 stating that „the first account sets up the cosmos as sacred space to 
function on behalf of people; the second account sets particular people in sacred space to 
function on its behalf‟.282 He emphasizes that  
Adam is given a priestly role, which would involve normal priestly functions: 
serving as a representative in sacred space, guarding sacred space from the 
intrusion of disorder and expanding the order of sacred space…This priestly role, 
not mentioned in the first account, would support an understanding of Adam and 
Eve as the fountainhead for humanity that may be understood as representational 
rather than biological.
283
 
The question is then how such representation becomes creatively expressed through our 
physicality. Danger lies in any temptation for dominion over the image rather than 
searching out the iconic gift resulting from it. Such inappropriate dominion – not actually 
proper to our nature – would render the image static, a false status “distanced” from 
divinity in an entirely pejorative sense. Conversely, searching out our iconic giftedness 
through sacramental involvement and encounter affords authentic communication with the 
Creator. Our positive potential is therefore towards iconic, sacramental maturity and our 
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negative potential towards the idolatry of attempting to control the image, robbing it of its 
dynamic. Considering the image as highlighting the theological relevance of our creative 
capacity, creativity and sacramentality then naturally belong together.  
Stenmark asks the question as to whether there is such a thing as a human nature at all,
284
 
and marks the prevalence in modern theological discourse to transfer the question of 
„nature‟ to the relational activities between human beings rather than some attribute or 
propensity,
285
 rightly countering this with the observation that 
If we did not have the capacity to love, we could not enter into loving 
relationships; if we did not have the ability to think and reason, we could not 
undertake a commission to be God‟s stewards on earth. We must have the capacity 
to relate actively to God, in order that we might relate actively to God…a purely 
relational view of human nature should be rejected.
286
 
Having acknowledged the difficulty in pinpointing the exact content of human nature he 
nonetheless affirms its existence, especially on the basis that „Christianity can provide a 
more attractive and informed metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical framework for 
understanding human nature in an evolutionary perspective than its secular rival, atheism, 
or naturalism...‟287 Dupré offers a well-balanced overview of the limits of scientism with 
respect to questions concerning human nature, especially with regard to self-consciousness 
and thinking about one‟s own thought.288 Such self-relating capacity is the subject of the 
next chapter. 
Torrance digs more deeply into Christian epistemological capacity to make human nature 
distinct,
289
 noting that „phenomenological approaches to the nature of humanity lack the 
categories to distinguish between human nature as the object of divine intentionality and 
its present dysfunctional and, ultimately, subhuman state‟.290 Only the Incarnate Logos 
possesses a fully completed human nature, such „possession‟ being for us a matter of 
eschatological anticipation. This still allows St. Paul to speak of our collective, holistic 
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share in the Mind of Christ, as Head of this Body (Colossians 1:18). The „share‟ is not 
fragmented or individualistic. Its evidence is in some collective property of unified, 
ecclesial emergence, remaining overall a „sacred mystery‟ to any individual perspective. 
The power of significance of the term „communion‟ over and above that of „community‟ 
emphasizes an authentic connectedness between even our incomplete human experience 
and the Mind of the Maker, in and through the Incarnate Logos. Carter reinforces a 
substantive understanding of imago Dei and its importance to human uniqueness, 
considering Christ as the perfected image according to which imago Dei may then more 
generally be expressed as humanity „living with the Mind of Christ‟.291 More will be said 
on this in chapter 3. 
A critical question remains as to how we might conceive of any movement towards 
completion or perfection in/of Creation. It is surely proper to consider the garden context 
of Genesis 2 as an iconic window on our theological origin, something lying outside of our 
more routine, temporal conception and pro-creative passing on (chapter 5) which begins 
only in Genesis 4:1 upon expulsion from the garden. Knight (as part of a broader summary 
of an Eastern Orthodox attitude towards scientific engagement) notes an Orthodox 
position concerning the Fall, deriving from Origen, as something „pre-cosmic…[and] into 
our empirical, space-time universe‟, noting the patristic reading of the „skins‟ given to 
humanity by God in Genesis as standing for our entire psychosomatic dispositions.
292
 
Nellas expands on this by emphasizing the double role of such skins as protective and as 
establishing a context in which the iconic image could still on principle flourish even in 
the midst of the „unnatural‟. He emphasizes Orthodox anthropology as being a 
„theanthropology‟ according to which the Creation attains a sacramental status and 
through which any human „movement‟ towards God is taken as being inseparable from 
some development in self-knowledge.
293
 In our empirical, space-time universe our 
conceptual context is nonetheless finite, and the finitude of the human person matches that 
of a corresponding, corruptible nature. 
As to the idea of some self-knowing „movement‟ towards God, Genesis focuses on the 
negative association between humanity and the Tree of Knowledge. Having eaten of the 
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forbidden fruit, Adam must somehow respond to the question of his own whereabouts 
(Genesis 3:9), especially in relation to the divine Presence. In asking, “Where are you?” 
the LORD poses him an epistemological challenge. What is the nature of any 
epistemological grasp of his predicament, his true whereabouts or topos „before‟ or „in‟ 
God, and how might it relate to his ontological status? He is clearly unable to effect his 
own completeness and the initiative ultimately involved in defining a manifest context for 
the completion and perfection of human nature occurs instead through the creative 
„motioning‟ of the Logos in Christ, something not strictly evolutionary in its roots since 
the Uncreated is not contingent upon the created. In itself the evolutionary domain of 
consideration has no means of grasping any definitive criteria relating to true perfection. 
That is not to imply, however, that humanity cannot discern or conceive something of 
what such „motioning‟ involves, especially given the invitation sacramentally to 
participate in the integrated topology of divine-human communion.  
Overall, we find therefore a critical meeting „place‟ between a top-down, incarnationally 
revealed perspective, in which the iconicity of human nature pertains to an eschatological 
dimension, and a bottom-up, evolutionary perspective in which it is treated in some 
respect as an emergent property, and for a fuller appreciation of which we may look to the 
biophysical origins of life itself.  
A psychological viewpoint 
Finally for this chapter, there is an importantly psychological dimension to the transition 
into the New Temple of the Body of Christ. The Temple, in its historical and 
eschatological aspects, offers a certain psychological bearing. Hurowitz notes specifically 
of Ezekiel‟s Temple vision that it „is commonly held to reflect in form the First Temple 
during its final days and as seen by the prophet…an ideal, visionary Temple that mixes 
reality with imagination‟.294 This imagination is the mark of a prophetic voice feeling 
justified in moulding and idealizing the natural, mountainous topography of Israel.
295
 
Joyce also invokes the idea of a mixture of dream and reality,
296
 promoting the idea that 
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Ezekiel was granted his vision halfway through a Jubilee period, standing for an admixture 
of reality and utopia.
297
 
Psychological viewpoints normally suggest an individual focus, but here, given the 
reinterpretation of the „place‟ and significance of the Temple, such individuality is drawn 
into (and supervened by) the critical topos pertaining to the Incarnate Logos. Concerning 
that which is „drawn into‟ the legacy of the Word made flesh, Rowland summarizes quite 
beautifully that 
Readers [of the Letter to the Hebrews] are shown a picture of a heavenly pioneer 
who opens up access to this other dimension and enters that which transcends the 
limits of „the veil of the flesh‟ to create the possibility of an alternative space for 
those who…journey with him in search of the eschatological rest „outside the 
camp‟.298 
Collective participation is held together according to the pervasive divine Presence. Where 
the concept of Shekinah is concerned, Hayward looks at the LXX translators‟ treatment of 
the Pentateuch, translating škn as „invocation‟.299 In practical terms this certainly seems 
congruent with Old Testament witness concerning a God who, from a psychological 
perspective, was never to be provoked but could nonetheless be invoked in covenantal 
accordance with His own invocation of Israel. 
The structure of the tabernacle, or the Temple‟s sanctified inner space, has also been 
suggested as a metaphor for some hypothetically perfect psychological balance or 
constitution. To Randall-Binns the sanctuary is a representation of Christ directly, and 
therefore a template of the essential human being „with the accidental characteristics of 
existential man added as subsidiary phenomena‟.300 He associates the inner sanctuary, the 
holy of holies, with the phenomenon of the intuitive perception of the unconscious, and 
the place of union by the altar of incense with the verging of this onto the rational aspect 
of human mind, then moving towards the inbuilt, instinctive aspects of being the nearer 
one approaches the veil over the entrance.
301
 Though he was writing over three decades 
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ago the analogy remains interesting, even if more up-to-date scientific engagement 
concerning the human mind is required (chapter 3). 
One might also consider a psychological perspective on the poetically structured argument 
between the various voices in the Book of Job, each with their own tradition concerning 
Wisdom. Represented therein is the relationship between humanity‟s „looking up‟ in awe 
and wonder and divinity‟s „coming down‟ to search out the uniquely curious, yet 
inevitable and pivotal novelty inherent in a psychosomatically fostered, human perspective 
regarding Wisdom. The strength of Job‟s human perspective may well be weaker than any 
vulnerability of that which is rhetorically referred to as God‟s „foolishness/weakness‟ (1 
Corinthians 1:25), but it is still significantly present. Likewise, our topology of encounter 
retains genuine theological significance.    
In Job one finds a testing dialogue and movement towards some novel encounter with 
Yahweh specifically, a novelty that Jung, with psychological subtlety, considers to be 
mutual.
302
 In incarnational terms, the kernel of such novelty is again represented here as an 
irremovable, essential singularity, a topologically irreducible component induced within 
the divine Economy by the necessarily novel regard pertaining to incarnate encounter in 
the Mind of Christ. 
MacKenzie and Carm discuss the different perspectives (highlighted by the variety of 
names used for God) involved in the Book of Job, their relation to an understanding of 
what constituted Wisdom, and how this is challenged by Christ‟s teaching in the 
gospels.
303
 Jung‟s psychological perspective is more revealing when focused on the 
holistic structure of the text and its overall developments. Any more specific imposition of 
psychological criteria onto the happenings or debates in particular verses seems excessive, 
and MacKenzie and Carm in that sense rightly criticize Jung‟s lack of consideration of the 
underlying theological issues involved. 
Edinger, however, takes his readers on an illustrated journey of Jung‟s commentary on 
Job, based on a series of pictures by Blake,
304
 establishing a genuinely relevant psycho-
analytical viewpoint concerning the stages through which Job‟s psyche must journey in 
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order truly to encounter Yahweh directly. Job is progressively afflicted such that the 
protectiveness of his conscious personality is weakened. The communication with the raw 
authenticity of his unconscious, and its connection to some „transpersonal Self‟ in which 
divine image is most starkly and terrifyingly to be discovered, begins to occur. The ego is 
understood in this case in terms of a covering of the depths (cf. Psalm 130:1) of human 
potential by some lesser consciousness. First, his outer body having been afflicted, there is 
an encounter with various peripheral aspects to his personality found in dialogue with his 
three pseudo-comforters. Then there is an encounter with the „child‟ (the young Elihu) of 
the unconscious, until finally the numinosum of direct communication with Yahweh is 
reached, a climax through which 
It is as though Job‟s encounter with Yahweh in his raw, undifferentiated form were 
a conception, a process of fertilization that brings about a new creation…Job‟s 
encounter with Yahweh in his uncreated form seems to have the effect of initiating 
a new creation. This corresponds to the effects we observe when the ego meets the 
unconscious…A process of creative differentiation often ensues which amounts to 
a regeneration of the personality.
305
 
Such a psychological viewpoint concerning a new creation is relevant here inasmuch as 
the critical novelty of divine-human encounter most fully and perfectly demonstrated in 
Christ effects the completed reconciliation of our shared humanity, precisely by being 
creatively encountered or „seen‟ afresh by Christ‟s divinity. Such re-conciliation fittingly 
suggests something newly conciliar, a new form of conversation between divinity and 
humanity that reveals a deeper wisdom (cf. 1 Corinthians 2:6-9). 
Given that Job is portrayed as a „servant‟ who suffers and, along with the so-called friends, 
as an outsider who still „believes‟,306 it is inevitable that the figure of the Suffering Servant 
springs to mind and thereby some consideration of Christ fulfilling this role, bringing in a 
New Creation associated with a New Wisdom. Human integrity is eternally established 
while remaining distinct, and similarly „Job has to insist on his integrity‟.307 I agree with 
Edinger‟s general assumption that Job cannot simply admit fundamental error or complete 
invalidity of his perceptions or conceptual viewpoint, since then the ego would constitute 
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no form of vessel at all, unable to facilitate any critical encounter with divine nature, hence 
Job‟s important refusal simply to submit to the voices of his critics. 
As an additional angle on the Wisdom literature, being perhaps (as for Polkinghorne) 
closest to having any overt scientific significance, McLeish looks to an understanding of 
Wisdom not as some „shallow law‟ but as something more like a reconciled chaos, seeing 
Job‟s experience as congruent with the scientific struggle to reconcile humanity to a means 
of understanding nature. He notes the „creative task that asks nature the right questions at 
the right time, questions that open up paths of understanding rather than lead to thickets of 
further confusion‟.308 The overarching context according to which his argument is 
developed involves a consideration of the chaotic boundary between the human and the 
non-human, involving both divinity and non-human matter in a dramatic arena in which 
divinity draws out the fuller significance of humanity through the mutual engagement of 
both with the latter. We can, McLeish claims, appreciate something of the evolution of this 
boundary in conjunction with our developing understanding or wisdom. The presentation 
of his argument emphasizes a probing of the manner of connectedness both within created 
space and across the aforementioned „boundary‟, and specifically „how the agenda of 
reconciliation between the human and the non-human evolves‟.309 That this involves 
wisdom is again implied by the term „reconciliation‟, and such wisdom can at least 
partially be acquired through scientific pursuit. That such a boundary may „evolve‟ may 
again be related to the central idea concerning a stability that is dynamic rather than static. 
Summary 
A biblical perspective regarding our nature awakens us to the awkward „nakedness‟ of our 
relative, contingent existence, being unable to complete ourselves in and of ourselves. 
Human existence, shared by the archetypical Son of Man, finds no ultimate rest simply „in 
earth‟. Theologically-speaking our mindscape yearns for some deeper stability and 
eschatological „rest‟. A transfiguring of our collective mindscape is effected through the 
Mind of Christ (chapter 3), reconciling human nature and enhancing our dynamic, fleshly 
potential sacramentally to encounter and to cooperate with divinity and to „move‟ towards 
God through a transformed and growing self-knowledge.  
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The Creation-Temple parallel is important here. Not only does the Logos under-stand the 
bottom-up aspect of stability within created order, by virtue of its harmonizing role in 
defining the „Principle‟ by which order is established in the first place, but by „becoming 
flesh‟ and transforming the Temple context into that towards which it was already pointed 
in theological terms, the Incarnate Logos institutes a re-understanding or re-hypostatizing 
of human nature, effecting a New Creation in so doing. This manifests itself according to 
the top-down induction and revelation of a deeper theological stability, permanently 
establishing human nature according to its eschatological relevance. This nonetheless 
occurs in a manner maintaining some proper aspect of connectedness with created 
order/space as a whole, overcoming or supervening the context of human incompletion in 
the „Old Creation‟. 
In seeking divinity, human prospective is inevitably limited against the fact that the 
Uncreated is beyond our finite understanding. However, one can perhaps say that, in the 
Christological encounter of the Incarnation, a greater theological „affordance‟ is effected – 
a prospective opening with respect to the Uncreated becomes humanly accessible within 
created space. Considering the necessary preparation for the Incarnation, an actively-
engaging refuge could then be seen in the „overshadowing‟ aspect of the Uncreated, divine 
idiom of engagement, in Creative Power. This overshadowing provides the critical, top-
down induction of stability in theological terms, enabling a sacramental appreciation of 
our theological „prospect‟. For an iconic representation of this idea one may consider Luke 
1:35, at the heart of the Annunciation narrative, with the Holy Spirit coming upon Mary as 
the Power of the Most High „overshadows‟ her, opening what one might call a 
“theosynthetic gateway” (adjusting the phrase used by Smith and Morowitz for application 
in a theological context) through which the Logos is conceived in the theologically deepest 
and physically most significant manner possible. 
Our very capacity for conception is itself conceived in accordance with Creation being 
continually effected and sustained through the Logos, and thus the Logos plays a suitably 
active role in its own conception by humanity. Mary needs obediently to “listen” to the 
Word in order for the critical conception to occur, her life somehow being in conjugation 
with that of the divine Economy. The active role of the Logos (or le Verbe) is then seen as 
being manifest in that Creative Activity by which the „overshadowing‟ of the Creative 
„Power of the Most High‟ creates the necessary context for active human responsiveness, a 
responsiveness (particularly in Mary‟s case) enabling the reception of le Verbe as 
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relevantly „conjugated‟ for the particular, participate context of revelation intrinsic to the 
Incarnation. In having our very conceptual capacity (re)grounded in the conceiving, 
Creative Activity inseparably pertaining to the dynamic, pervasive „place‟ of the Logos, 
we may legitimately be considered as being enabled to bear the previously unbearable 
(John 16:12) and to conceive of some critical aspect of the previously inconceivable, for 
which Mary‟s role or „place‟ is epitomic.  
Having presented this framework, invoking the rich potential of the Creation-Temple 
relationship as a point of reference regarding theological stability, and noting both its 
prospective eschatological relevance and its reinterpretation in the New Testament, the 
next chapter now considers the nature and potential of our physical embodiment and 
mental capacity, especially the sacramental significance of our self-consciousness or 
capacity for self-relation.  
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Chapter 3: Finite Self-Consciousness, its ‘Place’ and Potential 
Our distinctiveness and potential as humanity is clearly connected to the particular, finite 
form of our embodiment. This chapter considers the potential inherent in a capacity for 
self-reference in general, and specifically in emergent, self-consciousness in humanity – in 
itself a biologically complex, conglomerate form of feedback established in necessary 
interaction with the wider, cosmic environment. The interest here is twofold: that looking 
towards the physical connectivity and emergent phenomena of the embodied brain; and 
that theologically extended to apply, through some appropriate use of terminology, to the 
Mind of Christ as a critically unifying concept, to which the final parts of the chapter turn 
attention. 
On the one hand there is the scientific approach, concerning a layered and appropriately 
modulated, hierarchal ordering and communicability. One the other hand there is the 
theological approach, emphasizing the causal „first place‟ associated with the principal, 
conceiving Activity of the motioning Logos. It is then logical to suppose that a critical 
aspect of interaction between these approaches should occur in the Incarnation, in which a 
critical topos associated with the motioning and conceiving Logos becomes newly and 
objectively manifest through the assumption of those terms inseparably associated with a 
contingency-induced, hierarchical ordering of mindedness. 
Contemplating consciousness 
Given that our sense of self-consciousness is normally remarkably consistent, both 
consistency and continuity being obviously functional requirements with respect to 
evolutionary pressure, there must be some undergirding, developmental principles 
affording such sustainable continuity in our self-identity. The several viewpoints and 
angles of interpretative approach concerning such a central but intriguingly elusive notion 
as integrated „consciousness‟, not obviously part of any higher class of concept, give the 
impression of an incomplete, multidimensional jigsaw necessarily held together by 
something deep but still pragmatic. Weisberg summarizes in some detail the various 
possible philosophical positions concerning the mind-brain relationship, such as the 
dualistic, the non-reductive, the mysterian, the functionalist and the higher-order 
representationalist.
310
 He also helpfully distinguishes between „transitive‟ and 
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„intransitive‟ consciousness: the former being more justifiably synonymous with 
„awareness‟; the latter being a more general, background quality, with respect to which the 
transitive is transient.  
Singer highlights, largely from a psychological perspective, the barriers to be overcome in 
treating consciousness as a holistic entity, and whether integration is considered, 
functionally-speaking, to occur through a centralized or distributed „agency‟.311 He notes 
the importance of making a distinction between the largely parallel processing in the brain 
and a serial interpretation of the world, an interpretation which might be considered 
inseparable from the activity and effect of consciousness. He also considers the idea that 
creative, emergent potential is maximized in a system whose dynamic lies on the „edge of 
chaos‟. The appeal to chaos derives from a consideration of iterative systems involving 
some recursive feedback, and such feedback is endemic to considering self-consciousness. 
There is an inevitable circularity between those physical features pertaining to our 
embodiment and that reflective experience which enables us to discern their functional 
organization, integrating phenomenology and physiology through cognitive approaches in 
a manner seeking a between-ness that accepts distinction while maintaining overall 
continuity.
312
 This also highlights the important point that consciousness is not something 
isolated inside the head but exists in necessary connection with the external environment.  
Furthermore, our mode of „realism‟ changes throughout our development, especially in 
early infancy and childhood as we come better to coordinate ourselves and to learn a 
language. Piaget‟s pioneering work in child psychology saw the infant human as a „realist‟ 
in the sense of there being no rigid boundary between internal and external worlds or 
realities, exhibiting at first a certain conflation between „sign‟ and „signified‟.313 Here 
„realism‟ is being understood in terms of some degree of conjunction between ontological 
and epistemological aspects, perfectly conjugate in the case of divinity but not in the case 
of humanity. One‟s mode of realism is therefore, at one level, a description of one‟s 
potential capacity to define, appreciate and perhaps even deliberately manipulate a means 
of articulating one‟s representation of „reality‟. This representation is once again an 
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inherently dynamic category, evolving through developing means of learning and 
observing over time. This relates to the more modern idea of brain „plasticity‟ and Johnson 
and de Haan assess three major schools of thought concerning the nature of cognitive 
development: maturational (gene-focused), skill acquisition and interactive specialisation 
viewpoints, with the authors generally favouring the last of these.
314
 This viewpoint in 
particular emphasizes the reorganizational capacity of our cerebral arrangement, 
redistributing particular functions over particular regions of the brain throughout the 
developmental process, a good example being the reorganization of certain functions 
between the frontal and parietal lobes during adolescent years. 
With respect to any overarching philosophy of mind many contributory levels of 
investigation may be required: molecular, developmental, cognitive, behavioural, 
computational/circuit-based models and lateralization theories. This thesis is not directly 
concerned with any of these in isolation. Rather, it is interested in the relevance of the fact 
that there are all these levels of contribution and that their mode of integration is critical. 
Embedding things in an evolutionary context is here considered especially useful for such 
integrative purposes, relating explicitly to the development of creaturely physicality and 
cerebral organization across species. Distinguishing properly between micro- and macro-
evolution and between strong and weak emergence (depending on whether the underlying 
basis for a particular property is or is not reconfigured),
315
 and highlighting the important 
developmental role of canalization, Roth offers an excellent contemporary summary of an 
ethological perspective on the origin of mind,
316
 also distinguishing between perceptual 
actuality and some critically elusive „reality‟. Such an ethological perspective enables one 
to consider more fully how an integrated mental dynamic emerges and evolves in a 
sustainable manner and is complementary to the material of chapter 1.  
Ramachandran has been notable in considering evolutionary demands from the 
perspective of neuroscience, and the implications for any philosophy of consciousness.
317
 
He uses the distinction between perceptual and conceptual levels to great effect, especially 
in his experimental studies of theories concerning synaesthesia, noting that any 
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hypothetical boundary between the two is blurred when considered on the neuronal scale.  
He makes it clear that self-consciousness is a complex combination of many 
complementing or competing elements including (a) the communication, excitatory and 
inhibitory, between the two cerebral hemispheres, (b) the discrepancies between different 
pathways, evolutionarily older or more recent, of communicative input, (c) the relationship 
between the cerebral representation of our body map, at the boundary between the frontal 
and parietal lobes, and our holistic sense of „ego‟, especially when considered in 
conjunction with emotional disorders, and (d) whether “free won‟t” might contribute more 
to our actual functioning than a sense of free will, including our capacity to block certain, 
hypothetical „mirror neuron‟ effects. Nearly everything in these four points is related to 
the need for the mind to eschew contradiction and represent the most plausible „illusion‟, 
though Ramachandran explains the reasons for this in a manner more in tune with modern 
epistemic than the theories of Freud. 
Chalmers seems to have been somewhat hasty in his relative side-lining of both 
evolutionary and quantum mechanical contributions to considering consciousness-related 
questions.
318
 Evolutionary perspective will at the very least provide useful background 
consideration, and there is nothing unreasonable about looking for effects of quantum 
phenomena preserved on a classical scale of analysis and encounter. As to a quantum basis 
for consciousness, even if particular suggestions on this idea have not historically achieved 
wide following,
319
 there have nonetheless been recent, persuasive demonstrations of vital 
quantum influences being functionally preserved in living environments and over 
biologically significant timescales.
320
 The idea of a classical-scale manifestation of 
quantum processes is not new, having been around since the explanation of 
superconductivity.
321
 An analogous idea of some super-fluidity of cerebral process, 
something importantly beyond the out-dated metaphor of classical flow (with respect to 
neuronal functioning) and somehow either effecting or affecting the conceived „narrative‟ 
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(see below) of consciousness as some classical manifestation of underlying quantum 
influences, seems at the very least to be plausibly intuitive.
322
 
An analogy can perhaps be made here with the mathematical formulation of econometric 
analysis
323
 in which distinction is made between that aspect of a proposed model or 
relationship which corresponds to an average causal effect and that which pertains to a 
sampling bias in the way in which the „observer‟ has gone about searching for data. In the 
context of what one might call a neurological economy one could perhaps likewise 
discriminate between these aspects. An average causal effect could result from some 
underlying, possibly quantum-based influence, becoming manifest on the classical scale – 
a scale on which one can legitimately refer to causation. There would then also be an 
inevitable sampling bias, the evolutionary component of some selective, discriminatory 
filtering over time, with classical evolution shaping the broader physical contours 
concerning our mindedness. 
Given the reference here to „motion‟, I will adopt a particular viewpoint concerning the 
physical development of our neuro-ecology. Llinás considers the possible development of 
consciousness, and movement towards self-consciousness, as occurring via the 
internalization of sensorimotor imagery, forming a centralized control and command 
centre and incorporating predictive capabilities supporting the development of more 
complex movement, with selective pressure being placed upon such predictive capacity 
over evolutionary history.
324
 The basic idea is to consider more deeply the remarkably 
„plastic‟ abilities of neurons as their activity is shaped in necessary conjunction with a 
combination of externally imposed stimuli and internal physiology (including the 
orchestration of chemical disequilibria). Llinás considers how various modular 
components may come to function, or be seconded, in integrating motional coordination 
and fostering greater reliability in generating responses. He helpfully differentiates 
between the strategic aspect involved – leaving its mark through a developing and 
increasingly innate awareness of biologically accessible forms of action, response or 
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communication, becoming encoded in the form of fixed action potentials (FAPs) – and the 
tactical aspect, involving positive/negative feedback and memory-informed influences in 
order to effect the necessary nuances involved in fitting any given strategy to the 
uniqueness of the encounter in question as it develops over the relevant timescale.  
Llinás‟ theory involves a deep, biological consideration of motion. Self-referentiality and 
generativity lie at the core of his conception, involving a representational approach to 
appreciating how transient sensorimotor images are formed, processed and dispatched (or 
discarded) internally, and according to which informational content and an internalized, 
discreet readjustment of context become different sides of the same coin. Part of the 
process of generating necessary „responses‟ can, in the human case, come to involve 
precisely that generation of meaning noted in the Introduction. His theory also allows for a 
conceptual envelope by which one may follow motional and emotional aspects of 
development in tandem, emotional triggers being integrated in such a manner as to 
increase the probability for a speedy or reliable response to environmental demands (a 
capacity that may involve „co-opting‟ or „exapting‟ certain traits or modulated functions 
for new purposes).  
The link between motion and emotion is much more than an etymological convenience, 
and the very title of Llinás‟ book – I of the Vortex – beautifully captures the idea that as 
creaturely competence to engage more efficiently with a greater proportion of the 
environment spirals outwards, so too the necessary reintegration and partial rearrangement 
within the control and command centres effects some corresponding inward spiralling that 
highlights some internal, subjective sense of self-conscious awareness, most starkly 
pronounced in our own species. The interconnected compactness involved in 
environmental encounter, and its deeply generative potential, are clear in the development 
of his language and he traces the origin of cerebral integration and organization back to a 
weakly chaotic, intrinsic electrical oscillation associated with interconnected neurons, 
allowing „topological reorganization‟ over time.325 
From the perspective of a specialist in dream science, Hobson expands on Llinás‟ insight 
and, responding to the need for a robust post-Freudian paradigm, advocates an intriguing 
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theory of proto-consciousness.
326
 The idea is that, given that evolutionary pressure selects 
those cerebral organizations more efficiently integrated for the functional demands of 
some quasi-typical habitat (for which certain patterns of response have become robustly 
encoded in a developmental program), the pre-natal period of formation becomes 
increasingly critical, especially in more cerebrally advanced species, for ensuring proper 
readiness and stability upon being exposed to a sea of sensory input at birth. In the human 
case especially, Hobson suggests a parallel between pre-natal formation being a pre-
requisite for presenting a proto-conscious mind to its first-awakened experience of the 
sensory world, and REM sleep being part of a necessary preparation for the next waking 
period, especially considering that recently born babies and young infants need a greater 
proportion of REM sleep over a nocturnal cycle than older children or adults. This 
suggestion is interesting in highlighting the complex manner in which dynamic stability 
comes to involve an integrated conglomeration of feedback cycles in order for our sense of 
self-consciousness to become practically and consistently reliable in so seemingly 
automatic and flexible a manner. The theme of stability thereby remains integrated across 
physical and mental domains of consideration. 
Dennett‟s approach 
It was realized from Freud‟s time that „psychoanalysis cannot situate the essence of the 
psychical in consciousness, but is obliged to regard consciousness as a quality of the 
psychical, which may be present in addition to other qualities or may be absent‟.327 
Consciousness should not become some general synonym for either attention, given the 
evidence of change blindness (and, conversely, blind-sight experiments),
328
 or intention, 
given such evidence as demonstrated in the Libet-Hayes experiment, suggesting that what 
we think we are conscious of as our moment of decision-making is in fact subsequent to 
observable evidence of neuronal firings in our brains that seem already to have effected 
the required conditions for the action in question, implying that some decision has already 
been made subconsciously.
329
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Blackmore, in an introduction to the subject, notes the more recent shift towards 
appreciating the co-existence of many processes within the brain that are neither 
necessarily in nor out of consciousness.
330
 Among the theories mentioned, Dennett‟s 
centre of gravity illustration, by which is intended the centre of narrative gravity 
articulated concerning the conscious conception of self, seems apt in taking the 
„movement‟ towards self-consciousness as being inseparable from a developing potential 
for articulation, beyond some more primitive, behavioural gesticulation. This thesis 
affirms the position that robust self-consciousness, distinct from some broader, qualia-
steeped consideration of consciousness, is a development that is inseparable (perhaps 
inevitable) from the process leading up to the emergence of language. 
 
The general term „consciousness‟ encompasses a multi-level emergence, through which a 
co-developing linguistic capacity may act as a catalysing, organizing force, in tandem with 
a movement towards self-conscious articulacy. Dennett makes an importantly required 
emphasis regarding the often counter-intuitive difficulties concerning any contemplation 
of consciousness,
331
 including anticipating change blindness. He emphasizes how difficult 
it is entirely to shake off the pseudo-intuitive, internal observer viewpoint concerning the 
mind, looking instead towards spatially and temporally distributed components of some 
possible cognitive content, each potential component deriving from some manner of 
impression upon the embodied brain. This results in his „multiple drafts‟ proposal 
concerning possible, prospective interpretations of any content that ought best to be 
associated with a particular combination of inputs, received at slightly different times. 
Such drafts need integrating, but the means of such integration is somewhat obscured by 
the fact that time is represented cerebrally in an ambiguous manner owing to the predictive 
pressures of survival over the course of evolutionary history. Capacity for ongoing 
revision is therefore intrinsic to our „operational epistemology‟, to return to the vocabulary 
of chapter 1. 
 
The ongoing development of such a capacity is dependent on the possibility of one aspect 
of cerebral function becoming liberated from some previous requirement and seconded to 
another, as may be required by the developing or evolving context of encounter to which 
our mental „narrative‟ might need fitting. This requires that the most frequently 
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encountered forms of change are at least semi-predictable given our environment, such 
that integrated readjustment is realistic. Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of the 
insight from cognitive psychology that perception is a process in which the mind is 
specifically active, making use of particular memory cues in order to piece together the 
most plausible representation corresponding to the perceptual whole in response to 
particular stimuli.
332
 
 
Dennett‟s centre-of-narrative-gravity metaphor moves away from the Cartesian theatre 
model of the mind, towards one involving an informative focussing of many „coalitions‟ 
of neural organizations, competing for dominance amidst a thicket of signals and 
functionally-modulated regions of connectivity. While there are still „theatre‟ metaphors 
for the mind that avoid the problems of the Cartesian setup, such as Baars‟ Global 
Workspace model,
333
 Dennett‟s model enlarges on how embodied intelligence may have 
been formed in necessary accordance with environment encounter and engagement, in turn 
influencing how we come to perceive that environment and stimulating the developing 
capacity for conscious awareness in so doing. We may label such a feat by the blanket 
term „consciousness‟ owing to the summarizing power of reference that language affords 
us. However, this power of language to label may then cause emphasis upon things that, as 
Dennett cautions, prove ultimately less helpful in understanding the subject of 
consciousness, in both senses of the word „subject‟. 
 
Bracketing the subjective aspect of self off to the category of phenomenology of mind, 
Schrödinger ended up considering the idea of subjective self as a scientifically 
irreconcilable paradox owing to the apparent absurdity of being reliant for its emergence 
on a reality that it itself had brought into some representative conception in order to 
explain its own origin.
334
 The possible defect in this case seems to be the absence of any 
consideration of a hierarchical, higher-order representational view of our mindedness – a 
position certainly fitting best with the framework here. This viewpoint emphasizes a 
layered architecture in the constitution of our mindscape. The narrative form we generate 
through our developing, subjective sense of strategic relation to the world exists in a 
relationship of dynamic, two-way influence with such „architecture‟, and there is, as 
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Dennett acknowledges, an important distinction between the more opaque means of 
narrative construction, as here construed, and those architectures which are specifically 
designed or controlled on the part of a human artist/author. 
Simpson supports Dennett‟s view as compatible with modern, psychological views of the 
self and a good explanation for the phenomenological legitimacy of „self-loss‟ 
experiences, when attachment to the narrative is systematically defocused.
335
 This raises 
an important point regarding the distinction between consciousness and self-
consciousness, especially considering the implicit dissociation of subject-object 
„boundary‟ in the first case. The centre-of-narrative-gravity conception carries an 
epistemological accentuation by virtue of its narrative description. Our creative activity 
necessarily engages with an emerging interpretation of self and our topos, part of a self-
knowing process inseparable from our physical capacity to „move‟ or, in theological 
terms, our iconic capacity for being moved. 
Any centre-of-gravity, taking the metaphor at face value, is located (for a complex object) 
via the point of intersection between various lines of force implied by the suspension of 
the object from different points on its surface. These lines of force could perhaps be 
analogized with the nature of the competing demands from the perceived environment. 
There is, furthermore, an inevitable circularity involved, inasmuch as it is approximately 
that which we experience the need re-interpretatively to nuance, namely our self-
consciousness, which itself acts as a catalysing force behind any reinterpretation.   
Such approximation indicates a lack of completion. Williams asks „what is the world that 
art takes for granted?‟ and answers that „it is one in which perception is always 
incomplete‟.336 This parallels the approximate nature of our self-consciousness, something 
that will never fully “find itself” as such by its own skill. The word „approximate‟ implies 
some means of considering or defining proximity, noted earlier as involving an entire 
hierarchy of potential conditions, from the more flexible to the metrically strict, and 
according to which the nature of a topological space may be better appreciated. Our 
approximate sense (or degree) of self-recognition, psychologically-speaking, could 
therefore be considered part of the complexly interconnected „topology‟ in which our 
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environmental interaction consists, and one through which, among other things, we are 
able to discern and appreciate art (see below). 
 
Williams expands his observation by considering the complex tension between literal 
impulses, that may or may not be deciphered, and an overall sense of significance and 
symbol in the mind. The relationship between the literal and the symbolic will be 
expanded upon below, through a consideration of how our sense of semantic significance 
may be thought of as structured according to the „topology‟ of our mindscape. In the case 
of some narrative centre of gravity, linguistic development could be argued to contribute 
to reliably stabilizing the „centre‟, which must be converged upon within functionally 
practical bounds.  
 
One might ask “what is my perception of myself?” or “am I in control of myself or my 
actions?” Is there here some equivocation between subject and object,337 or between the 
way in which one intends the word „my‟ as some perceived, possessive pronoun and that 
in which one is supposedly imagining (in as far as it can be conceived as an image at all) 
any objectified concept of „myself‟? Does our subjectively experienced egocentricity 
control or manipulate some objectively abstracted perception in such a way as to generate 
an approximately accurate representation of the subject, or is such re-presentation always 
some form of illusion? The key word is surely „actions‟, being inseparable from the 
specifics of our physical embodiment. It is only an overall consideration of such 
physicality, and the specifics of its interconnectivity, that ultimately allows our sense of 
subjectivity to establish a greater congruence with any more objective representation. 
 
If self-consciousness ultimately derives from some sophisticated basis of illusion, 
naturally conceived through some resultant psychological force and possibly arising 
according to some fine-tuned bi-product of our evolved responsiveness to environmental 
pressure, then it relies on a continuous shifting or nuancing of the dynamic centre-of-
narrative-gravity. Like the constant shifts in posture necessary to maintain bipedal balance 
our brains must constantly correct – in functional association with relevant physical 
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actions or alterations – for any imbalance between our critical sense of subjectivity and the 
changing conditions encountered in our environment, the nature of our response to which 
will inevitably influence our more objective means of self-conception. It would then be a 
logical part of that correction process that, over time, cerebral (re)organization evolved or 
developed in such a way as for particular parts of the brain to be so appropriately 
interconnected as to accommodate the potential for developing a specific, autobiographical 
sense of self-consciousness. This conception importantly correlates with the 
aforementioned readjusting and reweighting of Polanyi‟s „tacit coefficients‟. 
 
All-in-all, Dennett‟s conception seems to make an important contribution to addressing 
further the critical question regarding the maintenance of a functional, dynamic stability 
concerning the human mindscape. 
McGilchrist‟s contribution 
Jung suggested that archaic humanity was far more interested in seeking broader, more 
general explanations of experience, while modern humanity differentiates things 
mercilessly into individual causes of events. This has, he claims, turned the world of 
archaic man upside down.
338
 Yet he goes on to assert that 
Nothing goes to show that primitive man thinks, feels, or perceives in a way that 
differs fundamentally from ours. His psychic functioning is essentially the same – 
only his primary assumptions are different.
339
 
Humanity has both the means of taking an intellectually holistic, integrated or tacit 
approach and also the ability to differentiate explicitly between concepts and respond to 
the degree of complexity involved (as per Polanyi and Vigo).This capacity to differentiate 
in turn requires some physical differentiation within the brain itself. Kaufman et al. 
examine the neurobiological aspect to human thought and creativity, allowing novelty to 
occur either in the task itself or in the means of approach, looking to a theory in which 
creative thinking might have a holistic origin in right-hemispheric activity of the brain, but 
requiring the „technical competence‟ of the left-hemisphere in order to receive such 
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stimulation as an outworking, propositional activity, requiring inter-hemispheric 
communication.
340
 
McGilchrist‟s work on the hemispheric division of the lateralized human brain is 
significant here for appreciating another aspect of our cerebral integration and stability. 
His underlying thesis is that the mode of the left hemisphere has come over time to 
dominate the state of Western civilization and culture,
341
 and he begins by noting the 
residual asymmetry in the nature of our reality, arguing that it applies to the „inner 
structure of our intellect‟ just as much as to the physical universe342 and emphasizing the 
phenomenological and ontological uniqueness of consciousness, lacking anything better 
understood by us to which we may compare it.
343
 Noting the topography of the typical 
hemispheric opposition in the human brain, and ascribing to the left hemisphere a general 
preoccupation with the question of „what‟ in contrast to the „how‟ of the right hemisphere 
(the hemispheres being used mainly as metaphors), he looks back to evolutionary roots, 
suggesting in particular that 
Clearly we have to inhabit the world of immediate bodily experience, the actual 
terrain in which we live…Yet at the same time we need to rise above the 
landscape in which we move, so that we can see what one might call the territory. 
To understand the landscape we need both to go out into the felt, lived world of 
experience as far as possible, along what one might think of as the horizontal axis, 
but also to rise above it, on the vertical axis.
344
 
If one abstracts this landscape imagery into the developing formation of human mindscape 
there seems to be a link between this dual demand and the insistence of de Bono 
that…„Lateral thinking enhances the effectiveness of vertical thinking. Vertical thinking 
develops the ideas generated by lateral thinking‟.345 De Bono sees lateral thinking as 
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having dual patterns of restructuring (insight) and novelty provocation (creativity) 
operating in tandem. In McGilchrist‟s terminology, the lateral component could 
correspond to the terrain awareness and the vertical component to a more territorial focus. 
Given that different degrees of lateralization are observed to occur in different individuals, 
which McGilchrist recognizes, I shall here prefer (unless quoting McGilchrist directly) to 
refer to the domains of „terrain‟ and „territory‟ on the basis of their more general validity, 
and their more obvious appropriateness to the landscape-mindscape dynamic.  
McGilchrist‟s use of the language of lateralization is more informed than that used in more 
popular parlance. He responds to his critics on his website, freely acknowledging the 
additional effect of „top-bottom‟ differences in cerebral functioning – another evolutionary 
dimension – but still affirming the undeniable evidence of asymmetry in left- and right-
hemispheric functionality through all of „size, weight, shape, surface structure, cell 
architecture in some areas, grey to white matter ratio, response to endocrine hormones and 
…neurotransmitter profile‟.346 Despite his warranted rejection of the looser left-
brain/right-brain parlance seemingly advocated in popular science books, Kosslyn (one of 
the critics) nonetheless concedes that  
Without question, the two hemispheres engage in some different kinds of 
information processing…the left preferentially processes details of objects we see, 
whereas the right preferentially processes the overall shape of objects we see. The 
left preferentially processes syntax (the literal meaning); the right preferentially 
processes pragmatics (the indirect or implied meaning).
347
 
As to self-consciousness, McGilchrist notes the close interconnection of the territory-
focused domain with itself, compared to the cross-connections more characteristic of the 
terrain-dwelling domain. The territorial aspect is heavily „self-referring‟ and „deals with 
what it already knows, the world it has made for itself‟.348 Choosing the example of music 
as something of which between-ness is a defining quality concerning the relation among 
notes, forming a tension between notes and the silence sandwiched by them, he relates the 
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holistic nature of musical appreciation to the function of the „terrain‟ domain, one whose 
„utterances are implicit‟.349 
Left-hemisphere activity is more explicitly definition-dominated. Although noting left-
hemisphere engagement with metrical rhythm, probably associating with a different 
evolutionary requirement from right-hemisphere attention to harmony, McGilchrist 
explicates his thesis concerning the breakaway of the territorial emphasis (the „emissary‟ 
forsaking the „master‟). The underlying idea is that „while we are gathering new 
information, the right hemisphere is responsible, but once whatever it is becomes 
thoroughly “known”, familiar, it is taken over by the left hemisphere‟.350 
Our capacity for specific definition needs to relate its potentially enriching means of 
categorization and denotational abstraction – the “what is it?” aspect – back to the terrain-
grounded domain. What began (in evolutionary terms) as a relatively open, though 
superficial „simplicity‟ must progressively interconnect with the relative compactness and 
closedness of definitional complexity, self-referring and linguistic abstraction that is 
involved in mapping out the multi-dimensional perspective of our „territory‟, enhancing 
our overall appreciation of the relief and relevance of our „terrain‟. A greater, deeper 
„simplicity‟ thus results. The danger is in the temptation to confine the complexity of our 
territorial construction to a particular regime of self-interest. The two domains or 
hemispheres must cooperate, offering something far beyond original split-brain 
advantages, such as birds having one eye for peripheral and one for focal vision controlled 
by different sides of the brain, without damage to one impairing the other.  
Looking to various specifics concerning the historical, physical formation of living 
creatures and their struggles and needs, McGilchrist notes that in the human case 
Certainty is also related to narrowness, as though the more certain we become of 
something the less we see…the fovea of the human eye, a tiny region in the retina 
at the centre of gaze, is the most pronounced of that of all primates…This is where 
the narrow focussed beam of left-hemisphere attention is concentrated: what is 
clearly [italics McGilchrist] seen.
351
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He regards it as a general philosophical disposition to scrutinize „the life of the right 
hemisphere from the standpoint of the left‟,352 suggesting that such scrutinizing needs in 
part to be responsible for undoing any damage. As here, he does not see language, in the 
verbally-articulated sense, as being necessary for the genesis of thought-process, but rather 
as a more firmly fixing bi-product of that thought. He appeals to the distinction between 
the sense of knowing implied by connaître/kennen and that implied by savoir/wissen,
353
 
the latter being arguably at least partially reliant on some form of language basis but not 
the former. Within the development of language, however, the criticality of self-referring 
feedback is made clear by the fact that „if it is the case that our understanding is an effect 
of the metaphors we choose, it is also true that it is a cause [italics McGilchrist]: our 
understanding itself guides the choice of metaphor by which we understand it‟.354 
The correlative basis to our generative thought-process, deriving from first impressions of 
environmental encounter, is initialized in the terrain-grounded domain, while the more 
strictly referential use of language develops through the more literally familiarized, 
territorially focused domain. Such terrain-grounded initialization supports the case for an 
original, holistic capacity for musical appreciation and coordinated rhythm leading to the 
specialization of language rather than vice versa, agreeing with Barrow‟s aforementioned 
assessment of the evolutionary advantages therewith associated. McGilchrist considers the 
referential use of words as an imposition of structural boundary on the way we are able to 
interpret things. 
Language is necessary neither for categorization, nor for reasoning, nor for concept 
formation, nor perception: it does not itself bring the landscape of the world in 
which we live into being. What it does, rather, is shape that landscape by fixing the 
„counties‟ into which we divide it, defining which [italics McGilchrist] categories 
or type of entities we see there – how we carve it up.355 
He describes the tension between left-hemisphere/right-hand grasping and right-
hemisphere/harmony-oriented dancing in the progression towards developing language.
356
 
The grasping, territorial fixation is suggested as being written into our language in such 
words as attend, contend and pretend, in which the tendency is symptomatic of possessive 
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focus expressed through the pointing and shaping activity associated with the right hand in 
most humans. Such linguistic heritage could also, for that matter, be seen in the word 
grasp itself, considering the earthly emphasis on struggling, shaping, territory-defining toil 
inherent in other such gr- words as grind, grapple, grope, graft, granulate, (en)grave, 
grist, grip, group and graph, each implying some defining of the contours by which a 
sense of reality is differentiated and subsequently articulated. The dance metaphor, by 
contrast, understands communication as being holistically-embodied, stemming from an 
engagement with the bodily gestures and motions of one whom the infant instinct motions 
to emulate, fuelling early emotional development in so doing. 
McGilchrist‟s work makes considerable impression, while providing here another dual-
component bond as between the „terrain‟ and „territory‟ aspects of our environmental 
encounter. He provides an important additional dimension for considering the dynamic, 
functionally stable „approximation‟ of our finite, incomplete but developing and becoming 
sense of self-consciousness and understanding.  
Consciousness as „cosmic‟ 
Material evidence of cosmic history now generally goes back some 13.7 billion years, 
which in Haught‟s view makes the arrival of subjective consciousness not less important 
but ever more intriguing, the cosmos having been somehow pregnant with the potential for 
self-consciousness. Haught neither trusts purely physicalist theories of mind nor does he 
accept that many casual invocations of the word „emergence‟ do more than exchange total 
reductionism for some general sense of „magic‟,357 though one might well ask what 
alternative paradigm to emergence one could realistically or responsibly advocate. 
Our creative capacity has been fostered through a particular form of embodiment, a 
progressively incorporated means of seeing and communicating inseparable from our 
evolutionary background, and further affecting our appreciation of intelligible structure 
and whether we interpret such as „design‟. If we consider, say, symmetry in a static 
manner, then overall we find an underlying brokenness or perturbed symmetry in nature. 
Any interpretation of „design‟ should more responsibly be seen as a dynamic rather than as 
a static glimpse or structural cross-section. In fact, the tendency to do the latter is precisely 
what Haught deems a central problem of the scientific community‟s evolutionary dispute 
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with Intelligent Design advocates, owing to the refusal of both sides to see any design in 
the unfolding dynamism of diversity, descent, drama, direction, depth and even death – the 
themes of his respective chapters.
358
 
Peck emphasizes that, through now known biological tendencies towards individuation, 
communication, niche construction and emergence, new forms of life and living 
opportunity are able to emerge in non-reducible ways without any pre-set Platonic goal or 
fixed evolutionary path. Creativity, he concludes, is something written into the very basis 
of communicative niche construction and emergent potential, and while he agrees that 
Darwinian evolution can explain complexity and variety it cannot explain the nature or 
origin of any thereby postulated „design space‟.359 
In relation to our consciousness, the dynamic of any non-pre-set „design‟ is something of 
cosmic proportions, scientifically-speaking. Theologically-speaking, this dynamic is 
somehow „representative‟ of the pervasive, harmonizing and ordering „place‟ of the Logos, 
through whom created space and cosmic order derived, as noted in the Introduction. The 
development of our consciousness is, furthermore, inseparable from the fact that such 
dynamic itself grounds our capacity for conception in the first place. The cosmic scope 
also offers an obviously natural limit to the aforementioned „terrain‟ and „territory‟ 
aspects associated with the engagement of our mental domain, especially as we become 
capable of considering the entirety of the cosmic context that formed our finite, embodied 
perspective. 
The nature of consciousness is taken here to involve interplay between bottom-up and top-
down components. It is considered that the domain or faculty according to which any top-
down component may become influential may well have evolved as some broadly 
„epiphenomenal‟ property, but not in the philosophically stricter sense of the term. 
Specifically, an evolutionary by-product may prove sustainable by emerging in such a way 
as naturally to “pay” for the resourcing of its own upkeep, in this case by interacting with 
lower operational „levels‟, right down to the most basic perceptual level, in a manner 
aiding that continuous reintegration which is critical to our unified perception of self (at 
least in the absence of perturbing neurological dysfunctions or psychiatric disorders). This 
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would have obvious survival and developmental benefits, while shirking harder 
epiphenomenal interpretations in which top-down causation is outlawed. Such causation 
need not be overtly direct but it must in some sense be indirect. It could, for instance, 
conceivably operate by influencing certain variables that may in turn affect the distribution 
of probability factors concerning occurrences on the molecular level. All this is ultimately 
the product of interactive formation throughout Big History.  
As to any brain-mind unification theory the critical idea of a dual-aspect monism is taken 
here to state that the science lying behind the embodied brain on the one hand, and any 
philosophy of mind on the other, should be considered as two inseparably complementary 
ways of seeking one underlying unity, „substance‟ or „stuff‟. The key question then 
becomes the nature of such „stuff‟. If we accept the ultimately cosmic connectedness 
allowing both for the formation and for the necessarily interactive operation of our 
consciousness, then the next logical step becomes to say that any „unity‟ should be traced 
ultimately to the origin of the „pregnant‟ cosmos itself. Taking a scientific perspective on 
this, perhaps considering a quantum or zero-point field as the original „stuff‟ pertaining to 
some critical, monistic integration in physical terms, might offer a basis for considering 
the cosmic „background‟ for consciousness without straying into panpsychism.360 
Bohm considers an „implicate order‟ within which various stably perceivable structures 
prove consistently re-levant as explicate approximations concerning a more deeply 
enfolded reality, approximations necessarily fitted to a given context of encounter. He 
believes that a cosmically „enfolded‟ view of consciousness properly belongs to the 
implicate order, whose „measure‟ is implicit according to the nature of interactivity within 
the interconnected whole (for which he appeals to the popular metaphor of the hologram 
for an analogical basis). He relates the enduringly structural properties of human 
understanding to a conscious appreciation of a continuous „movement‟ that is „sensed‟ 
through the co-presence of „many different but interrelated degrees of transformations‟. 
He therefore considers thought-process to be a motion in its own right, since „there is a 
basic similarity between the order of our immediate experience of movement and the 
implicate order expressed in terms of our thought‟.361 
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From a physical perspective the search for cosmic unity, and ultimately stability, involves 
many different components of consideration. Any postulation in physics regarding creatio 
ex nihilo concerns not only energy considerations but also the question of information 
creation, while acknowledging the incompleteness of any model still requiring initial 
conditions as an input.
362
 The new potential for a quantum-influenced view of the cosmos, 
as advocated by Bohm, is significant, especially where considering cosmic origin is 
concerned. As part of an argument for taking seriously the idea of consciousness having 
cosmic resonance and potential, Nelson remarks that 
As physicists developed the means to probe finer scales of nature, their familiar 
concepts of physicality, certainty, locality and time ceased to conform to their 
commonsense…The emerging physics reintroduced the apparent necessity for 
meta-physics. The world it described was an unseen realm of potential out of 
which the classical world mysteriously coalesced. In this deeply interconnected 
and holistic reality, notions of choice, information and knowledge emerged as 
indispensable concepts.
363
 
It is relatively undeniable that a substantive space-time (chapter 4), an entire array of 
material particles, many different forms of energy and that relatively curious entity known 
as „information‟ did indeed all somehow „coalesce‟ in a classically causal manner out of 
this original, hypothetical quantum unity. Furthermore, without any one of these 
components we would not now have the conscious sense of the cosmos that we do. The 
various components can interact and in some cases even interconvert, even if a robust 
info-dynamics or scheme of relation between energy and information is still largely 
lacking. Nelson actually speculates whether information might „be the nexus between 
mind and matter, containing intrinsic aspects of both?‟364 However this question might be 
resolved, interactive coalescence defines an energetically and informatically non-trivial 
architecture relative to which we may experience that critically compacted sense of 
proximity interpreted as our mental topos or mindscape.   
Laszlo also picks up on the information component, noting speculation regarding some 
extra, fifth ingredient of physics on top of the four better known force-describing fields, 
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and a possible fifth entity, in addition to space, time, matter and energy, that would, he 
argues, be something like a cosmic evolution parameter, unfolding through the progressive 
encoding of some „memory function‟ allowing for the maintenance of physical 
consistency and connectedness over time.
365
 
The fact remains that the emergence of our conscious awareness and the focusing of our 
self-conscious identification both ultimately derive from some primal, cosmic unity 
according to a mysteriously stabilizing form of coalescence, the various components of 
which interact as the cosmos expands and diverges, coalescing and differentiating further 
on various levels and scales. Modular components or domains of self-organization are 
thereby able to emerge and further to develop according to some degree of communication 
between bottom-up and top-down aspects of influence or operation. As such developing 
unity, ordering and coalescence may then be related theologically to the critical conception 
of the harmonizing Logos it is appropriate to relate such emergent consciousness to our 
iconic capacity for making such conception, for seeking patterns and generating meaning, 
and for discerning the relevance of the spatio-temporally diffusive topos associated with 
our mental dynamic (see below).  
The ability to self-refer: language, metaphor and sacramental significance 
Viewed dynamically, the sacramental significance of the suffering, Incarnate Logos and 
Cosmic Christ
366
 manifests itself through a dynamic „design‟ of reconciliation of truly 
cosmic relevance (as per Haught), a design that must be seen in temporally-engaging 
terms from our perspective. Our self-conscious engagement concerning such perspective is 
steered and augmented by our developing language, being both dynamically expressive 
over time and a means by which our intellect may “auto-catalyse” the aforementioned 
generation of meaning, inseparable from our search for rational intelligibility and 
ultimately held together, theologically-speaking, through the Logos. Through the Logos 
the divine Economy grounds and establishes the complexly connected and dynamically 
ordered architecture necessary for any creaturely discernment of its „motioning‟ and any 
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relevant reception of revelation. In the Incarnation the Logos therefore self-refers in a 
critical sense through an engagement from within created space. Language itself also 
possesses a critically self-referential aspect, able to draw philosophical insights concerning 
its own nature and limits. Indeed, the conceptual „space‟ that any active development and 
use of language somehow inhabits can itself come to be considered part of the relevant 
„topology‟ or „architecture‟ overall (see below). 
As noted in chapter 1, we cannot deny that there is some respect in which we „make‟ the 
world as represented in our mindscape, and that we may sometimes surreptitiously 
determine the shape of an outcome.
367
 Even given the definitional determinacy of our 
mathematical reasoning, formally represented in notational and axiomatic terms, there still 
remains a certain indeterminacy regarding our intellectual engagement with our cosmic 
environment and „reality‟. In Bohm‟s „implicate order‟ the implicate is understood as 
accommodating many potentially re-levable and contextually re-levant, explicate aspects 
of encounter, all ultimately interconnected in a manner that is not in itself precisely 
measurable – or rather, does not correspond to any externally imposed or more strictly 
locality-preserving „measure‟. Bohm contrasts the „algebraic terms‟ in quantum theory, 
understood to correspond to physical observables, with those terms that are to be 
„considered as extensions of the general language‟ in which, especially as mathematized in 
modern number theory, such terms become „undefinable symbols‟ in the sense that „the 
meaning of such a symbol is never directly relevant…only relationships and operations in 
which these symbols take part are relevant‟.368 Representative correspondence therefore 
becomes the mark of something made explicate, while the implicate order remains 
uncommitted in itself to any systematic attribution or „measure‟ of relevance. Implication 
suggests some in-folding, something not unreasonably analogized with a topology, not 
being necessarily constrained to any one explicit measure or metric, accommodating many 
possible, „explicate‟ geometries. 
Natural language must also, for its very development, allow for some semantic flexibility 
with respect to terms first used as markers to keep track of a particular semantic quality (in 
contrast to mathematical quantity) over the course of a developing discussion or thought-
process. The manner of understanding indicated by that quality may develop in accordance 
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with the connotation most naturally accessible or immediately useful to the developing 
dynamic of the context, argument or conversation in question. This is an inevitable fact 
about how language is, or it would never have developed very far at all. Furthermore, in 
addition to connotational and denotational aspects of language, it is important to 
acknowledge a more „silent‟, annotational aspect that may further nuance implication. 
While ardent formalists sought an abstract scheme of notation that is purely self-consistent 
and logically infallible, expressed simply through a collection of symbols and rules of 
operation concerning them, such a system would remain incomplete, as highlighted by 
Gödel‟s great insight that certain statements can be consistently contained in formal 
systems but without being provable purely in terms of the rules belonging to the system 
itself.
369
 In this context one is presented with a mutual exclusivity between completeness 
and consistency. Gödel‟s intellectual achievement arguably adds to mathematical 
potential, making truth a more powerful concept than proof, perhaps even accommodating 
the possible generation of additional axioms (which one might parallel with novelty of 
insight in the context of natural language). Likewise, in the biological context 
underpinning self-consciousness, demonstrating the potential inherent in a layered, 
hierarchical, dynamically-ordered stability and forming a basis for functionally effective 
communicability, has become a more powerful concept than an overtly mechanistic 
determinism.  
Hofstadter expounds a possible relationship between the implications of self-reference, as 
occurs in Gödel‟s illustrative mathematical sentence „I have no proof in this system‟, and 
the phenomenal emergence of our self-consciousness. He suggests an analogy with 
computer programs, and meta-programs translating other programs, the levels of 
translation between program and meta-program enabling emergent phenomena to occur as 
something not reducible to the sum of its parts. He uses the phenomenon of 
superconductivity as a physical illustration (involving Cooper pairs, polarons, electrons 
and phonons, virtual photons and positrons all interacting on different levels).
370
 He 
suggests an intriguing analogy between the worlds of self-reference in a system of formal 
mathematical logic and self-replication in molecular biology,
371
 with such parallels as the 
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genetic code and the Gödel code, an amino acid and a quoted symbol of typographical 
number theory (TNT), strands of DNA and formal strings of TNT symbols, and finally 
between proteins and statements of meta-TNT. Once tutored in the notational 
representation used by Gödel, Hofstadter‟s analogy is efficiently compact, revealing a 
philosophically intriguing connectedness across what might, at first, seem relatively 
independent disciplines – comparing the nature of interrelatedness involved in various 
self-referring feedback systems, or in abstract representations thereof. 
While there is ongoing debate between realist and nominalist viewpoints in mathematical 
philosophy,
372
 it is possible, from a more theological perspective, that mathematical 
principle or pattern could be a reflection of the ontology of the Mind of the Maker, 
according to the „image‟ of which we have an iconic capacity for conception. Here it is 
worth noting Penrose‟s view that 
There is something important to be gained in regarding mathematical structures as 
having a reality of their own. For our individual minds are notoriously imprecise, 
unreliable, and inconsistent in their judgements. The precision, reliability, and 
consistency that are required by our scientific theories demand something beyond 
any one of our individual (untrustworthy) minds. In mathematics we find a far 
greater robustness than can be located in any particular mind. Does this not point to 
something outside ourselves…?373 
He states further that  
The Mandelbrot set [on which fractal geometry is based] was certainly no 
invention of the human mind. The set is just objectively there in the mathematics 
itself. If it has meaning to assign an actual existence to the Mandelbrot set, then 
that existence is not within our minds, for no one can fully comprehend the set‟s 
endless variety and unlimited complication.
374
 
Furthermore, visual displays of mathematical art – such as fractals – are generated by an 
iterative operation. Such iteration indicates a certain critical feedback, the centrality and 
potential of which for life has already been noted. Applicability of referential language or 
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symbolism in general therefore consistently highlights the intriguing and potentially 
enhancing complexity that a capacity for self-referring feedback can induce. 
 
In the spirit of Popper, Penrose puts forward his own three-world system, the realms of the 
physical, the mental and the Platonic-mathematical
375
 in which the physical world derives 
its scope entirely from a small section of the Platonic-mathematical world, the mental 
world derives its scope entirely from a small section of the physical world (which Penrose 
acknowledges as controversial) and, somewhat surprisingly at first, the Platonic-
mathematical world derives its scope entirely from a small section of the mental world. He 
then offers another similar possibility, in which the condition of „entirety‟ is significantly 
relaxed.
376
 The most striking thing about his suggestion, for this thesis, is the mutual 
within-ness that these interrelated „worlds‟ seem to define among themselves. Although 
still removed from the fully intrinsic interrelation postulated of the perichoretic dance of 
the Persons of the Trinity, this nonetheless points to the potential inherent in such mutual 
interrelatedness and integration. 
As to an integrated, methodical viewpoint concerning the development of language, 
Lonergan seeks a means of understanding the method behind linguistic use and 
development as part of a universal pattern – a pattern necessarily in tune with those 
already existing, stabilizing patterns that influenced the nature of our embodiment in the 
first place.
377
 Developing this idea, and assuming that „by inquiring, intelligence 
anticipates the act of understanding for which it strives‟, he distinguishes the form of such 
anticipation from those properties involved in the process of developing or generating the 
relevant conceptual content. He also emphasizes the dual complementarity of classical and 
statistical investigations, according both to types of knowing and to the type of thing 
consequently known.
378
 Classical investigation anticipates the systematic while statistical 
investigation anticipates some non-systematic manner of deviation therefrom. 
Lonergan draws out of these considerations a universal theory of „emergent probability‟, 
finding an integrated worldview in which „classical and statistical laws can coalesce into a 
                                                             
375 Penrose, The Road to Reality, p.18. 
376 Ibid, p.20. 
377
 Crowe and Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol.3: Insight (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2013) 
378 Ibid, pp.127ff. 
144 
 
single unified intelligibility‟.379 The nature of such coalescence (comparing the use of this 
term to that in the previous section) is then articulated through various terms and 
conditions by which „schemes of recurrence‟ may become established. This resonates with 
a layered view of stability and Lonergan remarks particularly on the trade-off between 
stability and development, on the basis that „schemes with high probabilities of survival 
tend to imprison materials in their own routines. They provide a highly stable basis for 
later schemes but they also tend to prevent later schemes from emerging‟. The resolution, 
for him, is to distinguish between a probability of emergence and that of sustenance, 
allowing for a context in which the probability of the first is high relative to the second, 
providing a critical compromise between the sustainable resourcing of some underlying 
basis for stability and the tendency to surrender certain resources for the purposes of 
further emergence.  
Such emergent probability, forming part of a developing and universal program of human 
insight, is part of what Lonergan calls a „world process‟, which in this context is open and 
non-deterministic. The intelligibility of this means of considering the development of the 
relevant „schemes‟ is considered to be „immanent‟ in such world process and „since 
empirical method aims at such an immanent intelligibility, emergent probability is a view 
of world order within the limits of empirical method‟.380 In conceptual terms, language is 
similarly reliant, both for its development and for its sustainable consistency of usefulness, 
on various levels or schemes of stability, not least grammatical stability.   
In a contemporary review of the legacy of Lonergan‟s philosophy, Beards eruditely 
remarks, on the context of any philosophical debate regarding meaning, that 
The operational condition of possibility of all such debates is the basic, flexible yet 
pervasive conditional and evaluative structure that Lonergan outlines, identifying 
recurrent semantic structures…further situated in structural anthropological 
patterns of pre-conscious and conscious kinds that have their place in the genetic 
and dialectical unfolding of communal meaning and meaninglessness…381 
The capacity for reflection on language and meaning is likewise taken here as something 
deeply integrated with our anthropological development, the consideration of different 
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qualifications of „consciousness‟ and some appreciation of the finite limits to our capacity 
for making sense.  
The twentieth century saw various contexts of debate concerning language, from Frege‟s 
axiomatic system of reference and semantic value, to challenges based upon distinction 
between semantic value and sense, questions concerning the subjunctive, the empirical 
demand for verification and the potential ambiguity of translation from one linguistic basis 
to another.
382
 For present purposes, however, the key point remains that language, being 
naturally applicable in a self-analysing manner, is an obvious elucidatory tool for 
highlighting the possible consequences of a capacity, albeit finite, for self-reference.  
Sayers suggests that „all language about everything is analogical; we think in a series of 
metaphors. We can explain nothing in terms of itself but only in terms of other things‟.383 
This is only partially helpful, however, as it doesn‟t seem to allow for any cogent means of 
considering something to be „literal‟. By juxtaposing the word „explain‟ with the word 
„think‟ Sayers is also presumably intending by „thought‟ that which can, on principle, 
become specifically articulated through speech – articulating a thought-process whose 
roots are subliminal. 
As to considering the nature of metaphor, Lycan expresses the context of the problem as 
the need to find a compromise between two refuted extremes, one claiming metaphor as 
being a convenient, shorthand alternative to a literal, referentially symmetric simile – A 
being to B in the same way as B is to A – and the other transferring the nature of the 
comparison to a psychological causation.
384
 
In an in-depth analysis, Soskice notes the Greek conception of metaphor as, in its root 
meaning of „transference‟, an extension or decoration of language, and couches this 
conception within a linguistic context that must realistically be a blend of the „natural‟ and 
the „conventional‟, which cannot act against the „natural‟ to too great a degree. 
Definitional problems then occur in applying the idea of speaking about one thing in terms 
indicative (but not necessarily representational) of another, given that the context may not 
necessarily afford the exclusive situation of metaphor in either the physical or the mental 
domain. Metaphor must, most simply, usefully apply one context to another and Soskice 
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considers that metaphor is not syntactically well-defined, not necessarily pertaining to any 
one definitive conceptual structure or order.
385
 
She refers subsequently to an „irreducibility‟ regarding metaphor, particularly in the 
context of religious metaphors and those that „can only be redescribed by other 
metaphors‟.386 In relation to scientific language, she also notes the distinction between 
homeomorphic and paramorphic models: cases in which, respectively, the subject of the 
model acts as its own source or it does not.
387
 The homeomorphic case is of particular 
interest in the context of self-reference, and both concepts of irreducibility and 
homeomorphism are topological classifications – the latter indicating the possibility of 
making one shape into another by continuous reformation such as bending or stretching, 
but not tearing or puncturing.  
Appealing further to the idea of „closure‟, a concept relevant to set theory and topological 
analysis, one might (metaphorically) apply this concept to a situation in which the 
aforementioned „transference‟ relates back to the subject providing the basis for such 
transference, closing the referential domain in question in such a way as to enhance any 
„decoration‟ of language or manner of representation. This is similar to Lewis‟ 
aforementioned illustration of the Sun shining on a representation of itself and relates to 
the question of how sacramental significance becomes encounterable, a signifier not just 
being brought into significant effect by that being signified, but rather with the means of 
signification being actively enhanced and transformed by the communicating activity of 
the signified. 
Given the accumulation of topologically applicable terminology, one could extend this 
linguistic analogy to consider orders of topological „genus‟. Any one genus is not 
continuously deformable into another, so a metaphorical application of this term to 
considering various levels of representative significance would suggest some layered 
stabilization over a hierarchy. Of relevance to the conceptual „topology‟ of our mindscape, 
one could therefore consider a semantic hierarchy. The literal, or the surface impression, 
indicating the effect of those physical „impulses‟ stimulating our more innate capacity for 
representation, would then constitute the lowest genus in such a hierarchy. Above this 
would lie the genus of the symbolic, something one step removed from the „literal‟ 
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according to a more overtly deliberated, re-represented analysis or evaluation of 
contextual relevance. Above this would lie the representationally enhancing genus of the 
sacramental, bringing in a deeper sense of participation. Beyond even this lies the genus 
of the eschatological, something only indirectly appreciable to us now. Finally, everything 
still ultimately remains overshadowed by that which is immanent to divinity, 
unimaginable to us on theoretical principle. 
One could then think of the particular „topological class‟ pertaining, in this analogy, to 
metaphor as being able to accommodate a whole family of grammatical or syntactical 
„geometries‟. This fits with Soskice‟s general treatment of metaphor, while further 
suggesting a means of analogy between the topological and the semantic: representing 
linguistic relations and interconnectedness in topological terms and suggesting 
analogously qualified levels of stability in the conceptual, linguistic domain of our 
mindscape. Taken as a whole this ultimately collective and interconnected mindscape is 
open and indeterminate, a product of bottom-up emergence (as represented, for instance, 
through Lonergan‟s „world process‟) and top-down bestowal in terms of its iconic capacity 
for theological conception and active participation. This „topology‟ then supports our 
appreciable generation of meaning. 
Theologically, our entire capacity for such appreciation ultimately originates through the 
Logos, in accordance with the „motioning‟ of the divine Economy. Through the 
Incarnation the topos associated with such Creative Activity becomes sense-objectified 
and the sacramental significance of the temporally-engaging, Incarnate Logos is once 
again taken here as inseparable from a dynamic, pervasive „design‟ of objective 
reconciliation – a reconciliation made manifest through some collectively renewed 
conception (cf. 1 Corinthians 2:6-10). Before considering this dynamic more fully from a 
theological perspective, something ought first briefly to be said about the anthropological 
origins of the concept of logos and its special relevance to us as linguistic and theological 
creatures.  
The developing concept of logos  
Linguistic capacity is inseparable not only from genetically indelible, formational history 
but also from various second-order activities believed to be an additional aid to survival, 
maintaining and developing community once rudimentary language, mainly gesticulatory 
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at first, emerged. Such activities might occur under the broadest and most general 
description of „ritual‟. In a seminal study, Rappaport determines to  
…“unpack” a definition of ritual, in the course of which the sacred, the numinous, 
the occult, the divine, and the Holy, will be derived, and it will further be argued 
that social contract, morality, a paradigm of creation, the conception of time and 
eternity…and those orderings of the world that we shall call logoi…are all 
entailments of and are generated out of that form.
388
 
It could be that our most basic symbols, natural and lexical, are more the product of first-
order evolutionary struggle for survival while grammatical consideration is more closely 
attached to second-order, ritualistic habits over human history.
389
 Like Appleton and 
Dutton, Rappaport sees the development of language‟s attachment to „worlds parallel to 
the actual‟ as a fundamental step forward in the speedier, linguistic aspect of evolution and 
considers that language forms us as much as we form it.
390
 Furthermore, the nature of 
information carried by such symbolism is different from that carried by genes.
391
 Ours is 
an inherently self-relating world, and over time the fixed aspects of our conceptual 
capacity run the risk of imprisoning us, not dissimilarly to McGilchrist‟s concern, in what 
Rappaport calls „the great inversion‟.392 Language may inform or reinforce our sense of 
self-consciousness while the context of our self-consciousness in turn influences our use 
of language. Rappaport distinguishes between a symbol and an index – the latter being a 
sign genuinely brought into effect by the thing being indicated.
393
 Where consciousness is 
concerned, this understanding fits Greenfield‟s emphasis on the importance of establishing 
indices that relate specifically to consciousness, things that are not present unless 
consciousness is also present.
394
 
Rappaport defines ritual as „the performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal 
acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the performers‟395 and claims that this 
„logically entails the establishment of convention, the sealing of social contract, the 
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construction of the integrated conventional orders we shall call logoi‟.396 Ritual is seen, 
historically, as shaping some communally accepted means of understanding, establishing 
forms of activity that produce variegation either by conforming with, or rebelling against, 
some accepted convention. At first Rappaport relates his discussion of logoi to the self-
correspondence of some putative, unquestionable liturgical postulate, in which a truth 
value that would usually be relative to an investigation of something lying outside of itself 
is made absolute simply by corresponding to itself, so that „the correspondence theory of 
truth remains intact but…“stood on its head”‟.397 „Logos‟ is then, singularly, taken to refer 
to an unimpeachable, „divinely ordained cosmic order‟ against which all aspects of 
convention may be judged to be in, or out of, congruence.
398
 This fits with the conception 
of the Logos as the image of harmonious cosmic rationality. 
The historical progression in the meaning of the term is noted, from „collection/gathering‟ 
through „constructed speech‟ to „ground/reflection‟ and, in its interaction with 
mathematics, „order/measure‟.399 Theologically the concept is relevant both to the Greek 
understanding of truth as non-concealment and to the Hebraic understanding of all-
encompassment, a harmony guaranteed ultimately by the fact that God is the one 
„speaking‟ or „seeing‟. Rappaport notes Heraclitus‟ illustration of bow and lyre, in that 
In both there must be forces working in opposite directions if they are to perform 
as bows and lyres. This harmony, being a harmony that contains flux, conflict and 
tension as well as easy agreement, is hidden; nevertheless, it is in its true nature 
ultimately accessible to those who will heed it, that is, hear it and follow in 
order.
400
 
Recalling the aforementioned „tension‟ of interaction between Uncreated and created, such 
tension may likewise be taken to relate to a partially „hidden‟ harmony, a theologically 
significant „implicate order‟ unfoldable or revealable with respect to human encounter 
according to some proper „order‟ or „measure‟. Such encounter is ultimately defined 
according to the „measure‟ of the Logos through whom created „order‟ derives, and most 
profoundly so in „becoming flesh‟. This shaping and directing of our conceiving encounter 
is considered here in terms of the settling of some critical, eschatologically-orienting 
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„trajectory‟ (returning to Wood‟s phrase) with respect to the motioning of the divine 
Economy throughout created space. The aforementioned created bond securing cosmic 
harmony and stability in physical terms must therefore be considered in terms relevant to a 
Christological framework. In order better to relate this framework to the aforementioned 
dynamic design of reconciliation – considered holistically as a dramatic, cosmic artwork – 
an appropriate dual-aspect bond/dynamic will be borrowed from the philosophy of art 
through a consideration of form and content. 
Form and content 
Some engagement with the philosophy of art forms a natural corollary to considering the 
creative mind. One needs to ask what it is in art that arrests our attention to consider 
something as art. „Attention‟ is neither a unitary nor a trivial matter. Engle makes the 
distinction between alerting, orienting and executive attention in terms, respectively, of 
readying, selecting/discriminating and finally controlling the content of focus.
401
 
Attentiveness is a changing, dynamic process, with semantic interpretation coming 
through that dynamic and memory playing an importantly active role, as noted above.  
While most artistic representation is obviously in some way reliant upon a distribution 
over space, one must also consider distribution over time (chapter 4), allowing music and 
problem-solving as forms of art. Furthermore, when taking a cosmic perspective, the 
spatio-temporal inextricability of relativity theory may well have both logical and 
eschatological bearing if the Artwork of Creation is considered holistically. 
Taking the Logos as the principal, rationalizing, formalizing and harmonizing factor or 
dynamic „Principle‟ – any „conception‟ of which must consist in, and occur throughout, 
some representative dynamic – the associated hypostasis is not merely some inert 
“container” for rational structure. Rather, it acts as Mediator, according to the kenosis of 
God‟s Creative Activity, of a wider theological intelligibility concerning the relationship 
of God to all that is not God, thereby acting as „the foundation of analogy‟ by virtue of 
which theological relevance may be witnessed according to a distinct, finite, creaturely 
freedom. The „difference‟ or „distance‟ between Creator and creature is here interpretable 
as an opening or „excess‟ such that „in the relation of creature to Creator difference 
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increasingly opens out – as space for movement, not as alienation‟.402 This communicative 
interconnectedness, facilitating creative opening, is consonant with the topological model 
here. Our physically contoured, finite, actively participating and theologically proper 
topos, capable of generating meaningful content, is furthermore appropriated by divine 
nature in the Incarnation. 
The principles of active, communal contemplation, of „seeing the form‟ of revelation, of 
cosmic dimensionality and of the narrative interaction of divine-human encounter, 
enveloping the view of theology as drama, constitute hallmarks of Balthasar‟s theology.403 
His approach suggests, as does that of Sayers, some complementary philosophical 
consideration of the nature of an artwork, in this case with respect to a supra-cosmic 
initiation of such drama. 
Balthasar‟s approach is couched within a framework of „tension between immanence and 
transcendence – a tension that is fundamental to human existence in the world, and 
especially to the issue of how contingent human creatures can be said to act in 
freedom‟.404 To Balthasar, creaturely freedom needs to become „appropriately oriented to 
that greatest horizon of meaning, the eschatological‟, with such orientation occurring 
through Christ but in such a way that „Jesus is aware of the formal scope of his mission, 
but uncertain of its content‟.405 A philosophical consideration of art in such a context 
would therefore do well to base itself upon the concepts of form (or that which is formal or 
formalizing) and content. The word „content‟ suggests something being „held together‟ 
and therefore poses the question as to what effects or contributes to the holding, or 
stabilizing. In the case of some living art this holding, stabilizing aspect must, 
furthermore, provide a reliable basis in accordance with which any contributory content 
may progressively be generated as „from within‟ the artwork itself.  
From a philosophical perspective, Carroll rejects the sufficiency of representational and 
expressivist theories of art, owing to their respective ignorance of abstract art, music and 
dance on the one hand and purely noetic pleasure on the other.
406
 He looks at the original 
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development of twentieth century formalism, considering its weakness to have been that 
consideration of „content‟ was not treated in a manner sufficiently inseparable from any 
significance of „form‟. He moves therefore towards a neo-formalist approach involving 
form-content interaction. This form-content philosophy will be nuanced here to enable a 
clearer relation to be made with key theological principles, especially the Incarnation and 
the Transfiguration.   
The working out of the Incarnation, involving an associated transformation or 
transfiguration, is here considered inseparable from a proper theological contemplation of 
a cosmic, form-content dynamic. The word „transfiguration‟ is arguably more particular 
than „transformation‟, a figure being more clearly specific to a particular function 
(something specifically configured) than some generic „form‟. In this sense trans-
figuration might suggest a re-configuration of the living dynamic, „drawing‟ human nature 
and the cosmic Artwork of Creation into a new domain, „fit‟ for eternal life. Considering 
the active, preparatory, prefiguring involvement of divine Creative Activity for the 
Incarnation and its transfiguring outworking, Balthasar‟s theology of the place of Mary is 
again noteworthy, summarized by Gardner as „a type of the Church...prefiguring us for 
us‟.407 The transfiguring initiative itself is here specifically on the „side‟ of divinity. 
It can be difficult to define precisely what is intended by form or content. An obvious, 
somewhat superficial attempt is to relate form to something like a champagne flute and 
content to the champagne within.
408
 This idea seems, in one respect, theologically 
appealing. One could see the realm of material existence „in earth‟ as lacking independent 
definition in itself, being at first a formless entity only given shape by divine, formalising 
Activity. A little thought, however, should convince us that there are issues with this 
representation. One central problem is that in many, if not most, practical artistic 
applications it is very difficult to distinguish precisely between the contained and the 
container. As Carroll points out, content of joy and elation in the reception of a piece of 
music cannot really be separated from the underlying musical structures, neither can it 
necessarily be said to be contained by them.
409
 In the flute-champagne example the two 
are separable, in the musical example they cannot be. 
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The theological case adds an additional consideration. On principle the Logos as a divine 
hypostasis has being regardless of whether or not there is a materially manifest creation, 
but not vice versa. The formalising or form-giving factor is, on this reckoning, essentially 
independent of physically manifest form or content.  
Another unhelpful temptation is to conflate content and meaning, seeing form merely as 
the way in which meaning is presented. Any sentence, artistic or otherwise, may broadly 
fit this idea, as Carroll notes.
410
 Any philosophy of art then pivots on how one might 
define an appropriate relation between meaning and its manner of (re)presentation if 
something is to be considered an artwork, inevitably leading to some positions that are 
arguably too narrow and others that are too inclusive. 
The sentence analogy is also potentially misleading. Is it really appropriate to conflate 
meaning with content when clearly the grammatical form of a sentence in itself carries 
semantic implication, and therefore potential content, just as much as it shapes or presents 
it? Each word could be seen as an element of any content while also having its own 
grammatical or formal classification: noun, verb, preposition etc. Form carries semantic 
aspect in itself, relatively independent of context though difficult (or impossible) fully to 
define in its absence. Meaning is, furthermore, not just some inert, hypothetical content. 
Artistically-speaking, considered over a temporal process, it has a self-influencing life of 
its own, especially considering the interpretative participation of both artist/author and 
audience. Overall the most sensible view might be that meaning is the product of 
particular modes of interaction within an otherwise inseparable form-content bond or 
dynamic. Different types of interaction then produce different types/levels of meaning, as 
common to interpretative experience.  
The problem remains, however, as to what particular understanding to assign to the 
individual terms „form‟ and „content‟. Carroll notes the danger of conflating these 
terms,
411
 something which would involve a disastrous loss of distinction within many 
theological contexts of application. Perhaps the champagne example can yet prove useful, 
however. Is it true to say that the champagne has no form in itself? Clearly that is only the 
case if form is understood solely in the narrowest sense of solid, geometric, visible 
property. A theological analogy of such an understanding would be rather like claiming 
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not that the Logos was able to assume a human nature, but that it was unable to have any 
form apart from that visible in the Incarnation, begging serious questions regarding its 
nature or status in priority to the Incarnation, and any „pre-existence‟ of Christ. The Logos 
is necessary to give form to „the earth‟ rather than vice versa. In the above analogy, 
however, the champagne has a chemical form, and for that matter some formula, or 
admixture of formulae, something „hidden‟ in the sense of not being directly visible 
through the external context of its appearance. Keeping the concepts of form and content 
distinct, there are two ways in which one could therefore conceive of an „artwork‟ of 
champagne.  
One could consider form in terms of the underlying molecular structure, dictated by the 
physical chemistry, and any content as emerging through the context in which the 
champagne is viewed, whether as a jagged mass in mid-air or as a puddle on the floor (no 
glass now being necessary). Such content is not the „meaning‟ as such but more generally 
an aspect of mental impression, while the form remains, superficially speaking, in some 
hidden chemical consistency.  
One could, conversely, view the form as the visible shape of the flow, still inseparable 
from the physical laws producing it, and the content as some acquirable (or already 
assumed) knowledge of chemical property and its physical consequences, limiting the 
array of possibilities for how any hypothetical „flow‟ could on principle be expressed. In 
the case of the cosmic Artwork, acquiring some degree of knowledge regarding at first 
hidden properties is inseparable from appreciating some greater, collective context lying 
behind all those various patterns, of whatever degree of meaningfulness or relevance, that 
are expressible or explicable, on physical principle, within the Artwork. 
Both of these perspectives provide a certain insight with respect to forming a vocabulary 
suitable for distinguishing, rather than separating, form and content within a dynamic 
unity of interaction. In relation to the theological context concerning the Logos and its 
Incarnation one may of course prefer that „form‟ should not be understood in a physically 
confining or outwardly superficial sense. Theological viewpoint would more naturally 
conceive of form (as an overarching or undergirding concept) as some at least partially 
hidden property, invisible to us in any absolute sense, but nonetheless open to partial 
discernment by our particular, iconic mode of investigative intelligence. Such 
„discernment‟ operates from within the very same created domain to which the Creative 
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Activity of the Logos grants a possible plethora of explicate structures, outwardly visible 
„forms‟ held together according to some deeper, dynamic and implicate formality or order. 
Equally, such „discernment‟ necessarily occurs through an appreciation of many possible 
contexts of impression we might encounter, and their affect on any evaluation of 
„relevance‟. As our attention mechanisms are contextually transient, the various foci of 
such attentiveness also need to be integrated over some relevant time period. Together, as 
a whole greater than the sum of its parts, these contexts may facilitate some macroscopic 
impression of cosmic, theologically significant content, generated in necessary accordance 
with our operative idiom of engagement. The overall plethora of outwardly visible forms 
or structures ultimately shares some common origin „in a/the beginning‟. One might 
compare this to the big goal in physics to find certain initial conditions pertaining to the 
cosmos back at the stage at which all the natural forces of our present cosmic era might 
have been unified in one single force. 
Within this pervading, holistic view of cosmic unification, any overall associated content 
is only truly discernible according to some overall impression, integrated over the spatio-
temporally differentiated array of contexts that are physically expressible or explicable 
(and thus encounterable) in created space. Furthermore, such overall association of content 
should properly be considered ultimately according to a shared impression, something 
„afforded‟ to a collective consciousness or mindscape pertaining to human nature as a 
whole and relevant to its eschatological dimension. Such collectiveness is argued here as 
being sacramentally manifest and enhanced according to our communing participation in 
the Mind of Christ, in whom the aforementioned „formalising factor‟ submits to novelty of 
encounter or „impression‟ in the Incarnation.  
Considered in any non-sacramental framework such impression would be fragmented 
owing to the many possible, individual contexts influencing subjective interpretation or 
generation of meaning. Even in this case, however, the predominantly shared dynamics of 
our embodiment might suggest that, to a large extent, some overall impression could still 
reasonably be postulated as being shared by humanity collectively, and a participative, 
sacramental framework further enhances the significance of this. Therefore, just as one 
may distinguish between more superficial, outer structures and some deeper inwardness of 
form – something genuinely participated in or according to – so too one may distinguish a 
more superficial content, relating to subjective impression, from some greater, objective 
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content generated (or even regenerated) according to an integrated impression made upon 
a sacramentally connected and collective consciousness overall. This could then be 
understood theologically in the declaration of the Incarnate Logos that, when He was lifted 
up from the at first formless „earth‟, He would draw all things to Himself.  
In Genesis, appreciation of outer forms, types or structures is facilitated by a differential 
act of separation and some filling up of the resulting domains. Through the Creative 
Activity of the Logos differentiation and integration are held in perfect balance, hence the 
harmonious rationality. The „lifting up‟ of the Incarnate Logos then makes the 
transfiguring effect of the outworking of the Incarnation a focal point of theological 
relevance. The consequent drawing together of integrated, meaningful content then 
constitutes a plausible basis for appreciating the effect of the Transfiguration: all 
relevantly generated „content‟ being reconfigured in accordance with it being encountered, 
or „seen‟ afresh by divinity in a unique manner through the assumed and perfected 
humanity of Christ – an encounter encompassing everything of relevance to the physical 
formation and dynamic stability of human nature and its iconic capacity for theologically 
meaningful encounter. This effectively develops the Baluwski/Watkins idea noted in the 
Introduction. Our collective share in the Mind of Christ indicates something far greater 
than a sum of parts, in the world but not of the world, sustained according to a 
„remembering‟ Eucharistic activity (chapter 5) that is not merely a passive recollection but 
an active invocation, involving participate human self-consciousness and memory. 
Communal memory is not fully accessible by any one individual, but something „known 
only in part‟ (cf. 1 Corinthians 13:9). Likewise, any overall, collective content is not 
graspable as-a-whole by any one individual. However, just as the many different types or 
aspects of any healthy individual‟s memory somehow manage cooperatively to interact so 
as to present just one overall sense of self-identity, one personality and one 
autobiographical memory; so too one might suggest some greater integration 
accommodating just one autobiographical self-identity in the Church as the Body of which 
Christ is the Head. Such integration is enabled by the Holy Spirit, advocating, witnessing 
and re-minding. The Transfiguration therefore promises a revelation of those „greater 
things than these‟ (cf. John 1:50 and 14:12) which are already latent in the prospective 
content of what Christ has achieved for and initiated in the Church. The critically unique 
topology of connectedness pertaining to the incarnate Mind in question is one uniting the 
impartial, undifferentiated regard of divinity with the operational idiom pertaining to the 
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creative mind of the creature. Our potential for generating meaningful „content‟, more 
deeply appreciating our theological „prospect‟ in so doing, is enabled by and drawn into 
that in which our creative activity participates. 
Returning to the understanding of types/levels of meaning emerging from different 
modes/dimensions of interaction within an inseparable form-content bond, one may define 
some formal (or formalizing) aspect as manifesting itself within a proper balance 
between integrated unity and differentiated diversity. One may then define an inseparable, 
complementary contential aspect as manifesting itself within the necessary balance 
between impression and expression with respect to any context of encounter. Where any 
overall, holistic content is concerned this balance may be considered sacramentally 
enhanced inasmuch as an original creative „expression‟ through the Logos is „drawn‟ back 
into the Mind of the Maker as a result of being (re)encountered as a critical „impression‟ 
upon the Mind of the Incarnate Logos. The bi-directionality implied by the respective 
prefixes im- and ex- is then similar to the bi-directional „tension‟ postulated in the working 
definition concerning a basis for sacramentality in the Introduction.  
Given this use of vocabulary it is noteworthy that Torrance uses the term „intelligible 
impression‟ in discussing the manner in which medieval theology considered the „active 
intellect‟ to provide a grounding for the necessary objectification of some received 
image.
412
 The interpretative freedom of such active intellect is graduated in conjunction 
with those formal features or structures manifest within the created domain. From our 
perspective therefore, formal and contential aspects are inseparable from one another. I 
have chosen this nuanced redefinition, attaching the notions of „form‟ and „content‟ as 
attributive, adjectival qualifications within a dual-aspect dynamic, partly in order to 
accommodate the aforementioned dynamic inherent in the inevitably shifting aspects of 
human attentional focus. However, the above formulation also arguably skirts around 
Carroll‟s objection to neo-formalism on the grounds that „not all works of art possess 
content‟.413 Furthermore, the term „aspect‟ emphasizes the inherently holistic overview, 
one aspect occurring in tandem and dynamic unity with the other, not dissimilarly to the 
history of the proverbial, content-pregnant egg developing in tandem with the formal 
changes in that which produced it. Dynamic, evolutionary inseparability between the two 
produces a particular, symbiotic co-evolution. The holistic, creative relationship between 
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Logos and cosmos may conceivably be considered according to a not entirely dissimilar 
dynamic – a theologically-accentuated form-content bond. 
The summary diagram below represents formal and contential aspects as orthogonal but 
still inseparable axes. 
Rather than risking some purely psychological subjectivity or pretending any unbridled 
objectivity, one could (like Frege) appeal to the permissible manner or sense in which 
something is communicable to human cognition.
414
 Any „contential aspect‟ to cognitive 
activity is related to the manner or sense of impression upon the human mind, provoking 
and mediating some responsive expression of the same mind through resulting, self-
conscious behaviour. As to this „expression‟ potentially having, in turn, any impressive 
theological influence, any such influence should be seen as a participating invocation 
rather than a provocation.  
The suggested formulation can be related to Sayers‟ analogy inasmuch as the formal 
aspect may relate to the fact that the integral Creative Idea is communicated through the 
Creative Activity in a manner accommodating a dynamically representative, harmonious 
differentiation within created space. The contential aspect may then relate to the fact that 
the Creative Activity impresses itself, in Creative Power and in terms of its effect within 
                                                             
414 C. Tolley, Kant on the Content of Cognition (European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.22, No.2, June 2014), 
pp.200-228. 
159 
 
created space, in a manner inducing some meaningful expressiveness from human nature, 
evoking a „response in the lively soul‟.415 
Balthasar refers to the „impress and the shadow of Trinitarian life in all realms of the 
world‟ as playing a major part in the developments of Western theology, „trusting in the 
inferential development of the created mind‟.416 Here such „impress‟ is related to our 
cognitive ability to attend, focus and generate meaningful conceptual content. The above 
representation is I believe complementary to Balthasar‟s theology, especially considering 
the influence thereon by Maximus. Balthasar sees in Maximus‟ work a collection of 
polarities, including that between participator and participated, indicating some „inner 
movement...the underlying rhythm of being in the world...the precise place where God is 
present, where his incomparable otherness appears‟.417  
Complete otherness is a hallmark of negative theology but such still requires 
complementary, positive input in order to bring the implications of its claims into more 
robust accordance with a lived experience of revelation. Human experience or perspective 
must, however, be distinguished in terms of its concentrated attention, its focal 
compactness and the composite nature of our physical embodiment. Divine Being is then 
the origin of all compositional synthesis while in itself being non-compositional and 
beyond the synthetic. Balthasar looks to Maximus‟ development of cosmic synthesis, 
beginning with the classical triad of genesis, kinesis and stasis, and with the concept of 
motion being understood as expressing the distinction between origin and goal for any 
creative process of transition towards an eschatological identity in which Alpha and 
Omega, initial and ultimate, are in unity. 
In relation to our epistemological capacity, considering knowing and unknowing as part of 
a dialectic between motion and rest, the ultimate source and destiny of such „rest‟ is that 
which is unimaginable or inconceivable in its necessary absoluteness, pertaining to that 
peace passing all creaturely understanding.
418
  Here the Logos is represented according to 
the dynamic behind the „dawning realization of all things‟.419 The at first paradoxical 
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conceivability of the economically revealed Logos remains topologically central, and as 
Balthasar comments (on Maximus) 
Even if his style of thought is...one of a progressive synthesizing of poles, tensions, 
limited differences, all of which – when thrown into the melting pot of the Logos – 
are meant to rise from his fire as complete, simple wisdom: still he realizes, with 
utter clarity and certainty, not only that this unity can never be the result of our 
own laborious intent, but also that God always remains something infinitely other 
than the unifying idea of the world.
420
 
Theologically our contemplative or conceptual engagement involves an „imagination‟ or 
doxa that is „the Platonic opposite to causal explanation, since causality in God can never 
be obvious or accessible to our minds‟.421 In the Incarnation, however, we are able to 
discern the inconceivable as being active in economically manifesting its own self-
conception in as far as such is possible in physical, finite terms.  
Finite motion always relates to some concept of „interval‟ and intervals are contained 
according to a finitude represented (for Maximus) by the fundamentally ontological 
category of space, while time is seen as a „scattering of being that inevitably accompanies 
finitude‟ and effects an inevitable contrast between composite, synthetic being and pure, 
„simple‟ Being.422 According to a modern scientific outlook, chapter 4 will consider space-
time as an ontological category that is substantively influential, having consequences for 
our reception and appreciation of revelation. Any infinite Motion, or Self-Motioning 
within the Immanent Trinity, then pertains to a fundamentally distinct, humanly 
inconceivable ontology.  
The God-cosmos relationship consists in the economic communication pertaining to 
divine „motioning‟; the humanity-cosmos relationship emerges through the compositional 
contingency of our finite, becoming „movement‟ in space-time. An interactive, bi-
idiomatic cooperation between these two in Christ then opens the way for the revelation of 
our fuller theological relevance, the ultimately conceivable „prospect‟ of which is the 
eschatological establishment of all meaningful, becoming content generated within the 
objectifying limitations of the finite. Such limitations are inseparable from those formal 
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principles giving necessary definition to the finite – principles derived and established 
through the Logos. 
Maximus considers temporal fulfilment according to a form of closure, but with divine 
initiative „elevating the creature‟ into the inevitable beyondness implied by such closure. 
Closure, in this sense, defines the manner by which we are able to appreciate the openness 
of what lies beyond, again a topological conception. Balthasar gleans from Maximus the 
treatment of a „nature‟ as some „organized motion‟, a harmony ultimately centred on the 
Logos. Theosis is then initiated from beyond such a nature, made newly effective through 
the Incarnation and highlighting an eschatological openness with respect to our contingent 
and relative closure „in earth‟.423 
A balance between macro and micro contexts of consideration is maintained according to 
a reciprocity between universal generalization as a „real ontological condition‟ and 
individual particularity, for which the universal is both the ground and the result in 
Maximus‟ thinking. Balthasar notes that the „changeless stability‟ of universal being (or 
unity) is continually regenerated or reintegrated, as from below, by the „developing 
stability‟ pertaining to differentiated particularity – something interpreted „on the level of 
ideas‟ rather than over time as some strictly linear progression.424 From a scientifically-
engaged perspective, however, time clearly cannot be separated from our developing 
capacity for engagement through particular principles and ideas. Some scientifically 
tenable conception of a physically „developing stability‟ over time is therefore an 
importantly complementary consideration in this respect (chapter 5). As described earlier, 
such developing stability allows our compositely embodied means of conceiving to 
emerge. The meaningful relevance of any „content‟ thereby generated may then be drawn 
and held together through a Christ-oriented „motioning‟ towards eschatological rest, a 
motioning having the aforementioned „changeless stability‟ as its source. 
Rest does not imply absence of content, „the quieting of the heart‟s urgent quest does not 
at all have the character of self-abandonment, in Maximus, but contains in itself the full 
truth and positive implications of motion‟.425 While the psychological goal of rest 
ultimately transcends finite motion, Maximus‟ view of grace is as the transcending of a 
„self-contained nature‟. Balthasar summarizes that „the being that has been projected into 
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existence cannot achieve for itself the condition of rest...it can only assimilate to itself the 
ontological direction of its own being‟.426 
The polarities of universal-particular and subject-object are equally weighted or valued on 
either side for Maximus, and the macrocosm is a unity that provides a natural limit to 
differentiation, indicating some final synthesis. Any proper topos relevant to our 
participation therein must be appropriately interconnected according to the entirety of this 
unified whole.
427
 This complements the above consideration of consciousness as 
physically connected and imbued with a cosmic dimensionality and significance. The 
macrocosm is mirrored in the microcosm, in a critical balance of association between the 
material and the intellectual. Balthasar remarks that  
Man, as an intellectual and material microcosm, thus appears both as the midpoint 
of a universe arranged in a polar pattern and as its final synthesis. Insofar as he is 
at the same time the subject of his knowledge, through his intellect, and its object, 
through his body, he becomes both the world‟s axis and its system of coordinates, 
where its horizontal and vertical polarities cross. He stands in the middle...drawn 
into the internal mechanism of the macrocosm.
428
 
In the above representation of formal and contential axes, if considered now as polarities, 
we already have a unity-differentiation polarity regarding the material realm. The intellect, 
fostered according to some material impression, may then express itself in such a manner 
that influences the material cosmos and the form of impression made upon it. The human 
being can therefore be considered a microcosmic centre of appreciation and activity within 
a macrocosmic Artwork, dynamically representing it according to having the capacity for 
a particular idiom of encounter and operation within it – an encounter whose ultimate 
significance must be integrated over all participating generations. This integration occurs 
with the deepest theological relevance in the perfected humanity of Christ. 
As noted previously, Bohm considers thought-process as a collective movement, by which 
memory is impressed upon by the „general environment‟ and may in turn express itself 
through a reciprocally influential impression upon the same environment. He thinks of our 
mindscape in terms of a mental „dance‟ and states that „thought is a material process 
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whose content is the total response of memory, including feelings, muscular reactions and 
even physical sensations that merge with and flow out of the whole response‟.429 As to the 
stability of any flux or movement regarding our thought-process, Bohm emphasizes the 
relativity of such stability with respect to the physicality of the process. Furthermore, 
thought itself is, for Bohm, very much to be viewed as art, maintaining that „ultimately, 
the actual movement of thought embodying any particular notion of totality has to be seen 
as a process, with ever changing form and content‟. Formal aspect, in his description, is 
indicative of an „order of movement‟, something providing a „disposition needed for the 
mind to engage harmoniously in such a movement‟.430 Content is then inseparable from 
the emergent effects of such engaging „disposition‟ and it is argued here that this 
disposition is re-posited through the re-hypostatization of human nature by the Logos – 
through whom „form‟ and the „order of movement‟ derived in the first place. The next 
section now focuses on the implication of this doctrine where the centrally important 
concept of the Mind of Christ is concerned.  
The Mind of Christ  
The concept of the Mind of Christ is clearly of theological and doctrinal import. In 
considering the influence of Christological doctrine on the way we might study and 
appreciate the human mind, Noll regards the „come and see‟ of John 1:39 as being in itself 
an invitation to the scientific community.
431
 The criticality of the Mind of Christ for 
theological doctrine is made all the starker by the Church‟s claim to have a participative 
share therein. Torrance criticized the Roman Church for its (to him) uncritical 
identification of its own consciousness with the Mind of Christ, something in his view 
generating a self-evolving conception rather than exhibiting a genuinely deeper freedom 
within the discursive aspect of human reasoning.
432
 Here the „place‟ of the Incarnate 
Logos is being taken as central to a dynamic, topological representation of created space in 
terms of its relation to the Uncreated, and the significance of the Mind of Christ and the 
„opening‟ it affords is considered within this framework.   
The Mind of the Incarnate Logos must logically be open in two respects: firstly, to the 
entire array of interconnected principles whose interrelation corresponds to intelligibly 
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discernible patterns (or meaning) with respect to the human intellect, actively constructing 
and representing from the perceptual level upwards; secondly, to that idiom of operation 
corresponding to what it means to create as God, distinguishing the topoi pertaining to 
Uncreated and created „perspectives‟. In the first instance the „reasonable soul‟ and the 
convergent, focused and contingent mode of human intellectual activity are emphasized; 
in the second instance the hypostasis of the Logos is emphasized, under-standing the 
critical divine-human unity. Once again the Logos is taken as the dynamic, Principal 
Principle upon whom all communicable, created principles are contingent. This double-
sided openness is argued here to define an hourglass topology, according to which the 
„sides‟ of subject and object (see below) could be taken to constitute yet another critical 
dual-aspect unity in this case.  
An anhypostatic, two-nature Christology is maintained here with a clear distinction 
between „nature‟ (human nature being fully assumed by the Second Person in Christ) and 
„Person‟, pertaining emphatically to the divine hypostasis of the Second Person of the 
Trinity. Human nature can still be spoken of as „in-personal‟ but „theologians must deal 
with the fact that although the Mediator has both a human and divine consciousness He 
possessed only one self-consciousness‟ while also bearing in mind the obvious difference 
between the collective property of human nature and a particular personality, one of many 
possible, variegated dispositions to perform or live out this nature in some way.
433
 Gockel 
provides a good defence of the necessary complexity of any anhypostatic/enhypostatic 
discussion, and its presence both in Aquinas and in Protestant scholasticism, highlighting 
some of the disagreements to which different readings of a given prefix to the term 
hypostasis can give rise.
434
 The key, for him, is the simultaneous creation of the human 
nature of Christ and its institution as subsistent in the one hypostasis of the pre-existent 
Logos in one and the same divine act. The consideration of how human nature becomes 
united with divine nature in one divine hypostasis involves considering the relation 
between „flesh‟ and Logos in a way that safeguards divinity against any suggestion of 
becoming „accidental‟. 
Sumner examines how the anhypostasis-enhypostasis conception was useful to Barth in 
safeguarding total divine freedom with respect to the total Activity of the Source, in the 
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Logos, assuming a human nature that is then contingent for its identity upon the Second 
Person in such a way that the Word is in no sense a passive object and Christ is in no sense 
„adopted‟. Thus „the inconceivable becomes conceivable‟ while God‟s „realization of one 
possibility and the concomitant elimination of all others is not a restriction on divine 
freedom but its execution‟.435 He even suggests elsewhere that the notion of „fallenness‟ 
might, in an anhypostatic framework, be drawn into the assumption of human nature in 
Christ without implying any problematic lack of impeccability.
436
 
Some interpretation of our „fallen-ness‟ is necessary in relation to the terms „nature‟ and 
„person‟. It is the contention here that the negative aspects of any individual personality or 
disposition (seeing the „skins‟ once again as standing for our entire psycho-somatic mode 
of existence) indicate that which has been „fallen into‟, here the finite personality itself, 
blurring divine image and compromising the overall integrity of our nature. The finitude of 
our nature is inseparable from some negating or constraining aspect of definition, which 
provokes or highlights various dispositional characteristics. The Personhood of Christ 
always has its infinite Source in the Second Person of the Trinity and hence, one could 
argue, with no corruption of any thereby assumed, hypostasized nature.  
As per Baluwski/Watkins it is asserted here that there is, in the objectified context of the 
Incarnation, a mutual novelty of encounter, a critical oasis of symmetry irreducibly 
induced within the broader asymmetry of the Uncreated-created relationship. This avoids, 
however, the more wholly symmetrical framework of Process Theology, in which divine 
nature is somehow open to human influence in direct balance to the openness of human 
nature to divine influence. This oasis of symmetry, having its basis in divinity sharing in 
the humanity-cosmos relationship through the Incarnation, corresponds to the 
aforementioned, topologically irreducible „singularity‟ – an ineradicable potential for 
generating and manifesting genuine novelty, actualized in terms of a new creation 
eschatologically established by divine initiative through the Incarnation. 
As to finding any „model‟ of communicative cooperation between divine and human 
idioms of creative freedom, the fact that human consciousness is something re-
instantiated, or literally re-generated, as from one generation to the next must be taken into 
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account, emphasizing the theological importance of some overall, sacramental integration 
in the Mind of Christ. One must then distinguish between the divine and the human with 
respect to the central conception of self-consciousness.
437
 On the one hand there is the 
completely intrinsic and fully self-communicating relationship pertaining to divinity, in 
pure, absolutely stable and perfectly balanced Being of Trinity-in-Unity and Unity-in-
Trinity, not conceptually containable within our finite and compactly enfolded domain of 
reference. On the other hand there is the extrinsic and partially self-replicating activity 
pertaining to created life, variously passed on over many generations as part of a relative, 
quasi-stable existence, distinct from pure Being. 
Interesting from a Trinitarian perspective is the idea of considering the hypostases as three 
„centres of consciousness‟,438 although this leaves open the question as to whether or not 
the general term „consciousness‟ is automatically identical to self-consciousness in divine 
nature. Is it appropriate to speak of three centres of self-consciousness or must there be 
one self-consciousness within which these three „centres‟ mutually and fully participate as 
a result of their perfect interrelation among each other, pertaining to an infallible divine 
identity? Not „seeing‟ from divine perspective we cannot answer this question in any 
psychological sense, but we can rightly say that there must be just one self-consciousness 
in the united identity between divine and human consciousness in Christ. 
Schechter argues, with particular reference to cases of split-brain patients on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, to the prolific ability of the normal functioning of the brain to 
integrate concepts into such a form that the conscious mind can handle them, mostly by 
impeding communication between contradictory inputs, that there is a clear distinction 
between speaking of a unity of consciousness on a semantic level of overall coherence – 
such as matching a sense of personal intention to a capacity for responding to our 
environment – and speaking on a more obviously enumerated level, involving countably 
distinct „streams of consciousness‟ becoming somehow singular in their affect.439 She thus 
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distinguishes clearly between unity and singularity, as the theologian is also well advised 
to do.  
One could attempt to define self-consciousness with respect to some semantic coherence 
in individual self-perception, bearing in mind potential impediments to this in cases of 
mental disorder. One might then venture to extend this conception to self-consciousness in 
Christ, defined by some fully coherent self-perception „moving‟ in complete harmony and 
unity with the other Persons of the Trinity. Meanwhile, any „irreducible singularity‟, 
representing the critical, mutual novelty of encounter in the Incarnation, neither 
contradicts such unity nor is it synonymous with it. At the very least this analogy offers a 
useful vocabulary for making a necessary distinction. The Personhood according to which 
divine and human natures are united in Christ defines the unity, since, as Gregory 
Nazianzen put it, „the higher perfection dominated‟.440 While this unity is manifest 
through the hypostasis of the Logos, divine and human „streams‟ of consciousness remain 
„countably distinct‟ but singular in their effect in the sense-objectified life of the Incarnate 
Logos. 
The question of the two wills stands at the heart of any consideration such as this. 
Balthasar emphasizes, again from Maximus, the importance of „the foundation of an 
intimate community of being and of shared operation (ζςνεπγάηιζάπξ). This symbiotic 
interpenetration is the basis for the possibility of an “interconnected exchange” of the 
names that belong to the two natures‟.441 The hypostasis of the Logos is a supervening by 
the „higher perfection‟ rather than any superposition or imposition since the natures and 
the associated hypostases are in one sense infinitely different or „distant‟. As will be 
argued, however, they are nonetheless sufficiently „proximate‟ in a topological sense by 
virtue of the image. The implication is of two, ontologically distinct topoi, with the 
topology representing the relevant contours pertaining to created, human encounter being 
embedded within a broader, distinct and “transcendent” topology pertaining to uncreated, 
divine encounter, strictly inconceivable from our perspective but nonetheless immanent to 
our very created existence. Such „embedment‟442 preserves the uniqueness defining the 
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novel and para-doxical (with respect to an imagination operative in created space) topos 
assumed by the Logos in becoming ζάπξ.  
Balthasar continues  
This synthesis and its effect – a kind of indirect identity of God and man – remains 
the world‟s supreme miracle, for it incarnates within itself the most decisive 
“contradictions”. Because it cannot be self-contradictory, however, these 
contradictions must be both preserved and overcome within it.
443
 
This divine-human or Uncreated-created „tension‟ is in a different conceptual class from 
the other dual-aspect bonds or dynamics considered here. The „bond‟ metaphor might 
arguably be taken to imply a change rather than an exchange of corresponding attributes, 
and to think instead of „mixing‟ or „interpenetration‟ (as Balthasar does) seems more 
appropriate. The metaphor of diffusion springs to mind, and rather than maximizing 
entropy the „mixing‟ in this case attains maximization according to the supervening 
supremacy of perfect freedom in God. As to the novelty of the thereby “synthesized” topos 
Balthasar remarks 
This place of God‟s self-emptying is precisely the place of his holiest divinity, of 
love‟s highest freedom: a freedom that stands at once beyond both “natures”, 
makes both into an expression and sign of itself, and is genuinely capable of 
achieving a “coincidence of opposites”, in the sense of Nicolas of Cusa.444 
He refers to the „supreme paradox of a hypostatic centre of freedom that is both in and 
beyond all natures – a centre of freedom that is the fulcrum of the world‟s whole 
history‟.445 This hypo-static centre is induced through the under-standing of the Logos, 
sense-objectified as an expression of divine love in its deepest and most holy „place‟. In 
one respect divinity and humanity are in equilibrium, inasmuch as „just as far as the 
decisively human remains in force is as far as God appears...just as far as the two wills 
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remain themselves, unconfused, is as far as they can be united in a single (μοναδικωρ) 
activity‟. This results in a „theandric activity‟ specifically with respect to the hypostasis.446 
The finite activity of any finite being is de-fining of that being in as far as any „natural 
freedom‟ is established.447 In this finite context, nature and person must be taken on the 
same ontological level and nature must not be relegated to the status of a mere 
„marionette‟. In fact, the equal footing of nature and person could be said to ensure the 
necessary stability of being. As Balthasar puts it, „for Maximus...person is the realization, 
the concrete living out, of a rational nature; and because every realization points back to a 
real source, it is the original, functional centre of the rational nature itself, the radiant inner 
expression of its being‟.448 
Bulgakov traces the history of dogmatic contemplation and synthesis concerning formal 
Christology, from Apollinarius to the Calcedonian formulation and into the development 
of the enhypostasis viewpoint of Leontius and John of Damascus, struggling with how 
human nature could be fully assumed and hypostasized by the hypostasis of the Logos 
without either suppression or absorption of its distinction, integrity or freedom of 
participation. His principal caution is that 
As soon as [one] tries to define the mode and meaning of this deification more 
precisely, there arise – despite the dogma of the two wills and two energies – 
propositions of a monophysitic character, attesting to the absorption or suppression 
of human essence by the divine essence.
449
 
He picks up on the possible ambiguity of whether „will‟ refers to the psychological or the 
ontological and the importance of distinguishing between divine and human „subjects‟, 
upholding the „fundamental idea, that is, the duality of the self-determination in the case of 
unity of life‟.450 He enlarges on the context of the theological challenge in that „having two 
natures, the one hypostasis of Christ lives a “composite” life (“without separation and 
without confusion”); and it thus realizes its life simultaneously and in parallel in the two 
essences in the case of the unity of the living hypostatic self-definition‟. He then refers to 
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such life in terms of a theological „centre of gravity‟,451 and the link with the analogy used 
above with regard to human self-consciousness is interesting here if one considers a 
united, theandric „narrative‟. 
The divine will is beyond any opposition between freedom and necessity, while creaturely 
freedom is „expressed in voluntary, creative goal-setting and self-determination, 
corresponding to the state of becoming [italics Bulgakov] that is proper to creaturely 
being‟.452 Bulgakov remarks of the wills that „one surely cannot fail to see the imprecision 
and incompleteness of these definitions (“does not contradict”, “follows”, “is subordinate 
to”), especially if one remembers that the question is of the relation of the creaturely 
[italics Bulgakov] human will to the divine omni-wisdom and omnipotence‟.453 This leads 
him into his Sophianic approach in which divine self-consciousness is defined as proper to 
a subjective “I” that declares „I AM that I AM‟, perfectly self-understanding and thus self-
hypostasizing, in and as a tri-hypostatic unity. Elsewhere he states that „God‟s nature is 
thoroughly hypostatized by the divine hypostasis‟.454 Divine nature is perfectly self-
understood and „darkness‟ cannot in any way supervene or „overcome‟ this nature, since it 
cannot cause it to be „understood‟ in any alternative way (cf. John 1:5). There is no strict 
analogy of this in human self-consciousness. Human freedom, at the psychosomatic level, 
is based on a partially reflective form of self-awareness, of „seeing darkly‟. Considering 
some encounter of genuine novelty by divinity, in assuming human nature, ought therefore 
to require the qualification of a newly reflexive means of self-identification, manifesting 
itself with the required consistency throughout its engagement within the created domain.  
The „becoming‟ of creaturely humanity is seen as corresponding to the dynamic of the 
divine „Proto-Image‟: living, moving and having its proper being in divinity, having 
thereby „a particular creaturely eternity and even uncreatedness‟.455 This is consistent with 
an eschatological interpretation of human nature as a dynamic, collective property. Like 
Torrance, and consistent with the approach taken here, Bulgakov sees Creation and 
Incarnation as theologically inseparable, such that „God‟s pre-eternal design manifested 
His love for creation, which did not stop at creation but went beyond it; as the act of the 
new creation of the world, it determined the descent into the world of God Himself, that is, 
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the Incarnation…[and] one can even say that God created the world…for the sake of His 
Incarnation‟.456 
The idea that consciousness is cosmic in its origin and significance, both theologically and 
scientifically, is congruent with Bulgakov‟s view of the ideal human person as an iconic 
„microcosm‟ and „the creaturely Sophia‟.457 The Incarnation must furthermore involve the 
Creative Power of the Third Person in tandem with the Logos, effecting both the 
„introduction‟ and „reception‟ of the divine hypostasis with respect to human nature. 
Noting the reliance, for the consistent possibility of such reception, on the original essence 
of humanity being already intentionally divine-human, Bulgakov maintains that „as far as 
the in-hypostatization of the Logos in man is concerned, the postulate of the Incarnation is 
a certain primordial identity between the Divine I of the Logos and the human I; this 
identity, however, does not exclude the essential difference between them‟.458 The 
fundamental distinction between humanity and the rest of creation is then seen as being in 
the influence of that uncreated component originating in „God‟s breath‟. 
For Bulgakov, it is therefore in the Logos that the critical communion between divine and 
creaturely Sophia principally consists, Sophia being seen in turn as „the heavenly 
humanity…the proto-image of the creaturely humanity; inasmuch as she is eternally 
hypostasized in the Logos, she is His pre-eternal Divine-Humanity‟.459 While for Adam 
there was originally intended some primordial uncreated-created interpenetration and 
communication, in Christ our creaturely constitution is supervened by (or re-placed 
according to) the Logos fully assuming the psychosomatic nature pertaining to finite 
humanity.
460
 This opening of proper divine-human communion is possible precisely by 
virtue of the fact that the Proto-Image makes the hypostasis of the Logos sufficiently 
„proximate‟ to that established by original intention for Adam that a „topological 
neighbourhood‟ indicative of such communion may be established. Bulgakov‟s framework 
therefore seems congruent with the topological framework here. He acknowledges that, 
given the „equilibrium‟ by which the three „centres of consciousness‟ unite in one divine 
Subject – one “I” pertaining to the triune God – the key question becomes how to unite the 
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Immanence with the Incarnation-imbued Economy
461
 (a distinction for which he helpfully, 
for this thesis, uses the term „aspect‟). 
Part of the issue is a necessary translation between eternity and temporality, and „it is 
precisely eternity that is the true foundation for revelation in time…in its positive content, 
temporality is adequate to eternity and, in the end, merges with it‟.462 This idea is explored 
further in the next chapter. 
The negative Calcedonian formula still leaves space for some positive synthesis or 
definition,
463
 and this is where Bulgakov invokes Sophianicity as a uniting factor. Sophia 
stands for the interconnected unity of all „images‟ of divine self-revelation and is 
inextricable from the Logos (as hypostasis) inasmuch as „the Logos pre-eternally reveals 
the Father as the Word of all words…of all the divine ideas and images in all their 
unity‟.464 In this respect the Logos is arguably predisposed to draw all truthfully generated 
meaning, anything relating to any revealingly relevant or relevantly revealing „idea‟ or 
„image‟, to Himself. In engaging fully with a creaturely mode of becoming God properly 
receives such becoming by, in a sense, becoming that becoming. The participation of the 
hypostasis of the creaturely Sophia is still, however, necessary for the Incarnation itself. 
Again, Mary receives the „strength‟ or stability with regard to her necessary role in 
conjunction with the Creative Power of the Most High overshadowing her.  
Here one could again conceive of the Logos in terms of a Principal Principle while seeing 
Wisdom or Sophia as constituting an inseparable Witness „regarding‟ the interconnected 
entirety and unity of all contingently ordered, created principles deriving from God‟s 
Creative Activity through the Logos. A critical aspect of Sophia, in her role and relevance, 
could therefore properly be considered as „created‟, „formed‟ or „possessed‟, depending on 
the translation, „as/at the beginning‟ of God‟s creative Work (Proverbs 8:22). Such 
Witness is supra-cosmic while relating, in creaturely terms, to the context of the 
Incarnation. There is furthermore a critical double-sidedness involving divine and 
creaturely Sophia where „perspective‟ or „encounter‟ is concerned. 
Bulgakov proceeds to tackle the key question of how to avoid Christ‟s individuality 
„knowing‟ ontological limitation, being instead „equally [italics Bulgakov] close and 
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accessible to anyone who scrutinized Him closely…the Neighbour for every man‟.465  
Once again the suitability of the vocabulary here to the topological framework is 
transparent. He considers the original, intentional ontology of personhood to be unlimited 
by egocentricity, and how to find a theological „centre of gravity‟ in Christology that is 
mutually compatible with biblical witness, the historical Jesus and the cosmic Christ then 
becomes part of an, as yet, not fully resolved or transparent vitality. To Bulgakov the 
„capital‟ contained in the idea of a „theandric energy‟ is indispensable but only finds 
„partial application‟ in the doctrine of communicatio idiomatum.466 One must avoid any 
static sense of juxtaposition that obscures dynamic, theandric interaction.  
Emphasizing kenosis as a dual-aspect event or process, of both heavenly and earthly 
relevance or sidedness, and taking Sophia as expressing the unity of Creator-creaturely 
mediation, Bulgakov argues that God has the power of self-limitation such as to „change‟ 
the mode in which for Himself, economically-speaking, His Essence is lived out („out‟ 
being here a proper indication of the „outwardness‟ of revelation by the divine Economy). 
He avoids any instrumentalism or human passivity by seeing divine-humanity as 
consisting in a correlation of the divine and the human, a kenotic manifestation able 
properly to effect an internal regeneration of humanity.
467
 
Divine-human self-consciousness remains, subjectively-speaking, that of the “I” of the 
hypostasizing Logos, perichoretically united with the other hypostases whose interrelation 
constitutes the Trinitarian Life. Objectively-speaking, there is a „real conditionedness 
[italics Bulgakov] of the life of the Divine I by the psychosomatic life of humanity‟468 that 
must maintain its integrity by being allowed the correlative freedom to grow or „become‟. 
A critically irreducible, dynamic „equilibrium‟ identity is thereby sustained between the 
Son of God and the Son of Man who has „nowhere to lay His head‟. This identity 
constitutes a uniquely integrated topos correlating with the psychosomatic life of 
humanity: something fully assumed, newly „understood‟ and thereby newly created and 
completed by a divine hypostasis, as fully embedded and participant with respect to the 
Uncreated as is possible on physical principle. The divine hypostasis supervenes according 
to the necessity-identifying freedom of the „higher perfection‟ but not in an instrumentalist 
sense.  
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The manner in which Bulgakov fleshes out this idea with appeal to biblical witness is 
insightfully comprehensive and impressively detailed. One gets from his analysis a clear 
sense of the mutually encountered „novelty‟ or critical „singularity‟ affording humanity an 
active, contributory modus operandi with respect to the integrity of its distinctive, 
idiomatic mode of encounter. A unique aspect of symmetry is induced through the 
necessary cooperation and correlation between God-cosmos and humanity-cosmos 
relationships in the Incarnation, while Alpha and Omega dynamically coincide in a 
manner fully incorporating temporal, creaturely becoming. The next chapter develops this 
with regard to the sacramental significance of such temporality. 
Lonergan takes a more densely methodological approach to the question of the Mind of 
Christ, starting, by reference to Aquinas, from the position that  
Once the divine essence is understood…being is understood in its totality, both 
because God by comprehending the divine essence understands perfectly every 
being whatsoever, and because the blessed in heaven seeing God‟s essence behold 
both God and other beings in God in proportion to the perfection of the vision they 
possess.
469
 
Finite essence, however, does not in itself contain the infinite or infinitive „to be‟ – an 
Infinity for which „being by essence is being whose essence is its own „to be‟…in 
cognitional terms, it is being through the understanding of whose essence being is 
understood in its totality‟.470 Divine nature consists in perfectly conjugate identity between 
ontological and epistemological aspect, between being and knowing.  
Within the creaturely domain there is instead the radical, „dynamic orientation‟ of an 
intellectually rational consciousness tending towards „natural finality‟, referred to by way 
of „intention‟ but still in the process of intending in as far as it does not yet constitute 
knowledge in and of itself.
471
 Sapiential knowledge is then properly „intended‟ to know 
how all things are ordered as a whole, as already noted in reference to Bulgakov, and a key 
question becomes what „primitive terms‟ (which may perhaps be compared to Bulgakov‟s 
talk of „images‟) are necessary for defining those principles or ideas according to which 
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„all true conclusions are deduced‟ in the created domain.472 The Logos both effects and 
sapientially holds together these principles and their associated, created „terms‟.  
Lonergan considers that „the intending intention of being is part of human nature and 
common to all‟473 and he distinguishes the term „person‟ as something subsisting in an 
intellectual nature. Importantly, infinite persons are seen as being „constituted‟ by relations 
while finite persons have relations as a „consequent property‟ resulting from „operations 
which are necessarily accidental‟.474 Furthermore, „determining the constitution of a finite 
person means (i) assigning the intrinsic causes by which it is composed and (ii) applying 
the laws that govern the composition of a unit out of these several causes‟.475 
Moving to the core of operative but accident-imbued human intellect it is then necessary 
to distinguish between that towards knowledge of which the intellect „proceeds as to its 
goal‟ and that by which the intellect „is moved to understand‟.476 Knowledge of God is 
mediated to us through our being „moved‟ in theological terms. Science, meanwhile, is 
considered as „moved‟ according to creaturely, corporeal mediation.477  
As divinity is neither essentially compositional nor resolvable into causes 
…the philosopher begins with concrete being, the theologian with revealed truth; 
the philosopher proceeds by resolution into causes, the theologian by the 
illumination of reason; the philosopher arrives at an understanding of composite 
being, the theologian at an imperfect understanding of revealed truth.
478
 
However, „the many truths we know about God are interrelated in such a way that one 
truth is understood as being the reason for another‟.479 There is therefore the extremely 
important corollary that „common contingent truths predicated of God add nothing to the 
divine essence except a relation of reason, but imply an appropriate created term outside 
God‟, since in order for the appropriate correspondence to be maintained „a contingent 
truth cannot be predicated of God unless God is related at least conceptually to a 
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contingent being‟.480 This implication concerning „created terms‟ highlights a necessary 
aspect of the dynamic involved in the Uncreated-created relationship. Lonergan 
summarizes verbatim 
God is not a finite being such as would prevent God being something else besides 
God; rather God is an infinite being that by way of eminence includes in itself all 
the perfection of all beings both actual and possible. Furthermore, just as God by 
the same infinite act knows not only necessary but also contingent realities, and 
just as God by the same infinite act wills not only necessary realities but also 
contingent ones, so also God by the same infinite act of existence not only is 
necessarily God but also is what God has contingently become.
481
 
He proceeds to resolve revealed truth into „divine reasons‟ – incorporating both the 
potency and the act of assuming „on the side of the assuming subject‟ – and „created 
causes‟ which ground, „on the side of the object‟, the „potency enabling it to be assumed 
and the act by which it is assumed‟.482 After using this resolution to establish various 
proper parameters and corollaries regarding the hypostatic union he then considers the 
question of human consciousness, although it is not made clear what, if anything, he 
considers to distinguish consciousness and self-consciousness. He defines a „strict‟ 
understanding of the term „experience‟ as „a preliminary unstructured sort of awareness 
that is presupposed by intellectual inquiry and completed by it‟.483 Such unstructured 
experience forms a basis for inquiry into the „what‟ and „why‟ which in turn forms the 
basis for asking whether such distinctions genuinely pertain to how things actually are. 
This basis constitutes the „formality‟ overarching our existential subjectivity, „for we 
experience external or internal data in order that through inquiry we might understand and 
through reflection we might judge‟.484 Consciousness is seen more strictly as experience 
on the side of the subject than any „percept‟ on the side of the object and  
…this type of experience is not described but only indicated. Description supposes 
intellectual inquiry and includes what is known through insight and conception. 
But consciousness-as-experience is indicated inasmuch as a method is described by 
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way of which one can go from an experience structured by understanding and 
conception back to that experience itself in the strict sense.
485
 
Such indication squares with the idea of indices concerning consciousness, brought into 
genuine effect by consciousness being present. Lonergan considers consciousness-as-
experience to present a far less ambiguous basis for Christological application than 
consciousness-as-percept and highlights what he considers „three different levels of the 
same knowledge of the same reality‟: firstly, the subject as conscious, „known on the side 
of the subject and under the formality of the experienced‟; secondly, the subject as 
conceived, „known on the side of the object and under the formality of the intelligible and 
definable‟; thirdly, the subject as affirmed, „known on the side of the object and under the 
formality of the true and of being‟.486 
In Christ there is then a relation between human consciousness and the beatific vision, 
which requires a clarification regarding a divine consciousness that „must be predicated of 
God analogically [since] In God, the subject that is conscious, the act by which it is 
conscious, and the primary object of this act are…one and the same. Nor is God conscious 
through a multiplicity of acts, for in God there is but one act, an act that is infinite‟.487 
God‟s perfect freedom is, in this sense, interpretable as an infinite capacity for the 
accommodation of all necessary truthfulness, as held together according to one „regard‟.  
Lonergan distinguishes knowing on the side of the object from consciousness on the side 
of the experiencing subject. Consciousness as subject-sided and experience-formalized is 
seen as safeguarding „the truth of the assumed humanity‟,488 but any process involving 
understanding, of asking “what is it?” and passing into judgement (in temporal terms) as 
to whether any „it‟ actually is as such, then needs to be considered in such a manner as 
also to safeguard the unity of the natures. Lonergan achieves such safeguarding through 
the „beatific knowledge‟ since „Christ as human not only sees the triune God and incarnate 
Word on the side of the object but is also conscious of himself on the side of the subject; 
hence by a combination of knowledge and consciousness he understands and judges 
himself to be the incarnate Word‟.489 This resolution highlights what Lonergan considers 
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the crux of the problem, namely that „through a consciousness that is truly and properly 
human, a divine person is conscious of a divine person‟,490 to which he suggests that 
…a human being attains himself or herself under the formality of the experienced 
through his or her human operations and in proportion to the perfection of these 
operations. But in Christ the man the divine person of the Word senses, desires, 
understands and wills by way of finite human operations. Therefore the divine 
person of the Word subsisting in a human nature is conscious of himself as 
sensing, desiring, understanding and willing in a human manner.
491
 
The caveat is that, on the side of the divine subject, there is no need for God to „attain 
himself‟ under any formality pertaining to the definable or intelligible, or of being in any 
finite, creaturely sense of the term. Lonergan considers that „kenosis is certainly not a 
laying aside of the divine person or of the divine nature or of the consciousness that 
belongs to a divine person and nature. Rather, this kenosis consists in a certain acquisition, 
in that he who is God has also become human in the true and proper sense‟.492 His overall 
viewpoint therefore becomes 
…that the one person of the Word is the ontological and psychological subject of 
both his divine consciousness and his human consciousness. It is clear, moreover, 
that these two consciousnesses mutually communicate on the side of the object, so 
that Christ as God knows himself to be this human being and Christ as man knows 
himself to be the natural Son of God.
493
 
He argues for psychological as well as ontological unity of self-knowledge in the 
hypostasis of the Logos, on the side of the subject, a „side‟ that it is clearly difficult to say 
anything about from our psychological perspective. The key question is whether too direct 
an analogy has implicitly been assumed between divine Personhood and the human person 
with respect to any attribution of psychological subjectivity to the divine. It might be 
argued that psychological subjectivity ought to be particular to the psychosomatic nature 
associated with the finite human person, such finitude not being existentially active in 
defining the hypostatization of human nature in the Incarnation.  
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If, however, ontological unity is sufficient to establish the “simultaneity” of divine 
Personhood being conscious of the assumption of human nature and the subjective human 
consciousness being (or becoming) aware of being the Son of God then, in terms of 
coming to knowledge both in and of the uniquely objectifying context of the Incarnation, 
the postulated mutual novelty of encounter could still be argued as being fully secured, 
regardless of how one might consider it best to regard any „formality‟ according to which 
the psychological constitution of such unity might manifest itself. 
As long as ontological unity is properly secured the critical „singularity‟ is manifestly 
preserved, able to effect some transfiguring novelty of encounter and represented here as 
defining the “neck” in an hourglass topology according to a conceptual convergence 
effected in turn by virtue of the associative unity of all relevant, interrelated, created 
images or „terms‟ (borrowing Lonergan‟s phraseology again) corresponding to proper, 
contingent truths with respect to divine engagement with created space and sapientially 
united through their inseparable, collective association with the Logos. All genuinely 
creative human activity, generating authentic meaning and contingent truths from within 
created order, may then be considered to be „drawn‟ into, and channelled through, that 
theandric conceptual capacity manifest through the uniqueness of a double-sided but 
mutually coherent objectification in the Incarnation. The consequent, transfiguring process 
of engagement then occurs in necessary correlation with those contingently interconnected 
„created terms‟ according to which any contingent truths are, on principle, accessible 
within the created domain. Beyond the „neck‟ the topology opens onto that genus of 
semantic significance pertaining to eschatological relevance and beatific vision.  
The iconic image in humanity is perfected in the Incarnation, recapitulated according to a 
divine hypostasis, and this Incarnation is primarily possible by virtue of the fact that the 
same image, intentionally bestowed according to the original creation, affords sufficient 
„proximity‟ to divinity as to become, in Christ, the basis for defining the „neighbourhood‟ 
of divine-human communion. This effects a fuller „connectedness‟ of sacramental 
participation according to a “diffusive” pervasion concerning the topos of the Incarnate 
Logos. All truthful, meaningful, creative activity pertaining to our conceptual capacity is 
thereby sanctified through the Mind of Christ in as far as it must relate in some manner to 
the same Logos upon whom any coherence in such activity is ultimately contingent.  
180 
 
While Lonergan considers that any of the three divine hypostases could on principle have 
hypostatized the assumed human nature, it is nonetheless quite legitimate to ask instead 
whether in fact the Logos was the only option for „identifying‟ with the particular, precise 
necessity in question, especially considering the distinct modus operandi therewith 
associated: that of actively harmonizing those created contingencies necessary for 
establishing the required context for the Incarnation in the first place. In this respect the 
Logos is again active in its own conception. Taken as a conceptual and contextual whole 
there is in the Incarnation a critically subjective correlation among the natures, ensuring 
the truthful correspondence (Lonergan) and correlative necessity (Bulgakov) associated 
with the assumption of a distinctive, creaturely mode of becoming: involving an evolving 
freedom (chapter 5).  
Summary 
This chapter has emphasized the complexity of the stabilizing requirements necessary to 
sustain our remarkable capacity for self-conscious identity, in tandem with our mental 
development. Through the development of our language this may further develop into a 
sense of communal consciousness and identity, a development involving both the 
enhancing potential of a capacity for self-referring feedback and the development of 
communal appreciation with respect to the concept of logos. This development ultimately 
accentuates the prospective, eschatological dimension of our appreciation regarding 
theological relevance. Traced back over Big History this capacity in humanity is both the 
product of a cosmic interconnectedness and necessarily continues to engage with such 
interconnectedness. The physical cosmos forms a natural limit to the „terrain‟ aspect of our 
encounter, in accordance with which we idiomatically explore our sense of „territory‟.  
Given the cosmic scale of consideration, a conceptually dynamic means of appreciating 
„art‟ has been suggested and applied theologically to the „Artwork of Creation‟, and the 
significance of the Transfiguration has also been considered in this context, an interesting 
conceptual basis for which could be seen in terms of a deepening of humanity‟s 
theological relevance as our finite nature is elevated and reconfigured through the 
Incarnation.  
A potential theo-logic has then been considered regarding the cooperative interaction 
between our (re)generative, imperfect, creaturely mood of contingent participation and 
that perfect unity, self-relation and unimpeachable conjugacy between being and knowing 
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constituting divine identity, especially noting the genuine novelty of encounter actualized 
in the sense-objective, unified context of the Incarnation. The next chapter develops the 
idea of cooperation between divine and human idioms of engagement, paying particular 
attention to the sacramental significance or our temporal modus operandi. 
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Chapter 4: Towards a Model of Divine-Human Cooperation 
When considering temporal process it is not just the physical stability of any motion or 
operation over such process that is relevant, but also, from a theological and 
eschatologically-pointed perspective, the sacramental, participate and „developing‟ 
stability of that which is drawn out of the integrated totality of such process according to 
the deeper „motioning‟ of the divine Economy through its idiom of engagement with 
Creation.  
Where the particular, communicative engagement with humanity is concerned, the divine 
image bestowed upon human nature not only establishes the critical „proximity‟ 
considered in the previous chapter but also represents a distinctly theological dimension 
regarding the sustained communication of a crucial, top-down stability concerning our 
proper topos – that „dwelling place‟ upon which our temporal capacity for any enduringly 
effective up-building or generation of meaning is ultimately contingent. 
With regard to our active, participatory involvement, Sayers refers to the „reading‟ of the 
Book (the creative Artwork) in Creative Power, related to „the image of the indwelling 
Spirit‟. The Father is beheld through a particular way of „seeing‟ the Son (John 14:9) or of 
conceiving and receiving the Logos. „Seeing‟, like „reading‟, suggests some 
epistemological engagement. Human nature, taking the concept in its ontological 
wholeness, has been argued to indicate an eschatological potential, actualized „at the right 
hand of the Father‟. The phrase „we will see him as he is‟ then arguably connects our 
epistemological capacity – our means of seeing, hearing, reading, knowing and believing, 
and consequently of engaging creatively – to such eschatological prospect, with any 
associated ontological transfiguration occurring through divine initiative. Our contributory 
potential is fulfilled, in Sayers‟ terminology, by humanity becoming able to 
know/appreciate the nature of the Creative Idea as fully as is on principle possible. In the 
context of seeking theo-scientific integration, a potential fittingness regarding her 
particular vocabulary of „Creative Energy/Activity‟ and „Creative Power‟ will be 
suggested below.  
In conjunction with the advocated topological framework, this chapter develops the 
cosmic scope of consideration suggested in the previous chapter, focusing on the nature 
and significance of our temporal perspective with respect to the divine idiom of 
engagement with created space. Given this consideration it then advocates a panentheistic 
183 
 
development of the framework in question and considers how an eschatological 
perspective might preserve some necessary degree of continuity in physical and therefore 
scientifically relevant terms. 
Considering the identifying communication between Trinitarian Immanence and 
Economy, Moltmann is notable in his keenness for a dialogue between the „inwardness‟ of 
the Immanence and the „outwardness‟ of the Economy by which Trinitarian „impress‟ 
upon the created domain may be discernibly revealed, especially over the temporal course 
of salvation history. Indeed, for Moltmann, an active engagement with history in such 
terms constituted an important aspect of our doxology.
494
 He emphasizes the importance 
of a place for communication from „without‟ back „within‟, from time into eternity, and 
considered this to occur critically and centrally in the passion of the crucified Christ,
495
 
involving a consequent „transformation of meaning‟. The idea of time being held together 
or integrated „in eternity‟ is likewise important to what follows here. 
Torrance‟s insight 
Before considering the concept of time more fully, it is worth reviewing Torrance‟s 
important insight regarding the effect that particular means of considering space and time 
might have on theological development. He begins with the important clarification that  
God dwelling in heaven is essentially a theological concept like „God of God‟, and 
no more a spatial concept than God dwelling in Light – even if we could conceive 
of a heaven of heavens we could not think of this as containing God. It is the 
biblical way of thinking that is employed here, for God is the transcendent Creator 
of the whole realm of space and stands in a creative, not a spatial or a temporal 
relation, to it.
496
 
Here this clarification is essentially absorbed into the manner in which God‟s operative 
idiom of creative engagement is treated. Torrance proceeds to track developments through 
the influence of Plato – seeing space as that which permitted a sensible configuration of 
that lying beyond it, incorporating copies rather than the archetypes and allowing for the 
construction of mathematical hypotheses as a means to enhance understanding – into 
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Aristotle‟s rereading (or misreading) thereof, seeing instead the introduction of a more 
volumetric, quantified view of space, in which „place‟ becomes „the immobile limit within 
which a body is contained‟, the notion of a void becomes meaningless and attention is 
focused on „the innermost unmoved limit of the container‟ according to which everything 
can be related to some centre of absolute rest. He further considers the Stoic importation 
of the „body‟ – „that which is‟ – as the „active principle‟ (in contrast to the void) and 
motion generator, „making room‟ for itself and according to which space becomes a 
functional domain and the cosmos is seen as a „sphere of operation‟.497 As Torrance 
remarks 
The material universe is not held together, then, as Aristotle thought, by an exterior 
continent or an upper sphere which forces the parts to stay together, but by an 
interior cohesion or tension…or by an immanent reason (λογορ), which manifests 
itself in the laws of nature as the determinate and rational structure of the 
universe.
498
 
Whether thought of as „God‟ or „body‟ this „physical principle of rationality...could appear 
equally as mind or as matter‟.499 This way of speaking clearly has potential relevance to an 
embodied conception concerning the Incarnate Logos and its „place‟ regarding the 
communication between Uncreated and created. The danger in the Stoic approach, 
however, was a pantheistic tendency, losing the sense of the transcendental and risking a 
conflation between theology and cosmology. In terms of traditional Greek conception God 
was to be considered as containing the universe in terms of a creative relation, „by His 
power [italics Torrance]‟.500 Not only does this eliminate the need for any infinite void but 
it means that „space and time, and indeed all the structured relations within the universe, 
have to be understood dynamically [italics Torrance], through reference to the creative and 
all-embracing power and activity of God‟.501 This power was then related, by Origen, to 
the oversight of God‟s „creative comprehension‟, by which the rational structure of the 
universe was grounded.
502
 According to such rational structure theological statements 
could acquire „their objective and cognitive reference to God‟ and Torrance notes the 
                                                             
497 Ibid, pp.4-9. 
498 Ibid, p.9. 
499 Ibid, p.10. 
500
 Ibid, p.11. 
501 Ibid, pp.11-12. 
502 Ibid, p.12.  
185 
 
similarity between this viewpoint and that of Plato in terms of the role that the conception 
of space plays in our cognizing of „the correlation of events...through which we trace their 
reference objectively to the abidingly real‟.503 It was still vital, however, to bridge any 
separation between the „sensible‟ and the „intelligible‟ or „real‟ (cf. Lonergan‟s distinction 
between „experienced‟, „intelligible‟ and „true‟) and to find a manner in which we could be 
considered able worthily to theologize in accordance with the divine bestowal of rational 
character upon this world/cosmos. Reconciliation of this tension was then sought in the 
Incarnation, uniting heavenly and earthly topoi. As Torrance summarizes 
The Incarnation means that He by whom all things are comprehended and 
contained by assuming a body made room for Himself in our physical existence, 
yet without being contained, confined or circumscribed in place as in a vessel. He 
was wholly present in the body and yet wholly present everywhere, for He became 
man without ceasing to be God.
504
  
By the creative engagement of the divine Economy the stable basis for our capacity to 
generate meaning through our spatio-temporal encounter is dynamically held together 
through the Logos. Our capacity for comprehension, however, remains contingent upon 
the finitude, compactness and interconnectedness of our embodied modus operandi within 
this cosmos. 
Torrance affirms, as here, that any distinction between Uncreated and created pivots on the 
potentially awkward concept of separation and the paradox of applying the concept of 
topos with respect to the Incarnation. He emphasizes the forcing of theology „into the 
construction of a sort of topological [italics Torrance] language in order to express the 
dispositional and dynamic inter-connection between topos and topos [pertaining to 
divinity and humanity respectively]…This requires a differential use of concepts in which 
the ordinary and natural concept of place or space [has] to be adapted‟.505 God takes 
ontological initiative in manifesting a genuine openness to our distinctive, finite, 
creaturely „place‟. Here it is noteworthy that „the concept of space which we use in the 
Nicene Creed is one that is relatively closed, so to speak, on our side where it has to do 
with physical existence, but is one that is infinitely open on God‟s side‟.506 This fits with 
                                                             
503 Ibid, p.12. 
504
 Ibid, p.13. 
505 Ibid, p.6 and pp.15-16. 
506 Ibid, p.18. 
186 
 
the relative closed-ness with respect to human initiative as presented here (inasmuch as 
created space is considered in ontological terms) while allowing a conditional openness to 
the active involvement of our operational epistemology. It is also congruent with the 
hourglass topology. 
Theological pursuit, in its process and purpose, is ultimately geared towards revealing the 
eschatological consequences, on „our side‟, of such openness of conception on „God‟s 
side‟. Torrance sees proper talk of the Ascension „from place to place‟ as „adopting the 
open and differential concept of space developed by the Church Fathers, interpreting 
„place‟ differently in accordance with the nature and activity of God on the one hand and 
[that] of man on the other hand‟.507 The Ascension, on „God‟s side‟, does not lose 
anything assumed or achieved by the Incarnation in either spatial or temporal terms. As a 
caution against the problems of theologically misconstruing space, Torrance notes the 
receptacle notion of space as being especially illustrative of the potential pitfalls inherent 
in considering oversimplified conceptions of space and time in a theologically accentuated 
manner. He notes Luther‟s understanding of being „at God‟s right hand‟ as representing a 
connectivity with divine omnipotence rather than being a particular topos, beneficial in 
terms of the dynamism that could thereby be imported into the theology but potentially 
less helpful when speaking of „the place where God wills to be present for us‟, which 
became reduced to the sense of a „mathematical point‟.508 As Torrance notes, „without 
doubt an idea of a spatial presence that ignores time, such as we can find in Medieval 
thought, tends to lapse into magic, but it is no answer to that to reduce spatial relation to a 
mathematical point, for that is still to exclude time from our relations with God‟.509 
Here I am taking any centred-ness of divine „motioning‟ to be a topological centred-ness, 
appreciable according to some irreducible property pertaining ultimately to the whole, and 
with the nature of its manifestation „to us‟ being relevant to the entire interconnected 
dynamic of created space in theological terms. This avoids any unhelpful literalizing of 
terminology or any predominantly spatial representation over and above the necessary 
allowance for our distinctive temporality and its relation to the creative engagement of the 
divine Economy. 
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Torrance seeks to avoid any dualistic disjunction between Christ-in-Himself and Christ-
for-us. He is concerned, as here, with a relation between Creation and Incarnation 
theology, cautioning against the receptacle notion of space, whether finite or infinite, as 
potentially opposing a more relational notion.
510
 Human knowledge of God, involving 
„created rationalities‟, must furthermore remain connected to the concept of God‟s Mind511 
since truthful, created knowledge inevitably embodies something of its necessary relation 
to that divine rationality that grounds, enables or even compels our conceptual activity in 
the first place. In this respect the Incarnation is „to be understood as the chosen path of 
God‟s rationality‟,512 not dissimilarly to the aforementioned note concerning Wood‟s 
economic „trajectory‟ becoming settled in created space. Theologically, space and time 
need to be interpreted with respect to some „motioning‟, and the primary context for such 
interpretation is provided, created for us, according to the „path‟ chosen in the Incarnation.  
Scientifically, the interconnected four-dimensional geometry of relativity allows for space-
time to take a natural place in the order of things, meaning that the study of geometry must 
be pursued in „indissoluble unity with physics‟. Torrance parallels this with the idea that 
the proper place of natural theology is to provide a „theological geometry‟ within the 
objectivity of revealed knowledge of God, articulating „the inner material logic of 
knowledge of God as it is mediated within the organized field of space-time‟.513 Once 
again, any metrically explicit geometry may be couched within a broader topology.  
Any analogy involving topological language, such as physicists might use „to represent the 
difficult elastic connections between the dynamical and geometric aspects of things or 
between quite different kinds of space‟,514 ought, to theologians, to suggest some coherent 
connection between divine and human topoi somehow united in the critical and 
categorically unique context of the Incarnation. Torrance notes John of Damascus‟ attempt 
to make such connection by means of „mental place‟, offering „a way of linking up 
physical space with divine space through the concept of energy or non-observable 
activity‟.515 Sayers‟ vocabulary will be applied below in precisely this respect, relating to 
the categories of „energy‟ and „activity‟. 
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Torrance eloquently summarizes that  
Topological language can be used to express the relation of place in the physical 
sense, as spatial and temporal location, to the whole of space-time through the 
consideration of some field of energy or action, and through the extension of the 
kind of connection that emerges in it.
516
 
He challenges the biological field to adapt to this more interconnected level of thinking, so 
as to „supply historical science and theological science with more apt analogues than those 
which are now available in physics‟.517 One can only hope that he would have approved of 
recent breakthroughs in this area, especially considering the aforementioned work of 
Smith and Morowitz. The manner in which a topologically inspired level of thought, and 
its associated vocabulary, is developed in a particular field of inquiry – including the 
establishment of its necessary, conceptual domain boundaries – will in itself define the 
form of questioning most meaningfully and properly to be undertaken in that discipline, 
whether physical, biological or theological. With this in mind I shall proceed to consider 
the significance of the temporal more fully within the framework of this thesis.  
Focusing on the nature of time 
Our temporality is clearly theologically significant. The author of the Letter to the 
Hebrews states that God has never said to any of the angels “today I have begotten you” 
(Hebrews 1:5), perhaps because of the uniqueness of such temporal language to humanity. 
Humanity has a unique, personal self-consciousness and idiom of creative freedom in this 
respect. Regardless of how one interprets the concept or significance of the angelic host, 
there is something about our particular existential dynamic in time that, to the writer of the 
Letter to the Hebrews, affords humanity an importantly distinct theological significance,
518
 
perhaps even advantageously so thanks to the Incarnation.  
The divine-human relationship might further be contemplated and developed through 
some consideration of the temporal progression of human becoming and creative freedom 
(chapter 5). It is indeed according to a certain congruence with this domain that the 
„trajectory‟ pertaining to the „motioning‟ of the divine Economy must settle. Here there 
are two idiomatic engagements with temporality under consideration, and before it is 
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possible to try and relate human temporal engagement, referred to through normal use of 
the word „time‟, to divine engagement, distinguished by a capitalized reference to „Time‟, 
it is necessary to be explicit about what, in respect of our creative freedom, is being 
intended by the former. 
Early Christian tradition spoke of „duration‟ in regard to time, while looking to a God who 
„transcends his own transcendence, so that he may not be lost in abstract nothingness, but 
may give himself‟.519 This suggests a relation between time and something beyond 
timelessness. Modern science, meanwhile, offers a somewhat variegated viewpoint. 
Wilkinson acknowledges the scepticism surrounding an enculturated Newtonian view of 
time,
520
 especially in the wake of general relativity, quantum theory and chaos theory, as 
well as imaginary notions of time invoked in quantum field theory
521
 and those appearing 
in cosmic origin theories. Theologically, he notes the challenge posed by the concept of 
Sabbath to the conception of time, while maintaining the importance of the idea that 
„eternal time involves temporal movement without entailing the loss of the before as one 
moves on into the after‟.522 
The conception of time needs here to be relevant to human creative propensity, a 
propensity fostered and formed rather than automatically or inevitably inherent in some 
instant. Taking a linear view of such development is quite logical in this case, and, where 
the generation of novelty is concerned, it is worth noting Wilkinson‟s remark that 
The regenerating cycles of nature and the rhythms of the body do not sustain life 
without their interaction with linear time. As the cycles interact with linear time 
then novelty arises…It is extremely difficult to argue for novelty without some 
form of linear time and without other things passing away. Novelty in the universe 
cannot be separated from the increase of entropy (disorder), which gives time a 
linear direction.
523
 
Penrose highlights the problem of the reversibility assumption of Newtonian time, given 
that such would imply an increase in entropy in both past and future directions from 
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wherever one happened to be. Instead, he extends a cyclic notion of time to the cosmic 
scale by investigating carefully what is meant by the idea of entropy,
524
 noting the 
surprising effectiveness of the concept given the vagaries entailed in defining it. For the 
purposes of looking at human creativity our temporality should of course be considered in 
terms accessible to creative experience. Any more physically-involved or specific 
scientific considerations regarding time are, for this purpose, deemed relatively 
independent of the revealing or emergence of our creative thought over a timescale 
sufficient to produce something tangibly articulate.
525
 „Our time‟ is thus taken here to be 
That which facilitates (and according to which we recognize) change in our 
searching, focussing perception, enabling conceptual processing and an 
increasingly informed application of variously juxtaposed signs and symbols, the 
generation of meaning and the development of our creative freedom. 
This highlights a linear sense of temporal direction and the working definition is 
deliberately phrased so as to be grounded in the relevant language of mentally „tokened‟ 
(to use Fodor‟s phrase) representative symbols or states, possibly encoded directly as 
retrievable memories and certainly of psychological import. Indeed one might well ask 
…what is it that measures change and how? Augustine‟s answer is that changing 
bodies, of whatever kind, leave traces in the mind, and it is these that the mind 
measures, so that past, future and present are extensions (distentio) of the mind, as 
recollection, anticipation based on present causes and perception.
526
 
As part of a contemporary commentary on the philosophy of space-time,
527
 Dainton 
clarifies the importance of distinguishing properly between mathematically-focused, 
notational representations of time as a parameter, and consciousness-related, notional 
presentations of temporality as defining our experience. One could refer to the former as 
instants, duration-less in and of themselves but defining intervals when considered relative 
to one another – a purely mathematical postulation facilitating a complementary language 
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of „events‟, „reference frames‟ and „relativity‟. Then one could refer to the latter as 
moments, having subtle duration, arguably a sense of direction, and, as the description 
suggests, carrying some psychological „momentum‟ of impact upon human perception and 
interpretation.  
Lonergan offers a crisp review of this difference and the problems of understanding that 
can result from presuming too facile a mode of connection between the two, especially 
recognizing the absolute necessity of abstraction when considering what can and cannot 
properly be considered „invariant‟ in any geometrical view of space-time. To him 
„concrete extensions and concrete durations are the field or matter or potency in which 
emergent probability is the immanent form or intelligibility‟.528 
The concept of „emergence‟ might not merely apply over the process of time but to the 
status of time itself, although this is perhaps less important than it might at first seem. 
Concerning the critical search for a coherent relationship between the language of General 
Relativity and that of Quantum Mechanics, including their different approaches to time, 
Dainton emphasizes that 
…if it does turn out that time is absent from the equations of quantum gravity 
theory…There will be a clear sense in which time is not a fundamental feature of 
the universe…If this should prove to be the case, time will have the status of an 
emergent phenomenon…even if the status of time is thus diminished, its existence 
[italics Dainton] is scarcely threatened, for at the macroscopic level the distinction 
between spatial and temporal dimensions remains perfectly real. Cats are emergent 
entities; are they illusory?
529
         
Bohm makes a similar point in a different way, according to his vision of an enfolded, 
implicate order, such that  
 The whole implicate order is present at any moment, in such a way that the entire 
 structure growing out of this implicate order can be described without giving any 
 primary role to time. The law of the structure [as a compound of order and 
 measure] will then just be a law relating aspects with various degrees of 
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 implication. Such a law will, of course, not be deterministic in time [italics
 Bohm].
530
 
In his discussion on space-time metaphysics,
531
 Dainton makes a strong and important 
case for the substantivalist side of the substantivalist-relationist debate – the substantivalist 
position treating space-time as having real physical presence or effectiveness. This thesis 
also finds affinity with the substantivalist perspective, especially owing to its greater 
theological potential for accommodating a sacramental framework in terms that are more 
obviously physically relevant and engaging. Furthermore, the general difficulty in trying 
to separate container and contained in the context of General Relativity, especially given 
space-time‟s possession of a gravitational field of its own, is similar in principle to the 
previously argued form-content inseparability.  
Importantly, Dainton notes the difficulties arising from one possible relativistic conclusion 
that there is „no ontological difference between past and future‟.532 Clearly a purely 
mathematical conception of space-time is in this case being taken in isolation from any 
psychological relevance. Of particular relevance here, however, is that if one considers 
some communicative relationship between two distinct, operative engagements regarding 
the temporal domain, divine and human, then such a relationship could be considered to 
give both rise and theological significance to the psychological aspect of our perception, 
inasmuch as it is inseparable from our participation. This induces a genuine distinction 
between past and future, facilitating an authentic directionality and progression regarding 
our living, creative engagement. 
The helpfulness of thinking in terms of two idioms of operative engagement, and their 
associated relationships to both temporality and a-temporality, is also illustrated by appeal 
to the idea that God can be both everywhere in space-time and also „simultaneously‟ 
nowhere.
533
  This is far easier to appreciate if one qualifies the „everywhere‟ as concerning 
God‟s operative idiom of engagement with Time and the „nowhere‟ as concerning the 
pinpointing and focused perspective of our time – divine Activity not being confinable in 
such terms. 
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Overall, space-time is taken to constitute a substantive dynamic that we operate within. 
What God effects, through Creative Activity and with Wisdom (cf. Psalm 136:5, Jeremiah 
10:12), constitutes a „beginning-ness‟ within the creatively sustained expansion of which 
our temporal appreciation and conscious experience is embedded and our creative capacity 
is enabled and directed. 
Considering the divine idiom of engagement with Time is clearly no trivial task, being as 
it is fundamentally distinct from our movement in time. Williams remarks that 
John‟s Gospel is haunted by the idea of the „time‟ or the „hour‟ for which Jesus 
waits. There is a moment at which the purpose of the Father will be fulfilled, the 
glory of the Son made manifest; and that moment is signalled in the nineteenth 
chapter of the Gospel as Jesus dies with the cry, „It is accomplished‟.534 
The compression of temporal focus into this theologically critical „moment‟ is striking in 
the overall layout of John‟s Gospel, and Williams succinctly continues 
If we understand that it is the time of judgement, discovery and conversion that 
Jesus speaks of here, we may see why he says to his sceptical brothers, “Your time 
is always here”…For his brothers…their history and their world‟s history does not 
move to judgement and mercy…They are not conscious of waiting [italics 
Williams] for the moment of God‟s truth; their „time‟ is simply whatever happens 
to be going on...In this world, the truth of God‟s Word never appears…no one is 
called to recognize a time that is God‟s time…535 
Once this is recognized we may further experience a „dawning awareness that our hope in 
Christ is not just about a future event‟.536 The participle-like process of „dawning‟ 
emphasizes that our appreciation of the prayerful (human) and revelatory (divine) 
conversing between our development in time and God‟s idiom of creative freedom with 
Time is not manifest as some lightning occurrence. 
As to that „time that is always here‟, Stannard notes the distinction between conscious, 
mental time and physical time measured by clock ticks as being necessary in order to 
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allow for a coherently articulable perception of flow.
537
 He does in fact commend the 
relativistic placing of time and space (mathematically-speaking) on an equal footing, 
appealing to the idea that as all points in space may be considered to exist at each point in 
time, therefore all points of time might intuitively be considered to exist at each point in 
space, being then „always there‟ in a rather different sense. This conception is not 
necessarily forced by the mathematics, however, especially since General Relativity 
involves a greater degree of complexity than the contextually simplified case of Special 
Relativity on which Stannard spends most of his argument. Nonetheless, the overall 
distinction between what are here referred to as the „idioms‟ of engagement is hinted at in 
Stannard‟s remark that 
Now we discover that even we creatures, confined to live out our lives within 
space and time, can nevertheless discern intimations that there might be another 
way of regarding space and time…Space-time does not, of course, manifest itself 
to us in this fashion…But perhaps it presents itself to God directly in that 
fashion.
538
 
Some divine ability to know any spatio-temporal „slice‟ directly (with any „change‟ then 
being, to divine nature, universal and necessarily prehended) might be suggested by way 
of articulating God‟s creative, operative association with Time: something pervading any 
humanly conceivable representation, or interpretation of sets of available data through 
such geometrical constructs as volumes, lines, points, intervals and so forth, but without 
itself being conceptually grasped or confined according to such conception. This 
consideration will now be expanded by reference to Russell‟s analysis of Pannenberg. 
Russell‟s „Creative Mutual Interaction‟ 
Russell presents a framework of relationship between theology and science that he calls 
„Creative Mutual Interaction‟. As the background to his production of this framework was 
the result of many years‟ work and, in the second half of his book on the subject,539 he 
considers particular technical details beyond the scope of this thesis, the salient points of 
relevance alone will be summarized here. 
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The framework involves a “flow chart” representation of the manner in which theology 
and science may mutually provide an informational context for one another.
540
 Science 
presides over a „network of theories‟ and these are informed, from within the scientific 
discipline, by a cycle beginning with defining a context for observation. The data in 
question are then collected, and models or analogies (that such data subsequently inform 
or nuance) are developed in conjunction with various philosophical assumptions. This 
theoretical network informs theological pursuit via (i) philosophical assumptions 
influencing theological tradition or reasoning, (ii) a consideration of the form of „data‟ that 
ought to influence theological interest or methodology, and (iii) science-based analogies 
that could be helpful to theological thinking. In turn, theological pursuit may influence 
those philosophical assumptions, illustrative analogies and selection criteria that contribute 
both to a more robust interconnectedness and to a more judicious pruning over the entire 
network of scientific theories and candidate hypotheses. 
Russell applies this framework to Pannenberg‟s theology of eternity as being a source of 
temporality. The underlying idea is that such a source provides the context for the 
manifestation of temporality as a differentiated unity. Creaturely temporality ordinarily 
involves, experientially-speaking, both distinction and assumed separation between 
perceived events over long periods of time, but eternal temporality provides a context 
whereby the present can be understood not as an ontologically isolated point but rather as 
a unity of duration (albeit only psychologically sustained for a „moment‟ where human 
experience is concerned) in which distinction from past and future is maintained but 
without separation. In the New Creation a particular economic giftedness is argued as 
resulting from God‟s simultaneous „prehension‟ of the whole of space-time at once, the 
effectiveness of such giftedness being made manifest „proleptically‟ inasmuch as 
eschatological context provides an aspect of future causation (interpreted by Russell as a 
unique, creative mode of engagement) „reaching back‟ to the Resurrection of Christ. An 
aspect of continuity is thereby maintained between that which is relevantly established in 
eschatological terms and that creative, temporal engagement within created space which 
contributes to the formation of any positively enduring, constructive aspect of created 
order. Ultimately only those terms allowing for what Russell calls „natural evil‟ (among 
which he counts entropic decay) are lost. 
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There is, fittingly, a distinctively topological background to this idea, since, to use 
Russell‟s own words, prolepsis introduces  
a strikingly topological view of the relation between creation and the New 
Creation…This reaching back is not within the topology, or spatial structure, of the 
universe as we know it…it is a more extensive topology, one that connects the 
universe as creation with the New Creation where the New Creation is thought of 
as emerging through God‟s radically new action starting at Easter and continuing 
until its consummation in the global eschatological future of creation.
541
 
He fleshes this out through reference to different ways of representing singularities in 
space-time, noting the relativistic requirement that the existence of even one singularity 
requires a description in terms of at least two distinct temporal perspectives. Ultimately he 
considers this to have the consequence that „the relation Pannenberg describes between the 
eschatological future and the present is not a “path” in the ordinary space-time of this 
world but a separate spatio-temporal connection between two different realms of this 
world‟. He maintains that this involves a domain of more complex topology than linear 
time, as considered through an appeal to ordinary experience or classical physics, but that 
such is not something that „the musings of theoretical physics and cosmology‟ cannot 
somehow „prefigure‟.542 Precisely what such scientific input might help us, to a certain 
degree, to prefigure regarding eschatological outlook is then relative to what the special, 
proleptic mode of divine engagement, in accordance with God‟s universal „prehension‟, 
might transfigure through the Incarnation and Resurrection. This question will be revisited 
in what follows. 
Russell seeks to avoid the static conception of space-time inherent in the denial of any 
effective, unambiguous ontological distinction between past, present and future. He notes 
that Einstein‟s theory is built upon a relational view of space, and that, while any 
geometrical space implies divisibility, such divisibility is in turn conditional upon some 
relational unity. In God, relational unity is indivisible such that the Infinite is an ultimate 
condition upon the operation of the finite. Specifically 
Pannenberg asserts that these two views of space – space as relational/geometrical 
and space as undivided – though seeming to form a dichotomy, can actually be 
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brought at least partially together if relational space is used to refer to created 
space and if undivided space refers to God‟s omnipresence. Still, maintaining their 
difference is crucial if we are to avoid the pantheism of Spinoza.
543
 
This is consistent with that stated in the Introduction. The distinction between God‟s 
operational engagement with, and „prehending‟ perspective on, space-time and the 
scientist‟s ability to construct knowledge regarding any geometry or even topology of 
space-time as a whole is further maintained by the fact that „within God‟s eternal 
knowledge of the temporal process, the difference between temporal events and the 
specific past and future for each event is preserved‟.544 This has the feel of an extended 
topology, only fully prehensible according to a unique, externalized perspective regarding 
some holistic configuration space, again suggesting a basis for transfiguring engagement. 
Undivided, infinite „space‟ and „time‟ are „prior to the world‟ in Pannenberg‟s theology 
and we are afforded our particular experience – formally articulated according to a 
parameterizable, measurable, finite context – through an act of divine creation with such 
an infinite context.
545
  
What Russell refers to as the „causal priority of the immediate future‟546 (according to 
prolepsis) may relate in this case to our theological „affordance‟ or eschatological 
„prospect‟. The maintenance of a proper ontological distinction between past, present and 
future requires, for Russell, a theological input rather than a purely philosophical one, a 
claim concerning divine action that „gives meaning to the ontological difference between 
an event as a cluster of indeterminate potential future states and an event as a concrete, 
unique and actually real present moment‟.547 Eschatology then needs relevantly to relate to 
such present moment.  
God could be said economically to manifest measurable time (or space-time), from the 
„side‟ of the eternal. It is necessary again to distinguish properly between Immanence and 
Economy. At one point Russell remarks that „the passing and irreversible sequence of 
separated events that we experience in time is constantly comprehended by eternity as an 
attribute of the differentiated unity that is Trinity‟.548 One must recognize here that any 
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„differentiated unity‟ pertains, with respect to time and space, to the divine Economy: to 
that aspect of divinity whose idiomatic engagement outwardly communicates and reveals 
all those contingently discernible, interconnected truths that collectively and dynamically 
inform and „geometrize‟ (returning to Torrance‟s metaphor) our theologizing. In as far as 
its effects can be made manifest within created space at all, God‟s Creative Activity 
identifies with the entire necessity that the opening of such a distinct, created space 
involves with respect to its distinct ontological integrity. The pinnacle of such engaging 
involvement is then the novelty of divine self-identification in the Incarnation, a novelty 
having the effect of re-manifesting and transfiguring the totality of all relevant, contingent 
and interconnected „created terms‟ in the New Creation.  
Russell rightly views eternity as more than either static timelessness or infinite temporal 
„extent‟, considering instead „the boundless temporality of the Trinitarian God, a lavishly 
rich “supra-temporality” that is both the source and fulfilment of the temporality of 
creation‟.549 Here this „eternity‟ is again related specifically to the economic aspect that I 
will refer to as „God‟s Time‟ or, more precisely, the divine idiom of creative engagement 
with the temporal domain, creatively manifesting and holding together the holistic context 
that we know as space-time in accordance with our participate, temporal status therein. 
This „supra-temporality‟ is then that with which (or from the „side‟ of which) God 
economically creates the context for our temporal engagement and participation. To speak 
of divine Eternity is then taken here to refer to that immutable, undifferentiated, Uncreated 
“Space” as such is known only to God as God in His Immanence.  
The divine Economy creatively effects, defines and holds together a physically substantial 
framework, involving a particular, integral mode of connectedness – a „topology‟ of 
created space – that is not in itself purely relational but manifests a substantive, quasi-
stable domain of physical operation accommodating our idiomatic, temporal 
distinctiveness. Nonetheless, owing to a unique mode of communicability being possible 
between divinity and humanity, our temporal participation constitutes, theologically-
speaking, an iconic modus operandi. This is „drawn‟ towards its complete eschatological 
relevance by the particular creative engagement of the divine Economy through the 
Incarnation, Resurrection and Ascension, and in accordance with that aspect of futurity 
(noting the „I will draw‟ of John 12:32) that is, as Russell contends, proleptically 
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determining
550
 and transfiguring. Furthermore, this occurs in such a manner as for which 
God has pre-emptively grounded the particular, physical context within which the 
necessary conditions for catalysing such transfiguring prolepsis are already latent.
551
 This 
provides another means of considering the stability of that which is drawn out of a process 
of temporal engagement. Finding a framework for this engagement that is both 
theologically and scientifically salient is then an important consideration. 
Considering a panentheistic framework 
Stannard endorses a panentheistic outlook to accommodate the idea of time being „in God‟ 
rather than vice versa.
552
 Once again I will distinguish between our „movement‟ in time 
and God‟s „motioning‟, idiomatic mode of creative engagement with Time. The discernible 
effects of such engagement are made manifest as economically communicated from that 
infinite, supra-cosmic context lying somehow beyond space-time, and in which the 
existential entirety of our interconnected cosmic context then participates in theological 
terms. Theologically we „move and have our being‟ in God; scientifically, we are created 
and exercise our idiom of operation in space and time.  
The panentheistic framework is not unambiguously defined. Gregersen
553
 treats it in a 
manner not entirely unlike Penrose‟s consideration of entropy, both entropy and 
panentheism turning out to be malleable but critical conceptions, both of which must be 
considered holistically. Specifically, Gregersen identifies the key features of panentheism 
as (i) a wish to balance transcendence and immanence, (ii) the sense of a world somehow 
„contained‟ in God,554 and (iii) some „return‟ of the world into divine life. I will refer to 
„cosmos‟ in place of „world‟ both for its congruence with scientific perspective and for its 
etymological richness. Gregersen then distinguishes three Western flavours of 
panentheism within these general requirements: soteriological panentheism, in which the 
cosmos is in God as a gift moving towards an all-in-all eschaton; expressivist 
panentheism, in which God‟s self-relating by the Spirit allows the effect of divine 
motioning in created space to be (re)accommodated by the divine life; and dipolar 
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panentheism, in which the Process Philosophy view of a split between timeless and 
temporal „poles‟ of divine nature comes into play, the latter evolving along with the 
cosmos.
555
 
Gregersen notes that the first version qualifies the pan- component according to the 
problem of the non-allowance of evil within God, while the second version qualifies the 
en-component, through the implication of some final completion of a cycle somehow 
returning back into its divine source. The dipolar version may arguably require some 
qualification of the -theism component, but nonetheless the potential ambiguity inherent in 
pan-en-theism is evident. 
There is clearly a responsible caution in the soteriological position, though it needs to say 
something about a specific model or means of interaction that can combine eschatological 
and teleological considerations, acknowledging the present, practical inseparability 
between human potential towards good and that towards evil. The expressivist position 
also has its attraction, especially here, inasmuch as any expressiveness may relate to the 
„contential aspect‟ described in the previous chapter, emphasizing the potential role and 
contributory importance of our engagement, while also relating to the idea of „drawing‟ in. 
One should nonetheless be cautious of the idea of our finite mood of activity „enriching‟ 
divine life per se. It is still the case, however, that the Incarnation provides a critical 
context for nuancing the manner in which divine nature might communicate „back to‟ 
itself, especially considering the words of Isaiah 55:11 in relation to the Logos (something 
revisited in the Conclusion). 
While a broader Process Philosophy, with one „pole‟ representing some God-cosmos 
interactive symmetry, is broadly rejected as contravening the overall Uncreated-created 
asymmetry, a reclassification of terminology may be possible, especially given the novelty 
of the Incarnation, divine nature being united with a human nature whose psychosomatic 
quality does pertain to some humanity-cosmos symmetry of interaction. Any symmetry 
advocated here stems entirely from the incarnational engagement of divinity with a two-
way humanity-cosmos relationship, our physicality and consequent mode of encounter or 
engagement being itself the product of a particular cosmic interconnectedness. In fact, the 
Incarnation could arguably be considered necessary for demonstrating the fullest 
„expression‟ or revelation of divine omni-potential and omniscience (see below). At the 
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very least it implicitly represents an engagement with the cosmic totality of interconnected 
contingencies upon which our physicality depends.  
Gregersen considers that „without the Creator becoming a creature…and without God 
being an emergent property of the world, God creates the world as if from within‟.556 This 
illustrates the tension between created space being facilitated or opened within the 
Uncreated, and the Uncreated becoming conceived or revealed within created space. Such 
consideration is congruent with the required transcendence-immanence balance. As in 
Gregersen‟s „expressivist panentheism‟ the „in‟ component needs qualifying.  
Gregersen considers three ways in which this preposition could be understood.
557
 First, the 
literal sense, which he sensibly rejects; second, the mathematical sense of possibilities 
carved out of a broader context; and third, the qualitative sense of being „in‟ by 
relationship. He prefers the third position owing to its relation to Trinity and Communion. 
Without wishing to denigrate the importance of this I nonetheless remain, as indicated 
above, slightly suspicious of purely relational viewpoints with respect to the physical, 
created domain inasmuch as they still face the challenge of demonstrating some specific 
continuity of physical relevance regarding our substantive capacity for relating. In the 
context of considering a model of integration between theological and scientific domains 
of consideration I will instead work with the second of the above options, especially given 
that background framework here derives from a metaphorical extension of a mathematical 
conception – the „broader context‟ of a topology of connectedness, whether among 
actualities or possibilities.  
In order for the following section to make better sense, it is worth being clear about how 
the „eschatological‟ is being understood in the context of its relevance to creative, human 
involvement. Eschatological consideration will be understood broadly as involving some 
consideration of how best to extricate oneself from one‟s „own time‟. Such consideration 
must further be related to that self-knowing relevant to a „movement‟ towards God, being 
„drawn‟ into something more authentically endemic to our theological nature and 
emancipating us from the relatively superficial confines of „our time‟. 
The term „extricate‟ is chosen deliberately with Sayers‟ analogy in mind, since she 
suggests, with analogical reference to the mathematician‟s four-dimensional conception of 
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space-time and the difficulties involved in „seeing‟ it as if from without, that in order to 
discern the threefold structure of the creative image of divinity within humanity the 
creative artist must seek to „extricate himself from his own activity‟ to appreciate the 
whole as far as possible, as if „from without‟.558 
With this in mind, and emphasizing the important role of memory regarding our temporal 
context, I now suggest a thought experiment involving another analogy with a 
mathematician‟s activity, and relating to Gregersen‟s second, mathematical option 
concerning how one thing can be considered to be „in‟ another.  
A mathematical thought experiment 
Human accumulation of knowledge (or self-knowledge) is inseparable from semantic 
memory, communicating with episodic memory as necessary for the formation of a robust 
autobiographical memory. A particular means of reinforcing the acquisition of knowledge, 
enhancing the effectiveness of memory in so doing, is peculiar to the more formal 
approach of the mathematician – namely, the construction of a proof. I would like to 
suggest a hypothetical scenario concerning the process involved in such construction that 
may highlight potential theological significance. It should again be borne in mind that our 
very capacity to engage analytically in a consistently structured and intelligibly reliable 
fashion is already contingent upon a particular configuration of cosmic interconnectedness 
of which we are an active part.  
The process of proof construction might be considered participatory, participating in some 
„reality‟ structured by eternal value, validity or even by some intricately interconnected 
hierarchy of truths, each relative to some particular context of definition as being 
sufficient for its derivation, whether by deduction or induction.  
As to the form of engagement lying behind proof construction, Lakatos takes his readers 
on a journey through the thicket of complexities that may be involved, represented as a 
dialogue between teacher and pupil.
559
 This dialogue involves some toing and froing as the 
pupil is guided along a constructive path, part of which involves considering what is likely 
to constitute an appropriate method of approach for the problem in question: contradiction, 
induction, geometric representation or otherwise. 
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Consider a mathematical theorem, such as that of Pythagoras, for which more than one 
possibility for proof exists, remembering that commitment to a specifically defined, 
Euclidean space has been made. Imagine that a mathematician has already established a 
proof of this theorem, the final form of which demonstrates a series of steps of reasoning, 
each step constituting some episodically memorable unit of logic. Completion of this 
proof amounts to a successful recognition of the validity of the approach in question. At 
this point of realization, some overall semantic appreciation, acknowledging the overall 
Gestalt of „proof‟ is established, including the registering of personally engaged 
achievement in the autobiographical memory. The proof‟s validity is recognized as eternal 
or a-temporal, despite the necessarily temporal process involved in establishing the correct 
sequence of episodes of logic pertaining to the chosen methodology, worked out through a 
particular juxtaposing of signs, symbols or representations.  
Now imagine, purely hypothetically, that this mathematician subsequently loses his/her 
episodic memory, while retaining semantic memory. The validity of the theorem overall is 
still known as an a-temporal truth, but he/she must now work through some possible 
reconstruction of the proof from scratch, perhaps involving a different methodology and 
episodic sequence of steps – demonstrating another equally valid approach. This 
variegated array of possible forms of proof, all nonetheless converging on the same unity 
of truthful demonstration, might then be compared to the „formal aspect‟ discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
Moving sequentially through some episodic structure may then stand for the sense of our 
time which is „always here‟. The moment of realization involved in any subsequent 
completion of some possible, alternative proof, already faithfully anticipated according to 
the semantic memory, may cause some resonance in the mind concerning the a-temporal 
validity of the underlying truth in question. Through a particular method of approach in 
„our time‟, a result now already known to be „yet to come‟ may become newly 
appreciated. By this analogy, one could consider some consonant (and iconic) verging of 
our sense of a-temporality or „eternity‟ onto the economic, idiomatic mode of engagement 
referred to here as „God‟s Time‟, something already postulated as enabling our 
appreciation of both temporal and a-temporal aspects of reality. 
Here an illustrative return to Sayers‟ analogy proves useful. In her Book metaphor, the 
Book-as-a-whole in one sense „contains‟ an artistic theme, inseparable from an internal 
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demonstration of some „proof‟ of its artistic quality. Yet, in another sense, the theme 
transcends the Book-as-published, since it could on principle exist in the Mind of the 
Maker without being committed to material expression, even though it remains immanent 
to the potential for any physical manifestation or demonstration of its art.  
In the case of the divine Artist, Absolute Truth is immanently self-communicated „within‟ 
uncreated, divine nature, while a contingent, created space may still be economically 
effected, manifest according to a particular interconnectedness and such that distinct, non-
contradictory and contextually relative truths may emerge from differently explicable 
aspects and possibilities within the dynamic of the space in question, impressing 
themselves upon a creaturely intellect formed in accordance with the effects of those truths 
in the first place. The illustration involving the mathematician‟s array of possible proofs is 
then part of a generation of „content‟ through an explicating engagement with this 
dynamic, contingently interconnected reality or with an underlying and partially hidden 
formality of „implicate order‟. Such proofs are further contingent upon the order, measure 
and structure of some representational, abstract basis space explicitly defined and selected 
as being most „relevant‟ to the context of inquiry in question. This is consonant both with 
Bohm‟s outlook and with Lonergan‟s contingent „created terms‟ necessarily pertaining to 
any revealed but contingent truth, especially those interrelated truths regarding the creative 
engagement of the divine Economy, discernible (or receivable) from within created space. 
An interactive model  
As to the intricately enfolded „reality‟ corresponding to the „Artwork‟ of the created space 
in question, imagine that the Author of such knows or creatively intends that some 
particular property should emerge and/or become explicitly revealed at some point in the 
work, while some other detail, that will prove critical for that property is expressed at 
some other point. In the case of the divine Artist, this fits Russell‟s insistence on divine 
pre-emption. If a human author were „perfect‟ in the artistic sense, then every aspect of 
his/her creative activity, whether of direct or indirect significance, would have to relate in 
some way to all other relevant developments, forming a coherently interconnected, 
harmonized whole – a completely thorough artistic „topology‟, as it were. Considerable 
skill would be required to ensure the most appropriate balance in moving towards, while in 
another sense already latently and openly „containing‟, some subsequent, meaningful 
outworking, to be made manifest through some explicitly recognizable emergence.  
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The case of divine Authorship is even more involved, since creaturely emergence within 
the Artwork is gifted an iconic significance and afforded a distinct idiom of creative 
freedom, collectively and actively generating meaning in a manner conditioned by the 
overall theme and parameters of the Artwork. Furthermore, the Perfect Artist‟s Creative 
Activity must presumably be „perfect‟ both with God‟s Time and in or throughout our 
time, though not necessarily according to our finite conception of perfection.  
Here I am arguing that one of the things upon which the proper functioning of our iconic 
capacity is reliant is precisely the consonance between our sense of eternity (or the a-
temporal) and God‟s operational, creative and revelatory engagement with Time, as 
indicated by appeal to the previous thought experiment. This allows for some proper 
ascription of temporal association to divinity while still maintaining an overall asymmetry 
regarding the Uncreated-created relationship. Such temporal association does not, 
however, represent an involvement directly or exclusively analogous to that of human 
experience. The „consonance‟ should be seen rather as sacramental facilitation, enabling 
proper participation in accordance with the Uncreated-created „tension‟. 
Sayers expands the scope of her analogy to approach a philosophy of origin concerning 
Good and Evil,
560
 invoking the Thomist position of Good and Evil being, to God, related 
purely by mutual, intellectual negation. Although the existence of Evil is inevitable as the 
potential negation of created Good, God would know it only by pure „intelligence‟, never 
actively and creatively engaging in a manner granting such negation an ontologically 
effective status. Humanity, however, according to an imperfection or blurring of divine 
image, exhibits a double-sided propensity with regard to relative good and evil.  
I want to suggest an extension of this idea in relation to our temporality. God, as Absolute 
Self-Truth, can call forth both created time and a created aspect of engagement with 
eternity, accommodating our participative capacity for both temporal and a-temporal 
aspects of appreciation. Humanity, having the double-sided potential for relative self-truth 
and self-untruth, is incapable (ontologically speaking) of calling eternity into active effect 
on our own initiative. Nothing we ourselves can physically make is itself eternal, and 
divine initiative is ontologically necessary in order to afford human nature both its 
contingent physicality and its eschatological relevance. 
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Our a-temporal awareness accords with our capacity for semantic appreciation, known 
according to our distinct, iconic mode of intelligence, but in and of itself it is largely 
passive. Put another way, we appreciate a-temporality in terms of some negation of that 
sense of passing that we more normally associate with our temporal experience. God, 
however, actively „prehends‟ both His operative engagement with Time and the ordered 
totality of that complexly connected set of interrelations facilitating a revelatory „verging‟ 
onto our participate conception of eternity (or eternal validity). He actively effects „our 
time‟ and submits to being in some way affected by it in the Incarnation. His Eternity 
remains distinct, pertaining strictly to the incommunicable ousia of the divine Immanence, 
in which any internal or intrinsically associated „Motion‟ or Self-Motioning is 
qualitatively distanced and categorically distinct from that „motioning‟ whose effects are 
economically appreciable by humanity.  
While Bulgakov considers an uncreated aspect pertaining to the original, iconic intention 
with regard to human nature, the divine idiom of engagement referred to here as „God‟s 
Time‟ could be considered to manifest a created aspect inasmuch as its outward economic 
sense is contingent upon having something created (whether potential or actual) upon 
which to „verge‟ or within which to reveal. This „something‟ consists initially in some 
intentionally specific, holistic „beginning‟, held together „by a principle‟ (chapter 2). In the 
case of this cosmos, the sustained expansion of its physical beginning was such that an 
appreciative, self-conscious and reflective intelligence was able to emerge through a 
sufficiently stabilized hierarchy of interconnected contingencies.  
The aspects of Time and Eternity here associated with the divine idiom are, furthermore, 
beyond any mutuality of negation, the one not being some logical opposite of the other. 
Both have active ontological effectiveness but with one being associated with the 
Economy and the other with the Immanence. Our co-operative participation is then 
sacramentally facilitated in communication with that operative aspect pertaining to the 
Economy and to „God‟s Time‟. The non-negation between these aspects further guarantees 
a complete absence of any divine self-contradiction.  
God‟s Eternity is sublime, pertaining solely to divine nature‟s Self-understanding integrity 
of Being, incomparable with respect to anything intelligible to created perspective. When 
sublimation occurs in chemistry a particular phase is bypassed. Somewhat analogously in 
the theological case, for something to be sublime suggests a bypassing of any sense of 
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comparative, highlighting instead a relationship between some elusive, transcendent 
superlative and some attributive to whose existence it is (mysteriously) immanent. Such 
relationship may best be considered according to a participative model.  
With the above in mind a scientifically relevant extension to Sayers‟ particular use of 
vocabulary can be developed.  The phrase „Creative Power‟ might afford some 
metaphorical appeal to the scientific definition of power as a product of energy and 
inverse time. Considering our biologically functional embodiment as being largely based 
on a life-supporting, evolutionarily fine-tuned, metabolic efficiency, it seems that the 
sustainability of any living, dynamic system is dependent upon a particular relationship 
between some threshold availability of the right form of energy and the critical rate or 
tempo according to which it is consumed or converted over time – a dynamic, living 
„power‟. The terms „power‟ and „life-giving‟ are also characteristic attributes used to 
speak liturgically about the Holy Spirit, and the language involved in this means of 
considering life therefore offers a fitting, intuitive connection between a theological 
standpoint and those intricate scientific principles underlying the emergence and 
sustainability of life. 
If a particular energy-time relationship is essential to the living dynamic of the biosphere, 
then perhaps a theological relationship might be suggested between the „Creative Energy‟ 
(to use Sayers‟ alternative term for the Activity) associated with divine motioning through 
the Logos and the divine idiom of creative engagement with „Time‟ – a relationship 
essential for the proper sustenance of any participate aspect regarding the Creation, and in 
particular for actively „drawing‟ it into eternal life. Put another way, while some energy-
time association corresponds to the functionality of biological „motion‟, so some Creative 
Energy-Time association could be considered theologically to correspond to the modus 
operandi according to which the divine Economy „motions‟ throughout created space in 
order to settle the critical „trajectory‟.  
Finally, while space and time are being treated here as ontological categories, they clearly 
have epistemological consequences. An analogy with the physics of light is apt here. 
Considered in vacuo there are properties, such as light‟s constant speed and independence 
from any particular inertial reference frame, which must be intrinsic to any mathematical 
representation (such as Maxwell‟s equations). They are essential properties. In the 
theological case, for which the light is considered metaphorically, there is likewise some 
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essential, „unapproachable‟ aspect (cf. 1 Timothy 6:16), pertaining here to some 
hypothetical, qualitatively distinct „topology‟ concerning the Uncreated “Space”.  
Anything that is economically communicated from the „side‟ of the Uncreated, however, 
must manifest itself in or throughout a medium/space that is connectively particular to the 
intelligible capacity of created observers. One might here consider an analogy between 
many possible universes and many possible media into which physical light might 
propagate. The „constants‟ of nature constituting the interacting parameters of each 
„universe‟ are then analogous to the refractive index defining the effect of a given medium 
on the propagation of light. While there can be no fundamental ontological alteration of 
divine nature in these possible created spaces, there must be some epistemological 
refraction or diffraction
561
 – a necessary “translation” through various contingent „created 
terms‟ (borrowing Lonergan‟s vocabulary again). Any verging, iconic interface onto the 
medium/universe in question is importantly seen here not as some bounding surface but in 
terms of the pervading sacramental consonance noted in the Introduction, as one topology 
embedded within another. 
This light-based metaphor may also relate to the objectifying consequences of the 
Incarnation, especially with regard to our deepening participation in the Mind of Christ, 
ultimately transfiguring us „from one degree of glory to another‟. Ontologically this 
should be interpreted as topologically expansive rather than strictly additive. Divine nature 
is not added to, but we have something more akin to the magnification suggested in the 
opening line of the Magnificat, fleshing out the biblical witness of Christ that „I have been 
glorified in them‟ (John 17:10b).  
There is here yet another relation to Bohm‟s „implicate order‟, which has no visible 
„interface‟ as such with any context-specific, re-levated, explicate order or measure – no 
more than occurs between a „veil‟ of analytical symbols and some „reality‟ beyond, as 
Eddington noted.
562
 Replacing the idea of an „interface‟ with the all-pervading „tension‟ 
constituting the consonant, background basis of sacramentality, according to a 
participatory framework, makes intuitive sense here. Bohm introduces a parameter that 
stands for the „order of implication‟, effectively representing a measure of one‟s 
„proximity‟ to making explicate (or relevantly unfolding) some particular aspect of the 
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universal, implicate enfolding. He considers this parameter more significant than that 
mathematically representing time and suggests that any relationship between the two can 
only be hypothesized „in a contingent manner‟.563 Applied to the model suggested here 
one could say that the theological relevance of „our time‟ is only contingently related to 
„God‟s Time‟ while our degree of appreciation regarding the latter constitutes a far more 
significant „parameter‟ or „index‟ with respect to the unfolding of revelatory Activity, 
disclosed to a created context of reception that is in one respect „distanced‟ but in another 
respect still critically „proximate‟, as argued previously.  
To sum up, some „extrication‟ from our more familiar activity or experience into a new, 
but still accessible, mode of awareness (or „dawning realization‟) is necessary in order 
coherently to appreciate the dynamic of revelation. This also relates to what is here 
understood as enabling „eschatological consideration‟. The consonance necessary for such 
iconic, „verging‟ appreciation is not static but inherently dynamic, constituting the basis 
for the pervasive „design‟ of reconciliation noted in the previous chapter. Our recognition 
of such remains partial within this present cosmos, „seeing darkly‟ according to some 
„diffraction pattern‟ within a created space yet to be fully reconfigured or transfigured.  
It has been emphasized that divine, ontological initiative is necessary for establishing and 
manifesting eschatological relevance. Furthermore, such is an ultimate initiative, a phrase 
emphasizing the idea of an end in a beginning, and Christ as both Alpha and Omega. The 
next section considers such „eschatological relevance‟ with regard to its physical 
dimension. 
Eschatological relevance 
Eschatologically established stability and relevance is, as argued, ultimately contingent 
upon some ontological actualization by divine initiative. The „bi-idiomatic cooperation‟ 
inherent to the critical topological „neighbourhood‟ of divine-human communion is made 
manifest through the Incarnation, and the primary communicating initiative is on the „side‟ 
of the Uncreated. This communication occurs through an idiom of creative engagement 
verging on our iconic capacity for theological appreciation in a sacramental sense. Such 
creative engagement and initiative enables both our participation in the divine Economy 
and our capacity for conceiving (of) and receiving the Logos, coming to recognize 
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something of its critically pervasive topos. Inseparable from such capacity – especially 
from a physically relevant, scientific perspective – is a developing appreciation of the 
cosmic nature of our interconnectedness. Eschatological relevance, in as far as its nature is 
presently discernible, is ultimately established and revealed though a transfiguring of such 
interconnectedness. 
Complete eschatological consideration would therefore require some transfigured means 
of appreciating life, something somewhat beyond any present, more evolutionary sense we 
might have of continuing formation. Wilkinson highlights the need to look towards both 
continuous and discontinuous aspects of any transformation.
564
 If one considers two major 
metaphors relating to transformation, namely those of the phase transition
565
 and Kuhn‟s 
famous paradigm shift, and then considers the continuity and discontinuity aspects of 
each, then one already has four aspects of consideration. This thesis posits that the phase 
transition metaphor is more appropriate for the consideration of divine initiative, while the 
paradigm shift is more suitable for consideration of human initiative. The concept of any 
overall, eschatologically-pointed „formation‟ is then a product of some interactive means 
of cooperation between the two.  
In terms of the heavens-earth representation of chapter 2 it is clear that if the former 
heavens-earth unity is created in „a beginning‟ then any re-created or renewed heavens-
earth bond, a new syndesmos applying to a new creation and new „beginning‟, must 
likewise occur as a unity. Any mood of „becoming‟ can only be transformed if that of 
being – grounded in this case on indicative, stabilizing principles concerning sustainable 
physicality, and committed within a particular framework of laws/contingent truths – is 
also correspondingly transformed. In the allegory advocated here, a „new heavens‟ comes, 
in this sense, automatically with a „new earth‟, consonant with the vision in Revelation 21. 
Here the coming down of the New Jerusalem may stand for a new communication 
between Levenson‟s upper and lower „tiers‟ (chapter 2). This eschatological mode of 
communication is beyond any formational chaos, with no „sea‟ in the Revelation vision. 
There is no longer the double-edged potential for active expression of Evil as well as for 
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Good, and no double-edged sword guarding the Tree of Life (cf. Genesis 3:24). As 
Bulgakov remarks, „there is no more good in its relativity...only the tree of life remains‟.566 
Here the significance of transfiguration over transformation is again important, 
considering the enhanced functional effectiveness of an overall re-configuration. With 
regard to the form-content dynamic, the two aspects are transfigured in tandem. Even if 
we consider divine initiative predominantly to effect an ontological reconfiguration with 
respect to the „formal aspect‟ of the Artwork, the inseparability between this and any 
„contential aspect‟ means that the nature of any generated content is also transfigured (and 
thereby enhanced) but very much still accommodated. I would actually argue that the 
nature of the divine initiative, respecting the integrity of created order, should be 
considered as allowing the „content‟ of the Artwork to play an actively influential part in 
the nature and the result of the transfiguration process.  
Invoking the topological imagery of mindscape once more, human nature could be 
considered as being „motioned‟ or elevated towards a higher, distinctive genus of meaning 
or relevance.
567
 Cognitive formation begins with an encounter with the „literal‟ first 
impressions made according to our basic environmental context (genus-0). It develops 
through a deepening conceptual appreciation of variously juxtaposed signs and symbols, 
promoting those more consciously deliberated aspects of meaning pertaining to some 
metaphorical, transferred significance (genus-1). We may then come more fully to 
recognize and appreciate the enhancing effects of sacramental encounter and engagement 
(genus-2). Finally, we are called beyond even this into the eschaton (genus-3), 
permanently established according to the Mind of Christ at „the right-hand of the Father‟. 
These categories are no more reducible than are the distinct topological classifications in 
the mathematical analogy from which the metaphor has been borrowed. 
We do not, however, live in a cosmos made of language or semantic significance in and of 
itself, but one in which the nature and emergence of such language is substantively 
inseparable from the subtleties of our embodied physicality and its engagement with 
external, environmental structure in its quest for intelligibility. Likewise, to assume a 
human consciousness is representatively and dynamically to engage with the 
interconnectedness of the entire cosmic background and significance with regard to such 
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consciousness (chapter 3). Some obviously continuous and physically relevant aspect is 
therefore required of any eschatological viewpoint. 
Saudek presents a helpful overview of contemporary, physical perspectives on 
eschatology.
568
 He is acutely aware of the possible problems caused by a future 
eschatological timescale being potentially far greater than that of entire human history thus 
far, and considers nine distinct eschatological positions broadly summarized as follows:- 
1. „Physical eschatology falsifies theological eschatology‟                                         
This predominantly atheistic position usually combines a reductionist paradigm 
with the notion of an inevitable heat death, tending to see meaning (or its lack) as 
some static ultimate, without consideration of any deeper significance inherent 
throughout the dynamic process related here to the reconciling „design‟ of the 
Incarnate Logos. 
2. „Physical eschatology is compatible with theology‟s notion of an eschatological 
goal of the universe as long as one does not conceive of the eschaton literally as 
the end of time and the transformation of the physical universe…‟                            
This is noted for its popularity both with Process Philosophers and, perhaps rather 
unfortunately, with those seeing theology and natural science as constituting 
entirely non-intersecting languages. 
3. „Future development of the cosmos will be cut short by divine action‟                     
This raises questions of timescale and discontinuity, perhaps even allowing 
different eschatologies for different physical or cosmic domains. It also requires 
some coherent understanding of what is being intended by „divine action‟.  
4. „Short physical eschatologies‟                                                                                      
This viewpoint forecasts some natural, cosmic end during human lifetime, perhaps 
falling foul of the temptation to suppose that our presence and initiative defines the 
fate of the entire physical cosmos rather than vice versa. The degree of distinction 
between this and the previous viewpoint is also potentially debatable. 
5. Cosmic transformation is considered to lie entirely within the domain of human 
action.  
This, although an idea touched upon in the next chapter, inevitably verges upon 
some post-humanist outlook, outside the purview of this thesis. 
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6. „Optimistic emergentism‟                                                                                            
This often manifests itself as some statistical analysis of cosmic potential, as 
pondered by such thinkers such as Teilhard de Chardin. 
7. There is no physical dimension to eschatology. 
This seems to imply complete discontinuity, about which one cannot really say 
very much, and eschews all truly scientific discussion.  
8. A Popper-like „many worlds‟ outlook (similar to the aforementioned suggestion of 
Penrose). 
Here eschatological emergence or revelation occurs through some uniting 
interaction.  
9. The optimistic „don‟t know‟ position.  
This, depending on one‟s viewpoint, either speaks for itself or does anything but. 
In relation to the above model relatively few of these viewpoints seem to fit. The first 
seems to nullify any real theological engagement. The third and seventh are too emphatic 
of discontinuity, the seventh furthermore ditching any enduring sense of committed 
physicality. The sixth, by contrast, says nothing explicit about any discontinuity-aspect in 
as far as this may be distinct from the possible vagaries of the term „emergence‟ (although 
this position remains intellectually respectable in its ambition). The ninth clearly has no 
particularly meaningful contribution to make, especially if it is truly all that one can 
legitimately say. The fourth is vulnerable to a short-sighted and culturally-conditioned 
geo-centricity, the only philosophical paradigm justifying it with any optimism being 
some strongly contorted idealism. While I am not denying that a certain idealist 
consideration is important to a Christian understanding of collective mindedness – a 
„catholicity‟ according to the whole – the aim remains to relate the potential inherent in 
such consideration to the physically relevant transfiguring of contingent 
interconnectedness.  
The fifth viewpoint, though worthy of exploration from a teleological perspective, seems 
to take the idea of subjunctive possibility open to human control and use it, and it alone, to 
transform that aspect of the physical cosmos over which we might exercise any dominion. 
„Earth‟ and „heavens‟ aspects are not therefore renewed in conjunction with one another 
within a theologically interactive model. This way of thinking serves again to highlight the 
difference between having simply a physical transformation and having a physically 
relevant theology of transfiguration, the significance of which is inseparable from the 
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uniqueness of the „figure‟ of Christ, the genuine novelty of incarnational encounter and the 
distinctive collectedness and connectedness pertaining to a share in the Resurrection Life 
and the Mind of Christ. Through such transfiguration any dual-aspect bonds such as 
potential-actual, form-content and mediate-immediate
569
 are reconfigured together as an 
integrated whole, rather than in isolation. The topological interconnectivity of the 
framework here is therefore especially important in this regard. 
That leaves the second and eighth viewpoints. The second needs to make a concerted 
effort to find an appropriate link between scientific and theological schemas of thought in 
order to advertise credibility (for which a focus on stability is suggested here). The eighth 
begs the question of how each of the „worlds‟ might be involved in contributing to the 
nature of any eschatological transfiguration. The „worlds‟ must interact, avoiding any 
separatism that might imply, for instance, some materialist eschatology in one „space‟, 
„world‟ or „aspect‟ and some idealist eschatology in another. Contradiction, as opposed to 
some ultimately creative paradox, contrast or tension, needs to be eschewed.  
If one were to replace the term „world‟ (or „cosmos‟) with the term „idiom‟ – something 
collectively fostered, in our case, through a particular means of physical formation 
according to the parameters of precisely this particular „cosmos‟ – then one would need 
instead to say something explicit about how our idiom of engagement may be 
embedded/accommodated within that of the divine Economy, cooperatively interacting 
with it. In conjunction with promoting a particular, integrative basis for a theo-scientific 
outlook, such is indeed a concern at the core of this thesis. One must, however, still find an 
appropriate means of distinguishing between those continuous and discontinuous aspects 
resulting from any engaging, transfiguring process. 
Summary: the Incarnation as a (necessary) phase transition? 
Considering different sides of a phase boundary, any aspect of continuity across the 
boundary consists in some underlying holding together, as for example through the 
consistency in chemical formula between states such as water and ice, while some 
discontinuity is evidenced in terms of an organizational change, and its consequent effects. 
Theologically, in a metaphorical application of this idea, one must assume the ontology of 
divine essence as always consistent and thus „continuous‟, but something about the 
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economic manner in which divine communication is both possible and organized may 
change, both according to the aforementioned „diffraction‟ in created space and in 
conjunction with some transfiguring initiative involving the union of divine and human 
natures.  
As the phase transition metaphor is being used here in relation to divine, ontological 
initiative, and as the language associated with the phase transition concept is relevant to 
the topological framework, there is a good argument here for viewing the Incarnation itself 
(and importantly in the totality of its relevance from conception to Ascension) as 
manifesting a theological phase transition, defining the critical theological topology lying 
at the core of this thesis. If the metaphor is to be taken seriously then it is necessary to 
identify analogies for aspects of continuity and discontinuity, and also for an order 
parameter. The continuity aspect has already been suggested, while the discontinuity 
aspect is induced both by the „diffraction‟ and in accordance with the physically-
conditioned, sense-objectifying assumption of an incarnate „perspective‟ (chapter 3), 
according to which divine „regard‟ engages with the relative symmetry of the humanity-
cosmos relationship. Though not in itself altering any propositional statements concerning 
divine ontology, such engagement may redefine or reconfigure the „prepositional‟ aspect 
of our theological involvement and encounter, to reuse a term coined in the Introduction. 
This effectively re-instantiates, or transposes, the nature of our topos, initiating the process 
of drawing it into a deeper relevance and stability. The theological transition is 
subsequently developed through the transfiguring effect of the Resurrection, an effect 
carrying physical consequences and involving a certain aspect of continuity, worked out in 
necessary accordance with various preparatory terms already „latent‟ – to return to 
Russell‟s argument – in the cosmic context accommodating the Incarnation. 
The „order parameter‟ then becomes that which makes this process inseparable from the 
revealing of a new, reordered creation. In relation to the earlier discussion on the 
uniqueness of the Mind of Christ, this parameter is indicative of the re-membering (see 
chapter 5 for the origin of this phrase) of created space into a newly ordered domain. In 
comparison to Lonergan‟s insistence that to speak in terms of „percept‟ is distinct from a 
stricter view of subjective experience, being instead something „on the side of the object‟, 
one might consider such reordering from a perceptual standpoint, especially with regard to 
an active engagement of memory therein. Far from merely constituting some most 
plausible „illusion‟ (borrowing a metaphor from cognitive psychology‟s contemporary 
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viewpoint concerning the active involvement of our brains and memory systems in 
forming relevant perceptions) such sense-objectified re-membering – through the unique 
mode of encounter associated with the Mind of Christ – instead actively defines the 
deepest and most authentic reality in which humanity is able to participate. 
Eschatologically-speaking, our idiomatic mode of engagement is thereby transfigured to 
„see‟ such reality as it really is (1 John 3:2). 
Acknowledging the difficulty of understanding any „motioning‟ on the part of the Creative 
Power of the indwelling Spirit, Sayers suggests the analogy of trying to follow the motion 
of one‟s eyes in a mirror.570 Considering this analogy from an eschatological perspective, 
one could conceive of a divinely-initiated, eschatologically-focused transfiguration of that 
metaphorical lens through which we „see darkly‟ (1 Corinthians 13:12), transitioning into 
something topologically distinct, something enabling us to understand or „see‟ our proper 
topos in a manner that was previously either impossible or „unbearable‟ (cf. John 16:12). 
Through this transfiguring process our idiomatic mode of engagement, though still 
remaining distinct, attains deeper significance and more cooperative consonance with that 
of the divine Economy, as human nature is elevated to and re-established at „the right hand 
of the Father‟ and its relevance thereby attains eschatological stability. In this analogy 
both our „eyes‟ and the „lens‟ are interconnected aspects with respect to created space. We 
do not of ourselves define any formality according to which created space is held together 
– whether „from within‟ or „from without‟ – but the dynamic of our nature is nonetheless 
defined in such a manner as to afford us the potential for active contribution, participating 
in the generation of meaningful content. This activity remains eschatologically pointed 
and relevant owing to the sacramental nature of our stability in theological terms.  
If the Father is considered as the Source of Creation, the Logos as the Image of rationality 
and dynamic maintenance of order behind and within Creation, and the Holy Spirit as 
„giving‟ and formatively empowering the meaningful life of Creation, then the concept of 
God‟s ordering, formalizing Creative Activity becoming flesh, creatively suffering, and 
being resurrected in a subtly distinct mode of embodiment from that originally assumed at 
His conception (in other words, not merely “resuscitated”, remaining consonant with the 
concept of transfiguration), then this subtlety of distinction must carry consequences 
concerning the reordering of Creation.  
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As to the necessary, physically relevant aspect of continuity concerning such reordering 
that „might lie within the province of science‟, Russell appeals to Polkinghorne‟s ex vetere 
view of God‟s transfiguring involvement in the Resurrection to suggest that such 
continuities „include the significance of relationality and holism; the concept of 
information of a “pattern-forming kind” in addition to the familiar ideas of matter and 
energy; mathematics; and a dynamic view of reality as “open becoming”.‟571 This is an 
important insight, aspects of which were considered in chapter 3 in relation to a cosmic 
viewpoint regarding consciousness. The relevance of energy has also been considered, 
including the suggested possible significance of a relation between „God‟s Time‟ and the 
„Creative Energy‟ with respect to any revelation of transfiguring, „Creative Power‟. It 
must, of course, be to those attributes of order accessible to our physically-formed 
capacity for rational intelligibility that we look in order to consider any candidate entities 
that might be involved in establishing any aspect of continuity regarding our physical 
eschatology, ultimately secured through the drawing of all creatively constructive 
relevance to the Logos.  
As to the idea that the Incarnation is an inevitable necessity – not confined to 
soteriological consideration alone – it should be recognized that the Incarnation allows for 
a more complete demonstration of divine omnipotence and omniscience. Considering a 
classical philosophical conundrum such as “can God create a stone he couldn‟t lift?”,572 
one must be careful to distinguish uncreated and created aspects. The Uncreated “Space” 
from which God creates with (or motions according to) „His Time‟ is fundamentally 
distinct from that in which one might attempt to lift any created stone in our time. Implicit 
even in the word „lift‟ is an understanding of a certain corollary within created space, one 
in which the laws of physics come to function in a particular way, with implications for 
the structure of space-time and the relationship between matter and energy, as well as 
accommodating a life-form able to grasp and to effect the concept „to lift‟.  
The Incarnation readdresses this challenge by redefining the notion of omnipotence in dual 
terms of „power to lay down‟ and „power to take up‟ (cf. John 10:18). Divine omni-
potential is then that potential inherent in remaining consistent with any implicit 
boundaries concerning overall creative integrity, with no self-contradiction occurring even 
when the Logos „becomes flesh‟. In this respect the Incarnation could be considered 
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572 See P. Mercier, Night Train to Lisbon (London: Atlantic Books, 2009), p.136. 
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necessary for the deepest demonstration of complete omni-potential and, for that matter, 
omniscience – „all things‟ additionally being „known‟ by God-as-Man, encountered 
through that „diffraction pattern‟ induced by the topology according to which we „see‟ in 
created space.   
By its very nature the Light gives definition. Taking the notion of a „thing‟ to imply some 
contingently defined finitude it becomes somewhat tautological to say that „not one thing 
will be impossible for God‟, since in order truly to qualify as a „thing‟ is then precisely to 
be contingent upon a definitional basis ultimately deriving from the creative engagement 
of divinity through the Light. One such „thing‟ is then both the potency for, and actuality 
of, the assumption of human nature. That this is not impossible for God must then openly 
be demonstrated in the created domain as the ultimate expression – in this particular 
created space – of divine omnipotence and omniscience. The Light shines in the darkness 
and the darkness neither under-stands it nor over-comes it, neither hypostatizes it nor 
supervenes it. The Light does the defining and any subsequent redefining. On this 
reckoning, and specifically in the contingent context of the created domain, hypostatizing 
and supervening are two sides of the same coin. That which offers a renewed, under-
standing, definitional basis for an enhanced human topos is mirrored by an overarching or 
„overshadowing‟ supervention, revealing a higher „refuge‟ and deeper stability. 
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Chapter 5: Genres within an Idiom – the Evolution of our Creative Freedom 
Our dynamically stable capacity both for conceiving the „motioning‟ engagement of the 
divine Economy and for meaningfully responding thereto has been central to emphasizing 
the critical development of our topos and its active involvement in the dynamic design of 
reconciliation, especially as assumed in the Incarnation. Reference has already been made 
to that „developing stability‟ which represents a continual reintegration of (sacramental) 
connectedness with respect to the overarching „changeless stability‟ ultimately pertaining 
to the prospect of eschatological „rest‟. This chapter considers the evolution of such 
„developing stability‟ in terms that are more scientifically relevant to the concept of our 
anthropological development over time. It takes a holistic view of such development, 
expanding the concept of our developing „idiom‟ of creative engagement into a 
consideration of component genres representing critical aspects or stages involved therein. 
As a guiding metaphor one might think of such developing evolution in terms analogous 
to the expansion of a particular, representative volume of phase space, especially given the 
relevance of such a concept to a dynamic consideration of stability. Such „expansion‟ may 
then be seen in terms of an increase in our overall freedom if such is taken as being 
indicative of the depth or potential of our capacity for effective, creative engagement.     
Inhabiting „reality‟ 
Although not necessarily identical, there is some congruence between the reference in 
scholastic theology to a human habitus and that made here to a human idiom. Coulter, in 
comparing Eastern and Western approaches to human nature and its potential 
transformation, considers the Latin habitus tradition as referring to a particular way of 
coming to inhabit reality.
573
 The aforementioned scientific ressourcement has informed us 
more deeply about the physical specifics and complexity of such habitus. For all that the 
scope of science‟s informing capacity has significantly increased over the last century, and 
will continue to do so, there will equally be aspects of consideration for which the 
theological discipline is either more suitable or importantly complementary. In theological 
terms, a sacramentally stable habitus is critical, especially if theological and scientific 
insights are to work properly in conversation with respect to our vital association with the 
Logos.  
                                                             
573 D. M. Coulter, The Whole Gospel for the Whole Person: Ontology, Affectivity and Sacramentality 
(Pneuma, Vol.35, No.2, 2013), pp.157-161.  
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The Incarnation points beyond our present sense or direct experience of habitus, as well as 
making of that habitus an ultimately collective, communal phenomenon and establishing a 
renewed means of inhabiting „reality‟ – a deeper reality in conjunction with an enhanced 
topos.  The Incarnation indicates a way of being that is not so directly tied to the effects of 
our baser, earthly heritage, but neither is it irrelevant to such heritage. It re-conceives 
human potential through the fullest possible involvement therewith, fully engaging with 
the „bottom-up‟ emergence associated with our natural development.  
On the „side‟ of human perspective the most urgent pressure comes, at least at first, from 
our immediately encountered environment. Over time, however, humanity gains greater 
operational stability, gradually developing more robust or effective forms of engagement. 
Our conceptual or intellectual development may furthermore become extrapolated into 
plausible, abstracted representations of „reality‟ – in some sense „illusory‟ or „seeing 
darkly‟ but not necessarily delusory in any more fundamental sense. The noetic aspect of 
our environment expands and becomes better defined, and we invest a certain degree of 
faith in its reliability. This development affords us a deeper appreciation of the nature of 
our freedom, though such can never entirely be divorced from those indelible influences 
that first shaped our anthropological heritage. While chapter 1 considered one plausible 
means of articulating the dynamic of our holistic mental process, this chapter develops that 
dynamic over the course of an evolution in our creative freedom. 
Considering the nature of our freedom is inseparable from considering that of our topos or 
„dwelling‟, which is in turn related to our sense of inhabiting and belonging. Such a sense 
may change or deepen over time in perhaps quite unpredictable ways that do not appear to 
resemble any smooth, linear progression, but perhaps the one aspect of our deepening 
sense of habitus, idiom or influence that could justifiably be considered in linear terms is 
that relating to a more scientific perspective on our developing awareness and capacity. 
This could still be a complex task, however, given the inseparability between our sense of 
topos and the complexly-connected „topology‟ shaping the nature of our environmental, 
and ultimately cosmic, encounter.  
In his theological commentary on the work of Dostoevsky,
574
 Williams insightfully 
highlights the destructive, deeply-rooted flaw in any artificially compartmentalised 
outlook on the world, and the problems associated with any worldview that lives by facile 
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and ultimately unjustifiable presumptions, refusing to accept the richly interwoven, 
multidimensional tapestry of interconnected signs, symbols and indices playing a 
relatively complex role in orienting our appreciation regarding the topologically non-
trivial nature of our „dwelling‟, inhabiting or belonging.  
Treating cosmic reality as a whole involves a sense of authentic belonging being made 
meaningful through the formation of a complex but honest system of exploration within it. 
Here I mean emphatically a constructive complexity, upon whose vital degree of 
organization and stability all potential life depends right down to the most basic physical 
level, as opposed to some random, meaningless complication. Such constructive 
complexity characterizes any „reality‟ in which physical life can sustainably flourish and, 
in the case of humanity, with the capacity to generate intelligible meaning (chapter 1). To 
fail properly to appreciate the complex connectedness of our environment may, 
furthermore, lead to the degrading exploitation of environmental resource. If, however, we 
seek honestly and authentically to discern such complex but constructive connectivity then 
even a broken image retains a venerably iconic aspect, and, as Williams remarks 
Inexorably, the Christological question returns. The icon that is recognizably 
anchored in the actual world of decision and change, yet carries an abundance that 
inducts us into a larger world is...an appropriate sign of the primordial icon, the 
eternal image of God which is embodied in time in the flesh and blood of Christ.
575
 
Here, such Christological consideration is deemed critical to a broader and deeper 
consideration of our proper topos and of the appropriation of our modus operandi in the 
Incarnation. The development of our creative freedom ought, theologically, to be related to 
Christ‟s invitation to „come and see‟ where He is „staying‟ – an invitation likewise pointed 
towards a deeper freedom as a sacramental sharing in the topos appropriated and 
recapitulated by the Logos in the Incarnation. 
Evolving freedom 
From a more scientific perspective the concept of „freedom‟ needs here to be considered in 
the context of that nested, modulated and stability-qualifying hierarchy which is indicative 
of a dynamic, layered development over Big History – a development attaining in 
particular that critical, complexly-connected „topology‟ suited to the sustainability of life 
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and the biosphere as an integrated whole. This fits with the idea that (as for Bulgakov) 
correlative freedom ascends in various degrees and qualifications to the human person. 
Furthermore, I am in agreement with Dennett that the concept of freedom is one that, from 
our perspective, must necessarily evolve.
576
 An evolutionary framework emphasizes that, 
in conjunction with a necessary degree of cooperation, some form of competition is 
intrinsic to the emergence of certain aspects of freedom in the created domain, including 
the fostering of human capacity over time. This tension between cooperation and 
competition (see below) highlights a certain incompleteness to our freedom overall. Our 
freedom is what it is precisely because it is part of an evolving process. 
In the case of divinity, where freedom „identifies‟ with necessity, the notion of „perfect 
freedom‟ is constituted by the requirements of self-consistency, self-completeness and 
self-sufficiency while not being limited by them in any ontologically finite sense. Given 
Gödel‟s insight that, in any rigorously formalized presentation of logic, the requirements 
of consistency and completeness are mutually exclusive, one might suggest that one key 
aspect of distinction between the respective idioms of creative freedom is that this 
exclusivity is absent or bypassed in the divine case. Divine freedom ought not, however, to 
be thought of as some boundless independence, but rather in terms of the perfectly 
cooperative and entirely non-competitive interdependence of Trinity-in-Unity.  
Given the background idea of a „bi-idiomatic cooperation‟ between divine and human 
idioms of engagement with(in) created space, the conception of freedom advocated here in 
more theological terms adopts a „concurrence‟ viewpoint regarding divine-human co-
operation.
577
 This avoids any conception of „competition‟ between divine sovereignty and 
the created integrity of creative, human self-consciousness, and seems especially apposite 
– if not essential – where considering the Incarnation is concerned. I would advocate the 
two-idiom „model‟ as expanding the concept of concurrence within a framework whose 
language is holistic enough to be of general theological relevance and scientific enough to 
be of particular contemporary interest. For Kant, the concept of concurrence had its 
starkest relevance and application precisely to a consideration of freedom. Even though 
our understanding of those physical principles according to which particular degrees of 
freedom are mediated has accelerated since Kant‟s time, the conceptual centrality of such 
freedom still remains.  
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One must however be cautious as to how the notion of human freedom is interpreted. 
Couenhoven notes „the theological insufficiency of associating freedom with the vagary of 
choice, rather than a definite orientation to the good‟,578 and on this basis freedom will be 
related here far more to the idea of an overall capacity than to qualifications involving 
„choice‟.  
Equally, given its evolutionary nature, our freedom is inherently graduated and 
contextualized. The process of moving through a succession of different aspects or degrees 
of freedom will, in requiring some readjustment to environment, influence our means and 
effectiveness of response to subsequent encounter (relating back to Siegel‟s „experienced 
mandates‟ in chapter 1).  
Overall therefore, any holistic sense or appreciation of „freedom‟ is taken here simply to 
constitute a conceptual „index‟ – again in the sense of being actively brought into effect by 
that freedom which is being indicated. The stability of this „index‟ is then proportional to 
the extent of our capacity to understand, respond to and, in some cases, emancipate 
ourselves from the relative constraints of our environment. Ultimately, one could 
theoretically reach the point at which only necessarily irreducible constraints remain, those 
inevitable natural boundaries in accordance with which our capacity for appreciating and 
articulating our evolving sense of freedom develops. Generally speaking therefore, a 
greater depth of self-conscious awareness, capacity or ability then indicates a greater 
overall degree of freedom. Emerging self-consciousness enables us more capably to relate 
to our own roots, fostering a deepening awareness of our potential.  
An obvious way of appreciating that the creative freedom associated with our idiom of 
engagement necessarily evolves is to consider our reliance upon some inter-generational 
process of passing on (see below). From a scientific perspective evolutionary journeys are 
rarely, if ever, smooth. The notion of progress is neither equally-spaced chronologically, 
in terms of transitional moments, nor is it geometrically progressive, in some smoothly 
accelerated sense, towards some predictably final but potentially rather artificial „Omega 
Point‟.579 Although this concept will be considered below, it will be seen that it is not easy 
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to reconcile the idea with the messier context of materially-evolving life. Furthermore, 
from a theological perspective, any prospective eschatology should not be isolated in its 
significance to some future event or limit, bracketed off from present relevance. Rather, its 
future causation is relevant to our creative potential and freedom of engagement now, as 
Russell suggests in quite substantive terms. The relevance of God‟s on-going, sustaining 
and creative engagement is at least partially discerned through our creative and 
cooperative involvement therein: the „topology‟ associated with our engagement and its 
dynamic stability being embedded within a broader and deeper topology associated with 
the creative engagement of the „motioning‟ divine Economy. The enveloping of a higher 
environing, within the broader context of which our associated freedom of engagement 
evolves and acquires prospective eschatological relevance, becomes more transparent in 
the context of this framework.   
Developing the „compact‟ context of our dynamic stability 
The development of our idiom of engagement and its associated creative freedom is 
expanded here in terms of three component genres which are, chronologically-speaking, 
dependent upon one another: the most basic genre forming the basis for the emergence of 
the next. In their chronological order of development the genres in question, as described 
in the Introduction, are referred to as the pro-creative, the re-creative and the co-creative. 
Ultimately these co-exist and (I will argue) offer an appropriate compound lens through 
which to consider the aforementioned complexity that constitutes our authentic belonging 
and developing modus operandi, indicating a coherent means of appreciating a sense of 
directedness regarding the dynamic stability of our idiom or habitus. Once again, this is 
just one possible way of considering the stages involved in such development, from an 
intentionally holistic perspective fitting to the framework and language of the thesis 
overall. 
Chapter 3 distinguished between the perfect self-relation pertaining to divinity and our 
imperfect, incomplete self-replication – something that seems to be a consequence of the 
necessary prior development of a critical, hierarchical arrangement of qualified levels of 
stability, acting to promote further development as necessary for the sustainable 
emergence of higher forms of life and, most importantly in this case, the dynamic stability 
of our mindscape and creative intelligence. From a scientific perspective, Barrow and 
Tipler offer a good discussion on the parameters involved in the cosmological process that 
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resulted in the necessarily finite and fine-tuned compactness of our particular physical 
constitution and its associated modus operandi.
580
 Such development is again contingent 
upon critically sustainable conglomerations of feedback cycles, and our deliberated, 
expressive response to environmental impression may in turn influence our environment, 
for better or for worse. The form of environmental feedback involved in developing our 
creative activity therefore constitutes another aspect of iterative closure.  
Paramount to our sense of creative freedom is the collective, formational influence of 
those natural boundaries defining the limits to our operational potential. In addition to 
physical and biological constraints there is also, where our mindscape is concerned, the 
influence of linguistic or even psychological constraints, considering what can or cannot 
effectively be conceived or sensibly be expressed as a possibility. Such constraints may be 
relatively numerous, but the degree of freedom consequently defined by their interrelation 
may nonetheless become so intensely specific as also to become very efficiently precise in 
its functional potential. Human creativity, even in its finitude and its imperfection, may 
thereby prove contextually potent.  
Although largely constrained to build upon things already existing, we may nonetheless 
develop some genuine, accentuating influence that may ultimately work itself out as a co-
creative potential. It is according to this co-creative genre of our activity, emerging 
through the successive development of the pro-creative and the re-creative, that we come 
most fully to „extricate ourselves‟ from our baser first impressions of „reality‟. Such 
extrication affords us an enhanced appreciation regarding meaning, purpose and our 
theologically proper nature. Theologically-speaking, through the Incarnation, this 
ultimately involves our topos or „dwelling‟ being elevated (or re-levated) in the 
Incarnation, and thereby made more profoundly relevant.  
Scientifically, we need to search for the best means by which our increasingly informed 
expressiveness might make the most appropriate impression on our environment, 
enhancing our overall capacity for creative engagement while contributing to the content 
of the aforementioned „Artwork‟ in so doing. This is clearly a critical challenge for 21st 
Century humanity. Consideration of our best means of humanizing an increasing 
proportion of space, an activity that has already proved critical to our participation in Big 
History, forms an interesting potential component of this challenge (considered below). 
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First, however, it is necessary to move through a consideration of the pro-creative and re-
creative genres in order better to appreciate the emergence of the co-creative as here 
understood. 
The pro-creative genre: induced by survival necessity 
The pro-creative genre of our operational activity brings into focus the shaping of our 
earliest-conditioned freedom in conjunction with that environmental pressure shaping our 
most fundamental survival necessities and causing various cognitive processes more 
instinctively to resonate in our developing consciousness. Our idiom of operation is 
inescapably inter-generational, inevitably needing to hand things on to others, dying in 
order to make space for new life. The pro-creative genre represents the basest and most 
primitive freedom with regard to how things are passed on – the level of operation that is 
most strongly instinctive. Our intuition is to be considered primitive in this genre, facing 
an as yet un-analysed approach with respect to our survival necessity. It is the genre 
dominated most clearly by those „indelible influences‟ connected with our early formation 
as a species (chapter 1), incorporated in Polanyi‟s „tacit coefficients‟ and progressively 
reweighted in response to (often unpredictable) changes in environment encounter.  
In this genre any strategic awareness or conception is at its most basic, something largely 
written into those fixed action potentials noted in the discussion on Llinás‟ contribution 
(chapter 3). It is the product of the natural progression through Bermúdez‟s levels of 
rationality (chapter 1) prior to the deeper influence of more robustly articulate uses of 
language and more contextually abstracted or formally investigated modes of conception. 
The context of focus is primary, showing the strong influence of Siegel‟s „experienced 
mandates‟ (chapter 1) and a lower order re-representation of information already re-
presented in the act of perceiving (cf. Appleton). It demonstrates the most basic level of 
creative conception and interpretation regarding our „terrain‟ (as per McGilchrist‟s 
terminology). Our relatively self-stabilizing capacity for conception plays a central role in 
the framework of this thesis, but the „corrections‟ necessary for the integrated 
development of our mental dynamic according to this genre are relatively haphazard: 
stumbling, reweighting adjustments concerning our tacit, mental coefficients. The need for 
such an intricate balancing act was highlighted in chapter 3, but here the word „stumbling‟ 
has been chosen specifically with another input in mind.  
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The scope of our pro-creative activity is relatively narrow, partly because the way in 
which we „choose‟ one option over another is not necessarily by conscious searching, but 
rather by „stumbling upon‟. This phrase is borrowed from Gilbert, who uses it to highlight 
what he considers to be the naïve assumption of the human mind that it knows best where 
it ought to be steering for „happiness‟.581 He exposes the naivety by highlighting three 
major defects in any attempt to predict our emotional future: first, a sketchily-labelled 
recollection of past events by which our memory is forced to fill in the gaps in the most 
plausible manner; second, being deceived to an extent by some spatially-stimulated 
imagination concerning the passage of time, involving a projection of the present as one 
might project spatially in cases of separation; and third, a failure to take account of some 
synthetic induction of a feeling of happiness as part of what he calls a psychological 
„immune system‟. We do not know the best course to steer because we do not know how 
the course will later seem to any future, interpretative framework, nuanced and adapted 
largely according to hindsight. In this sense a residue of the pro-creative genre – an 
evolution-induced necessity – is a certain reliance on „stumbling upon‟ beneficial traits or 
forms of action largely according to circumstance, requiring innately embedded 
mechanisms to be called, or possibly co-opted, into particular roles so as to increase our 
capacity for speedy and reliable readjustment in response to possible challenges. 
All other functional developments are built around this inherited basis. The seeds are sown 
for a later, analytically more capable community, cooperating through more developed 
social dialogue, but such potential is not necessarily realized at this point to any greater 
extent than is forced upon us. To give but one example, it was noted as early as the 1950s 
that due to the heavy supervisory demands of cooperative labour placed upon the 
obligatory maintenance of canals, dams and dykes for the sustaining of irrigation, in 
conjunction with the need to resolve disputes over water rights, a prerequisite of organized 
stability in society was placed upon those living in such a region, and hence why some of 
the oldest-known, ordered civilizations emerged from the region of Egypt and 
Mesopotamia.
582
 
Inherent to procreation in the more literal, biological sense is a necessary cycle of dying 
and bringing forth of new life. This idea also applies to the development of our capacity 
for mental conception: some concepts or methods of approach have to give way to more 
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robust means of understanding, or to a deeper strategic awareness as our idiom of creative 
freedom evolves. Gombrich presents a thorough review of the fuelling of one artistic style, 
whether in the representational medium of a canvas, architecture or sculpture, by a 
previous one, in a manner partly continuous and partly discontinuous, occurring right from 
the art of the primitives for whom „there is no difference between building and image 
making as far as usefulness is concerned‟.583 Indeed, a critical transition point with respect 
to the emergence of the re-creative genre of creative activity could well be considered as 
being the point at which a practical difference does become permanently established 
between the actual usefulness of that which is built to serve a particular function and the 
potential usefulness of what might emerge from the human imagination (or our capacity 
for the construction of appropriately representative images and models) through more 
abstracted means of analysis. This constitutes a key sign of extrication or emancipation 
from the more urgent demands of our surroundings into a more detached and scientifically 
effective manner of considering our situation and purpose. 
The manner in which we are able to hand things on to new generations may thereby 
become more robustly encoded through more abstract means of conceptual representation 
and communication, and an altogether greater understanding of the nature of the „territory‟ 
that we explore. A complementary, strategic sense resulting from the development of such 
insight may then more freely assert its influence, beyond those originally incorporated 
fixed action potentials that had granted us the previously necessary level of stability and 
adaptability concerning our capacity for effective and (increasingly) creative response.  
As to the idea of conceptual evolution occurring through the dying of older or less robust 
means of conception, Hitchcock considers an analogy between the developmental journeys 
of mathematics, science and ecosystems in terms of a dying to offer new life, effectively 
invoking the idea of paradigmatic shift in such a way that „the old passes, not away, but 
into the new. For this the commonly used images of scrap heap, rubbish tip and 
archaeological strata are totally inadequate and misleading. Far more appropriate are the 
organic images of compost, forest floor humus and peat-bog‟.584 
He remarks that „concepts [of which he notes such examples as Hamilton‟s quaternions 
and Peacock‟s Algebra] combine to create a fertile medium in which other superseding 
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concepts can take root and develop‟.585 Among more physical examples, the death of the 
ether hypothesis is noted as still having provided Hamilton and Maxwell with a critical 
conceptual framework.
586
 In fact, the idea of intellectual influences needing somehow to 
„die‟ or at least „be retired‟ to make way for future progress is one coming increasingly 
into focus, especially given the 2014 Edge.org question posed by Brockman concerning 
what leading academic figures considered to be the ideas most in need of such retirement, 
leading to the 2015 publication This Idea Must Die (referenced earlier). 
The above illustrates how the emergence and development of our re-creative potential 
occurs through continuing involvement in those aspects of life pertaining to our pro-
creative activity and its response to variously impressed necessities. Such relative 
emancipation and developing capacity for more efficient methods of abstraction and 
representation increases the freedom of flexibility, and yet also the contextual precision, 
with which we may “package” our importantly acquired insights and hand them on to 
others. There is an inevitable interplay between the basic human need on the one hand to 
focus for clarity, and yet, on the other hand, to expand for the sake of interest and broader 
awareness. Clarity then becomes to our developing appreciation of mental „refuge‟ what 
interest, or even the „affordance‟ of a novel means of conceiving or understanding, 
becomes to our sense of „prospect‟. Appleton‟s terminology therefore proves useful in 
keeping track of our evolving mental development over time.  
Conceptually-afforded prospect might, for instance, reveal itself through our developing 
capacity (and therefore freedom) for selecting the most promising means of representation 
or language use for responding to a particular context of challenge. In itself this involves 
some evaluation of the prospective „content‟ of focus that might be associated with such a 
selection. The „index‟ corresponding to our developing sense of freedom and capacity may 
further be developed through the progressive availability of different strategic methods or 
structures of reasoning, each stimulated and made relevant according to the memorable 
processing of some particular form of „impression‟ upon our mindscape. There is therefore 
an intuitive connection between the references made to „prospect‟, „content‟ and 
„impression‟ – complementary means of considering the nature of that „affordance‟ to 
which our means of responding to our environment causes our attention to be drawn, with 
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the familiar and reliably encountered aspects of such engagement becoming innately 
embedded and encoded in our long-term memory. 
Our need for mental refuge in this sense is made clear given the practical need for 
concluding various channels of exploration, a process offering more relevant, reliable and 
perhaps permanent mind-marks collectively defining the contours of such „refuge‟ and 
continuing to inform our more authentic, „inhabiting‟ sense of prospective potential. Such 
dynamic prospect-refuge interaction is clearly still somewhat unpredictable in its 
progression over time, but the more developed our conceptual compactness and 
interconnected sense of awareness becomes, the greater also becomes the potential for 
what our evolving intellectual and creative freedom might achieve. The seconding of 
relevant correction mechanisms then becomes more actively deliberated and significantly 
less haphazard. Selective, evolutionary influence acts primarily upon those traits whose 
development pertains most strongly to our pro-creative activity, literal and metaphorical, 
and its influence on those properties developing more lucidly in conjunction with the 
emergence the re-creative genre is therefore significantly more opaque.  
The re-creative genre: emancipation into a new freedom for invention 
Dennett suggests, I think correctly, that good scientific method involves, to a certain 
extent, making that which was previously too close or familiar sufficiently distant or 
abstract as to enable one better to comprehend the nature of things. We are obviously close 
to, and familiar with, the relative vagaries of our incomplete self-perception, especially as 
immersed in our pro-creative activity (again, literally and metaphorically). This poses the 
question as to how we might best distance, abstract or „extricate‟ ourselves from such a 
perception in order to allow for an enhanced, better articulated, self-conscious 
understanding, challenging certain previous assumptions.  
In terms of Dennett‟s language,587 the emergence of  the re-creative genre challenges the 
manner in which any evolutionary „rationale‟ could even conceivably be considered „free-
floating‟, now regarding a more consciously deliberated, creative activity rather than a 
more rootedly instinctive, relatively automatic process of copying or emulating. One may 
develop the tools-of-the-trade or rules-of-the-game learned from one‟s predecessors all the 
more effectively the more one becomes capable of emancipating oneself from the more 
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purely instinctual forms of expressiveness pertaining to the pro-creative genre. 
Furthermore, some „games‟ or „trades‟ within the intellectual and creative potential of our 
habitus will lend themselves much more readily than others to the noting of variations, 
upon which evolutionary principle (in Dennett‟s view) strongly relies. 
In a significant emancipation from environmentally-provoked, pro-creative activity 
humanity develops towards a new threshold of opportunity creation, securing the 
opportunity for more consciously and effectively deliberated investigation and possible 
invention, which in turn opens up further opportunity. Such development may be 
„indicated‟ through a manner of activity that is potentially both recreational (as connected 
with some personally sought recreation) and also re-creative (as developing from a fresh, 
mental processing of something already latent in our heritage or memory, but in a newly 
represented or abstracted form). In the second of these senses such is effectively a re-re-
representation, adding as it does at least one significant extra „layer‟ of analysis or 
evaluation to that re-representation endemic to our more basic, pro-creative capacity for 
mental conception. The re-creative is therefore a genre more concerned with hypothetical 
possibility and abstract thought experiment. 
A good case study for illustrating some of the characteristic features associated with this 
genre of creative activity is the invention of, and involvement in, the Game of Chess, taken 
here as consisting in a strategic emergence from of a set of arbitrarily defined, freely 
invented rules. This is chosen for four reasons: first, because it is helpfully analogous to 
the analytical emergence of, for example, various branches of mathematics, involving 
more formal, axiomatic, rule-based systems; second, because it is clearly not the product 
of any obvious or immediate sense of survival necessity, and in that sense becomes a 
recreational pursuit; third, because it is, in many ways, a re-creation of the already latently 
familiar concept of a battleground and of social relations within society‟s „army‟; and 
fourth, because I have over twenty years‟ active experience of tournament chess and 
consequently a relatively deep understanding of the mind of a chessplayer. 
Shenk provides a thorough examination of the importance of the game‟s history,588 asking 
what was instrumental in attaching this game to the continuing intrigue of the human mind 
over a 1,500 year period and noting not only the many historical examples of famous 
                                                             
588 D. Shenk, The Immortal Game: A History of Chess (London: Souvenir Press, 2008). 
232 
 
figures taking to and using chess in some way but also his sense of fascination for a game 
which  
…seemed to have been present in every place and time, and to have been utilized 
in every sort of activity. King‟s cajoled and threatened with it, philosophers told 
stories with it, poets analogized with it, moralists preached with it. Its origins are 
wrapped up in some of the earliest discussions of fate versus free will. It sparked 
and settled feuds, facilitated and sabotaged romances, and fertilized literature from 
Dante to Nabokov.
589
 
He describes how chess had appeared in many myths and fables told about a nation or 
society‟s past, and its prevalence in bringing abstract truths into a finite context of 
understanding that people could appreciate directly before their eyes.
590
 Chess had broken 
away from the previously fate-based aura suggested by the forerunning dice games, 
migrated along busy trading routes and found, at first, different forms of rules and 
different representations of pieces according to the nature of its interaction with different 
cultures and times.
591
 Such relative emancipation and cultural variegation, at least in the 
earlier stages of development, may be considered typical to this genre of creative activity.  
Its regional forms being both revitalized and reunited under the influence of various strong 
15
th
-16
th
 Century European queens, the full power and potential of what we now know as 
the modern game burst forth onto the world scene.
592
 Many master players developed, 
analysing through many games in search of the best means of evaluating or strategizing. 
This lead to a succession of schools of thought, from Count Philidor‟s pawn-structure 
centred strategy, through the Romantic emphasis on tactical combination and sacrificial 
attack, into Steinitz‟s more scientific approach, and then finally the seemingly radical, 
hypermodern conception of counterstrategy by Nimzowitsch and Réti. This is indeed 
comparable to paradigmatic shifts in other intellectual journeys through human history.  
The re-creative genre involves such open, more self-consciously creative engagement, the 
initial motivation for which may simply be some particular degree of intrigue, perhaps 
fuelled by competitive intent but increasingly explored for its own sake and for the benefit 
of gaining expertise within that avenue of exploration. Part of this intrigue lies in the 
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power of abstraction. Shenk notes that „we all take in a surprising amount of practical 
knowledge from abstraction: abstract reasoning, according to many experts, is what 
defines human intelligence. By removing ourselves from the morass of functional detail, 
we can isolate goals, tactics, strategies, patterns – meaning‟.593 It is not difficult to 
translate the abstracted prospect-refuge symbolism into terms relevant to this invention: 
„prospect‟ emerging through a combination of the spatial degree of freedom (defined by 
the board) and the combinatorial degree of freedom (allowed by the rules); „refuge‟ being 
definite knowledge of certain key concepts and variations, ones reaching decisive 
evaluation, established in the memory of the more advanced chessplayer. Any experienced 
chessplayer will be aware of the tension between these two aspects in working their way 
through the complications of any critical position that is new to them. 
The use of the Game of Chess as an analogy also requires appreciating the balance 
between the capacity of any individual player and the state of knowledge of the chess 
world as a whole at any one time – an awareness of some „chessic‟ tradition. As presented 
here, the re-creative genre inevitably involves some degree of involvement with already-
existing, communal knowledge. The individual chessplayer relies on the wealth of 
previous communal, officially-recorded chess experience for the formation, to take one 
key example, of a personal opening repertoire. Only a sound understanding thereof can 
afford the chessplayer a confident and reliable grounding for future participation in the 
Game of Chess in general. There is open potential for on-going invention, since an 
opening variation may selectively be studied purely for the sake of improving one‟s ability 
to play the game, any „freedom‟ to learn and to play chess well in practice being once 
again more a question of overall capacity than of abundance of choice. 
Any degree of freedom is defined according to its dependence upon some boundary or 
bounding structure. Freedom therefore presupposes conformity with certain enabling 
principles. Defined in its rules, and searched out in its more advisable and reliable 
strategies, chess is made what it is by the bounding limits of an eight-by-eight board.  The 
pieces and the rules governing them might need to be changed were officials to deem the 
current setup too constraining, replacing it instead by a ten-by-ten board, resulting in a 
fundamental shift in the chessplayer‟s „mindscape‟.  
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Only superficially black and white, chess has survived the test of time precisely because of 
its continuing greyness, lacking obvious transparency as to any one, definitive strategy. 
Emergence of any expertise or confidence in this genre of creative activity and pursuit is 
the result of many layers of work, building on previous representations (or iterations of 
representations). The word strategy, though deriving from the Greek word for a 
commander of an army, also interestingly suggests a possible connection with the idea of 
being stratified or layered. Just one letter different, strat-ergy, would imply „layered 
work‟. Strategic up-building – incorporating a particular degree of stability or reliability – 
is just as hierarchical (and arguably modular) over the course of our mental development 
as the evolving biological „strategy‟ undergirding the dynamic stability of the biosphere. 
Different „layers‟ correspond here to different, functionally accessible forms of response, 
awareness or understanding, the coherent integration of which then allows for an 
appreciation of some overall increase in our strategic capacity. 
Arriving cold to a particular position causes one to speculate how that position might have 
occurred. Only one variation has actually been played out, but there have been perhaps 
tens of others considered and, for whatever reason, rejected. One might compare this 
previous, unseen mental labour to the many layers on an artist‟s canvas or even to some 
benefit inherited from the labouring of previous generations as they adapted in accordance 
with the intellectual demands of their environment.
594
 This inter-generational transference 
constitutes an important reminder that the development of any indices of freedom through 
our re-creative activity is not divorced from pro-creative influence but supervenes in 
certain critical respects. 
Establishing a critical cooperation 
The chessboard defines a shared arena of spatial resource, outside of which no player can 
trespass. As a particular game unfolds, material imbalance can develop, often by deliberate 
design, and progressive assessment of the game‟s developments is critical. With high 
standard of play and evenly-matched opponents an interesting equilibrium may develop, 
allowing a strange sense of cooperation to develop amidst the competition. The deeper 
one‟s analytical awareness, the less likely one is to be a slave to an opponent‟s 
                                                             
594 With regard to our theological heritage in Scripture it is important to consider why various sorts of 
things were said and done by those who had grappled with trying to discern and respond to a theological 
context of challenge and encounter before us. See R. Williams, Being Christian: Baptism, Bible, Eucharist, 
Prayer (London: SPCK, 2014), pp.21-39. 
235 
 
unpredictability. When two strong players are sufficiently, mutually convinced of the 
correctness or criticality of a means of proceeding, even if still uncertain as to the final 
outcome, each may correctly predict the other‟s responses. An affirming co-operation may 
thus develop between them, each surreptitiously agreeing with the intuited thought-process 
of the other.  
Cooperation is deeply engrained in the symbiotic dynamics of evolutionary progression 
(chapter 1). The classical evolutionary question “whom does it benefit?” forces some 
consideration of how past heritage might prove relevant or adaptable to present context. 
One must reflect on precisely what is most responsibly to be deemed „beneficial‟ and 
„damaging‟ and why. Benefit and obstruction may change somewhat relative to 
environmental context, though limited in their overall divergence according to symbiotic 
communication and feedback. Most biologically beneficial and sustainable developments 
over time consist, as previously noted, in circumstantially convenient arrangements of 
various quasi-stable cycles and feedback mechanisms, which can on principle be broken 
and/or reconfigured by external or internal perturbation. Such a process of evolutionary 
formation clearly carries a relatively low predictability factor, and the extent to which we 
can potentially engineer our way around this limitation is a question connected with recent 
advances in Game Theory. 
The idea involves an evaluative engagement with strategic models and scenarios made 
purely for the sake of increasing our understanding concerning the manner in which the 
dynamics of living processes might work themselves out. This could be seen as a key 
point of entry into the appreciable emergence of a scientifically relevant, co-creative 
engagement, actively learning from natural strategy or process. Game Theory has been 
used, among other things, to study the evolution of co-operation within systems having 
lasting properties of biological emergence. Frank makes a good mathematical summary of 
the tense state of play between different dependents sharing a common resource or 
space,
595
 noting in particular the inevitability of having „conflict and cooperation in 
constant tension and never separable‟.596 Taylor and Nowak see cooperation as being as 
indispensable to evolutionary principle as mutation and selection, and analyse the 
parameters within which evolutionarily stable pay-off with respect to such cooperation 
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may theoretically occur, considering five separate model scenarios each pertaining to 
differing theories concerning the mechanisms of evolutionary development.
597
 It is shown 
that some sustained cooperation is theoretically possible in all cases, simply by modifying 
the underlying matrix dynamics. Maskin further allows for the event of mistakes being 
made in any playing strategy, leading to mutant strategies, and shows that living systems 
are, on principle, capable of sustaining themselves against such strategies.
598
 This relates 
to the concept of „structural stability‟ noted earlier. 
A key element of this analysis is that, even in the case of a very low probability that an 
environment might, mathematically-speaking, present for the emergent potential of any 
evolutionarily stable, cooperative dynamic, the tightness of the required parameters 
(involving a very specific and energetically costly use of available resources) is potentially 
offset by the magnitude of positive payback or benefit. Once such strategic stability is 
established and sustained within a particular environment the capacity for further 
development may become increasingly open. 
Game-theoretical consideration is normally based on the idea of some common resource 
being competed for, involving an interplay between competition and cooperation. In the 
holistic context of this thesis a common created „space‟ is instead being engaged with(in), 
involving two distinct idioms of engagement cooperating according to the complexly-
connected „topology‟ of such space. With this is mind, and before moving to consider the 
co-creative genre, it is worth briefly extending the chess example for the purposes of 
promoting this key concept of cooperation in a participatory framework, something which 
I believe constitutes an interesting analogy for theological consideration. 
The Game of Chess, participation and an eschatological analogy 
The Game of Chess, as an abstract whole, offers the possibility of an interesting analogy 
concerning eschatological consideration. There is a clear difference between the Game of 
Chess and a particular game of chess played out between two particular opponents and 
recordable for posterity, somehow „participating‟ in the allowance of the Game of Chess 
as a whole. There are two methods by which a beginner may, on principle, develop a 
working „opening repertoire‟ or increase his/her overall capacity, expertise or „freedom‟. 
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The ineffective method is to pick up the latest volume on opening theory and read it 
through, choosing only the most immediately pleasing parts. Inevitably, the variations 
with the most positive evaluations for White or Black after a certain number of moves will 
stem, over the course of the volume as a whole, from different move orders and opening 
systems that are incompatible with each other within the context of one, consistent 
repertoire. One is unable thereby to incorporate all the potential lines leading to the most 
positive evaluation for a particular side, especially if maintaining a consistent individual 
style.  
The effective method is to start playing plenty of games, getting a feel for how strategic 
awareness and tactical formation develops, recognizing certain common sequences and 
transposable orderings regarding various combinations of opening moves, and coming to 
find that style of approach with which one‟s developing understanding or intuition proves 
most naturally and psychologically congruent. In so doing, and in searching out 
intelligible patterns, the chessplayer may generate meaningful competence. At this point 
one may more profitably consult the openings manual and compare assessments of 
theoretical status on the part of masters both past and contemporary. 
 
One might compare this means of repertoire formation, through which one may 
strategically and creatively develop, to that of becoming initiated into an appreciation of 
sacramental participation. Such initiation is likewise most effectively achieved through 
active involvement and in conjunction with the communal heritage lying behind our 
creative activity, according to our idiomatic means of generating meaning through our 
search for consistent forms of intelligibility. However, there is also something beyond this. 
Evidence from the very top chessplayers indicates that, eventually, an advanced chess-
playing mind becomes sufficiently cognisant with the contours of the Game as a whole 
that, increasingly, such cognisance becomes demonstrated relatively independently of any 
one fixed, personal style, incorporating a far wider potential repertoire. The theological 
analogy here might be of an advanced, cooperating participation beginning to recognise 
with greater assurance, though not idolatrous familiarity, some aspect of that which 
transcends and grounds our sacramental participation – a recognition pertaining to some 
eschatological aspect, prospect or hope. Those „contours‟ with and according to which the 
master chessplayer becomes sufficiently cognisant could then be compared with the 
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aforementioned economic „trajectory‟ being settled in a context in which it is at least 
partially recognizable on the „side‟ of human intelligence. 
The direct analogy of the eschaton, in the chess example, would perhaps be the suggestion 
of the „perfect game‟ – in which any „perfection‟ is demonstrated throughout the entirety 
of the game in question and from both sides. This hypothetical concept of the perfect game 
mediates between the notion of the Game of Chess as an abstract, conceptual whole and 
the many possibilities for particular games that could be played out in practice, involving a 
conceptual topology of interconnectedness over the various possible subsets of such 
games. Any reasonably and responsibly attempted evaluation or „recognition‟ of such a 
hypothetical game would therefore be inseparable from participative involvement in, and 
memorable experience of, the Game as a whole, and according to the intelligible principles 
involved.  
One must, however, be healthily sceptical as to what basis might exist for even 
contemplating the existence of such a perfect game. On what exterior, communally agreed 
standard of evaluation would such an ascription of „perfection‟ be based? What basis do 
we have for contemplating the notion of an eschaton with genuine intellectual integrity? I 
think the chess analogy is helpful here. Working for the moment on the assumption that 
„the perfect game‟ could on principle exist, discerning the critical property (or properties) 
of such would then be inseparable from a proper consideration of what general principles 
would need to play a part in weighting any evaluative criteria – criteria requiring 
communal acceptance at the appropriate level. There is an intuitive connection here with 
Lonergan‟s note (chapter 3) concerning „sapiential knowledge‟ as properly considering the 
ordering of the whole, an inseparable question then being what „primitive terms‟ are 
required in order to define those necessary principles whose interrelation indicates or 
truthfully corresponds to such ordering, or in order to stipulate the relevant, contingent 
truths involved in any proper consideration of the whole. 
Furthermore, if the „perfection‟ necessarily corresponds to some dynamic entirety – 
accommodating everything, from both sides, contributing to its justification given the 
entire collective memory and recorded experience of the chess world‟s expertise or 
tradition – then such an attribution would refer to a game that somehow demonstrated, in 
proper balance, all the epitomizing features/principles potential to the Game as a whole. 
The activity of playing out such a game would then consist in „participating‟, in the fullest 
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and deepest possible manner, according to the proper interrelatedness among all its truth-
indicating principles. As argued earlier, the concept of „design‟ is seen most properly 
throughout such dynamic entirety, something that (as in the chess example) is ultimately 
demonstrated through the establishing and/or discerning of some optimal, enveloping 
„strategy‟ in accordance with an idiomatic engagement over time. Theologically the 
„establishing‟ may be considered as occurring on divine initiative while the „discerning‟ is 
open to the secondary, conditioned initiative of humanity, ultimately involving a bi-
idiomatic unity of cooperation. 
The chess-playing community is actively involved in searching out the various, relative 
truths somehow contained in the Game of Chess as a whole but only intelligible through 
the practice of playing out particular games. Such involvement, especially concerning the 
development of evaluative criteria, is important to recognize with respect to the argument 
here concerning the contributory potential of the human idiom and its prospective 
eschatological significance. It is precisely through such formation, involving the imparting 
of certain information, that the community becomes better equipped to consider any 
prospective criteria according to which even the hypothetical concept of some „perfect 
game‟ might realistically be considered. The ecclesiastical counterpart to this would be the 
necessary contingency of our eschatological discernment upon some developing, 
participate involvement – something healthily iconic rather than presumptuously 
idolatrous.  
A final analogy can then be made between the „created space‟ and the medium in/through 
which particular games (literally or hypothetically) may be played out and formally 
recorded. Uncreated “Space” would then correspond, on principle, to the source of the 
conception of the Game of Chess as a whole, not in itself contingent on anything that 
might emerge from the chess-playing community‟s subsequent involvement, being 
transcendent to any one possible game but still immanent to the potential for any such 
game to become actualized. The connectedness between the two, dynamically represented 
here through the „mediated immediacy‟599 of the (hypothetical) „perfect game‟, then 
logically correlates with the topologically central and sacramentally pervasive „place‟ of 
the (hypostasizing) Logos in the theological context, fully communicating between 
Uncreated and created.  
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In summary, if even considering the hypothesis of some „perfect game‟ necessarily 
involves acknowledging (a) some oppositional „tension‟ owing to a double-edged two-
sidedness, (b) the potential for cooperative emergence amidst any apparent „competition‟, 
(c) that design or artistic quality is something most properly discerned or interpreted over 
some dynamic entirety, and (d) the importance of a proper awareness of some tradition of 
past participation, then the analogy seems apposite to a theological context and might 
suggest something quite profound. One question, of course, would be whether to interpret 
any „oppositional tension‟, in the divine-human context, principally as a product of some 
fallen-ness or more simply in the sense of an inevitable „otherness‟ by which each nature 
maintains its own distinct integrity. The latter of these options arguably relates more 
efficiently to the suggested working definition of sacramentality, especially in a 
Christological context. Any idea of „competition‟ would likewise need redefining or 
circumventing, achievable through the principle of concurrence. It is also noteworthy that 
at no point in this discussion has it proved necessary to speculate concerning the static, 
quantitative aspect of any final outcome – whether the „perfect game‟ would end in a 
victory for one side or a draw. Fittingly, the Christological context could well be 
considered to stand theologically for a mutual victory achieved through proper divine-
human union.  
Theological context is also concerned, however, with the active revelation of that 
according to which the „bi-idiomatic co-operation‟ under consideration is made manifest. 
Such actively concerned engagement with that which may be considered „revealed‟ brings 
us naturally to consider the transition into the co-creative genre of our activity.   
The co-creative genre: searching for a „maximum‟ in creative potential 
The above analogy suggests a possible correlation between something humanly created 
and something creatively revealed to humanity. This possibility forms the kernel of what 
is here expressed as the co-creative genre, focussing on an active, co-operational and 
contributory participation, having potential eschatological relevance. This genre of activity 
has before it the hypothetical possibility of a „maximum‟ in our creative potential. In as far 
as this may be of more strictly scientific relevance, genuine progression involves an 
evolving process of optimization concerning our means of response to environmental 
challenge, based on previously accumulated expertise and on an informed intuition 
regarding where best to focus attention for the increase or application of such expertise. 
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Our co-creative engagement may seek this hypothetical „maximum‟ in order for our 
creative activity to achieve greater practical significance, both beyond those considerations 
pertaining to more immediate survival and beyond any perspective on our „environment‟ 
that risks relative self-isolation over deeper, more authentic belonging and the potential for 
some higher cooperation. This is where theological consideration concerning the 
suggested „bi-idiomatic co-operation‟ becomes especially important. Co-creativity, 
imbued in this case with a theological dimension, involves searching for this „maximum‟ 
in our overall, iconic potential, properly engaging with contemporary scientific 
ressourcement regarding what this might most responsibly involve and how it might be 
stably sustainable. We may thus discern more fully our proper topos as co-operating with 
that Creative Activity inseparably associated with the harmonizing Logos. 
This clearly requires communal cooperation, involving some responsible assessment 
regarding where best to focus our resources and concentration in order to discern the best 
direction(s) in which to progress. This „maximum‟ remains hypothetical in the sense that 
we have no definitive criteria for assessing when or how we might reach such a point (not 
dissimilarly to the aforementioned „perfect game‟). However, the active, creative process 
of searching and researching remains inseparable from our potential for, and calling 
towards, such necessary cooperation. Our capacity for such co-operation will inevitably 
co-evolve with our means of searching out, making sense over time. 
Some sense of co-operation with our natural, physical environment clearly accompanies 
an emergence from the pro-creative into the re-creative. Such is not therefore the sole 
feature distinguishing our co-creative genre of activity. The term „co-creation‟ is taken 
here, particularly in its prospective scientific relevance, to imply an actively and 
communally deliberated initiative of engagement in responding to what we learn about our 
environment, consciously and positively engineering the manner of our participation 
therein as part of our calling and responsibility. It is more than simply some double 
negative of “not interfering”, as if our way of being would then somehow automatically 
resonate with the natural world.
600
 We must actively respond, for instance, to the 
knowledge we have of the dynamic of the biosphere and the part we take in it. 
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The „cosmic‟ relevance of this is then highlighted by the fact that the natural limits to the 
scope of our mental „terrain‟ and „territory‟ alike are laid down by the extent, structure and 
topology of the cosmos as a whole. Our co-creative capacity and endeavour, becoming 
more aware of the nature and scope of these bounding factors, could therefore be said to 
seek to establish, or otherwise occupy, a deeper and more intrinsically stable niche. This 
concept is amplified in its significance by virtue of our iconic capacity to conceive of a 
higher sense of environing (and freedom therein). Progression through the component 
genres as suggested here drives our creative activity towards a more deeply integrated 
appreciation of a critical stability that is both theologically and scientifically relevant.  
There are obviously both important theological and scientific considerations concerning 
how such a „niche‟ is to be interpreted or sought out. Scientifically, we might apply the 
compact, conceptual interconnectedness of our developing expertise to a consideration of 
the potential cosmic significance of our topos (see below). Both scientifically and 
theologically we may search for the discernible effects of the „motioning‟ of the divine 
Economy in Creation. 
The co-creative in physical practice 
I used the phrase „searching for a maximum in creative potential‟ in the title to the 
previous section quite deliberately, since to find a maximum, mathematically-speaking, 
requires some differentiating operation. This fits quite suitably with a creation whose order 
is diversified and whose „space‟ is differentiable. We may turn to science‟s prolific ability 
to analyse and evaluate various aspects of our environment through some form of 
differential analysis in order to begin to appreciate how its contribution to our co-creative 
potential might work out in practice.      
Given the chess analogy, consider an extension to computer chess programs. The point 
behind programming a chess computer is to enable its distinct means of processing to co-
create solutions to the demands of analysis in a way that may be compared to, and 
contrasted with, the specifically human ability to play the game. In a sense, one invention 
(the computer) is being superimposed upon another (chess). Walls has studied the 
possibility of various human conceptions, referred to as „beauty heuristics‟, being used to 
enhance the analytically brute-force heuristics mostly used by computer programs, 
demonstrating that, in comparison with a program of standard heuristics, a „beauty 
heuristic‟ enhanced program could be operated to achieve, on average, a 25% increase in 
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analytical speed and a 33% reduction in the number of nodes evaluated for a given 
position.
601
 
There is an engagement here between two distinct means of analysing, one „natural‟ and 
one „artificial‟. Now consider the case in which the operation of the computer program is 
combined not with the arbitrary invention of the Game of Chess, but rather with our 
knowledge of, and cooperative engagement with, our environment. This is purview of the 
area known as Digital Biology. Bentley, a pioneer in this field, examines the idea of using 
our knowledge of the strategies found in nature to enhance both what our computers can 
do and what they might in turn tell us about the potential of the natural world. One could 
potentially find some optimum from a series of hypothetical, self-organizing possibilities 
by means of a computer analysis enhanced by principles gleaned from the study of 
strategies employed in naturally evolving systems.
602
 
The advantage of the natural archetype in question is that many components may interact 
with each other on different levels, while „digital universes‟ are held separate by the 
demands of having one set of rules per program. Bentley uses the term „universe‟, as 
applying digitally, to indicate that which „is made from a set of rules that define outcomes 
[and in which] at least one of the rules must be defined in terms of another universe. This 
two part definition acts as a key that opens the door to other universes‟.603 A digital 
„universe‟ may then expand through inputs from other digital universes. Not entirely 
dissimilarly, the human mind is most creative when it most openly draws upon things 
from outside a set of parameters confined to one particular context of focus. 
The possibility of relating the lessons emerging from our epistemological involvement 
with the natural world to some enhanced algorithmic potential provides a helpful insight 
for any communally deliberated program of co-creative engagement within the scientific 
community. The potential for enhancing computer-processing power through 
programming techniques more in tune with a natural simulation of the processes of our 
physical environment is perhaps one key step towards realizing another threshold moment 
in Big History. The inner principles of life‟s natural environment are opened up within 
digital space, while calculations in digital space may be reapplied to interpreting, perhaps 
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even actively engineering, some means of optimization regarding environmental potential. 
We could, on principle, digitally evolve forms of solution to problems that would 
otherwise remain beyond us. 
This area is strongly related to the recently flourishing conception of bio-mimetics after the 
pioneering work of Benyus,
604
 looking to learn from nature as to the best ways to grow 
food, cure disease, store information and harness energy (to name but a few key 
examples). Patek has described a means of bringing bio-mimetics into a quantitative 
analysis within an evolutionary framework,
605
 while Snell-Rood has illuminated the far 
broader canvas offered by the evidences of biodiversity than current engineering focus is 
necessarily embracing.
606
 Scobey-Thal also offers a brief, concise summary of the timeline 
of biomimetic development.
607
 
A sense of idiomatic progress: developing through the genres 
In the transition from the pro-creative to the re-creative, the obvious effecting feature 
came through emancipation from immediate survival necessity, accompanied by a more 
flexible, epistemological capacity concerning the manner in which things could be 
„handed on‟. Our situation gradually emancipated itself from the heavily-conditioned, 
largely forced interplay between conscious life and its environment, developing an 
increasing capacity actively to influence the manner in which any intellectual legacy 
inherited from our ancestors might subsequently become co-opted to serve a somewhat 
different function than that according to which such legacy was originally fostered. Both 
genres are still active in their influence, however, necessarily co-existing in an abstract, 
conceptually creative „symbiosis‟. 
In the transition from the re-creative to the co-creative, our control over such mental 
legacy becomes increasingly efficacious and focused. Our sense of mental prospect 
continues to derive from our prospective appreciation of what the potential outcome or 
„content‟ of our creative engagement might involve, but this appreciation (including our 
predictive ability) is now increasingly informed by the results of our active discernment of 
natural process. In tandem, our sense of mental refuge correlates with the increased 
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reliability and stability of those more rigorously formalised structures of reasoning or 
understanding coming more appreciably to inform, or even constitute, our modus operandi 
over time, both enabling and „buffering‟ our evaluative and analytical capacity. 
Any development of our idiomatic engagement within created space demands some 
reorientation of human nature towards a higher appreciation of physical „environment‟ or 
theological „environing‟, affording us a deeper and theologically more meaningful sense 
of „proximity‟. The participative model advocated here further accommodates the potential 
for active cooperation with divinity. Considering the Incarnation it can equally be seen 
that divine engagement therein relates to all three of the genres. Our pro-creative activity 
is engaged with in order to prepare the way for the conception and birth of divinity within 
humanity, something one might compare to St Paul‟s elegant description of the creation 
waiting „with eager longing for the revealing of the children of God‟ (Romans 8:19). Our 
re-creative activity, a deeper capacity involving our more abstract, conceptual means of 
searching, processing and, for that matter, theologizing, and fostering our iconic ability to 
conceive something of the Logos, is „drawn into‟ the Creative Activity of the Incarnate 
Logos, transforming the „place‟ represented by the significance of the Temple and 
effecting a Jubilee-like liberation, a theological emancipation into a re-creation „set free 
from its bondage to decay‟ (Romans 8:21). Our co-creative activity is then ultimately 
established as having eternal significance and eschatological stability. It is the genre of 
activity according to which the aforementioned „developing stability‟ is most obviously 
engaged with through direct, active cooperation. Divine initiative ontologically attains and 
maintains the active incorporation of a fully cooperative human nature in Christ, 
developing according to our idiomatic engagement and completed according to that of 
divinity. 
The „Mind of Christ‟ then represents the most theologically responsible means of 
integrating divine and human idioms of creative self-consciousness and self-conscious 
creativity. Self-consciousness is immutable and intrinsically creative in and of itself on the 
„side‟ of divinity, while on the „side‟ of humanity it evolves or develops according to an 
engaging creative process and means of discernment. The idea of human mindedness 
being treated as some collective property is not new. Dennis looks back to older traditions 
of spiritual belief by which human beings were considered united to each other‟s thoughts, 
in perfect tune with the mysterious motions of the universe, while noting that  
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Breaking out of our many and varied social conditionings requires that a whole 
new system of perception be brought into being. It calls for mental, emotional, and 
energetic reserves of concentration that can replace a person‟s old conditioned 
terms of reference for new terms of reference…608 
Here such „replacement‟ (a term etymologically fitting to a consideration of topos) could 
be related theologically to the recapitulation of human nature, and the reordering of 
Creation as a whole, through the Incarnation. The necessary „reserves of concentration‟ 
could equally be considered in terms of a gifted prayerfulness inasmuch as it allows for the 
maintenance of a functional liturgical space, involving the collective „work‟ of a species 
whose nature has been assumed, sanctified and eschatologically-established. This 
liturgical aspect also relates to the question of our Eucharistic activity.  
Eucharistic significance 
The history of Eucharistic development and interpretation as liturgical practice is 
thoroughly charted by Dix,
609
 but I would like to suggest a complementary means by 
which we might come to appreciate our Eucharistic involvement from a contemporary, 
cosmic perspective, and in terms of the genres of creative activity proposed above. 
Eucharistic context requires some appreciation of what precisely it is that we are 
purporting to „offer‟ through our liturgical involvement. Communally-speaking, I would 
like to suggest the offering of precisely the unique distinctiveness of our collective idiom 
of engagement, an offering „sanctified‟ in the Incarnation.  
Our unique capacity to consider our topos in terms of a communal sense of embodiment 
and connectedness is highly significant. Our humanity is only engaged in its entirety if the 
totality of our communally-embodied capacity is ultimately invoked. The roots of our 
collective striving are aptly represented in the gathering and grinding together of grain and 
grape as a basis for the offered Eucharistic gifts. In one sense such „work‟ precedes the 
critical transition point in the Eucharistic unfolding; in another sense it is assumed as part 
of the liturgical process. A distinct mark of human nature upon our Eucharistic offering is 
symbolically imposed in the process of transition from grain/grape to bread/wine; while 
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that transfiguration from bread/wine to the Body/Blood of Christ is clearly representative 
of the divine idiom of engagement, manifest through the Incarnation.  
Given the above, the manifestly Christological context of the Eucharist is one in which 
each of the genres of our creative activity acquires, I think, particular liturgical 
significance as pertaining to the „work of the people‟.  
1. Our pro-creative activity (literal and metaphorical) relates to the laborious 
involvement of human toil, necessary for survival and growth, a critical product of 
which is represented in the offerings of grain and grape presented by the people at 
the altar.  
2. Our re-creative activity relates to that ordering and reordering, patterning and re-
patterning according to which our communal search for stable intelligibility 
generates distinct meaning and significance, something we wish to hand on and 
have remembered by our progeny, instigating a developing process of 
emancipation. The significance of the Incarnate Logos drawing all things to 
Himself then in turn affords us a theological emancipation, something now to be 
honoured „in remembrance‟ of Him. Furthermore, an authentic context for human 
completion is demonstrated in Christ‟s Passion and declared in those immortal 
words „it is finished‟ (John 19:30). As a fulfilment of the seemingly paradoxical 
divine „rest‟ the possibility is open for our humanity to be fully (re)accommodated 
in/as the Body of Christ, bringing in a new creation. The double association 
between re-creation and recreation can therefore in a sense be applied to divine 
engagement in the Eucharistic context – a new creation being effected in 
conjunction with a fulfilment of divine „rest‟ in Christ. 
3. Our co-creative activity then relates to the relevance of our grain/grape offering 
being trans-figuratively taken up (or elevated) as an acceptable „flock offering‟ 
through the Lamb of God (cf. Genesis 4:2-5 and Hebrews 12:24). This happens, in 
the Eucharistic context, through the activity of consecration – a liturgically 
creative activity in which humanity, through/as some ordained membership, co-
creatively participates and co-operates. As such cooperation is enabled from the 
„side‟ of divinity we do not have any direct, epistemological understanding 
concerning any consecratory „mechanism‟, but we should not deny the ontological 
dimension of such in our Eucharistic theology, since such denial would effectively 
forsake this critical accommodation of active, co-creative participation. This seems 
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consonant with a proper view of consecration which Fagerberg notes, in reference 
to the theology of Paul VI, as not implying some exclusive divine reservation away 
from the „profane‟. He summarizes this as meaning that „to consecrate the world is 
to re-establish it in its proper relationship to God‟.610 This is precisely the 
theological goal of our co-creative activity – a full and proper incorporation of the 
bi-idiomatic cooperation between divinity and humanity. 
4. Finally, eschatological relevance is „motioned‟ towards, in the Eucharistic context, 
by the act of consumption or communication, anticipating an opening beyond „the 
veil that is the flesh‟ in accordance with the suggested topology. Furthermore, 
Christ‟s establishment „at the right hand of the Father‟ allows humanity to „draw 
near to the sacred mysteries‟ in the topological sense of „nearness‟. 
This layout is complementary to other Eucharistic viewpoints. Firstly, it is relevant to the 
idea our „motioning‟ coming to dynamic, eschatological „rest‟ in Christ. Secondly, the 
importance placed on how things may be passed on or „remembered‟ may relate to 
Mayne‟s suggestion that the act of Eucharistic re-membering is just as much in opposition 
to dis-membering as to any sense of forgetting.
611
 In the Passion such dis-membering is 
represented in terms of the violent assault on the Body and the scattering of the disciples. 
In the same context the penitent crucified next to Christ asks to be „remembered‟ when 
Christ comes into His Kingdom, ultimately re-membering created space/order by drawing 
all things to Himself. To be co-creative in a Eucharistic sense then involves some share in 
this re-membering activity. 
Thirdly, there is the importance of the categorical uniqueness of the (re-membering) Mind 
of Christ. This relates to Williams‟ suggestion that our communion is one of a mutually 
recognized aloneness. Christ, as the Incarnation of Absolute Truth, becomes the archetype 
of a unique „aloneness‟, being deserted in a manner totally unique to the theological 
context of the Passion.
612
 While being the Incarnate Logos, referred to in John‟s Gospel as 
„the way and the truth and the life‟, guaranteed perfect communion within the Trinity, it 
also determined a critical distinction from us, especially in the power to lay down life and 
                                                             
610 D. W. Fagerberg, Consecrating the World: On Mundane Liturgical Theology (Kettering: Angelico Press, 
2016), p.3. 
611 M. Mayne, Pray, Love, Remember (London: DLT, 1999), p.128. 
612 Williams, Open to Judgement, pp.143-149. 
249 
 
take it up again. As Williams remarks, „the solitude of Our Lord and God, by some great 
divine comic dénouement, [is] made into the means of our communion‟.613 
The „point‟ of focus to which this critically irreducible „singularity‟ draws our attention is 
an eschatological pointedness, and something ought finally to be said regarding the 
manner in which we might consider our embodied activity as being drawn towards/into 
this „pointedness‟ in terms relevant to scientific engagement. 
Considering an „Omega Point‟ 
Despite opposition and scepticism among his contemporaries, Teilhard de Chardin‟s 
evolutionary insight
614
 was in a sense ahead of its time. Even if some aspects of his 
language need revising in the wake of subsequent scientific advance, other aspects are 
remarkably pre-emptive. He looks to the origin and totality of cosmic „stuff‟ – something 
he sees in different ways as a „system‟, a „totum‟ and a „quantum‟ – and considers, in 
agreement with what was said in chapter 3, that „order and design do not appear except in 
the whole. The mesh of the universe is the universe itself‟.615 Within the expansion of the 
cosmic framework he considers domains of stability as a combination of top-down and 
bottom-up influences and seems in many respects to foresee later developments 
concerning the significance of emergent, nested, modulated hierarchies pervading nature‟s 
ability to transition between various operative domains, and the necessary interaction 
between various geospheres for this to be possible.
616
 
He uses some familiar vocabulary, including terms like „fibres‟, „bundles‟, „layers‟ and 
„levels‟ and refers to the „exhaustion‟ of various energetic processes of organization on 
certain scales as therefore requiring an openness to new domains of organization on other 
scales. However, he also coins some rather idiosyncratic terminology, such as cooperating 
„liberties‟617 (in place of evolving freedom) and his famous presentation of energy in terms 
of „tangential‟ and „radial‟ components. Ultimately, consciousness is the focal point of his 
attention, developing, for him, by virtue of properties concerning conformation, curvature 
and relative closure, generating the required complexity of interaction across various semi-
permeable boundaries. Accordingly, the „without‟ aspect of things, more directly 
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accessible to physical science, nurtures a gradual increase in richness regarding the 
„within‟, again providing a critical context of stability.  
His vocabulary remains, to an extent, of significance to this thesis. I have suggested 
considering „strategy‟ as a dynamic accumulating over some „layered work‟. As well as 
thinking very much in terms of such „layers‟, Teilhard de Chardin notes that „the 
organism…is able to find room inside itself to lodge the countless mechanisms added 
successively [italics Teilhard] in the course of its differentiation‟.618 The development of 
any phylogenetic line is ultimately successful if it has been able to build successively on 
that already laid down by previous adaptation and/or innovative rearrangement. This goes 
hand-in-hand with the „layered work‟ of enduring, biologically „strategic‟ development, 
also requiring some capacity for self-attenuation in order to maintain the required degree 
of compactness. Teilhard seeks to find in this developmental process 
…the particular coefficient which empirically expresses the relationship between 
the radial and tangential energies of the world in the course of their respective 
developments…Obviously [this pertains to] arrangement [italics Teilhard], the 
arrangement whose successive advances are inwardly reinforced…by a continual 
expansion and deepening of consciousness.
619
  
This reinforces the idea of a dynamic architecture and an arrangement ordered in 
conjunction with many competing influences, including energy and information 
requirements. The critical „concentration‟ of consciousness, his main theme, is measured 
against a point of „paroxysm‟,620 whereby particular manifestations of „consciousness‟ 
(through the progressive incorporation of what we might now think of as innate, fixed 
action potentials) become solidified in a manner making them more functionally adept but 
potentially inhibiting further internal expansion and flexibility, owing principally to a lack 
of available volume. The „particular coefficient‟, which in this case indicates the degree of 
internal flexibility pertaining to the „arrangement‟ in question, therefore has different 
manifestations in different organisms. In this respect, Teilhard‟s approach seems to 
connect the aforementioned (and, in historical terms, subsequent) insights of Polanyi and 
Llinás. Primates come to present the correct conditions for the critically required 
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„concentration‟ at which Teilhard considers that „thought is born‟.621 Fittingly, given the 
language used here, he sees the ascent of consciousness through such transitional 
development as being a „movement of movements‟.622 
Thought then further concentrates itself through reflective capacity, effecting „noogenesis‟ 
and the emergence of the „noosphere‟. This is where the above genres find particular 
relevance, by providing a means of considering the „layered‟ development of the 
noosphere. Teilhard uses the term „groping‟, interpreted as some „directed chance‟,623 to 
refer to what is here expressed as the pro-creative struggle for the more basic sustainability 
of a living niche or domain. Not dissimilarly to the above mention of „stumbling‟ 
happenstance, this „groping‟ takes us across a critical threshold into „reflective‟ thought. 
Society then develops beyond such „groping‟ and into higher forms of „invention‟.624 This 
is where the re-creative genre emerges, producing some mental expansion in connection 
with such reflective capacity. It is also where we become capable of appreciating the 
concept of the sacramental, as here understood in terms of enhanced representation. 
For Teilhard the biggest and most enduring imprint of evolutionary heritage can be found 
in the crystallization of various „maxima‟ that have proved able to accumulate an 
evolutionarily critical „mass‟ within what he sees as variously discernible „fans‟ in the 
development of phenotypic lineages. Somewhat analogously, having accumulated a 
critical intellectual „mass‟ or „volume‟ (recalling the phase space analogy), our co-creative 
activity could then be thought of as a freedom indicated by our capacity to search for a 
hypothetical „maximum‟ regarding the development of the noosphere. Teilhard expresses 
such a maximum in terms of a hypothetical Omega Point. A critical component of this 
„concentration of consciousness‟ is a re-evaluation of that to which we consider the 
dynamic of our nature to be „proximate‟.625 Trajectories in the development of the 
biosphere that might otherwise simply diverge can converge in a closed noosphere owing 
to the „effect of reflection and the recoils it involves‟.626 
To Teilhard, this critical concentration also relates to the concept of Personhood. He 
considers a connectedness through some „hyper-personal‟ dynamic, „beyond the 
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collective‟ and according to which closedness and centredness become critical properties. 
To use Teilhard‟s own words one final time, the idea is that 
…by structure, the noosphere (and more generally the world) represent a whole 
that is not only closed but also centred. Because it contains and engenders 
consciousness, space-time is necessarily of a convergent nature [italics Teilhard]. 
Accordingly its enormous layers, followed in the right direction, must somewhere 
ahead become involuted to a point which we might call Omega, which fuses and 
consumes them integrally in itself.
627
 
In the vocabulary of this thesis, however, any such „centredness‟ is regarded in terms of 
topological irreducibility and an associated stability. Such stability in turn provides a basis 
for interconnectedness and longer-range communicability. As iconic image-bearers (an 
„image‟ attaining its greatest efficacy when considered as a collectively bestowed 
property, reincorporated and perfected in Christ) with a focused, compact mode of 
concentration we may be afforded some critical appreciation of the immanence of that to 
which we are, in theological terms, most genuinely „proximate‟. This critical, iconic 
capacity for being able to appreciate some deeper sense of immanence connects with that 
which is transcendent, transcendence and immanence being intricately connected 
concepts. 
The topology of the framework towards which Teilhard motions would certainly benefit 
from being made more explicit. For all his well-intentioned enthusiasm and advanced 
insight, he is arguably a little too eager for the material world to conform to a certain 
poetic elegance.
628
 Some of his metaphors are used in a manner too far removed from 
actual scientific context, including his apparent determination to view evolution in smooth, 
geometrically progressive terms. The unity of the Omega Point is represented as a higher 
„paroxysm‟629 towards which the concentration of a collective consciousness is 
convergent. In one respect this concludes quite lucidly his previous use of language, but 
beyond this the presentation becomes somewhat tenuous and sentimental, arguably 
contorted in order to preserve the conceptual coherence of individuality. Part of the 
difficulty derives perhaps from his not being particularly specific in distinguishing divine 
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Personhood. The theology becomes disappointing in comparison to the in many respects 
highly insightful scientific build-up. 
Tipler developed the Omega Point theory,
630
 and as a professional cosmologist he made 
the physical inclusivity that is ultimately important to Teilhard‟s conception more robustly 
apparent, also making more specific, mathematical appeal to topological properties 
concerning the cosmos. Irrespective of what one may make of his suggestion on a practical 
level, his conceptual impact should not be underestimated. Tipler‟s original vision went all 
the way to the aforementioned „natural limit‟ concerning the potential for conscious 
exploration of the cosmos: namely, the case in which such a living engagement 
incorporates the entirety of cosmic interconnectedness. As he had already looked, with 
Barrow, at such contingent interconnectedness with respect to our physical origins, it was 
logical for him to try to extend such consideration to futurity.  
While I am cautious of Tipler‟s effectively materialistic identification between „God‟ and 
some Omega Point singularity, there is something in his underlying motivation that is 
appealingly reasonable. His determination to involve all of space-time in the outworking 
of any co-creative participation is especially striking, provoking profitable questions 
concerning our capacity for such involvement up to whatever its realistic limit might be. 
This motivation remains of interest here, accepting that empirical justification proves, as 
Tipler later acknowledged, somewhat wanting. 
He was clearly convinced that Judaeo-Christianity constituted a differently informed way 
of regarding physics and its future projection. He presents theology in terms that he 
considers relevant to empirical science,
631
and his earlier work formed a framework in 
which 
1. There is a counteraction, or potential cancellation, between unconscious, residual 
cosmic chaos and conscious, intelligently engineered chaos. 
2. The mind/soul is seen as a program run on a brain/computer in a body/machine, a 
concept that is extended to some „spiritual body‟, seen as the current body at 
„enhanced implementation‟. 
3. The cosmos is seen as possessing an indefinite capacity for supporting life. 
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 F. Tipler, The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead (New 
York: Doubleday, 1994) 
631 F. Tipler, The Physics of Christianity (New York: Doubleday, 2007), pp.1-6. 
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4. A future tense translation of “I AM that/what I AM” is taken, as per Luther, as “I 
WILL BE what I WILL BE” (Exodus 3:14) in support of the Omega Point theory. 
5. Theology is taken to be equivalent to physical cosmology combined with an 
assumption of overall immortality of life. 
6. Ultimately a closed, re-collapsing universe is assumed, couched within a multi-
verse reality.
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Tipler acknowledges that this framework makes no systematic appeal to revelation, 
proceeding instead to defend the scientific credibility of future technological advance 
giving us the means to colonize other areas of the galaxy, and ultimately perhaps wider 
reaches of the cosmos, before any cosmic contraction phase commences.
633
 He 
hypothesizes a combination of natural changes in the material structures of the cosmos 
during this time and the possibility of intelligently engineered influence upon the way in 
which it collapses along different directions. The theory, of course, still rested on the 
question concerning the ultimate fate of the universe.  
Arguably Tipler‟s cosmic viewpoint represents something rather more like a „universe‟ in 
the digitally-modelled sense of the term given by Bentley. The actual content of his 
suggestion, involving some pre-programmed colonization strategy, may inevitably 
develop into some post-human vision, which Teilhard seems more eager to avoid. The 
idea that each individual human cell may be said to contain the genetic information for the 
entire organism seems to be extended to an idea that each individual life-form ultimately 
knows everything that all others know, such that any cosmic strategy eventually becomes a 
perfectly worked out teamwork, a superlatively strong condition of universal mindedness.  
While this has potential theological resonance, it is (in Tipler‟s materialistic terms) far 
from obviously feasible or realistic, given the wake of  an evolutionary history known to 
be chaotic and unpredictable, messy and circumstantial, involving the chance-necessity 
interplay evident in an extinction-punctuated, biological history of interaction within a 
changing environment. Even active engineering would surely have an implausibly large 
challenge overcoming this, and evolution would indeed need to be almost entirely 
engineered in Tipler‟s system. It is, in the end, as united an effort as is possible now which 
would be necessary for empowering even the genesis of such a venture. Although moving 
                                                             
632 Tipler, The Physics of Immortality, pp.ix-xii and pp.1-17. 
633 Ibid, especially chapter 2. 
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beyond our present frontiers is very probably possible, and even necessary in certain 
respects,
634
 human expansion and engineering will not suddenly become sufficiently 
predictable in its impact or its sustainability just because technology may bring it within 
certain practical bounds of long-term possibility and cost-effective vision.  
Post-human development (not the focus here) would be the only obvious way of 
controlling or redefining evolvability in any longer-term manner. Furthermore, Tipler‟s 
original requirement of a closed, Big Crunch scenario was called into significant doubt by 
subsequent discovery of the accelerating expansion of the Universe. There is also an 
inherently pantheistic convergence upon a material Omega Point implied in his 
description. In his closed-universe model, any notion of faith is replaced with that of logic 
and reasoning, through an appeal to overall statistical likelihood. Holistic, statistical 
„necessity‟ is then ultimately treated according to quantum physics – some cosmic 
wavefunction that Tipler analogizes (if not even actively identifies) with the Holy Spirit, 
and even then his viewpoint is certainly not explicitly Trinitarian. 
He rightly advocates, in his own language, the important potential for active contribution 
on the part of self-organizing life, although the overall form of „enhanced operation‟ 
remains decidedly post-human. His Omega Point is focused, occurring on the boundary of 
all time, with any sense of „flow‟ being bypassed by the quantum treatment inherent to his 
approach. Life is defined in terms of information processing,
635
 together with the 
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 Difficulty in conceiving an Omega Point does not in itself mean that an extra-terrestrial expansion of 
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635 Russell, Time in Eternity, p.63, notes Dyson’s application of a similar information-processing definition of 
life. In fact, Dyson’s work on the future potential of life as information-processing was originally conducted 
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substitution of faith by logic. Patterns in such processing have their variation bounded by 
persistent feedback or iteration. Time becomes a rate of information processing and the 
„test‟ of the theory is based on whether our universe statistically satisfies the conditions for 
it to be possible on principle. The theory suggested specifically that „when life has 
completely engulfed the entire universe, it will incorporate more and more material into 
itself, and the distinction between living and non-living matter will lose its meaning‟.636 
According to his information-based definition life attains omniscience by gaining 
complete control over informational organization, being omnipresent in the material 
cosmos and hence omnipotent regarding what might, again on principle, be achievable 
with such organized information. There is a clear eschatological connection, in Tipler‟s 
thinking, between the created order as a whole and some ultimately shared participation in 
a means of knowing.  
In this thesis such participation is considered to be in accordance with the Life of the 
Economic Trinity, but I share the above interest in information patterning and processing, 
and furthermore in an operational epistemology that may generate meaning in a physically 
and theologically significant manner. If life is evaluated in terms of some patterned 
„arrangement‟ or information-processing capacity, then there is an automatic and direct 
relationship between the way that life is and the manner in which it may come to know 
through a particular organization of information. This maintains a proper, dynamic 
interrelation between ontological and epistemological aspects of consideration.   
Tipler‟s emphasis on logic and rationality, on bounded forms of information-processing 
and patterning, and on some ultimately shared, organized knowledge affording active, 
contributory influence and significance on a cosmic scale is, in a sense, not that far 
removed from the interest and conceptual focus here. What this thesis promotes, however, 
is a suitable theological framework with respect to which, given the material problems 
concerning Tipler‟s original vision, something of the underlying interest may nonetheless 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
on the assumption of an open universe, published some years before Tipler’s. His vision is likewise post-
human, postulating the indefinite continuation of life in informational terms on the basis of a scaling law. 
Life and consciousness are seen as being based more fundamentally on a particular structure than on a 
specific type of matter, and the critical scaling law depends on this assumption. Interestingly, Dyson’s 
analysis makes use of the distinction between some purely parameterized, psychologically inert ‘physical 
time’ and ‘subjective time’, the latter being measured according to ‘moments of consciousness’ which are 
subsequently applied functionally in order to define a rate of entropy production, indicating the 
consequent ‘complexity’ of the creaturely dynamic in question. For details, see F. Dyson, Time Without End: 
Physics and Biology in an Open Universe (Review of Modern Physics, Vol.51, No.3, 1979), pp.447-460.   
636 Tipler, The Physics of Immortality, p.154.   
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be maintained but in a reconfigured manner. The theological and topological 
representation of created space advocated here has the important advantage that it offers 
an intuitive means of considering some „end‟ as being already latently, intentionally and 
dynamically embedded „in a/the beginning‟, something to be „drawn out‟ or „unfolded‟. In 
terms of a „movement‟ towards the ultimate establishment of their mutual „relevance‟, 
Alpha and Omega can then be considered dynamically coincident throughout the critically 
irreducible, sacramentally pervasive topos inseparably associated with the „motioning‟ of 
the divine Economy in its engagement with the „Artwork‟ of Creation. In particular, the 
„radical coincidence‟ of Uncreated and created in the Incarnate Logos is accommodated 
and „elevated‟ therein. There is no need here to import a speculative, panpsychic model or 
viewpoint in order to achieve the required connectedness. Individuality is likewise 
accommodated, although communal significance is still considered „greater‟. 
I am suggesting here that fuller appeal to a Logos-focused theology not only circumvents 
the material complications in Tipler‟s original suggestion but secures an eschatological 
outlook within an acceptable panentheistic framework. Furthermore, the Logos may „draw 
all things to Himself‟ even in a cosmos whose physical expansion is accelerating. The 
language here explicitly has its roots in Trinitarian thought, and the consideration of a 
form-content dynamic is a logical accompaniment to the artistic analogies used by both 
Balthasar and Sayers. The Logos becoming flesh, as opposed to what is arguably vice 
versa in Tipler‟s framework, further allows for the transfiguring novelty of encounter and 
involvement that brings in the aforementioned eschatological „pointedness‟. 
Summary 
In the holistic, topological framework promoted here it is not some pinpointed, theo-
scientific „solution‟ that is being indicated, but rather a pervading resolution, involving the 
settling of that „trajectory‟ pertaining to the motioning of the divine Economy throughout 
created space. Such pervasion ultimately „draws out‟ the New Creation, establishing it 
according to a higher „genus‟ of relevance through the combined effect of the Incarnation, 
Resurrection and Ascension of the Logos. In this context no contingently relevant, truthful 
conception is lost if it genuinely contributes to some actual, enduring formation, especially 
that of our idiom of engagement within created space. A particular, scientifically 
significant aspect of such „developing stability‟ has been considered here in terms of an 
enlarging „capacity‟ and evolution of collective freedom through our pro-creative, re-
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creative and co-creative genres of activity. Given the sacramental significance given to 
such activity through the Incarnation our scientific development can be seen in at least 
covertly sacramental terms and is just as relevant to the overall framework as theological 
contemplation and formation. 
The cosmos clearly presents us with certain physically-conditioned horizons. From a 
philosophical perspective, Hemming emphasizes Tradition as, properly speaking, going 
ahead of us as well as coming before us, such that we can become the „horizon‟ of its 
actualization and „faith becomes the conditioning mode of making something real‟.637 He 
compares and contrasts this „mode‟ to the „mood‟ implicit in Heidegger‟s Dasein. Given 
the advocated form-content dynamic, applied theologically to the multi-dimensional, 
complexly interconnected Artwork of Creation, our physical participation and potentially 
enduring contribution to any associated „content‟ goes far beyond any mere resignation to 
inevitability, instead discovering a new „mood‟ of freedom through our capacity for 
appreciating a higher sense of „environing‟ and encountering a new „horizon‟ through 
cooperation with divinity.  
Our anthropological journey requires us collectively to bear a growing self-knowledge, 
acquired through an increase in our ability to „extricate‟ ourselves from that which is too 
familiar or „close‟ in order to further our understanding thereof (both scientifically and 
theologically). In particular we may develop beyond our less meaningful first impressions 
regarding any perception or conception of our topos. Theology should emphasize to 
science that our proper, iconic topos does constitute a genuine reality, embedded in the 
engaging, dynamic context pertaining to the divine Economy. It is not some illusory 
invention of the human mind, but something with which science can genuinely engage, 
and with potential eschatological relevance. Any authentic investigation of our „place‟ in 
created order must, in some way or another, be relevant to our means of conceiving the 
Activity of the Logos through whom that same order is ultimately established. Science, in 
turn, may examine more thoroughly the nature of the interconnectedness and contingency 
in the created order, better articulating the context of our anthropological challenge in the 
21
st
 Century and encouraging the theological community responsibly and open-mindedly 
to incorporate the consequences of such understanding. 
 
                                                             
637 L. P. Hemming, Nihilism and the Grounds of Redemption, in Milbank et al. Radical Orthodoxy, chapter 4. 
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Conclusion 
Summary of the argument 
While it necessarily starts from a holistic viewpoint, maintaining a proper balance between 
immanence and transcendence, theology must be developed within a framework allowing 
it most concisely to „say something about everything‟, especially with respect to the 
focused engagement of scientific pursuit regarding contingent truths – truths which are 
ultimately interrelated on the basis of shared origin. This thesis has effectively assumed 
that there is – indeed, must be – a deeper order of stability circumscribing and giving 
ultimate definition to the cosmos, or „created space‟ in general, than is directly discernible 
by scientific approach. Nonetheless, the relative, contingent and dynamic stability 
according to which our iconic intelligence creatively engages allows our scientific pursuit 
actively to participate in such a way as for it to be proper to consider such activity as at 
least covertly sacramental. In terms of participation, the „topology‟ of interconnectedness 
according to which we encounter „reality‟ and engage within created space is embedded 
within the deeper context of the „motioning‟ engagement of the divine Economy. 
A theological view of stability ought, given the transcendence-in-immanence framework, 
properly to be something which both undergirds and overarches created space and order. 
All aspects of bottom-up emergence (and contingent top-down emergence or feedback) are 
then ultimately derived from its undergirding basis, while being upwardly convergent in 
terms of an eschatological „pointedness‟ towards an overarching stability mirroring that 
undergirding basis. Such overarching stability is, however, additionally representative of 
the completion or perfection of the top-down bestowed „image‟ through its recapitulation 
in the Incarnation – an encounter transfiguring our relative, contingent mode of stability 
and encounter through the Resurrection and Ascension, establishing an enhanced topos. 
The „convergence‟ is then understood as being upon a higher „topology‟ of connectedness 
and encounter rather than as a geometric convergence on a point or locus. Such 
convergence is ultimately guaranteed by the fact that if certain contingent principles, 
manifest through various indicative and interrelated „created terms‟, collectively and 
truthfully correspond to a revelation of divine, creative engagement then such truthfulness 
remains consistent even, if not especially, through that encounter associated with the 
incarnate Mind of Christ. This convergent continuity is then represented by the node or 
260 
 
„neck‟ in the hourglass topology, opening the way into a New Creation and an 
eschatological stability.   
Scientifically, stability is a quantified (with respect to perturbative effects) and qualifying 
property of hierarchically layered and functionally modulated systems, dynamically self-
integrating and self-organizing in the case of biological systems so as to enable 
reproducible patterns of stability over time. Bottom-up development leads to emergent 
properties that may in turn produce top-down feedback, the results of which may 
beneficially be incorporated into the evolving dynamic of the system in question.  
Theologically, stability may be qualified according to a consideration of „motion‟ and 
qualifying in terms of the depth and significance of any participate activity. Such stability 
is here considered sacramental in its nature and manifestation. The motioning of the divine 
Economy throughout created space becomes centred on the irreducible and sacramentally 
pervasive topos of the Logos, through whom the same space and order is created in the 
first place. This constitutes the basis of the „theological topology‟ and the engagement of 
God‟s Creative Activity through the Logos becomes sense-objectified through the 
Incarnation, by which a discernible „trajectory‟ becomes settled. 
Inasmuch as the conscious human person may be considered as a microcosm, having the 
capacity mentally to represent the cosmos according to a particular mental impression, the 
dynamic, developing stability of our mindscape becomes a key aspect of focus. The 
reliability and stability of our conceptual capacity and our ability to develop articulate and 
constructive thought processes are dependent upon the particular „topology‟ of 
interconnectedness according to which we perceive „reality‟, resulting in a convergence on 
various universally relevant „categories‟ acting as mind-marks that collectively foster the 
development of our mindscape and our various accompanying forms of language. Given 
that such dynamic, conceptual stability is contingent upon an entire layered hierarchy of 
undergirding levels and domains of stability, the idea of considering the intricate and 
complexly connected topology of created space or order as being embedded within a 
broader theological topology – supporting a sacramental view of stability according to a 
participatory model with respect to the Uncreated – seems to provide a suitable framework 
within which theology can demonstrate universal relevance in an integrated manner, while 
allowing scientific pursuit actively to influence the direction of theological development.  
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Order parameters and topological properties both contribute to the establishing of various 
domain-bounded scales of convergence and stability. The ancient concept of logos as 
implying arrangement or order is something that can clearly be applied both theologically 
and scientifically, and therefore our capacity for conceiving something of the „place‟ and 
relevance of such seems a good focal point for such theo-scientific integration, especially 
given the convenient etymological association where the very word „topology‟ is 
concerned. The theological representation of the „architecture‟ of Creation in the Temple 
may be quite different from a mathematical representation of cosmic order and stability, 
involving as it does an entire, interrelating array of terms. However, in „becoming flesh‟ 
and recapitulating the iconic topos associated with a human nature (and representational 
mind) created in divine image, the Logos conception is simultaneously relevant to both of 
these representations, the New Temple now being a re-embodiment and renewal of 
Creation as dynamically established through the apex theoriae of divine-human encounter 
in Christ.  
In assuming human nature the Incarnation is furthermore implicitly relevant to the entire 
interconnected array of contingencies necessary for the emergence of our bio-physicality 
and the dynamic stability of our mindscape, now collectively and sacramentally shared in 
the Mind of Christ. The assumption of human nature therefore ultimately has the effect of 
drawing together all relevant, interrelating „created terms‟ – corresponding to the 
contingency of that nature, its idiomatic engagement and its manner of conceiving – into 
the critical encounter of the Incarnate Logos. The novelty of such encounter then effects a 
transfiguring of created order, as now being „seen‟ afresh on the „side‟ of divinity in a 
unique way.     
The „artistic movement‟ towards eschatological establishment is therefore considered to 
consist in a transfiguring, or reconfiguring, of that complex interconnectedness among all 
the physically contingent, created terms that collectively comprise a latent substrate for 
any revelation in the created domain. While this transfiguring is, ontologically, on divine 
initiative, our sacramental and creative activity can nonetheless contribute to the 
generation of content within the divine Artwork – „content‟ dynamically held together in 
accordance with the „formalizing‟, ordering role of the Logos – owing to our iconic 
capacity for conceiving something of the Logos and the inseparable, revealing engagement 
of the divine Economy. Our potential for such active involvement and contribution is 
likewise formally contained in necessary conjunction with those explicate structures and 
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forms that we may encounter, which are in turn held together in a harmonious, implicate 
and interrelating whole through the Logos.     
While our physical being or „dwelling‟ is contingent upon the pre-requisite, layered 
stability necessary for our bio-physical emergence, our capacity within the created domain 
for contributory up-building is also theologically contingent overall upon a deeper aspect 
of „dwelling‟ – upon a topos defining the sacramental participation of the finite, compactly 
embedded within the Infinite. In this context the Incarnation dynamically represents a 
topologically central „point‟ of theological focus: an irreducible, novelty-inducing 
„singularity‟ necessary for the context of establishing unity among divine and human 
natures. The net, eschatologically relevant effect of the „bi-idiomatic cooperation‟ between 
these natures is to bring the newly established Creation to „rest‟ in the Incarnate Logos. 
Our distinct, idiomatic capacity for the creative generation (and inter-generational passing 
on) of meaning attains cooperative relevance in conjunction with that idiomatic 
engagement pertaining to divinity, involving the integration of all relevant activity 
throughout the entirety of „our time‟. Such „relevant activity‟, part of a „developing 
stability‟, also becomes progressively explicated over time – a process incorporating our 
increasing capacity in more scientific terms.  
The iconic aspect of our nature affords us a certain mysterious „proximity‟ to divinity (cf. 
Acts 17:27) despite the „distance‟ between Creator and creature. Such proximity has been 
interpreted here according to broader topological conceptions of „nearness‟ and 
„neighbourhood‟. The „implicate order‟ inherent in this topological framework enfolds the 
potential for various forms of communicability, whether implicit or explicit, within created 
space, requiring this broader conception of proximity. Such subtle communicability 
sustains our participative, embodied mode of being, as it is „moved‟ towards a deeper, 
more significant mood of participation „according to the whole‟. Various aspects of this 
whole are revealed in the cosmos (physics), the biosphere (biology) and the ecclesia 
(theology). Each of these relatively and contingently determines some aspect of the 
associated embodiment but not so as to deny our creative, creaturely freedom. 
The path of discipleship involves a continuous process of prayerful learning, something 
necessitating an increasingly fuller and proper association between our way of being (in 
faith) and our way of coming to know (through our beliefs), enabled according to our 
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participation in the divine Economy.
638
 An important aspect of such learning is related to 
our capacity to „conceive‟ concerning the „place‟ and relevance of the Logos, through 
which the creative engagement of the divine Economy is discernible. Such conceivability 
is itself part of a dynamic „movement‟ here associated with the development of our 
collective, participating mindscape. Being assumed and newly encountered in the 
Incarnation, in and by which the Logos is conceived in a critically unique manner, this 
mindscape becomes sacramentally enhanced and eschatologically pointed. This critical 
phenomenon of human involvement occurring in the Mind of Christ is considered 
inseparable from a dynamic and cosmic „design‟ of reconciliation. 
Finally, the Incarnation has been argued (within the topological representation here) to be 
at root a theological „phase transition‟, arguably necessary for the fullest possible 
demonstration of divine omnipotence and omniscience. Considering the Incarnation within 
the terms of a phase-transition analogy provides a robust metaphor incorporating a proper 
consideration of continuity and discontinuity aspects regarding God‟s transfiguring 
engagement. The Incarnation is here considered to indicate a pervasive engagement with 
the whole Creation, renewed by being drawn back into and through the same Logos 
through whom it was derived in the „first place‟, in accordance with a primary topos or 
principal, uniting Principle. Appropriate, physically relevant aspects of continuity ought 
therefore properly to be incorporated in any eschatological consideration of the New 
Creation. This relates to the example of the hypothetical perfect game in the chess 
analogy, any even partial discernment of which must develop through active involvement 
with that interconnected set of „terms‟ pertaining to the Game of Chess as it came 
originally to be established. 
Additional observations 
The framework here highlights the principle of dynamic interconnectedness, and the 
theological importance surrounding the principle of distinguishing between crucial, 
interrelating aspects within some deeper unity. The consideration of stability with respect 
to the Creation in general and to the role played by the development of the human 
mindscape in particular has been expanded, respectively, according to the interrelating, 
dual-aspect bonds of form-content and refuge-prospect. The form-content dynamic was 
argued as being a natural philosophical accompaniment to regarding created order as an 
                                                             
638 R. Williams, Being Disciples: Essentials of the Christian Life (London: SPCK, 2016), pp.1-18. 
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Artwork. The refuge-prospect dynamic was argued to be a helpful means of considering 
more holistically the dynamic development of the compositional nature of our intellectual 
evolution. 
In each case, the two aspects are considered to be in a relationship of necessarily mutual 
influence (rather like the physical interaction between space-time and momentum-energy). 
In the mindscape context our sense of „prospect‟ correlates with a particular perception 
and evaluation of some „affordance‟ regarding our specific environmental context of 
encounter, which becomes conceptually translated into an articulation of some prospective 
„content‟ emerging from our engagement therewith. This progressively contributes to any 
developing conception of our „place‟ both in Creation and with respect to divinity. The 
divine idiom of engagement with Creation is argued as being open to our contributory, 
generative activity. At the same time our sense of mental „refuge‟, indicating our very 
capacity to develop our thought and language according to various conceptually stable 
categories of focus (à la Vigo), is contingent upon the „formal aspect‟ of the Artwork, or 
upon those parameters or „terms‟ seemingly written into or constituting created order in its 
dynamic stability. Even slightly influencing the nature of such parameters is something 
largely (if not entirely) closed to our initiative in ontological terms, and any transformation 
of such formality occurs on divine initiative. Furthermore, in necessary accordance with 
the formalizing Activity of the Logos, humanity has the iconic capacity actively to 
contemplate a higher „refuge‟, some sense of „overshadowing‟ or „environing‟, and such 
capacity necessarily involves a certain distinctive freedom.  
In terms of relative openness and closure where our initiative of engagement is concerned 
the layout below may be helpful for thinking about the interrelation of vocabulary used 
here.  
Form (or „formal aspect‟) Content                                                     
Refuge                  Prospect                                                 
Immediacy     Mediation                                                                                                                           
Mathematical ontology    Scientific epistemology 
In the left column are those aspects that are largely or entirely closed to human initiative – 
ontological givens. In the right column are those aspects that are on principle open to 
contributory human engagement. The final row above relates to Penrose‟s contribution 
noted in chapter 3. 
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As a final note, any pantheistic framework runs into the challenge of how appropriate 
distinctions are to be maintained between the natures and their associated idioms of 
engagement. A panentheistic framework seems better suited, both for the fact that it can be 
presented in different ways, as Gregersen shows, and for the fact that any all-in-all 
eschatology is intrinsically panentheistic. The framework suggested here arguably 
corresponds best to an expressivist flavour of panentheism, while remaining open to 
soteriological concern in the sense that the transfiguring process assures that the result of 
being „drawn‟ to the Logos is ultimately that of a fully stable, embedded relationship 
between created and Uncreated. It is important to discriminate here between a static and a 
dynamic stability. A rigid, fixated conceptual framework or outlook can be statically 
stable in an often unhelpful and unhealthy way, just as (psychologically) madness may 
result from becoming imprisoned in an inflexible and inaccurate logic peculiar to an 
individual or group.
639
 Such static stability is here considered non-contributory in the 
above sense, and eschatological relevance and stability likewise remains dynamic, albeit 
according to a distinct „mood‟ of dynamism reflecting the „higher topology‟ involved. The 
challenge is then how to distinguish our present „mood‟ of participation from that more 
properly pertaining to the eschaton. One possibility suggested here is to consider the 
transfiguring process as re-creating and deepening the context of creaturely participation, 
ultimately inducing a topological transition into a higher „genus‟ of theological relevance 
and elevating its associated physicality in so doing. 
Inasmuch as God is not confined by our imagination He can freely recreate, but it also 
needs to be appreciated that this freedom is a precise freedom, identifying with necessity. 
The deepest and most engaging act of recreation is precisely that which „sees‟ creation 
afresh from the necessarily unique, double-sided but united perspective of the Incarnation, 
in union with the actively engaging imagination of an assumed human nature thereby 
perfected and completed. Our communion „share‟ in the imagination sanctified in the 
Mind of Christ then becomes dynamically representative of a transfiguring or 
reconfiguring of our engagement within created space, ultimately accommodated in terms 
of some newly embedded „space‟ pertaining to our eschatological „place‟.  
If the Resurrection first focuses our attention on the transfiguring Light of Christ‟s divinity 
and – after some period of adjustment with respect to our blurry, unclear and at first 
                                                             
639 See G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (Massachusetts: Hendrickson, 2006), pp.9-24. 
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disoriented focus – then moves into the „transition‟ of the Ascension, where the Light 
illuminates that which we instead come to behold because of it,
640
 then a critical aspect of 
what we subsequently „see‟ remains consistently related to the way in which all relevant 
„things‟ are drawn together by the Incarnate Logos lifted up from „the earth‟. If there can 
properly be said to be any affect with respect to the „side‟ or „aspect‟ or „idiom‟ of divine 
engagement then one could perhaps think of the Ascension as the drawing up of a 
perfectly fashioned „lens‟, both by the Father and to the Father, establishing the relevance 
of that idiomatic engagement made on the „side‟ of humanity in its fullest possible 
magnification, and consequently a new „degree of glory‟.  
Overall, there is a connection well worth exploring between those topologically qualified, 
geometrically reinforced stabilization processes pertaining to the scientific domain of 
inquiry or interest, and the topologically defining manifestation of a critical, sacramentally 
stable basis for participation pertaining to the theological domain of consideration. Both 
involve a necessarily hierarchical consideration of the dynamic in question, according to 
their own context, language and methodology. Such hierarchy allows for the possibility of 
different levels or qualifications of „motional‟ complexity, freedom and participative 
involvement. This is, I think, a profitable framework for exploring a more holistic theo-
scientific integration, avoiding the danger of looking for any model concerning divine-
human interaction according to some physically reductionist paradigm, such as looking for 
inspiration exclusively in the uncertainty of the quantum regime. 
A unifying theme for scientific involvement 
Various areas considered here could be united through a Logos-focused, theological 
consideration of information, remaining scientifically relevant to contemporary 
engagement given especially the aforementioned priority of bioinformatics principles over 
any secondary, selective evolutionary filtering. Given the complementary importance of 
energetics and informatics regarding a scientific perspective on stability, one might 
consider the complementary concepts of „efficacy‟ (or sufficiency) and „efficiency‟ from 
the perspectives of energetics and informatics. Neurologically, for instance, these could be 
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regarded in terms of a cost-benefit consideration regarding the energetic sustainability of 
particular domains of informational organization over particular developmental periods.
641
 
The informational aspect is hard to describe fully, owing to the contextual dependence 
regarding how information comes to be evaluated at different levels of consideration (a 
photon, a gene, a nerve impulse, etc.). Yet information still constitutes an indispensably 
critical link in a broader chain or hierarchy. Starting with the concept of Logos, the 
Principal Principle necessary for any theologically proper giving/consideration of form, 
one may ask how this „formalizing factor‟ in and beyond created order might best be 
appreciated from a scientific perspective. In terms of „settling a trajectory‟ one could 
consider a „motioning‟ through developing, cosmic formation, a process progressively 
incorporating more deeply integrated informational components, encoding various 
functionally robust domains. Eventually we reach the point of a living, quasi-stable means 
of knowing and self-informing, accommodating the possibility for creative intelligence, 
linguistic ability and openness to cooperation with divine nature through the divine image. 
This enables a deepening participation in the self-knowledge of God and a more profound, 
Sophianic appreciation. 
Such Sophianic appreciation then sees the completion of a stable, theological cycle, 
returning to the original centrality of the Logos by virtue of the conceptual inseparability 
between the Logos and Sophia. The latter is considered here as the Principal Witness to 
the ordering of Creation, representative of a sharing in the „perspective‟ of the Logos on 
the „side‟ of divinity that mirrors our share in the Mind of Christ on the „side‟ of humanity. 
This cyclic consideration, the Logos conceiving Creation while in turn being open to being 
conceived in a particular manner by a particular aspect of that Creation, and sharing in that 
process through the Incarnation, might then be related to Isaiah 55:11 – „so is/shall be my 
Word that goes forth from my mouth, it shall not return to me fruitless/empty, but it shall 
accomplish that which I purpose, and succeed in the thing for which I sent it‟. 
Scientifically, it might be possible partially to integrate energetics and informatics 
approaches through consideration of configuration space, acknowledging the effect of 
additional, conformational properties as particular geometries of interaction become 
established on particular scales. This might enable us better to understand the biological 
                                                             
641 A good analysis of efficiency at the neurobiological level is given, with respect to synaptic organization, 
in G. M. Shepherd, The Synaptic Organization of the Brain (Oxford: OUP, 2014).    
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significance of topological properties of (self-)organization and how various transitional 
developments and emergent properties come about.  
If scientific language involving configurational, conformational, phase-transitional and 
topological properties could be incorporated into a set of demonstrably interconnected 
principles concerning biophysics or bioinformatics then the potential for a theological 
application of critical concepts such as Logos and transfiguration could conceivably be far 
richer in its physical relevance. While Russell applies his Creative Mutual Interaction 
schema chiefly to a consideration of space-time metaphysics it would be interesting to 
apply it instead to some consideration of bio-theology, since the integrative potential of 
bioinformatics seems to offer a rich, contemporary channel for a possible scientific 
development of theological ideas. Furthermore, there is the liturgical consideration of what 
it means to be an embodied, information-organizing „worshipper‟. Overall, I consider that 
a modern engagement with theology along these lines should have significant potential for 
making a lasting, valuable contribution to 21
st
 Century theology-science conversation. 
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